

## Critical discourse analysis of hate speech from a linguistic perspective

### *Naida runas kritiskā diskursa analīze lingvistiskā skatījumā*

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The present study is concerned with the analysis of hate speech – an offensive discourse, which is harmful to democracy and to the members of targeted groups and/or individuals, whose inherent characteristics or public image is threatened.

It seems reasonable to assume that the democratic and peace-loving world has been astounded by the offensive language often used by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a NATO leader and a representative of a European Union (EU) member state. Therefore, a speech by Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orbán (2022) delivered at the Bálványos Free Summer University and Student Camp on 23 July 2022, with an approximate research corpus of 9 000 words, has been selected as an object of the linguistic study. This speech has been referred to as a “racist tirade” (Coakley 2022), and European Parliament political group leaders have condemned his “openly racist declarations”, breaching the EU values (EU Parliament Press Room 2022), to mention but a few reactions to the speech. This is even more alarming at present in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, when Prime Minister V. Orbán’s pro-Russian stance subverts the EU’s fundamental values and hinders the EU decision-making process.

The study employed InfraNodus and Wmatrix methodology for the thematic analysis, the analysis of keyness at the word, part of speech and semantic domain level focusing on the three aspects of discursive proximization that provide for the discussion on the ideological schism in the discourse space. The results of a micro-linguistic level study of the speech indicate that from the perspective of its form, the hate speech under analysis demonstrates Prime Minister V. Orbán’s rather uncompromising stance towards the events being referred to, as well as his attitude towards the prospective action, which might be taken by the target audience. As a result, the qualitative research findings demonstrate that the hate speech under analysis exhibits the features of offensive discourse, created by means of context-dependent linguistic realizations.

**Keywords:** hate speech; critical discourse analysis; discursive proximization.

## Introduction

Public speeches, which are “delivered by an individual to a public audience gathered in a shared physical environment to listen collectively” (Crick 2017, 10) might appear to be influential instruments, which are used for disseminating the messages related to the target audience.

In the context of the above, this study examines hate speech as a type of offensive discourse. It is generally known that hate speeches are usually delivered in political contexts and are harmful to democracy and to the members of the targeted communities or individuals. Besides, a hate speech threatens public image or face, because it “expresses, encourages, stirs up, or incites *hatred* against a group of individuals distinguished by a particular feature or set of features such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation” (Parekh 2012, 40).

Considering the aforementioned, this study poses several research questions:

- 1) What characterises the rhetorical public speech genre?
- 2) What features characterise the hate speech genre?
- 3) Which topics and context-dependent linguistic realizations in Orbán’s speech might qualify it as a hate speech and create negative emotions, or tension in society?

The present paper consists of three parts; part 1 and part 2 construct the theoretical background of the study. Part 1 offers brief insights into rhetorical public speech genres and illustrates the differences between a major and minor speech genre; part 2 addresses theoretical contributions on hate speech. Part 3 outlines the adopted methodology and analyses the research data employing a three-stage corpus-assisted qualitative critical discourse analysis.

It should be admitted that most of the past and current research as regards the study of hate speech has been conducted in the areas of politics, legislation, and sociology (e.g., Azman et al. 2022; Brown 2017). The novelty of this study might be referred to examining hate speech as a specific communicative situation-related discourse.

### 1. General characteristics: rhetorical public speech genres

From today’s perspective, “rhetorical public speeches act to address public concerns by employing deliberate persuasive strategies” (Crick 2017, 271). In general, public speeches are made in specific communicative contexts when, for example, certain problematic situations arise, and then rhetoric functions as “the available means of [...] persuasion” (Herric 2021, 83). Therefore, rhetorical public speeches involve a speaker’s awareness and audience’s beliefs regarding its cultural, ethical, moral, political, and social values.

Thus, it can be assumed that each rhetorical speech genre “represents a coherent and recognized arrangement of elements in a composition or discourse that is appropriate to certain occasions and [...] that guides a speech’s content, style and delivery” (Herric 2021, 27). Besides, any rhetorical speech should be made so that it addresses

the target audience; consequently, rhetorical public speeches are usually not delivered to randomized groups of population, instead, the target audience has gathered for a justifiable reason and expects to satisfy certain and/or immediate information needs.

Rhetorical public speeches fall into several genre types, such as *minor* speech genres and *major* speech genres (Crick 2017).

