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## XXVI

Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti

XXVI

CONTENTS

Jānis Priede
Kaspars Kļaviņš

INTRODUCTION

DYNAMIC ASIA: SHAPING THE FUTURE.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL ARTICLES, VOLUME XXVI

The tradition established with *Religious-Philosophical Articles*, Volume XVIII continues in the current Volume XXVI, which is dedicated to the themes discussed during the scientific conference *Dynamic Asia: Shaping the Future* that took place in Riga on 13–15 April 2018, and were further explored after this conference. The conference was organised on a wider scale than previously – as a cooperation event between the Latvian Society for the Study of Religions and the Baltic Alliance for Asian Studies.

The origins of the society date back to the Society for Philosophy and Religion established under the auspices of the University of Latvia in 1922. The association organized presentations on theological, religious, scientific, and ethical issues. In 1939, the society re-registered under the name Society of Religious Sciences. The Soviet occupation started on 17 June of 1940, and the society was closed down on 14 November of 1940. The society's activities resumed only in 2009 with establishment of the Latvian Society for the Study of Religions. Its first international conference, *Between East and West: Cultural and Religious Dialogue before, during and after the Totalitarian Rule* in 2011 was attended by more than 55 researchers from 20 countries. Revised versions of selected conference

papers were later published in a scholarly series by the University of Latvia.[1] The society's second conference *Between East and West: Youth, Religion, Politics* was held in 2014. Select papers presented at the conference were published in a more extensive format in the *Religious Philosophical Articles,* Volume XVIII.

The society's third conference, *Dynamic Asia: Shaping the Future*, organised jointly with the third conference of Baltic Alliance for Asian Studies brought together more than 80 participants from 20 countries. The topics presented at the conference are reflected in the current volume. Many of these articles are dedicated to Japanese culture, where spiritual, material and routine aspects intermingle in all walks of life. The Far East topic is expanded in papers on Korea and South East Asia, while current matters of importance to the Islamic civilisation are treated in the context of the Near and Far East by analysing the problems caused by modernisation (including Islamism and terrorism) and unveiling the true causes of these phenomena, clashing with the stereotypes perpetuated in international media. The papers consider matters that are exceptionally varied and diverse, but each of them brings us all towards a more profound understanding of different cultures, reasserts the importance of human spirituality in the self-contradictory turmoil of a unidimensional, materialistic, globalised world. This special issue of the journal sees the light of day thanks to the initiative of Professor Agnese Haijima, as well as the financial support of the Japan Foundation and the University of Latvia.

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[1]   Between East and West: Cultural and Religious Dialogue Before, During and After the Totalitarian Rule. The 1st international scientific conference of the Latvian Society for the Studies of Religion, University of Latvia, Riga, October 6–8, 2011, J. Priede (ed.), *Acta Universitatis Latviensis*, *Oriental Studies*, 793, Rīga: Latvijas Universitāte, 2013.

Agnese Haijima

TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE ARCHITECTURE AND INTERIOR DESIGN WITH FOCUS ON FUJIMORI TERUNOBU AND KENGO KUMA

Introduction

Contemporary Japanese architects and designers are among the leaders in their field in the world. In the last decade, a number of Japanese architects have been awarded the Pritzker Architecture Prize, frequently referred to as the Nobel Prize of architecture. In 2010 it was awarded to SANAA, in 2013 to Itō Toyō, and in 2014 to Ban Shigeru, known for his architecture using paper, particularly in the form of cardboard tubes. Before that, the prize was awarded to Tange Kenzō in 1987, to the Metabolist Maki Fumihiko in 1993, and to Andō Tadao in 1995. Thus, with six recipients, Japan is second to the United States in the total number of winners – a significant accomplishment considering that historically the prize has focused largely on European and American architects.[1] Igarashi points that "future historians may look back on contemporary Japanese architecture as the most vigorous of the early twenty-first century."[2] Despite these achievements, Igarashi remarks that "unfortunately, however, this view is not widely shared in Japan, where

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[1] Igarashi, T., *Contemporary Japanese Architects, Profiles in Design*, Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 10.

[2] Ibid., p. 11.

architects do not enjoy especially high status".[3] On the other hand, Western architects and designers frequently visit Japan to gain inspiration for their work. Meanwhile, Japanese specialists increasingly travel to the West to work, study, and to absorb Western influences. Even in this age of global interconnectedness, when nothing can truly be contained within national borders, Japanese architecture and design has not lost its identity. Thus, the aim of this research paper is to attract attention to Japanese achievements in contemporary architecture and design, focusing on the role of tradition in recent projects.

The article consists of three parts: in the first part: "Essential Features of Japanese Traditional Architecture" the author analyses those elements in Japanese architecture that makes it distinct in the world. In the second part: "The Development of Modern Design in Japan" gives insight how modern design developed in Japan, when Japanese traditions were merged with Western culture; and in the third part "Contemporary Japanese Architecture and Interior Design" the author discusses the current situation in contemporary Japanese architecture and design while paying attention on the role of traditions in it. The author believes that currently contemporary architecture is at the crossroads as if searching for a new formula in how to deal with the ongoing environmental issues. A number of contemporary architects have displayed ideas and experimented with new approaches that would fit the 21st century values. According to author's opinion, the 21st century architecture will witness a return to traditional values, natural building materials which will be upgraded with recent technologies, return to native, local aesthetics, focus on sustainability and response to the environmental issues. While there are many outstanding architects in contemporary Japan who have displayed interesting solutions to the above topics, the author will be focusing on the recent output of two leading Japanese architects and theorists: Fujimori Terunobu (b.1946) and Kengo Kuma (b.1956). One reason why the author has selected these two architects is because they represent unusual and innovative ideas that

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[3] Igarashi, T., *Contemporary Japanese Architects, Profiles in Design*, Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 10.

not only care for cultural heritage but also environment. According to author's opinion, both architects display a number of approaches to using sustainable natural building materials in the contemporary context and are noted for individual approach to each separate project. The author has included only those photos which have been taken by herself while visiting the sites in person. The current article is only the first step towards a wider research which is expected in the future.

Before discussing contemporary architectural projects, the author would like to talk about essential features of Japanese traditional architecture and the development of Modern architecture and design in Japan.

1. Essential features of Japanese traditional architecture

What makes Japanese architecture and interior design so particular and different from others in the world? What factors, value systems influenced Japanese approach?

This is indeed a complicated question. First of all, it is difficult to define one single line or one standard formulae. Contemporary Japanese and foreign architects and designers feel free to choose from a rich and diverse pool of tradition for the inspiration of their work. On the other hand, the author is convinced, that there do exist certain concepts that have influenced the majority of Japanese architecture and design and some of these theories can be radically different of a typical western approach. The underlying concepts of Japanese architecture and design developed over a long period of time and were influenced by Japan's unique geographical situation, climate, nature, religious views, social, economic conditions, even politics. It is not possible to describe in detail all of them due to the limited scope of this article, but the author tried to focus on several key concepts.

One of the first foreign scholars who studied Japanese architecture was American zoologist, academic, author and museum curator Edward S. Morse (1838–1925) who came to Japan in 1877 to do research in zoology and later became a professor at the Tokyo Imperial University and taught

zoology and biology there. While in Japan, he researched traditional Japanese houses, making detailed sketches and descriptions of them. This information was used to publish a book *Japanese Homes* (1880).

Despite the fact that several foreigners who had arrived in Japan at about the same time as him criticized traditional Japanese dwellings and crowded cities, like Rein, who wrote that Japanese house lacks solidity and comfort, has no privacy and is easy inflammable[4], Morse tried to introduce positive aspects of Japanese dwellings. In the beginning he acknowledged that "[..] the first sight of a Japanese house is disappointing; it is unsubstantial in appearance; and there is a meagreness of colour. Being unpainted, it suggests poverty," however, later he gradually came to characterising the elements, which he thought were superior to western tradition. For example, he wrote: "One of the chief points of difference in a Japanese house as compared to ours lies in the treatment of partitions and outside walls."[5] He later goes on explaining that in western houses walls and partitions are permanent, but in the Japanese house "there are two or more sides that have no walls". He talks about the use of sliding screens to make partitions inside the house and with outside.[6] In his book, accompanied with detailed sketches done by himself, Morse introduced step by step construction elements and techniques of building traditional Japanese houses showing particular admiration to features like austere simplicity, cleanliness, emptiness, flexibility, practicality, contact with nature.

The next major research of Japanese architecture by western specialists was done by Frank Lloyd Wright (1867–1959) an extinguished American architect. Wright was so inspired by certain elements in Japanese traditional architecture that these Japanese influences more than any other lead him to formulate modern architecture. In his autobiography Wright told about his huge collection of Japanese prints and his admiration of certain aesthetic approaches in them as "elimination of insignificant",

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[4]   Morse, E. S. "Japanese Homes and their Surroundings", Tuttle Publishing, 1st edition, 1880.

[5]   Ibid., p. 6.

[6]   Ibid.

his trip to Japan and features in Japanese architecture that he was impressed most: the elimination of insignificant, simplification, modern standardizing, insulated roofs, the underfloor ventilation, the notion of screens as walls, the continuous space between garden and house.[7]

In 1936 architect and Tokyo Imperial University professor Kishida Hideto (岸田　日出刀1899–1966) in the pamphlet *Japanese Architecture* defined the distinct characteristics of Japanese architecture. He listed seven features that he understood to be essentially Japanese:

1) construction based on the column, 2) materials featuring natural wood, 3) the function and expression of the roof, 4) prominently projecting eaves, 5) *masu-gumi* (升組 square framing) structural detail to support the eaves, 6) natural colour of building materials, and 7) an architectural feeling based on an admiration of the beauty in nature.[8]

Like Itō Chuta and others before him, Kishida selected the Shintō shrine at Ise as "the purest expression of original and genuine Japanese taste"[9]. A typical Japanese interior, as shown in Fig. 1, 2, will exhibit most of the above characteristics.

Bruno Taut was invited to Japan in 1933. Four years later, in 1937, he published *Houses and People of Japan*. Taut looked both at Japanese way of life and specific buildings, including Katsura Imperial Villa which impressed him greatly. Of the Villa he wrote: "the entire arrangement [..] followed always elastically in all its dimensions of purpose which each one of the parts as well as the whole had to accomplish, the aim being that of common or normal utility, or the necessity of dignified representation, or that of lofty, philosophical spirituality.[10]

According to Shelton, Taut "saw Japanese buildings very much through the ideals and intentions of Modernism" and "both Wright and Taut represent a turning point in Western attitude towards traditional

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[7] Wright, F. L. *An Autobiography.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943, pp. 194–200.