As concerns *minor speech genres*, speeches of encouragement, speeches of deliberation, speeches of solicitation, and speeches of administration can be referred to this subgroup (ibid.). *Speeches of encouragement* are delivered to create a sense of solidarity; *speeches of deliberation* offer opposing viewpoints of diverse audience groups on different approaches taken to address a common issue (e.g., a speech held by a judge); *speeches of solicitation* are delivered for the purpose of persuading an audience to adapt certain policies; *speeches of administration* are addressed by officials to a group of listeners; for example, they specify the steps to be taken for implementing the decisions made by administrative bodies.

*Major speech genres* include introduction speeches, enrichment speeches, and advocacy speeches (ibid.). While *introduction speeches* usually fulfil linguistic functions identical to those of a conversation or interview, *enrichment speeches* satisfy the target audience's need of having additional information about processes or events, where "the term enrichment bridges the gap between information and entertainment" (ibid., 31). *Commemoration speeches* deal with shared values focusing on ritualistic elements, e.g., national festivals, and annual commemorative events, or else address specific events, e.g., graduation, awards, or weddings. The fourth type of major speech genres, *advocacy speeches* "place[s] certain beliefs and attitudes at the top of the hierarchy of needs by showing how they are necessary to achieve ideal ends" (ibid., 259). This speech type targets those who are dissatisfied with the existing situation; for example, it addresses those who demand new changes or radical transformations being brought into society.

Advocacy speeches are held "when the situation is intolerable" or "when a smaller public wishes to make their position heard by a larger public through a power of spectacle" (ibid., 34); apparently, *hate speeches* can be referred to this genre, because they are prepared to achieve far-reaching results and are usually communicated in different ways, for example, by means of social media, to ensure a greater outreach.

## 2. Hate speech as a type of major speech genre

Research interest in an individual's or group's language performance and behaviour in specific social contexts is not a recent one. For example, a sociologist Goffman (1959, 107–112) conducted a comprehensive study to explain human behaviour in social situations. Through the study of theatrical performance, he has attempted to explain the underlying processes of face-to-face and group interaction.

The term *hate speech*, as a neologism from the perspective of linguistics, was coined in the late 1980s in the USA "to highlight the way in which the legal system in the USA failed" (Brown 2017, 424). Today, hate speeches can be heard or read in

multiple ways: on TV, on the radio, on social networking websites, and on Internet channels.

In fact, the distinction among *hate speeches*, *offensive language* and *anger in speech*, *angriness* seems to be blurred or even controversial. Due to unlimited use of social media, boom in unmeasured Internet access, the nature of interaction in social contexts has changed dramatically.

The current research highlights that hate speeches, offensive language or insults and angry speeches are often used as interactional tools in social media. The term *hate speech* bears a complex nature, and it represents different forms of interactional group-related hostile linguistic performances (Davidson et al. 2017, 512–515). The scholars state that hate speech “is a language of expression that describes the use of words that are hatred or blame, offensive or insulting to the subject” (ibid., 513). Besides, hate speech can cause inner emotional tension between interlocutors and, thus, might create increasing class, cultural, ethnic, social, and religious conflicts in everyday communicative acts.

Mondal, et al. (2017, 85–94) assert that hate speech represents a type of language that is associated with hatred and anger: it displays conflicting, sometimes destructive emotions and often involves vulgar and abusive language as an instrument for expressing subjective attitude. The scholars refer to eight types of hate speech concerning: a) race, b) behaviour, c) body, d) class, e) gender, f) ethnicity, g) disability, h) religion.

Brown’s contribution is dedicated to explaining the term *hate speech* from two perspectives: as a legal concept and as an ordinary concept (Brown 2017, 423). It is stated that “hate speech is used to identify messages that violate the existing legal norms [...], it spreads, incites and promotes hatred, violence and discrimination against individuals or groups of people” (ibid.).

From the above discussion, it can be assumed that scholars who represent different areas of study, such as philosophy, sociology, and politics, in general, agree that *hate speech* as a term can be referred to malicious type of language that is related to hostilities, which can be communicated both verbally and non-verbally and which create negative emotions, feedback or tension in society.

As regards *offensive language* or insults, several scholars (e.g., Yuan et al. 2018, Shushkevich et al. 2020) claim that offensive language must be separated from hate speech, as each of them represents two distinct language categories. Being considered rude, insulting, unacceptable, and abusive, offensive language contains offensive terms, but it is not targeting any group of individuals in particular (Davidson et al. 2017). The scholars note that even if a precise differentiation between these two categories is blurred, the use of them is distinct: hate speech is used to express hatred towards a targeted group or individuals based on race, religion and alike, but offensive language does not address any particular social group. To exemplify, racist or chauvinistic speech may be referred to a type of hate speech, but sexist language can be classified as offensive language.

*Anger in speech* is a display of emotions expressed in an articulatory way. It reveals subjective, usually negative reactions, which can be caused by physiological

arousal, hostile thoughts, or maladaptive behaviours. In communicative contexts, anger might develop as a response to the situations where an interlocutor experiences a disrespectful attitude or a face-threatening act from a communication partner. Anger in speech is often voiced through loud verbalizations, which can lead to unfavourable consequences in experienced different communicative contexts, for example, in the workplace or in the family. Directly contrary to its negative effects, anger in speech can give rise to positive consequences, as well: it can stir the others' attention and make interlocutors alert, so that they pay due attention to the one who displays negative emotions. Emotions can be expressed in an array of ways, not only linguistically, but also non-linguistically – by means of facial expressions, body language, and the tone of voice, but only speech serves as a reliable tool to display emotions. Valentino et al. acknowledge that anger in speech can be often observed in political discourses, where anger characterizes the nation's mood and emotional climate, which are rooted in subjective impressions and displayed in political campaigns (Valentino et al. 2011, 156–170).

Thus, within the framework of this paper, the above analysis has revealed the linguistic and psychological differences pertaining to hate speech, offensive language, and anger in speech.

### 3. Topics and context-dependent linguistic realizations in Orbán's speech

Bálványos Free Summer University and Student Camp, also known as Tuszányos Festival in Transylvania, has become a regular event since the fall of the communist regime in Romania in 1990. The event was initially conceptualized as a platform for anti-communism and interethnic collaboration, allowing Romanian politicians to communicate with the Hungarian minority.

However, when Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Orbán returned to power in 2010, the concept of Free Summer University changed, and Mr Orbán has frequently used the Festival to promote various separatist ideas. For instance, in 2014, marking the agenda of his third term as PM, Mr Orbán announced there the construction of a non-liberal democracy in Hungary, which largely defined Budapest's movement to split with the West. In 2018, the PM declared that Ukraine would not be a member of either the EU or NATO; however, in 2022, with Russia unleashing the war in Ukraine, Hungary changed its stance and became less unbending in its rejections of Ukraine's EU candidacy or blocking political meetings between NATO and Ukraine regarding NATO accession.

The speech under analysis delivered on 23 July 2022 at Tuszányos Festival, during the fifth premiership, targeted “mixing” of European and non-European races, illuminated the death of the Western world and strongly condemned Western military assistance to Ukraine. It has been referred to as a “racist tirade” (Coakley 2022), and European Parliament political group leaders have condemned Orbán's “openly racist declarations”, breaching the EU values (EU Parliament Press Room 2022) to mention just some reactions to the speech.

The apparent tendency of PM V. Orbán's agenda to subvert EU's fundamental values is showcased in Perle Petit's research on "What should the EU do about Hungary's illiberal turn?" conducted for the European Policy Centre, where the analyst explicitly states that "Since 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government has followed a clear and deliberate trajectory away from democratic principles, turning Hungary into the first illiberal country in the EU" (Petit 2022, 3).

### 3.1. Methodological assumptions

Considering the context and eight types of hate speech proposed by Mondal et al. (2017) and discussed in the theoretical section of the paper, the empirical analysis adopts a blended reading strategy (Stulpe and Lemke, 2016), which comprises automated evaluations obtained via computer-based analysis as assisted by InfraNodus software for topical clusters analysis (see more in Paranyushkin 2019) and Wmatrix tools for corpus annotation and retrieval (CLAWS (part-of-speech tagger – 97 % accuracy), SEMTAG (word-sense tagger – 92 % accuracy), LEMMINGS (a lemmatiser), frequency lists, KWIC concordances) developed by Paul Rayson (see more in Rayson 2008, 2009), as well as qualitative evaluations of the obtained data based on the hermeneutic understanding of the discursive context.

For the purposes of the study, the comparison is performed between the selected Mr Orbán's speech, i.e., the focal text and BNC (British National Corpus) Sampler CG (Spoken) Institutional with 151,445 words from BNC Sampler Context Governed Institutional corpus, which contains political speeches; sermons; local and national governmental proceedings and other resources, i.e., the reference corpus (see more on Samper corpus in explanatory documentation on UCREL).