[8] Kishida, 1936, p. 29, cited in Locher, M. *Traditional Japanese Architecture: An Exploration of Elements and Forms.* Tuttle Publishing, 2010, p. 40.

[9] Kishida, 1936, p. 40, cited in Locher, p. 40.

[10] Taut, 1937, p. 29, cited in Shelton, 1999, p. 6.

buildings in Japan."[11] "The things that particularly stirred the modernist hearts were the modular frame construction, elevated floor, free space both within the building and between inside and outside, honest exposure of the construction, minimal decoration, and otherwise Spartan aesthetic."[12]

The 1955 book *Architecture of Japan* by Arthur Drexler, the curator at the New York Museum of Modern Art identified six elements its author believed to be "of continuing relevance to American building activities." They include 1) the post-and-beam skeleton construction system, 2) the expression of shelter through the large roof, 3) the decorative use of structural elements, 4) the preference for additive space, 5) the flexibility of plan, and 6) the close relationship of indoors and outdoors.[13] Ironically, while the West was discovering some of the qualities of traditional Japanese building through Modernism, the Japanese were discovering Western Modernism in part as a continuation of their "Modernization" and imitation of the West through literature and travel but also through young Japanese working in the ateliers of the European pioneers (Bunzo Yamaguchi and Chikatada Kurata with Gropius, and Takamata Yoshizawa, Junzo Sakakura and Kunio Maekawa with Le Corbuiser).[14]

By the mid-1960s Gunter Nische was able to report that Modern architecture of Japan had returned "step by step to its roots".[15]

In the book of 1965 *Ise: Prototype of Japanese Architecture*, a collaboration between architect Kenzō Tange, architectural critic Kawazoe Noboru and photographer Watanabe Yoshio, Kawazoe noted the essential Japanese elements in the historic architecture as 1) the centrality of wood as a building material, 2) the preference for structures that relied on a grid of horizontal and vertical members and avoided diagonals and curved lines, 3) the tendency in Japanese building to perpetuate architectural form without undue concern for the preservation of the actual building itself,

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[11] Shelton, 1999, p. 6.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Drexler, 1955, p. 262, cited in Locher, 2010, p. 41.

[14] Shelton, 1999, p. 6.

[15] Nitschke, 1966, p. 177, cited in Shelton, 1999, p. 6

4) an appreciation for the mutability of all things, and 5) the recognition that the practice of building should be attuned to natural processes.[16]

In the same book Tange makes note that the entire later course of Japanese architecture starts at Ise,[17] based on 1) the use of natural materials in a natural way, 2) the sensitivity to structural proportion, and 3) the feeling for space arrangement, especially the tradition of harmony between architecture and nature.[18]

Historian Jonathan Reynolds, writing about Tange's book, explains that Ise "resonates with cherished assumptions about Japanese culture. Ise has come to serve as an exemplar of architecture devoid of unnecessary ornament; an architecture that reflects extraordinary sensitivity to building materials; an architecture that is integral with nature rather than being imposed on it.[19]

[..] while Taut and Gropius praised the Ise Grand Shrine and Katsura Imperial Villa, Kurokawa focused attention on Himeji Castle and the Tōshōgū at Nikkō as progenitors of postmodern style.[20] Bruno Taut [..] made a contrasting classification of the Buddhist architecture of the shoguns with the Shinto architecture of the emperors, criticizing the baroque tendencies of the former as superficial and praising the simplicity of the latter as a world class artistic accomplishment.[21]

Kishida in 1942 wrote: "If one searches within ancient Japanese architecture for examples rich in purely Japanese aesthetic elements, they are limited to structures that have not adopted the elements of Buddhist temple architecture, or have been little influenced by it.[22]"

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[16] Kawazoe, Tange, 1965, pp. 200–206, cited in Locher, 2010, p. 41.
[17] Tange, Kawazoe, Watanabe 1965, p. 16, cited in Locher, 2010, p. 41.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Reynolds, 2001, pp. 321–323, cited in Locher, 2010, p. 42.
[20] Igarashi, Taro, *Contemporary Japanese Architects, Profiles in* Design on Kurokawa Kishō "Buddhism and Metabolism", Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, pp. 47–48.
[21] Ibid., p. 47.
[22] Kishida, 1942, cited in Igarashi, 2018, p. 25.

Fujishima asserted that "in the East there is the Grand Shrine at Ise, in the West, the Parthenon". Fujishima went on to divide the 2600-year old history of Japanese architecture into three main periods: an era of pure Japanese architecture, an era of continental influence, and the era of global influence.[23]

In another book from mid-1960s, *The Roots of Japanese Architecture*, a collaboration between historian Itō Teiji, Japanese-American sculptor Isamu Noguchi, and photographer Futagawa Yukio, Itō lists ten elements of an underlying system that gives Japanese architecture its validity: 1) the materials wood, stone, and earth, 2) setting limits to infinity, 3) dynamic space,4) the garden as a miniature universe, 5) the linking of nature and architecture, 6) the pillar and the tatami mat, 7) teahouses, bamboo, and more pillars, 8) borrowing space; 9) the rhythms of the vertical plane, and 10) the roof as a symbol.[24]

More recently, Nishi Kazuo and Hozumi Kazuo in their 1983 book *What is Japanese Architecture?* list 10 characteristic traits: 1) the choice of materials (wood, paper, straw, plaster and clay, tile, stone only for temple podia), 2) the post and lintel structural system, 3) the great roof (with extended eaves), 4) the interior core from which secondary spaces may radiate, 5) the preference for straight lines rather than curves, 6) the dim interiors due to the deep eaves, 7) the fluidity of interior partitions, 8) the inside-outside fluidity/integration of buildings and landscape, 9) the proportional system, and 10) decoration that embellishes rather than disguises basic construction.[25]

2. Development of modern architecture and design in Japan

In the field of design, the beginnings of modern Japanese design movement start in the end of the nineteenth century when Japan opened its doors to the West, but soon intellectuals sought a return to traditional

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[23] Fujishima, 1944, cited in Igarashi, 2018, p. 27.
[24] Itō, Noguchi, Futagawa, 1963, p. 9, cited in Locher, p. 42.
[25] Locher, p. 42.

Japanese culture. In 1927, the Japanese philosopher and art critic Sōetsu Yanagi (柳 宗悦 1889–1961) published a book *Kōgei no Michi*「工芸の道」*The Way of Crafts* and together with potters Shōji Hamada (濱田 庄司 1894–1978) and Kawai Kanjirō (河井 寛次郎 1890–1966) started Japanese Mingei (民芸) or folkcraft movement that laid basis of modern Japanese design. In his book Yanagi discusses the rich heritage that crafts embody and the importance of sustaining their production in a modern context.[26]

The essential features of *Mingei* objects are that they are simple, inexpensive, utilitarian, made by unknown craftsmen, produced in quantity and quality. In an interview, Sōri Yanagi (柳宗理 1915–2011) said that when designing, he does not create an object on the paper, but rather works with miniature models made of paper or wood. Of course, nowadays the science of engineering is so advanced that the form of the ideal chair is already known. Strict numbers for size and angle are already known, but the interesting thing is, when one makes a chair with the right prescription, it is actually not as restful to sit as expected.[27]

But above else the promoters of *Mingei* valued functionality. Sōetsu Yanagi wrote in his "Responsibility of the Craftsman" that designers should endeavour to produce articles that are pleasant to the eyes, useful, and helpful as our daily companions to create a happy life.[28] "In Kingdom of Beauty and Folk Crafts" Sōetsu Yanagi expresses his opinion, that "Beauty must not be sought or admired only on special occasions, but more widely and deeply, one's everyday life itself should be full of beauty".[29]

Their museum – The Japan Folk Crafts Museum – opened in Tokyo in 1936 and displays a wide variety of Japanese traditional crafts. These

[26] Sparke, P. *Japanese Design*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2009, p. 13.

[27] Sōri, Yanagi. Mingei Movement and I, in *Mingei – Two Centuries of Japanese Folk Art*, Tokyo: Japan Folk Arts Museum, 1995, p. 164.

[28] Soetsu, Yanagi. The Responsibility of the Craftsman, in *Mingei – Two Centuries of Japanese Folk Art*. Tokyo: Japan Folk Arts Museum, 1995, p. 131.

[29] Soetsu, Yanagi. Kingdom of Beauty and Folk Crafts, in *Mingei – Two Centuries of Japanese Folk Art*. Tokyo: Japan Folk Arts Museum, 1995, p. 127.

crafts are not meant to be viewed as art objects, rather they are presented as simple, functional objects created to facilitate daily life.[30]

In an interview with Sōri Yanagi (son of Soetsu Yanagi, the founder of *Mingei*), when asked what is the quality that attracts people to *Mingei* products – things created by unknown artists – Sōri Yanagi answered that it is warmth and simplicity that radiates from these hand-made objects and that in current times of machine-made products people long for this touch of humanity.[31]

Shōji Hamada's simply decorated glazed pots and bowls successfully combine Japanese tradition with a sense of contemporaneity based in an understanding of the continuing relevance of craft to modern life. Another potter working in Japan in this period, Kitaoji Rosanjin, combined pottery with calligraphy, woodwork, lacquer and painting. His pieces adhere to the principle of *wabi* – the rustic understated beauty inspired by the world of nature that underpins Japanese crafts[32] and established a strong foundation for the technology-led modern design movement that emerged some decades later and still has influenced some part of contemporary design.

Japanese and western architects and designers did not work in ignorance of each other. Soon after encountering Japanese art and design, westerners borrowed heavily from it. At the turn of the century Europe, the French and Belgian Art Noveau movement was strongly influenced by *japonisme*. In the United Kingdom, designer Christopher Dresser drew inspiration from asymmetry and decoration of Japanese artifacts. American architect Frank Lloyd Wright admired the lines, structure, and underlying philosophy of the interior of the Japanese house, and he incorporated them into his designs. In the early 1920s, Wright built the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo.[33]

Also, along with the numerous Japanese students who travelled outside their country to be educated in the West, young Japanese architects came to

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[30] Sparke, P. *Japanese Design*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2009, p. 13.