Wmatrix methodology ensured the analysis of keyness at the word, part of speech (POS) and semantic domain level (see more on keyness with Wmatrix in Rayson 2008, 2009). The focal text of 9,597 tokens was converted to plain text (HTML format) and processed with Wmatrix tools. Although most attention was paid to open-class words, the closed-class words were not ignored either, or their concordances were consulted where relevant.

Since the Proximization Theory (PT) is chosen as the methodological tool to characterise the fracture in the given discourse space (DS), a brief note on the key concepts of the theory is a must. Cap (2020, 54) defines the concept of proximization as "a forced construal operation meant to evoke closeness of the external threat, to solicit legitimization of preventive measures. The threat comes from DS-peripheral entities, referred to as ODCs (outside-deictic-centre), which are conceptualized to be crossing the Space to invade the IDC (inside-deictic-centre) entities, the speaker, and her addressee."

To adapt the PT for the purposes of hate speech analysis, Hungary is referred to as the IDC, while other actors are located as the ODCs.

Cap's framework for the analysis of proximization considers three aspects: spatial proximization, temporal proximization, and axiological proximization. The scholar argues that "spatial and temporal proximization involves fear appeals" (ibid.), while

axiological proximization “involves construal of a gathering ideological clash between the ‘home values’ of the DS central entities (IDCs) and the alien and antagonistic (ODC) values” (ibid.).

Although Cap’s framework provides for a comprehensive quantitative analysis of changes in the intensity of proximization, the present research does not aim at quantifying the lexico-semantic and grammatical items of the analysed DS; it rather aims at offering an insight into its key features and uses corpus tools to gather general clues as to the linguistic realisations of the schism in the given DS; thus, the statistical data acquired with Wmatrix tools were not recalculated on the manual revision of the findings even where the software mistagged the items. The data cloud presentation was chosen over tabulated data where possible for the same reasons.

## 3.2. Discussion on findings

The analysis comprises three iterative stages. First, the thematic threads or main topical clusters with high-level ideas are identified to align them with the key targets of hate speech. Then, the keyness analysis at the word, POS and semantic domains level is conducted, where the quantitative data is considered in terms of initially established main topical clusters and discourse context. Finally, considering the apparent fracture in the EU and Hungary’s programmatic values, the thematised analysis of US vs THEM schism is performed by focusing on the discursive strategy of proximization as guided by the Proximization Theory (PT) proposed by Piotr Cap (2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2020), which allows for identifying the gap opening in the discourse space (DS), where the EU and Hungary are drifting apart, as Hungary believes the EU encroaches on its system of values.

### 3.2.1. Stage 1. Topical clusters

InfraNodus is a software for text mining, network analysis, data visualization, NLP, and others (see more on InfraNodus methodology in Paranyushkin 2019). The software was used as a starting point when determining thematic threads. The automated coding produced four key topical clusters and high-level ideas.

The references to *world*, *Europe* and *west* build patterns in the topical cluster of *Western Europe* (19 %); the cluster of *Gender Politics* (17 %) is cross-referenced through the notions of *war*, *Hungarian*, and *stay*; the cluster of *Energy Supply* (15 %) shows links between the references to *energy*, *Russian* and *price*, while the cluster of *European Economy* (13 %) shows the factors of time (*European*) and location (*time*, *year*).

The automatically coded topical clusters resonate with the major systemic threats or challenges for Hungary as introduced by Mr Orbán. These systemic threats are categorizable into the following thematic threads, which agree with 4 of 8 targets of hate speech as determined by Mondal, et al. (2017), viz., *race*, *behaviour*, *gender*, *ethnicity*:

- 1) demographics-related threat, i.e., the excess of mortality over births,
- 2) migration-related threat, i.e., the likelihood of migrants moving to Hungary,



- 3) gender-related threat, which encapsulates demographic- and Western-related threats, thus, creating an iterative textual loop,
- 4) war-related threats for Hungary,
- 5) economy and energy, i.e., economic threats for Hungary.

Mr Orbán builds the discussion on the said threats to open a critical US /THEM schism in the given DS as exemplified during Stage 3.

### 3.2.2. Stage 2. Keyness analysis

The keyness analysis at the word level quite expectedly demonstrates the high frequency of the nouns *Hungary* and *Hungarians*. *West*, *Western*, *Europe*, *Europeans*, *European Union*, *NATO*, *Russia*, *Russians*, *Ukraine*, *Ukrainians* are the keywords that chart spatial proximization. The obtained data allows setting major actors on the inner and outer brim of the DS (see more in Stage 3 on key semantic domains).

The thematic analysis identified *war* as one of the high-level ideas; likewise, Mr Orbán addressed the military challenge as the fourth most important threat to the well-being of Hungary and its people, and devoted the most space to the discussion of the same; thus, not surprisingly, the word keyness analysis spotlighted *war* as one of most significant items. Keyness value expressed in a log likelihood ratio (LL value 230.744) suggests that the token *war* appears significantly more frequently in the focal corpus as compared to the reference corpus.

The concordance lines associated with *war* returned 48 occurrences, where it is referred to by such noun phrases as

- (1) *Russo-Ukrainian war; Ukrainian war; war against Russia; this war; the war; European war; not our war; etc.*

or else *the war* becomes the actor or the mediator itself and activates material processes as in

- (2) *war has intervened; this war is making relations with our friends difficult; this war would never have broken out if; this war will be the one that demonstrably puts an end to that form of Western ascendancy; the war has disrupted this system; etc.*

The frequent use of *stay out of* is associated with the non-participatory status Hungary assigns to itself:

- (3) *we want to stay out of this war; we stay out of the war; we stay out of migration; we stay out of gender lunacy; if we stay out of the global tax; we stay out of the general recession in Europe; etc.*

The usage of *energy* aligns well with one of the high-level ideas:

- (4) *energy prices; energy deficit; the West have lost control over energy carriers; China eliminated its energy dependence; wartime energy prices; energy cost; we do not want to stop getting energy from Russia; reduction in energy charges, etc.*

The usage of *will* as a marker of the future that awaits Hungary will be discussed in Stage 3.



The keyness analysis at POS level showcases the following items of high frequency in the focal text as compared with the reference corpus.

NP1 – singular proper noun (e.g., *Hungary, Europe, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, US, EU*)

ND1 – singular noun of direction (e.g., *west, south, east, north*)

II – general preposition

PPIS2 – 1st person plural subjective personal pronoun (*we*)

JJ – general adjective

PPIO2 – 1st person plural objective personal pronoun (*us*)

RR – general adverb

VBZ – *is*

VBI – *be*, infinitive

CCB – adversative coordinating conjunction (*but*)

CS – subordinating conjunction (e.g., *as if, even if, even though, so that, because, while, since*)

The data indicates that adversative (CCB) and subordinating conjunctions (CS) significantly outweigh coordinating conjunctions, which undeniably showcases rhetorical patterns, which imply causality and counterexpectation with the conjunction *but* alone having 82 occurrences.

This key POS data indicates that the focal text is marked using first-person pronouns (POS tags PPIS2 and PPIO2), which resonates with Nini's (2017) findings that hate speech would feature a higher frequency of first and second-person pronouns. Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion plot for PPIS2 in the focal text as determined by AntConc (Anthony 2021).



Figure 1. PPIS2 dispersion in the focal text

The plural personal pronoun “we” is well distributed across the focal corpus. The dispersion of “we” suggests telling findings as regards the relationships between PPIS, semantic verb type (according to Halliday's (1994) six process-types model), and tense. The verbal clauses expressing emotion and desire, as well as the communicative act, thus constituting mental and verbal process types, which prevail, where sentences contain PPIS1 and PPIS2, as in

- (5) *we understand* (mental); *we see* (mental); *we want to understand* (mental); *we control* (material); *we do not want* (mental); *we ask* (verbal); *we are asking* (verbal); *we are fighting* (material); *we protect* (material); *we will decide* (mental); *we listen* (behavioural); *etc.*

- (6) *I have to say* (verbal); *I suspect* (mental); *I think* (mental); *I should speak* (verbal); *I have a lot to say* (verbal); *I say* (verbal); *I am about to say* (verbal); *I ask* (verbal); *I need to say* (verbal); *I could say* (verbal); *I have talked about* (verbal); etc.

The attribution of mental and verbal process types to PPIS and respectively to IDC signals that the speaker adopts the position of authority for himself (I – pronoun) and his people (we – pronoun) and objectivises the actors in ODC.