[31] Sōri, Yanagi. "Mingei Movement and I", in *Mingei – Two Centuries of Japanese Folk Art*, Tokyo: Japan Folk Arts Museum, 1995, pp. 162–164.

[32] Sparke, P. *Japanese Design*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2009, p. 14.

[33] Ibid., p. 14.

Europe and the United States to work and study alongside modern masters. Junzo Sakakura and Kunio Mayekawa both spent time in the studio of French modernist architect Le Corbusier. Sakakura went on to create a pavilion for the 1937 Paris Exposition Internationale that combined elements of eastern and western architecture in a single building. In 1933 German modernist architect Bruno Taut was invited to Japan by the Architects Association, and he ended up spending three years there. Le Corbusier's collaborator, Charlotte Perriand, lived in Japan between 1940 and 1943. Her task was to advise the Japanese Ministry for Trade and Industry on industrial art and suggest which Japanese goods would appeal most to Western markets.[34]

In the 1950s and 1960s, when Japan entered a period of growth and the country was transformed into consumer society, designers continued to learn from the past – in particular from the Japanese ability to adapt to small, highly flexible living spaces, using screens (*shōji*) to transform spaces as needed and storing items, such as futons, when not in use – a number of Japanese high-tech manufacturers began to develop sophisticated products characterized by portability, flexibility, and a miniature scale.[35]

In architecture it was Tange who refined a unique modernism in designs that could compete at the global level. His students Kurokawa Kishō and Isozaki Arata built international networks from the time of their debuts. Kurokawa published the Metabolist manifesto, Metabolism 1960: Proposals for a New Urbanism, which became the first major Japanese contribution to modern architectural theory. Isozaki developed many contacts overseas and engaged in a variety of cultural interventions through symposiums, competitions, and architectural projects. Born in the 1940s, Andō Tadao and Itō Toyoo tackled a number of international projects in the 1990s, and remain active as global architects, while the 1950-born Sejima Kazuyo (of SANAA) and Kuma Kengo are also working on an increasing number of projects outside Japan. Atelier Bow-Wow and Abe Hitoshi, born in the 1960s, have exerted an influence internationally, and

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[34] Sparke, P. *Japanese Design*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2009, p. 16.
[35] Ibid., p. 18.

the 1970s generation of Fujimoto Sou and Ishigami Jun'ya has also built a strong network outside Japan.[36]

3. Contemporary architecture

Modern Japanese architects find a vast variety of resources in traditional Japanese culture while designing contemporary buildings both for private or public use. As already mentioned in the introduction of this this article, contemporary architecture, according to the author's opinion, finds itself at crossroads, as if searching for new formulae for the 21st century to address the environmental issues. This time the author selected two distinctive Japanese architects and theoreticians: Fujimori Terunobu and Kengo Kuma and some of their recent projects to analyse their approach to tradition and environment. According to author's opinion, they have displayed interesting theoretical ideas, and their built objects reveal new exploration and experiments that could serve the future development of architecture. In the architectural projects discussed here the author was particularly attracted to their innovative application of traditions, the usage of traditional natural building materials in tune with ideas of sustainability and environmental protection. The photographs displayed here were taken by the author herself while she visited the sites. This article is only a first step towards a wide scope of research that is planned in the future and will comprise many other contemporary architects and their recent output. Another reason why the author selected these architects and their projects is their originality and being outside the mainstream.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Japan's architecture, urban spaces, and landscape were changing dramatically. Industrial products like steel, concrete, glass and plastic became main architectural materials. They offered consistent quality and were easy to manage and work with. The industry was moving straight forward ahead toward efficiency and

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[36] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 10, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism".

mechanization. [..] At construction sites, the characteristics, texture and expression of architectural materials were being neglected. Living, breathing materials with their distinctive inconsistencies and variations in colour were being shoved aside in favour of industrial products that compiled with JIS standards.[37]

The projects selected here provide an opposite tendency, the work of individual craftsmen with a variety of natural materials that display the beauty of natural colour, texture, fragrance and form.

In his essay "The Power of Handwork" Terunobu Fujimori wrote: "Contemporary architecture is built with industrial technologies. The question of how to incorporate natural materials and the rich character of manual craftsmanship into this context is one that will become increasingly important as architecture moves past the 20th century's lopsided emphasis on science and technology and seeks an approach better suited to the challenges of the 21st century."

Fujimori Terunobu (b.1946), a practicing architect, has been active as a historian and critic of contemporary architecture[38]. He makes unusual architecture in his own style, because of this it is impossible to evaluate him by the standards of modernism or postmodernism.

Fujimori describes the style of his own work as *yaban gyarudo* ('barbaric guard'), a play on the word 'avant-garde'.[39]

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[37] Abo Akinari, Yamada Shuji, Naoki Kusumi and others, dialogue "Engaging with Materials, Conveying the Skills of the Craftsman", *Architecture and Urbanism*, 2019, No. 580, 2019.

[38] Terunobu Fujimori was born in Nagano prefecture in 1946. Graduated from the Architecture Department of the school of Engineering at Tohoku University in 1971. Completed graduate school at the University of Tokyō in 1978. Professor at the University of Tokyō from 1998 to 2020. Professor at Kogakuin University from 2010 to 2014. Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyō since 2010. Director of the Takenaka Carpentry Tools Museum since 2000 (from Terunobu, Fujimori. The Power of Handwork. *Architecture and Urbanism*, No. 580, 2019).

[39] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 131, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism".

Fujimori finds inspiration in Japanese traditional architecture, but usually selects styles that have largely been forgotten by contemporary architects. Several of his projects like his own home, Tanpopo House (1995), Nira House (1997) were influenced by farmhouses of Northeast Japan capped with *shibamume* – a thatched roof with grass growing along the ridge.[40]

His other source of inspiration was Jōmon (prehistoric period) architecture. He represents the new Jōmon. He created a nonprofessional group of volunteers, called Jōmon Architecture Team that became involved in several projects.

Fujimori has said: "The first aspect of our "Jōmon style" is the strong presence of columns".[41]

This style is evident in his Jinchōkan Moriya Historical Museum (1991) with four columns made of unfinished tree trunks pierce the roof at one end of the building, creating an unusual atmosphere. This contrasts very much the transparent glass walls of modernism. Another new Jōmon project is his Takasugi-an (Too High Teahouse) project of 2004.

The Contemporary Tea House project was launched in when Japan's top architects redefined the tradition. Takasugi-an was Fujimori's interpretation.

In the introduction of the book devoted to this exhibition Fujimori wrote: "Why do so many Japanese architects take up the challenge of the tea room despite its severe formal constraints? I think it is because they are fascinated with exploring architectural space limited to the extreme, with the possibilities inherent in the smallest spatial unit. Of all the world's structures, the tea room is the perfect medium for satisfying their passion and curiosity.[42]

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[40] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 123, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism".

[41] Ibid., p. 129.

[42] Terunobu, Fujimori. Introduction to the book: Arata Isozaki, Tadao Ando, Terunobu Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House, Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*, from Kodansha International, 2007, p. 25.

Fujimori declares: "I have not attempted to create the kind of traditional space used for tea ceremony with my designs."[43] Instead, he pushes design boundaries by planting teahouses on top of tree trunks – as high as 6.5 meters off the ground – and working with amateur artisans on their construction.[44]

About the construction process of Takasugi-an Fujimori wrote: I began with a general sketch, then headed into the mountains in search of a chestnut tree that fit my idea. Not surprisingly, I didn't find what I was looking for, since trees do not grow with the aim of meeting human design needs. Ultimately, I made a forked trunk my only requirement and cut down two suitable trees. Using chestnut for my tea room's braces was crucial because mong trees indigenous to Japan the chestnut is the most rot resistant and durable.[45]

Later he continued: "Every aspect of the tea room turned out as I envisioned it – the result is something utterly, completely personal. This tea room may even be perfect expression of my architectural philosophy."[46]

Fujimori Terunobu also uses materials in surprising ways, noting, "The most overt characteristic of my tearooms is the finish of the material.[47] His teahouses are highly textured compositions of plaster, bark, wood, metal, and glass.

Fujimori's architecture because of its use of natural materials, is frequently characterized as New Age or ecological, but it's not as simple

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[43] Terunobu, Fujimori. Introduction to the book: Arata Isozaki, Tadao Ando, Terunobu Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House, Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*, from Kodansha International, 2007, p. 25.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Terunobu Fujimori on Takasugi-an in: Arata Isozaki, Tadao Ando, Terunobu Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House, Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*, from Kodansha International, 2007, p. 89.

[46] Ibid., p. 86.

[47] Fujimori Terunobu. The Tea Room: Architecture Writ Small, in Isozaki, Ando, and Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House*, p. 80.

as that. He revives ancient traditions, but at the same time does not reject modern technology.[48]

In his essay "The Power of Handwork" Fujimori wrote about the possibilities to join modern technologies with the usage of natural materials. Regarding wood, he wrote:

"Wood is inferior to concrete and steel in its mechanical properties, and it burns easily. But efforts are underway to overcome these weaknesses. Good examples are the Osaka Timber Association Building (2013), a fire-resistant wooden office building, and the Shin-Kashiwa Clinic (2016). The former features curves surfaces in its plan that suggest new possibilities in wooden architecture.

An example of hybrid wooden structure is the Harmonie Hall built for the Kobe International Junior and Senior High School (2011), which provides a vast column free space."[49]

Besides, Fujimori is critical of the glossy, uniform surfaces produced by contemporary technology; he sticks to a rough, Brutalist finish for his work. For example, he chars timber and then uses rock drill to give it a rough surface texture, reminiscent of rustic design in the West. Although his work is grounded in modern structural technology, Fujimori uses natural materials to achieve surface treatments that give his architecture a unique texture and feel. This privileging of the sense of touch over the sense of sight may bring to mind the critical regionalism proposed by Kenneth Frampton.[50]

Igarashi praises Fujimori as an architect who fast-forwards the time – creating the architecture that spans past, present, and future. According to author's opinion he will continue to inspire many future architects.

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[48] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 132, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism"

[49] Terunobu, Fujimori. The Power of Handwork. *Architecture and Urbanism*, No. 580, 2019.