Mr Orbán poses 13 immediately addressed rhetorical questions, thus further strengthening his positioning as an authority since the use of rhetorical questions indicates epistemic stancetaking. (Heritage 2012)

The manual revision of the keyness at semantic domain level as assigned by Wmatrix USAS tagger (Rayson 2008), flagged the domain named by the tagger as *Interested / excited / energetic* as out of 41 listed occurrences, 35 occurrences of the token *energy* had to be reattributed to the domain of *energy supply* as initially identified in the thematic clusters; thus, the domain *Interested / excited / energetic* should be reassembled and renamed.

The most significant difference (LL value 751.95) in the semantic comparison is for the tag Z2 representing the semantic field of *geographical names*, W1 (LL value 164.97), which in the given case is the *world* at large, M6 *location and direction* (LL value 110.89), *energy supply* (LL value 58.55) and G3 *warfare* (LL value 56.52).

The semantic domain of GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES lists 291 entries, where Hungar(y(ian(s))) – 67 + Carpathian Basin – 3 + Visegrád Four/ V4 – 4, Europe(an)s – 58 + Brussels – 3 + European Union/EU – 12, Russia(n)s – 38 + Moscow – 3, Ukrain(e(ian(s))) – 25, West(ern) – 50, America(n(s)) – 17 + United States – 5, Chin(a(ese)) – 12, and others, which makes IDC being mentioned almost equally with the EU, thus creating a visible opposition.

Another notable finding is related to the semantic domain of EMOTIONAL ACTIONS, STATES & PROCESSES, where the lexis related to *violence / anger* is largely associated with the Russia-Ukrainian war, which places *anger* on the outer brim of the DS.

- (7) *Russia will never attack NATO; Russia attacked Ukraine; Russians are seeking to achieve by force of arms; ensuring that it is not attacked from Ukrainian territory; that could hit Russian territory; There will be no peace; Ukraine cannot win a war against Russia; The Ukrainians will never win a war against Russia, etc.*

The semantic domain of TROUBLE is used when speaking about the West and the world, as in

- (8) *political trouble; economic trouble; tension; being torn apart; in a state of disorder, etc.*

thus, again amplifying the state of tension and disorder in ODCs.

The manual revision of process types related to *anger and violence* indicated that as the agent / senser of *violence / anger*, so the recipient / phenomenon are largely set on the outer brim of DS. It suggests that there is no typical fixation with the ODCs,

which would be characteristic of hate speech, but there is explicit juxtaposition of the positive evaluation of IDC and problematic evaluation of ODC.

Likewise, the semantic domains of FAILURE and ABILITY set the opposition of IDC and ODCs.

- (9) FAILURE (ODCs) *Western civilization is losing its power; the West have lost control over energy carriers; the West is losing the battle for materials; have already lost four governments; will be waiting in vain; the EU is incapable of solving this problem; the West's inability to defend itself, etc.*
- (10) ABILITY (IDC) *we have been able to speak with one voice; we would be able to deal with the economic consequences; we will be able to influence the events; we will be able to influence the events, etc.*

The semantic domain of STRONG OBLIGATION OR NECESSITY lists 77 occurrences of mostly strong and medium modals, e.g., *must, should, need to, have to*, while the VOLITION / PREDICTION domain has 152 occurrences (will – 103, would – 22, shall – 1, be going to – 1, want to – 24) that on manual revision proved to be the markers of authoritative stance, which express certainty regarding the future and deductive reasoning.

### 3.2.3. Stage 3. Proximization strategy: fear appeals and ideological clash

To avoid the unnecessary redundancy and circularity of the discussion on fear appeals and ideological clash, the first step of the proximization analysis, where key lexico-grammatical items of the spatial, temporal, and axiological proximization are identified, is omitted to focus on fear appeals activated at spatial and temporal levels, as well as an ideological clash at axiological level.

The fear appeals in the focal text are closely related to ideological schism, because the speaker, by and large, communicates the fear of the consequences of putting the EU values in practice. The ideological clash is represented by anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian narratives, as well as the schism that pulls Hungary and the EU apart through Orbán's mistreatment of fundamental values defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, i.e., human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights with his references to migration, race, and gender.

As established during Stage 1, Viktor Orbán's speech is built around five distinct fears / threats.