[50] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 133, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism"

Another contemporary architect who participated in the same Contemporary Tea Room project was Kengo Kuma. By the way, Kengo Kuma has visited Latvia in 2017 and given a lecture: "Driving Forces behind Architecture of Smallness" where he explained his opinion that architecture of grand scale has ceased to be topical in the world, and architects should rather concentrate their attention upon creating a smaller scale architecture which does not dominate nature but harmonically blends with it. Kengo Kuma has experimented with architecture of smallness, for example, he tried to transform wood joint techniques used in the traditional game *chidori* to big and small architectural projects, like "Milano Salone 2007", "Starbucks Coffee House" in Fukuoka 2011, Sunny Hills in Tokyō 2013.[51]

Kuma Kengo (b.1954) debuted as a postmodernist architect in the 1980s, but from the latter half of the 1990s onward began to use minimalist design to express a Japanese sense of space, preferring to work with wood and bamboo. For example, his Great (Bamboo) Wall (2002) in Beijing and the Main Gate of the Lake Hamana Flower Festival (2003), bamboo was chosen as the primary material.[52] Recently his company Kengo Kuma and Associates is involved in about 100 projects all around the world including the construction of the Stadium for 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo. He can duly be called one of the starchitects (star-architects) of Japan.

Kuma's interest in Japanese traditional architecture is not limited to the use of traditional natural materials. If Fujimori represents new Jōmon, then Kengo Kuma is associated with the new Yayoi[53] in certain of his projects, like Nakagawa-machi Bato Hiroshige Museum of Art (2000). This is a simple gable-roofed structure that makes extensive use of local cedar and

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[51] "Mazā un lielā arhitektūra. Seši japāņu arhitekta Kengo Kumas meistardarbi" ("Big and Small Architecture, Six Masterworks by Japanese Architect Kengo Kuma"). 16.05.2017. translated from Latvian by the author. Available at https://www.delfi.lv (retrieved 24.02.2019).

[52] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 131, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism"

[53] Ibid.

Japanese paper. The entire structure is clad in louvers made of extremely thin cedar timbers, spaced 12 centimetres apart, said to be inspired by the fine lines that Andō Hiroshige used in his ukiyo-e woodblock prints. [..] Yet at the same time Kuma did not make use of traditional woodwork techniques, this is an example of digitally processed wooden architecture.[54]

In his book *Anti-Object* (2000) taking cue from Japanese classic architecture as Katsura Detached Palace as well as from Bruno Taut's Hyūga Villa, he proclaimed the concept of 'anti-object'. He was critical of object-oriented architecture, which stood out against environment, and said that neither modernism nor postmodernism had been able to escape from that particular pattern.[55]

In his book *Makeru kenchiku* (*Defeatist Architecture*, 2004) Kuma proposed a softer, more passive model for architecture than the 'victorious' architecture characteristic of the twentieth century, with its tendency to overwhelm and dominate the environment [..]. He was searching for an architecture that was not about enclosing space but which would instead throw itself open to the urban environment.[56]

As he wrote in *Shizen na kenchiku* (*Natural Architecture*, 2008), Kuma came to harbour doubts about an architecture fixated on strength and power, and began producing a series of experimental works that replaced steel and concrete with a variety of materials – wood, bamboo, stone, and so on – used in innovative ways.[57]

In the project "Contemporary Tea Room", Kuma Kengo understands "the tearoom as a radical form of critique".[58] Kuma builds "tea rooms to critique the use of concrete as a building material [..]. Concrete is by far

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[54] Igarashi, Taro. *Contemporary Japanese Architects Profiles in Design*. Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2018, p. 131, about Kurokawa Kishō, "Buddhism and Metabolism"

[55] Ibid., p. 182.

[56] Ibid, p. 183.

[57] Ibid, p. 186.

[58] Kuma, Kengo. "Tea Room Building as a Critical Act". In Isozaki, Ando, and Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House: Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2007, p. 108.

the main reason for the terrible decline of Japan's traditional building culture".[59] As well as carefully considering materials, he also notes inspiration from historic examples, especially designs by Sen no Rikyū. Kuma's teahouses show great material breadth and ingenuity. He wrote: "I chose delicate materials, with fragile, "anti-concrete" qualities such as fiberglass reinforced plastic, igneous rock with its earthenware-like texture produced by extreme heat, and *washi*.[60] He further expresses his opinion: "the most basic architectural use of concrete is in rendering, as a thick cosmetic coat. I prefer completely opposite approach [..] why not build a tea room consisting of no more than fragile, structurally unreliable *washi*?"[61]

This philosophy is realized in his project "Washi Tea Room "Seigaiha"" (2005). About this tearoom Kuma wrote: "This is my experiment in taking the theoretical transience so integral to the tea room to a splendid extreme. This tea room is made of a folded paper and stored in a small envelope. Naturally, it is exceptionally light. But when expanded into shape, it is large enough for a person to sit inside."[62] Further he explains that he used a traditional Japanese pattern that depicts overlapping waves, diffused light and with this example tried to combine modern technology and traditional methods.[63]

Kengo Kuma's "Miraie Lext House Nagoya" (2018, Nagoya, Japan) is a building for wedding ceremonies – a place where people come together to form new families (Fig. 1–3).

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[59] Kuma, Kengo. "Tea Room Building as a Critical Act". In Isozaki, Ando, and Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House: Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2007, p. 108.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Kuma, Kengo. "Washi Tea Room "Seigaiha"". In Isozaki, Ando, and Fujimori, *The Contemporary Tea House: Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2007, p. 122.

[63] Ibid.

Figures 1–3. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018
Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

The name of the building that can be translated as "Towards the Future" and might express the idea of people coming here and making new plans, determinations for the future. The building itself can be called architecture of the future and displays many innovative ideas. The author of the article visited the building herself and when seeing it first from outside – it stirred the heart. Firstly, the building's form and concept differed very much from the usual city scenery. It was a long horizontal wooden construction surrounded by trees and miniature gardens from all sides that contrasted with mainly vertical architecture in steel and concrete surrounding the building. The trees were newly planted and still small, but probably after many years the site will look like a small forest in the middle of the city. White stones were laid out marking the edges and borders of the outside gardens. Most pleasant was the beautiful texture and pleasant scent of natural, unpainted wood (Fig. 4–6), that contrasted with concrete, asphalt and steel in the surroundings.

"We didn't want a building like a closed box, so we placed the entire structure under a sloped roof to express the space like a well-preserved forest."[64]

When entering the building, it offered a number of pleasant surprises: a very space-full and light lobby with a view to a small inner garden on one side further supported the idea of being surrounded by nature and in contact with it. *Washi* paper lanterns placed in the lobby casted a mild, dim light (Fig. 2). The front desk was decorated with *ikebana* composition.

The two-floor building had several halls for ceremonial usage and smaller rooms necessary for the preparation of the ceremony. The walls of the chapel were covered with textured *washi* paper, traditional *shōji*, plastered with *washi*, covered the windows and cast a dim light. Various elements of contemporary and traditional architecture were blended together into a harmonious whole. The interior was rather ascetic in subdued colours, but very elegant, clean and modern (Fig. 7–11).

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[64] Available at https://www.archdaily.com/903552/miraie-lext-house-nagoya-kengo-kuma-and-associates (retrieved 24.02.2019).

Beauty of natural wood

Figures 4–6. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018
Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

Usage of *Washi* – Japanese traditional paper

Figures 7. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Chapel Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

Figure 8. Wallpaper made of *washi*, Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Chapel Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

Figure 9. Wallpaper made of *washi*, Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Chapel Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

Usage of *Washi* – Japanese traditional paper

Figure 10. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Chapel
Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

Figure 11. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Chapel
Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

One of the greatest pleasant surprises was the ceiling of the ceremony
hall that was decorated with wooden assemblies and reminded ancient
Japanese temples and their exceptional wood craft techniques (Fig. 12,
13, 14).

Wooden assemblies

Figures 12, 13, 14. Kengo Kuma, "Miriae Lext House Nagoya", 2018. Ceremony hall
Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

"By attaching long pieces of cedar and larch, we added a rhythmic variation to the ceiling and the wall. The space was further enlivened by the passing of light through the ceiling like *komorebi*, or light filtering down through the trees in a forest."[65]

Similar wood assemblies were used as interior decoration the ceiling in another building created by Kengo Kuma – Misonoza in Nagoya (Fig. 15), which will be introduced in detail later.

Figure 15. Kengo Kuma, Misonoza, Nagoya, Japan. Interior of souvenir shop
Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

These wood assemblies reminded old Buddhist temples with their excellent wood work techniques.

Japanese wooden architecture has a tradition of joinery that eschews metal and nails. When a member is not long enough, another can be added to it with a *tsugite* (butt joint). When two members need to be joined at an angle, a *shiguchi* (angle joint) is used. There are many variations of these basic types, and many types of saws, chisels, and other tools to create them [..]. The *shiguchi* joints in a round log framework of *sukiya* architecture are remarkable. They are enabled by the skill of the carpenter and the support of his tools. Up to about 50 years ago, it was common to see

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[65] Available at https://www.archdaily.com/903552/miraie-lext-house-nagoya-kengo-kuma-and-associates (retrieved 24.02.2019).

carpenters using hand tools at wooden house construction sites – marking dimensions with black ink, and joining members after shaping with tools like saws and chisels. But recently almost all new houses are simply put together like plastic models, using metal fixtures and factory pre-cut wood. Aside from shrine and temple architecture, *sukiya* architecture, and a few houses, it has become rare to see carpenters notching and joining members at the construction site. The same is true of non-residential architecture, where wooden buildings have become fewer due to building laws and cost considerations.[66]

But the beauty of Japanese wooden architecture continues to influence us today and is evident in Kengo Kuma's projects, where he has found usage and space for traditional wood work details that exist parallel with the modern technologies.

When Kengo Kuma visited Latvia in 2017 in an interview to the newspaper "Diena" he wrote that in 80s and 90s when the economic bubble had burst and he did not have any work in the city he travelled around in the country districts and with local craftsmen created small projects. This experience made him realize that Japanese crafts still possess a huge potential and that they have been preserved in the countryside. Young craftsmen have a difficulty to find clients, but nevertheless they keep the quality high. He said, that we, Japanese, maybe have difficulty to express ourselves in words, but the work of our hands tells everything." He further told that he is trying hard to give work to Japanese craftsmen, particularly those who come from 2011 Tsunami areas and thus he helps them to survive.[67]

In his contemporary projects Kengo Kuma lends a lot from Japanese traditional wood work techniques.

Interior design with traditional elements in Miraie building spoke of the fact that future cannot be constructed without the past. The whole

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[66] *Architecture and Urbanism*, No. 580, 2019.
[67] Budže, Kristīne "Intervija ar arhitektu Kengo Kumu" ("Interview with the Architect Kengo Kuma"). The newspaper "Diena", 2017, June 17. Translated from Latvian by the author.

building had a positive and very stimulating atmosphere, the right place to make decisions for a successful future in people's personal life and society as a whole.

Quite close to the Miraie building in Nagoya there are two more buildings designed by Kengo Kuma's architectural design company. In Fushimi, the central area of the city there lies the renovated traditional theatre Misonoza building (2018). The building housing *kabuki* theatre is a centre with diverse attractions: there is a souvenir shop, traditional restaurant on the first floor, while the upper floors have office space and apartments (Fig. 16, 17).

Figure 16. Kengo Kuma, Misonoza, Nagoya, 2018

Figure 17. Kengo Kuma, Interior detail in cafeteria, Misonoza building, Nagoya, 2018
Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

The design of the site incorporates a number of traditional elements. The entrance of the *kabuki* theatre startles with bright red colour reminiscent of *kabuki* costumes, masks and bright performances. The interior of the souvenir shop had a number of traditional accents: visible posts and beams, decorative wooden joints in the ceiling. Particularly attractive were bamboo railings that were used to decorate the wall of a small cafeteria inside the souvenir shop (Fig. 18, 19).

Usage of bamboo

Figures 18, 19. Kengo Kuma, Misonoza, Nagoya, 2017. Cafeteria wall made of bamboo, inside souvenir shop
Photographs by Agnese Haijima, 2019

The façade of the building was decorated with a web of steel profiles that resembled a spider's web and at night the flashing lights in the exterior web formed various decorative patterns (Fig. 20).

Figure 20. Kengo Kuma, Misonoza, Nagoya, 2018
Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

The author of the article visited the building herself and was very pleasantly moved: the place offered incredible entertainment and relax from

everyday cares and routine. It also made think that elements of traditional culture can offer a very pleasing feeling and thrill to the visitors, especially foreigners.

Just behind the Misonoza there lies another building designed by Kengo Kuma and Associates, which is a Hekikai Shinkin Bank (2018, Fig. 21).

Figure 21. Kengo Kuma, Hekikai Shinkin Bank building, Nagoya, 2018
Photograph by Agnese Haijima, 2019

The façade of the building was very unusual – the structure resembled a tall bamboo forest. "Wooden louvers not only create a gentle rhythm to the streets but also take in forest sunbeam inside the building".[68]

Conclusion

As it is evident from the materials gathered in this article, Japanese contemporary architecture is a sphere full of vigour, and the tradition is being continued in a modern context. There are many diverse projects, interesting experiments that have led to solution (at least partly) of several issues: preserving traditional crafts in the contemporary society, where new technologies play increasingly important role, allowing nature to enter the city environment, etc. We cannot speak about sustainable architecture yet, but at least in some aspects a movement in that direction is present: this article reflected projects that tended to use natural, biodegradable materials more than on the average. Japanese contemporary architecture is going to develop in the future and the author is sure that it will offer the world innovative approaches and ideas that address the issues of the 21st century.

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[68] Available at https://aasarchitecture.com/2018/07/hekikai-shinkin-bank-misono-by-kengo-kuma-and-associates.html (retrieved 24.02.2019).

"Mazā un lielā arhitektūra. Seši japāņu arhitekta Kengo Kumas meistardarbi" ("Big and Small Architecture, Six Masterworks by Japanese Architect Kengo Kuma"). Portal "Delfi", 16.05.2017. Translated from Latvian by the author. Available at https://www.delfi.lv (retrieved 24.02.2019).

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Natālija Abrola

ORIGINS AND PROLIFERATION OF INDIC SCIENCES IN LATVIA

Introduction

A thread of this study emerged with the translation of a hymn in the Rigveda X mandala into Latvian by famous Latvian poet of the beginning of 20th century – Rainis (birth name: Jānis Krišjānis Pliekšāns (1865–1929). This hymn was published in 1921 by Rainis in the collection of poems *Restless Heart. Songs from All Over the World*[1]. One of the first hymns in this collection is "The Beginning of Things"[2], which, in its essence, is a cosmogonic type of hymn – one of the most renown hymns of the Rigveda – depicts the poet's interest in cosmogony and orient.

This vague thread commenced the investigation of Indic sciences in Latvia. The current research traces the origins and proliferation of Indic sciences in Latvia within a time span from the end of the 19th century and, due to its limited scope, only to the 1940s. The research paper is divided into seven sections, including the introduction, which embraces the methodology and metadata sources, followed by brief insight into the origins of Indology in Europe embraced by Romanticism at the end of 18th century, as well as a look into the problematics of national awakening in India and Latvia. It will also provide an overview of early relevant

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[1] Rainis, J. *Nemeeriga sirds. Dziesmas no visas pasaules.* Komanditsabeedribas "Daile un Darbs" apgādē, 1921.

[2] Ibid., pp. 9–10.

publications and societies operating in pre-World War II Latvia, discern new dimensions regarding Latvian poet Rainis and other litterateurs concerned with Orient. The analysis of interviews with people on yoga, ayurveda and Indian literature will be given at the conclusion.

To implement this study, following qualitative research methods have been applied, including archival research method, content analyses of semi-structured interviews with 8 respondents, analyses and synthesis. Only four interviews are relevant to this part of research. All the respondents have given a written consent to depositing of the interview audio recordings in the Archive of National Oral History[3] (ANOH), as well as to use and publishing of the acquired data for the research purposes[4].

Funds of Rainis and Rihards Rudzītis were investigated at Literature and Music Museum, as well as consultations and deciphering of postcards were performed by Rainis's researcher Dr. Gundega Grīnuma. Funds of Kārlis Egle were investigated at the Misiņš Library and the information gathered about the history of relevant Latvian societies during the pre-World War II period at the Latvian State Historical Archives (LSHA). Interviews with respondents were recorded from January 26 to March 14, 2018. This research has been partially funded by the State Culture Capital Foundation (SCCF).

1. Indology tide over Europe

The translation of Sanskrit texts into European languages was launched by the first Indologist – the French theologist – Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731–1805), who finished translation of 50 Upanishads from Persian into Latin language in 1796[5]. Although German scholar Friedrich Wilhelm argues that the translation was done

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[3]   The Project of National Oral History, hosted and conducted by Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia, Riga. Available at http://www.dzivesstasts.lv/lv/free.php?main=502 (retrieved 09.11.2018).

[4]   The eight interviews are registered in the cataloge of ANOH: No. 4614–4620.

[5]   Ivbulis, V. *Indoeiropiešu dzimtenes meklējumos.* Rīga: Zinātne, 2013, pp. 19–27.

in French[6]. This controversy requires clarification. Nevertheless, these translations reached Europe at the dawn of Romanticism, which was characterized by breaking the conservative codes of literary expressions of Neo-classicism and introducing the new waves of philosophical thought. The epoch of Romanticism and discovery of Eastern philosophies reaches Latvian intelligentsia and revolutionary writers and poets in the middle of 19th century. As stated by Lillian Furst, Romanticism did not commence homogenously at the beginning of the 19th century throughout Europe. Moreover, Furst asserts that Romanticism or rather pre-Romanticism originated in England by a poet Edward Young 1683–1765) in 1742, with publication of his poem "Night Thoughts", and only later, around 1770–1790, France and Germany took it over[7]. Alongside the typical features manifested in Romanticism – expression of individualism, imagination and emotion –, Furst also indicates the notions of 'original', 'genius', 'divine', 'grows', 'magician' parallelly with the cult of sensibility, vague religious feelings, and the pantheistic approach of the unified cosmos[8]. Similarly, the movement of pre-Romanticism in Latvian literature was characterized by Pauls Daija with the expressions of self-reflection, where the individual is perceived as the centre of universe, and excitement about oriental and exotic motifs as well as mythology, all of it ignited by French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) with his call 'to return to the nature'. It is noteworthy to mention Rousseau's disciple Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who played a key role not only in German, but also in Latvian literary history by not only being an intermediary in bringing of Rousseau's ideas to German adherents of *Sturm*

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[6]   Wilhelm, F. The German Response to Indian Culture. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 81, No. 4, Sep.–Dec., 1961, pp. 395–405.

[7]   Furst, L. R. Romanticism in Historical Perspective. *Comparative Literature Studies* No. 5, 1968, pp. 115–120. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40467744 (retrieved 24.09.2018).

[8]   Ibid., pp. 119–121.

und Drang movement[9, 10], but also by expressing interest in Latvian folk literature and the life of Latvian peasants. Hence, he published 11 of the Latvian songs in his book *Alte Volkslieder* in 1778[11]. Wilhelm highlights the special role of Herder as it was particularly *Herder* who introduced Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) to Indian literature and philosophy. However, both of them alongside with the Schlegel brothers (Karl Wilhelm Friedrich (1772–1829) and August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845)) were doubtlessly the pioneers and disseminators of Indology in Germany[12]. Herder, in particular, who introduced Goethe to Latvian folksongs in 1770[13]. In 1802, German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) read the Latintranslation of Upanishads, and thus the philosophy and values expressed therein became a significant source of inspiration in the construction of his philosophical ideas[14]. Subsequently, in 1816, German linguist Franz Bopp (1791–1867) discovered the resemblance of Sanskrit with many Indo-European languages. His most voluminous work *Comparative Grammar of Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Gothic, German, And Slavonic languages* took him over 21 years (1833 to 1852) to complete and aroused unparalleled interest around Europe. In 1897, Latvian poet Rainis with his wife Aspazija (birth name: Johanna Emīlija Lizete Rozenberga, 1865–1943) jointly translated Goethe's *Faust* into Latvian and this is a turning point in the Latvian literary and linguistic history since this deeply philosophical literary work required coining of new words and concepts in Latvian language. Rainis had been fascinated

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[9] Daija, P. Literary History and Popular Enlightenment in Latvian Culture. Newcastle upon Thyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017, p. 8.

[10] Furst, L. R. Romanticism in Historical Perspective. Comparative Literature Studies, 5, 1968, pp. 119–120.

[11] Chatterji, S. K. Balts and Aryans in their Indo-European Background. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1968, p. 61.

[12] Wilhelm, F. The German Response to Indian Culture. pp. 395–397.

[13] Strods, H. "J. G. Herders un latviešu tautasdziesma". Riga: *Karogs*, No. 6, 01.06.1983, pp. 147–152.