- demographics-related threat, i.e., the excess of mortality over births
- (11) *Whether we like it or not, the peoples of the world can be divided into two groups: those that are capable of biologically maintaining their numbers; and those that are not [...].*
- migration-related threat, i.e., the likelihood of migrants moving to Hungary
- (12) *There is a world in which European peoples are mixed together with those arriving from outside Europe [...], in the Carpathian Basin we are not mixed-race [...]. Brussels, reinforced with Soros-affiliated troops, simply wants to force migrants on us.*

The politician intensifies the ideological threat coming from the West, by extending it to the future generations of Hungarians:

(13) *This might not yet be a very important task for us, but it will be for our children, who will need to defend themselves not only from the South, but also from the West. The time will come when we must somehow accept Christians coming to us from there and integrate them into our lives.*

- gender-related threat, which encapsulates demographic- and Western-related threats, thus creating an iterative textual loop; the fear stems from the EU stance regarding LGBTIQ people in the EU countries, which appears to be unacceptable to Mr Orbán who immediately refers to the Child Protection Act and claims that

(14) *we are just asking them to accept that in our country a father is a man, and a mother is a woman, and that they leave our children alone. And we ask them to see to it that George Soros's army also accepts this. It is important for people in the West to understand that in Hungary and in this part of the world this is not an ideological question, but quite simply the most important question in life. [...] This is the great historic battle that we are fighting: demography, migration, and gender.*

- war-related threats and even more so axiological clash are frequently foregrounded through fallacious argumentation schemes including “manipulation of a viewpoint; manipulation of the common ground; and manipulation of word use” (Macagno 2022), and result in anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian narratives, for instance by claiming that Russia will never attack NATO, so it is “not our war”; or that the EU and NATO support Ukraine with weapons, and thus are participants in the war, while Hungary is not, which puts it in a difficult position.

(15) *The Russians have made a very clear security demand and have even written it down in a way that is rare in diplomacy, sending it to the Americans and NATO. They have written their demand that Ukraine should never be a member of NATO, that Ukraine declares this, that NATO itself assures Russia of this, and that we undertake to never place weapons on the territory of Ukraine that could hit Russian territory.*

Orbán blames the United States and NATO for the outbreak of the war.

(16) *The West has rejected this offer and has refused to negotiate on it. And the consequence of this refusal is that today the Russians are seeking to achieve by force of arms the security demands that they had previously sought to achieve through negotiation.*

The decision of the West to support Ukraine with weapons is a losing strategy, because:

(17) *The Ukrainians will never win a war against Russia with American training and weapons. [...] Supplying Ukraine with weapons only forces Russia to attack, as they [Russia] are a military nation that thinks only in terms of security and is only interested in ensuring that it is not attacked from Ukrainian territory.*

Orbán claims that the EU cannot negotiate with Russia, but it should abandon sanctions against it, and

- (18) *[...] stand between Russia and Ukraine. This should be the essence of a new strategy.*

However, America is named as a possible saviour of the situation, but only if Biden is defeated in the forthcoming elections.

The disrupted Polish-Hungarian collaboration through the Visegrád Group is highlighted as one of the negative consequences for Hungary.

- economy and energy, i.e., economic threats for Hungary are like the EU situation in general; however, the speaker believes that Hungary might become an exception:

- (19) *The West is losing the battle for materials [natural resources and raw materials].*

- (20) *The European Union is doing badly because its energy deficit.*

- (21) *[...] we must withdraw from natural gas. Electricity represents a much smaller burden for Hungary, because we have a nuclear power station and solar energy.*

- (22) *Hungary will only succeed in maintaining its success if we stay out of the war, if we stay out of migration, if we stay out of gender lunacy, if we stay out of the global tax – [...] – and if we stay out of the general recession in Europe.*

The above-illustrated five threats are conveyed through the pragmatic layers of recursive intentions to declare, assert, and commit to radical right-wing populist Fidesz narratives, as well as to judge antagonistic outside-deictic-centre values alien to Fidesz regime and political agenda, thus alienating Hungary from the EU values.

## Conclusion

Nowadays, the rhetorical public speech genre is characterised by the emphasis on persuasion and deals with various social issues and cultural, ethical, moral, political, and social values.

Hate speech belongs to an advocacy speech, a major speech type, which communicates about topical, controversial social issues affecting the lives of society and argues in support of a particular opinion. theoretical considerations allowed establishing the working definition of hate speech as a malicious type of language that is related to hostilities which can be communicated both verbally, as well as non-verbally, and which create negative emotions, feedback, or tension in society.