[14] Abrola, N. *Pedagoģiskās vērtības vēdiskajos tekstos – Upanišadās un to pārmantojamība mūsdienu Indijas kultūrvidē.* University of Latvia. Faculty of Education, Psychology and Art, Department of Education, 2017, p. 4.

and influenced by the grandeur of Goethe's mind, literary, philosophical and scientific works since his college days[15].

2. National awaking in Latvia and India

The period from the end of 19th century to the 1940s was a very complicated time in the history of Latvia, as it had experienced the first national awakening before, and during the time – two revolutions in 1905 and 1917 under the rule of Tsarist Russia, as well as the World War I, until it acquired independence in 1918.

After the long colonial oppression, the processes of national awakening commenced in both countries – India and Latvia, beginning in the middle of the 19th century, regardless of their geographically distant locations. In Latvia, the national awakening was initiated by the elite of intelligentsia at Tērbata University – the burgeons of the eventually formed movement called "New Latvians". The most renown and active among them were Krišjānis Valdemārs (1825–1891), Juris Alunāns (1832–1864), Atis Kronvalds (1837–1875) and Krišjanis Barons (1835–1923). All had been influenced by the German national movement in 1948, as well as the translations of Latvian folksongs and ideas of nationalism propagated by the German philosopher, theologian, poet and literary critique – Herder, who had come to Riga as a young clergymen in 1764 to work there.

A similar process of national awakening could be observed in India too, as pointed out by Sigma Ankrava[16] and Viktors Ivbulis.[17] The most influential and significant litterateurs included Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809–1831) with his sisters Aru (1854–1874) and Toru (1856–1877) Dutt, a philosopher and religious person Swami Vivekananda (birth name:

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[15] The Latvian National Library. J. V. Gēte. *Fausts*. 1898 (translated by Aspazija and Rainis). Anotācija, (n.p.), 2015. Available at https://runa.lnb.lv/63652/ (retrieved 07.11.2018).

[16] Ankrava, S. *Dzeja un politika Indijā. Pirmsneatkarības periods*. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2011, pp. 9–20.

[17] Ivbulis, V. *No indiešu civilizācijas vēstures. Kā radusies Indija.* Rīga: Apgāds Zvaigzne ABC, 2017, p. 293.

Naredrandranath Dotto, 1863–1902), brothers Manmohan (1869–1924) and Aurobindo (1872–1950) Ghose, as well as poetess Sarojini Naidu (birth name: Chattopadhyay; 1879–1949) who all contributed to the process of national awaking with their literary works and public activities.[18] Besides them, Viktors Ivbulis also mentions the entrepreneur living in London at that time – Dadhabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) and a religious person Ramakrishna Paramahansa (birth name: Gadadhar Chattopadhyay; 1836–1886), and the last but not the least – Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941),[19] whose literary works and social activity were recognized not only in India, but far beyond its borders. There certainly were many more persons who contributed to the national awaking of both of the countries, however, due to the limited scope of this article only a few names could be highlighted.

3. Early publications on Sanskrit and Indian literature

To obtain an overview of the repository[20] of newspapers published in Latvia since 1810, the search word 'sanskrits' was entered, and it showed that the first newspaper record in Latvia mentioning Sanskrit language was published in German language (old orthography) in the newspaper *Rigasche Zeitung* in 1819, which was actually republishing London news.[21] From 1819 to 1859 altogether fifty-nine newspaper publications in German language (both old and new orthography) are indicated. The very first newspaper publication in Latvian language (old orthography) was

[18] Ankrava, S. *Dzeja un politika Indijā. Pirmsneatkarības periods*. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2011, pp. 19–20.

[19] Ivbulis, V. *No indiešu civilizācijas vēstures. Kā radusies Indija*. Rīga: Apgāds Zvaigzne ABC, 2017, pp. 314–369.

[20] Latvian National Digital Library. (n.p.), (n.d.), www.periodika.lv (retrieved 10.11.2018).

[21] London, den 10. December. *Rigasche Zeitung* No. 102. Riga, 20.12.1819. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_003_rzei1819s01n102|article:DIVL45|query:Sanskrit|issueType:P (retrieved 10.11.2018).

published in 1856 in a newspaper *Mahjas weesis* titled "Ihsas ziņņas pahr to, kur Latweeschi cehluschees un kahdi eeraddumi teem bijuschi weccōs laikōs"[22, 23] This article informs the reader about the similarities of Latvian and Sanskrit languages, as well as a custom of wearing long hair and beard among both the nations: Latvians and Indians. Moreover, it states that the Latvians originated from Asia, the River Ganges region. In addition, the author gives an overview of all the Latvian major and minor ancient pagan deities and their functions, although it is obvious that he or she condemns the pagan traditions and praises the Christian faith. In the time span from 1810 to 1900, 172 newspaper records can be found containing the search word 'sanskrits', namely, the topic of the origins of the Latvians and their language was broadly discussed, whereas from 1900 to 1940, the number of articles soared to 601 – both in old and new orthography, while none were found either in Latgalian or English. Only one article applying a search word 'санскрит' was found in Russian (old orthography) dedicated to Rabindranath Tagore.

Another newspaper article spotted by the author was published in 1873 in old Latvian orthography, and it informed the readers of Riga city that the Holy Bible was rendered into Sanskrit by German missionary called Wenger in the city of Calcutta (India), who started this work in 1847 and completed it in 1873.[24] It is noteworthy to highlight the astounding medley of praising Christian tradition and at the same time diminishing the reminiscence of pagan traditions, and comparison to the pagan traditions in a far, distant country like India. The above-mentioned

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[22] The translation in English: "Brief notes on the origins of the Latvians and their habits in ancient times". Translated by the author. Due to the lack of old orthography font, the title has not been typed precisely.

[23] M., F. *"Ihsas ziņņas pahr to, kur Latweeschi cehluschees un kahdi eeraddumi teem bijuschi weccōs laikōs"*, *Mahjas weesis* (6), Riga, 06.08.1856. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2-viewer/view/index-dev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_mavi1856n06|article:DIVL26|query:Sanskritu|issueType:P (retrieved 10.11.2018).

[24] D. Bihbele pahrcelta Sanskrit wallod. *Latviešu Avīzes*, No. 8, 1873. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_laav1873n08|article:DIVL159|query:Sanskrit|issueType:P (retrieved 10.11.2018).

number of published articles certainly reflected the incredible interest among the peoples of Latvia despite the dominance of Christian religious community and this could be perfectly explained by two preconditions: the dawn of Romanticism in Latvia fuelled by the movement of national awaking. Perhaps the ambiguous interest in Orient might have been considered a threat to the clergy of well-rooted Christianity, and in particular Lutheran church, which dominated in Latvia. Thus, in 1880, the first book in Old Gothic orthography on the work of German missionary Richard Handmann (1840–1912)[25] was published in Latvian, titled *Joga Surapenna Kilkotejas zemidara dzīves gājums un atgriešana*[26, 27, 28]. The book of 32 pages is a narrative dedicated to the life and ordeals of an Indian zamindar called Yoga Surapenna and the hardship of a missionary to convert a 'well rooted pagan' into an obedient Christian devotee. The narrative is a rich source of historical data on the life of Indian people and the methods applied by Handmann to convert as many indigenous people as possible into Christianity, and particularly into Lutheranism, hence, it could be considered as a chronicle. Handmann advocates the doctrine of Christianity as the only saviour from ordeals undergone by Yoga Surapenna, namely, imprisonment. Surapenna's conversion takes place in three stages: disappointment into his ancestors' gods followed by conversion into Islam, and finally, after disappointment in Islam, he gets converted into Christianity. The narrator also indirectly reveals that some of his first converts belonged to the lowest classes of social strata,

[25] Richard Handmann – a higly prolific German missionary from Leipcig mission with 39 works in 95 publications in 2 languages and 329 library holdings. Available at http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-no98064600/ (retrieved 18.11.2018).

[26] The translation of title in English. Yoga Surapenna – the course of the life of a zamindar from Kilkoteya and his converting, 1880. (Latv. Sarakstīts no Riht Indijas Trischinopoles ewangeliskas luttera tizzibas missionara R. Handmanna; Engl. Written by the East India Trischinopole Lutheric religion missionary R. Handmann).

[27] Handmann, R. Translated into Latvian by Blumberg, H. *Joga Surapenna Kilkotejas zemidara dzīves gājums un atgriešana*. Rīga, 1880.

[28] Handmann, R. *Iogi Surappen der Zemindar von Kilkotei*. Available at http://www.worldcat.org/title/iogi-surappen-der-zemindar-von-kilkotei-eine-bekehrungsgeschichte-erzahlt-von-rh-etc/oclc/560205789 (retrieved 18.11.2018).

most likely, outcasts as by converting into Christianity they obtained some human rights – a significant reason to abandon the religion of the forefathers[29]. Needless to say, the Indians or pagans are depicted in a very controversial manner, firstly, as people belonging to a learned and highly spirited nation, and at the same time, as very shallow persons, emotionally as cold as stone.[30]

Thus, the narrative of Yoga Surrapenna is preceded only by a hand-written manuscript, in black ink, additions in pencil and black ink, on Sanskrit studies[31] by a Latvian poet and philologist Jēkabs Lautenbahs-Jūsmiņš (birth name: Jēkabs Lautenbahs, 1847–1928)[32]. He was also a lecturer, privatdocent and a professor (1878–1918) at the Faculty of History and Philosophy at University of Terbata (contemporary Tartu). Lautenbahs-Jūsmiņš wrote articles on the themes of literature, linguistics, folklore, mythology etc. in Latvian, Russian and German languages. Another book on Sanskrit grammar[33], printed in German language, was discovered by the author of this article in the library of Latvian Roerich Society[34].

Then, in 1888, the same year, when Latvian epic *Bearslayer* was completed, the *Hitopadeca*[35, 36] was published in Germany in Old Gothic orthography – a renowned collection of Indian 'folk' wisdom – useful tips, fables, maxims based on ideas reflected in *Panchatantra*[37, 38] that

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[29] Handmann, R. Translated into Latvian by Blumberg, H. *Joga Surapenna Kilkotejas zemidara dzīves gājums un atgriešana.* Rīga, 1880, pp. 15–16.

[30] Ibid, p. 5.

[31] Lautenbahs-Jūsmiņš, J. *Anleitung zum Studien der Sanskrit-Sprache.* (n.p.), 187 u.

[32] More about life and work of Lautenbahs-Jūsmiņš, J. Available at http://literatura.lv/autors/Jekabs-Lautenbahs-Jusmins/26319 (retrieved 18.11.2018).

[33] Fick, R. *Praktische Grammatik der Sanskrit-Sprache für den Selbstunterricht.* Wien: A. Hartleben's Verlag, 18 uu.

[34] More information about Latvian Roerich Society is available at http://www.latvijasrerihabiedriba.lv/images/RXLVang.htm (retrieved 18.11.2018).

[35] Fritze, L. Hitopadeça: Ein Indisches Lehrbuch Der Lebensklugheit In Erzählungen Und Sprüchen. Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1888.

[36] In Sanskrit: हितोपदेशः [Hitopadeśa]. IAST transliteration.

[37] In Sanskrit: पञ्चतन्त्र [Pañcatantra]. IAST transliteration.

[38] More about Pañcatantra. Available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810105545695 (retrieved 18.11.2018).

was composed 100–500 B.C. in Sanskrit by an ancient brahmin called Viṣṇuśarman. However, it was received by the Misiņš Library only in 1925, most likely, as a donation from a private collection. It is impossible to trace the exact year when the book reached Latvia.

A few years later, in 1891, Latvian readers were introduced to Indian customs, religious views, virtues, household and culture based on the oldest ancient Indian scripture – the Rigveda – in the article in Latvian language "Indiešu vecākā kultūra un literatūra"[39] by Weismaņu Jānis[40] (1867–1913) which was published in the first nationally oriented periodical containing article collections and titled *Sēta, Daba, Pasaule*[41], released in Jelgava, in the notebook No. 6. The publication of the periodical was realized in the time span from 1860–1893 by Latvian intelligentsia called 'New Latvians'. The reference to this work is also given in the index of belletrist literature translated into Latvian, which was published in 1902[42].

There are nine articles in Latvian National Digital Library (www.periodika.lv) covering the time span from 1810–1940 and dedicated to Ancient Indian music, however, the most explicit information on music is given in "Pictorial Music of Fabulous India" by professor of Ancient Indian music Krishna Narain Swami (n.d.)[43], whereby Latvian reader is introduced to the history, music instruments and tone system of Ancient Indian music.

Latvian scholars who had dedicated a considerable time to Indology, achieving recognised and well-appreciated results, include a linguist,

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[39] Translation by the author of this paper in English: *Indian oldest culture and literature*.

[40] He was also publishing under the pseudonym Pavasaru Jānis.

[41] Apgādājis Alunāns, J. *Sēta, Daba, Pasaule*. Sestā burtnīca. Jelgava: Drukāta pie I. F. Stefenhāgena un dēla, 1891. More information available at http://www.lingvistiskakarte.lv/tag/seta_daba_pasaule (retrieved 19.11.2018).

[42] Sastādījis Āronu Matiss. *Latviešu tulkotās beletristikas rādītājs*. Rīga: Drukājuši Kalniņš un Deutschman, 1902.

[43] Svami, P. K. N. *Teiksmainās indijas gleznainā muzika*. Rīga: *Atpūta* No. 775, 1939. The original orthography of the professor's name given in the article is retained here.

ethnographer and folklore scholar, professor Pēteris Šmits (1869–1938)[44] – the first Latvian orientalist who had mastered Chinese, Manchurian, Mongolian and a number of other languages[45], however, there is no evidence that Šmits had mastered Sanskrit. Yet Šmits had written a comparative research on the mythology of the Balts, Greeks, Romans, Prussians and Indo-Europeans in the book *Baltu Mitoloģija* (1918)[46] and a number of publications on Oriental languages, Latvian philology and Latvian language, the latter one in collaboration with another great Latvian scholar – linguist and philologist – Jānis Endzelīns (1873–1961)[47]. Endzelīns brought extensive contribution to development of Latvian language, but mainly gained recognition as a world class scientist with his research methods in historic-comparative linguistics.[48] The connection of Endzelīns with Indology will be more elaborated in the next sections. One cannot miss a social activist and a chief of Lutheran Church in Luga parish, Sankt-Petersburg Gubernia, the Russian Empire – Juris Lecs (sometimes called Lecis, 1860–1935)[49] who apparently had written quite specifically about such Ancient Indian scriptures as the Rigveda, Atharvaveda, and gives references to Taittisiya-Brahmanam[50], and even analyses and comparisons of Sanskrit terms and mythological deities with

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[44] More information about Pēteris Šmits is available at http://garamantas.lv/lv/person/25873/Peteris-Smits (retrieved 07.12.2018).

[45] His contemporaries argued that Šmits had mastered 26 languages. Information available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_burt1928n06|article:DIVL253|query:P%C4%93teri%20%C5%A0mitu%20P%C4%93teri%20%C5%A0mitu|issueType:P (retrieved 19.11.2018).

[46] Prof. Šmidt, P. *Latviešu mitoloģija*. Maskava: Latviešu Rakstnieku un Mākslinieku Biedriba, 1918, pp. 7–16.

[47] More about Jānis Endzelīns available at http://garamantas.lv/lv/person/26246/Janis-Endzelins (retrieved 07.12.2018).

[48] Endzelina, N. J. *Par latweeschu prepozicijam*. Austrums (8). Riga, 1897.

[49] Misāne, A. *Reliģija un latviešu nacionālisms ideju vēsturē Latvijā*. Latvijas Universitāte Vēstures un filozofijas fakultāte: Filozofijas nodaļa, 2016, p. 78. Available at http://dspace.lu.lv/dspace/bitstream/handle/7/34500/298-56364-Misane_Agita_am09480.pdf?sequence=1 (retrieved 08.12.2018).

[50] Original orthography has been retained.

Latvian counterparts in two of his pamphlets titled *Aryans–Latvians*[51] and *Creed of Ancient Latvians and prettiness of the Soul in Social Life*[52]. However, Agita Misāne also admitted that these articles and a research work did not qualify for publishing elsewhere in scientific journals[53], neither there was any evidence that Lecis would have known Sanskrit himself. Most likely, Lecis had reproduced some ideas of German Indologists, whose references he had given, namely, German philosopher and Indologist Paul Jakob Deussen (1845–1919) and a Latvian researcher – A. Winter (n.d.) who had written an article dedicated to one Latvian folksong and the hymn of Rigveda,[54] and etymological analyses were rather superficial and arbitrary.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable manuscripts discovered by the author in the Misiņš library, is *Commentaries on Avesta and Rigveda* by Kārlis Zalts[55] (1885–1953) – a mathematician and researcher of folklore. Zalts had been publishing his scientific articles with the real name, as well as pseudonym 'Zalktis' since 1906 on themes related to exact sciences, philosophical matters, and also Latvian folklore, specifically focusing on road transportation in ancient Latvia, and horse related research. Therefore, finding the handwritten manuscript in Russian, Latvian and German (old orthography) – written in Kiev from 1907 to 1909 was a great surprise, as it was apparently not exposed to large audiences and certainly remained unpublished. However, this discovery alongside with the article related to Rigveda by Weismaņu Jānis, as well as several other publications in German

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[51] Leca, J. *Āreeši – latveeši*. Jelgava: Latviešu etnogrāfijas biedrības izdevums, No. 30, 1914.

[52] Lecis, J. *Senlatviešu dievticība un dvēseles glītums sadzīvē*. Rīga: Latviešu etnogrāfijas biedrības izdevums, No. 3, 1917.

[53] Misāne, A. *Reliģija un latviešu nacionālisms ideju vēsturē Latvijā*. Latvijas Universitāte Vēstures un filozofijas fakultātē, Filozofijas nodaļa, 2016, pp. 77–79.

[54] Winter, A. *Mein Bruder freit um mich* (*Grib brālitis mani jemt*). Mythologischer Versuch über ein lettisches Volkslied und ein Lied des Rig-Veda, Berlin: Verlag von A. Asher & Co, 1897, pp. 172–184. Available at https://www.digi-hub.de/viewer/image/DE-11-001674327/186/ (retrieved 08.12.2018). Unfortunately, the author of this paper did not succed to trace more information about Latvian researcher Winter, A.

[55] More about Kārlis Zalts is available at http://garamantas.lv/lv/person/26678 (retrieved 19.11.2018).

language, is a clear indication of the profound interest of Latvian scholars and intelligentsia in Indian literatures. The author possesses no evidence on the reasons why the latter manuscript remained unpublished. One can only speculate whether there was a threat of censorship by the tsarist regime of Russian empire or other considerations. Most likely, more studies were conducted by Latvian scholars and intelligentsia that would require an in-depth research. Nevertheless, it might partially explain the interest of the great Latvian poet Rainis in Oriental literatures and philosophies that will be more explicitly elaborated upon in the next section.

4. Latvian poets, writers and translators – the early Indologists from 1900 to 1940

The current section contains an overview of translations of Indian literature into Latvian from 1900 to 1940, as well as a new dimension of Rainis's personality related to Oriental philosophies.

The list and overview of translations of Indian literary works into Latvian was given in the edition of *The History of Latvian Writing* (1934)[56]. Vilis Plūdons (birth name: Vilis Lejnieks; 1874–1940) – a Latvian poet translated *Chudraka*[57] (*Čudraka*) – the ancient Sanskrit drama in ten acts in 1910[58], and later it was also staged in the contemporary Latvian National Theatre during the occupation period under the title *Vasantasena*.[59]

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[56] Zeiferts, T. *Latviešu rakstniecības vēsture*. 3. sējums. Rīga: A. Gulbja grāmatu spiestuve, 1934, pp. 520–521.

[57] In Sanskrit: शूद्रक [Śūdraka]. IAST transliteration. Plūdons, V. (translator). *Čudraka*. Original title of the play is In Sanskrit: मृच्छकटिका [Mṛcchakaṭika]. IAST transliteration. In Europe, the work was titled *Vasantasena*.

[58] Zeiferts, T. *Latviešu rakstniecības vēsture*. 3. sējums. Rīga: A. Gulbja grāmatu spiestuve, 1934, pp. 520–521.

[59] Kārkliņš-Zeltmatis, E. *Latviešu teātris okupacijas laikā*. Rīga: Izglītības Ministrijas Mēnešraksts, No. 12, 1938. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2-viewer/view/index-dev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_izmm1938n12|article:DIVL153|query:Vasantasena|issueType:P (retrieved 08.12.2018).