The analysis of Mr Orbán's controversial speech delivered at Tusványos Festival in 2022 exhibits features of offensive discourse and qualifies as hate speech, which has been proved by means of context-dependent linguistic realizations. The analysis showcased that its key targets coincide with frequent targets of hate speech, i.e., the attack on *race, behaviour, gender, ethnicity*. The usage of several markers of authoritative stancetaking, e.g., first-person pronouns, modals, rhetorical questions, process type attribution,

as well as noun and verb phrases construed as markers of outside-deictic-centres and inside-deictic-centre indicate the ideological schism in the given discourse space.

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán charted Europe into the West and the post-West, claiming that Western Europe is “post-West”, which is heading for disaster and decline, and therefore the speaker attempted to distance himself and his country from this agency, where countries are no longer nations; while Central Europe or “of the West”, where Hungary with its “pure race” belongs, was introduced as the new spiritual West. The speaker strongly opposed the right of LGBT people in Hungary, naming them a factor in the demographic problem and occasionally resorted to the battle motif, which became a call for heroic missions to protect traditional values such as children / family / marriage, to struggle for national sovereignty or rather to oppose supranationalism, where the anti-immigration and anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives surfaced, creating tensions in the community cherishing the EU values.

### Abbreviations

CCB	adversative coordinating conjunction ( <i>but</i> )
CS	subordinating conjunction
DS	discourse space
G3	semantic domain Warfare
IDC	inside-deictic-centre
II	general preposition
JJ	general adjective
LL	log likelihood
M6	semantic domain Location and direction
ND1	singular noun of direction
NP1	singular proper noun
ODC	outside-deictic-centre
POS	part of speech
PPIO2	1st person plural objective personal pronoun ( <i>us</i> )
PPIS2	1st person plural subjective personal pronoun ( <i>we</i> )
PT	Proximization Theory
RR	general adverb
VBI	<i>be</i> , infinitive
VBZ	<i>is</i>
W1	semantic domain World
Z2	semantic domain Geographical names

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## Kopsavilkums

Šis pētījums ir veltīts naida runas analīzei – aizskarošam diskursam, kas kaitē demokrātijai un vērsts pret naida mērķa grupu locekļiem un/vai indivīdiem, kuru raksturīgās īpašības vai publiskais tēls ir apdraudēts.

Demokrātisko un mieru mīlošo pasauli ir pārsteigusi aizskarošā valoda, ko bieži lieto Ungārijas premjerministrs Viktors Orbāns (*Viktor Orbán*), NATO un Eiropas Savienības (ES) dalībvalsts vadītājs. Tāpēc pētījuma objekts ir Ungārijas premjerministra V. Orbāna runa Bālvānosas Brīvajā vasaras universitātē un studentu nometnē 2022. gada 23. jūlijā (Orbán 2022). Pētījuma korpuss ir aptuveni 9000 V. Orbāna runas vārdus. Šī runa nodēvēta par „rasistisku tirādi” (Coakley 2022). Savukārt Eiropas Parlamenta politisko grupu vadītāji nosodījuši V. Orbāna „atklāti rasistiskos paziņojumus”, kas pārkāpj ES vērtības (EU Parliament Press Room 2022). Runa ir īpaši

satraucoša Krievijas pret Ukrainu izvērstā kara dēļ, jo Ungārijas premjerministra V. Orbāna prokrieviskā nostāja grauj ES pamatvērtības un kavē ES lēmumu pieņemšanas procesu.

Pētījumā izmantota *InfraNodus* un *Wmatrix* metodoloģija teksta tematiskajai, atslēgvārdu, vārdsšķiru un semantisko lauku analīzei, koncentrējoties uz trim diskursa aptuvenības aspektiem, kas iezīmē arī ideoloģisko šķelšanos. Runas analīzes mikrolingvistiskā pētījuma rezultāti liecina, ka analizētā naida runa formāli pauž premjerministra V. Orbāna bezkompromisa nostāju pret pieminētajiem notikumiem, kā arī parāda viņa attieksmi pret iespējamo rīcību, ko varētu veikt mērķauditorija. Pētījuma rezultāti liecina, ka analizētajai naida runai piemīt aizskaroša diskursa iezīmes, kas veidotas, izmantojot valodas konteksta resursus.

**Atslēgvārdi:** naida runa; kritiskā diskursa analīze; diskursa aptuvenība.



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