Professor of the University of Latvia Aleksandrs Janeks (1891–1970)[60], the pioneer of colloidal chemistry in Latvia introduced the Latvian reader to the teachings of Buddha – *Buddas mācības pamati* (1924)[61] and a number of other publications on Buddhism, religion life and culture.[62]

Teodors Lejas Krūmiņš (1871–1947), a writer and translator, translated *The Beggar Woman* or *The Beggar Girl* (*Indietes stāsti*) in 1921.[63]

Valts Dāvids (1890–1969), a writer and translator, translated Rabindranath Tagore's (1861–1941) poem "The Crescent Moon" ("Augošs mēness") and one act play *Chitra* (*Čitra*) – both in 1922.[64]

Jēkabs Janševskis (birth name: Jēkabs Janovskis; 1865–1931), a Latvian teacher, journalist, translator and writer, translated classical Sanskrit writer – Kalidasa's (the 4th–5th century CE) *Shakuntala*[65] (*Šākuntala*).[66]

A Latvian writer and an art scholar Viktors Eglītis (1877–1945) was also mentioned in the anthology of Latvian written history[67], indicating that he also had been influenced by Indian Rigveda.

A long section dedicated to the ancient Indian literature, poetry and epic genre giving an overview of the Vedas, Upanishads, epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, Puranas, Jainism and Buddhism texts, classical Sanskrit and Prakrit poetry, Dravidian literature, as well as Hindu literature of that period represented by several renown Indian authors, for instance, Tagore,

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[60] Alksnis, U., Grosvalds, I. *Profesors Aleksandrs Janeks*. Latvijas Universitātes raksti, 815. sēj.: Zinātņu vēsture un muzejniecība, 2017, pp. 13–22. Available at https://www.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/apgads/izdevumi/LU_Raksti/815/01_Alksnis.pdf https://doi.org/10.22364/luraksti.zvm.815.03 (retrieved 09.12.2018).

[61] Janēks, A., *Buddhas mācības pamati*. Rīga: Finansu ministrijas jūrniecības departamenta izdevums, 1924.

[62] Alksnis, U., Grosvalds, I. *Profesors Aleksandrs Janeks*. Latvijas Universitātes raksti, 815. sēj.: Zinātņu vēsture un muzejniecība, 2017, p. 21.

[63] Zeiferts, T. *Latviešu rakstniecības vēsture*. 3. sējums. Rīga: A. Gulbja grāmatu spiestuve, 1934, pp. 520–521.

[64] Ibid.

[65] In Sanskrit: शकुन्तला [Śakuntalā], IAST transliteration.

[66] Zeiferts, T. *Latviešu rakstniecības vēsture*. 3. sējums. Rīga: A. Gulbja grāmatu spiestuve, 1934, pp. 520–521.

[67] Ibid., p. 125.

was published in the illustrated almanac *The World History of Writing*[68] A writer and translator Jānis Veselis (1896–1962)[69] in 1931 composed a tragedy in three acts *Jumis*[70] – a dramatic poem that depicts the migration processes of ancient Aryans. 36 actors were involved in 54 roles named after many well-known characters and deities from Latvian and Indian mythology and epic literature, for instance: Sita, Jumis, Naja, Hanumats, Vivasvats, Barata etc.[71] Unfortunately, Veselis did not finish the translation of ancient Indian epic *Mahabharata*.

Another Latvian amateur researcher and a writer who was highly estimated by the contemporaries for his research work on comparative linguistics, mythology and Latvian language history – Voldemārs Leitis[72] (n.d.), who at his own expense published four books: *Latvian-like Indian Rigveda* (1938)[73] – the entire book is permeated with the ideas to raise Latvian nationalism by means of showing its ancient roots; *Latvian Gods in Asia* (1939)[74] – the mythological deities of Latvia, Egypt, Japan, China and India; *The Master, Cow and a Ploughman* (1939)[75] – on the etymology of Latvian words; *Blonde or Brunette?: (difference of characters)* (1939) – on

[68] Egle, R. Upīts, A. *Pasaules rakstniecības vēsture*. 1. grāmata. Rīga: izdevis A. Gulbis, 1930, pp. 16–76.

[69] More information about Jānis Veselis is available at http://garamantas.lv/lv/person/25654/Janis-Veselis (retrieved 09.12.2018).

[70] *Jumis* – an ancient Latvian deity and a symbol of fertility and wealth, often linked to crop yield. Graphic design of this symbol can be depicted as two crotchets and may look like English letter 'W'. Available at http://valoda.ailab.lv/kultura/kultura/orn12.htm (retrieved 09.12.2018).

[71] Osis, J. *Jāņa Veseļa traģēd. 3 cēl. 'Jumis'*. Riga: Filma un Skatuve, No. 23, 1931. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_fisk1931n23|article:DIVL215|query:%C4%81rie%C5%A1u%20%C4%81rie%C5%A1u|issueType:P (retrieved 09.12.2018).

[72] Most likely, Leitis was a president of American Latvian Trade Community who left America for Latvia in July 21, 1920. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_amea1920n03|article:DIVL71|query:Voldem%C4%81rs%20Leitis|issueType:P (retrieved 25.12.2018).

[73] Leitis, V. *Latviskā Indijas Rigveda*. Rīga: Aut. izd., 1938.

[74] Leitis, V. *Latviešu dievi Āzijā*. Rīga: Aut. izd., 1939.

[75] Leitis, V. *Kungs, govs un arājs*. Ogre: Aut. izd., 1939.

anthropometric features of Asian and Latvian people, as well as differences in character traits. A newspaper article, as well as the information acquired during the interview with the respondent[76] reveals that *Leitis* was also invited to read on his research at the Society of Researchers of Latvia in Antiquity (*Latvijas senatnes pētītāju biedrība*) and he had been working on *Latvian – Aryan dictionary* (*Latviešu – āriešu vārdnīca*)[77] stating that Leitis had found 30 000 terms similar to the ones in the Vedas, whereas another article denominates it *The Historical Dictionary of the Latvian language* (*Latviešu valodas vēsturiskā vārdnīca*) and the number of terms collected by Leitis – 25 000,[78] as well as his works were sent to Theodor Diedrichson – a Latvian scholar working and residing in Beijing, China,[79] who had given suffice arguments to support Leitis's and professor Šmits's assertions on the matter of resemblance of Latvian binary mythological deity *Jumis* with its counterparts: Avestan *Yima*, Pahlavi *Yimak*, Buddhist and Aryan *Yama* and *Yamī*, Persian *Yim* and *Yimak,* Chinese *Yin* and *Yang*, Japanese *Izanaki* and *Izanami*, and, finally, Egyptian *Osiris* and *Isis*.

Rihards Rudzītis (1898–1960*)*, a poet, philosopher, essayist, translator, a social activist, and a president of Latvian Roerich Society from 1936 to 1940. Rudzītis had studied the classical languages at Terbata University,

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[76] The respondent Valdis Muktupāvels, Dr. art., prof. at the University of Latvia informed about the Latvian-Sanskrit Dictionary, record No. 4618, (retrieved 25.12.2018).

[77] *Latviešu valoda priekš 4000 gadiem*. Rīga: *Rīts*, No. 103, 1935. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_rits1935n103|article:DIVL350|query:senatn%C4%93%20Latvie%C5%A1u%20senatnes%20p%C4%93t%C4%ABt%C4%81ju%20biedr%C4%ABbas|issueType:P (retrieved 09.12.2018).

[78] Grāmatu galds. *Visai intereranta grāmata par Āzijas materiāliem mūsu senvēsturei*. Rīga: *Valdības Vēstnesis*, No. 104, 1939. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2-viewer/view/index-dev.html?lang=fr#panel:pp|issue:/p_001_wawe1939n104|page:13|issueType:P (retrieved 08.12.2018).

[79] Diedrichson's detailed response was published in the newspaper *Dzimtenes atskaņas*, No. 4, Tientsin (China): Tientzinas latviesu biedribas literaras sekcijas izdevums, 1939, pp. 43–52. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev.html?lang=fr#panel:pp|issue:/p_001_dzas1939n04|article:DIVL754|issueType:P (retrieved 25.12.2018).

translations of the Bible in different languages, treatises on Buddhism, Bhagavad-Gita, Theosophical literature and the works by Helen Roerich (1879–1955) and Nicholas Roerich (1874–1947). He had also translated the works by Vivekananda, and the Roerichs Tagore etc. However, among all the translations it is noteworthy to highlight the translation of collected works of Tagore within a time span from 1927 to 1934 in collaboration with Kārlis Egle (1887–1974), a bibliographer, literary historian, a translator. A letter written by Rudzītis to Egle on March 9, 1921[80] reveals that Egle suggested translating and publishing the collected works of Tagore, an idea Rudzīts accepted with great delight, however, doubted to find funding for it.

Although Rudzītis admired Rainis and even had written him a letter, yet he did not receive the reply from Rainis, and their friendship failed to develop. They met only once in Riga, in 1929. As the body language suggests in the photo (Figure 1), Rudzītis did not feel comfortable in that atmosphere. Moreover, his daughter Gunta Rudzīte admitted that her father was slightly disappointed after meeting Rainis, as he found him too pragmatic.[81] Rudzītis's diary reaveals that he felt perplexed and dissapointed on the fact Rainis had turned from socialism to individualism. "He is such a singleton that he rather craves friendship". Rudzītis also finds detachment in religious views – not only longing for humanity, but also for transcendence[82].

A letter sent to Aspazija by Rudzītis on October 7, 1929[83] shortly after the death of Rainis allows to discern some new dimensions of Rainis's personality. Despite of the fact Rainis was a lawyer by education and also a politician and public figure, he had believed in the immortality of the soul. In addition, in his letter Rudzītis claimed that although Rainis was a

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[80] A letter is available in Kārlis Egle fund in *Misiņa library*.

[81] The interview with Gunta Rudzīte and Alvils Hartmanis, registered No. 4614 in the catalogue of ANOH.

[82] Rudzītis, R. *Dvēseles dziesmas*. Dienasgrāmatas II. daļa 1920.–1930, n.p.: Izdevniecība "Sirds gaisma", 2011, pp. 433–436.

[83] Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia), inventory No. RTMM-71057 Asp K 75/26.

Figure 1. February 27, 1929 at Riga City Hospital No. 2. Left to right – Rudzītis with Johanna Ķeģis, Rainis and a nurse Dombrovska, the last person is unknown.
Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia),
inventory No. RTMM-43508 (1)-Rainis.

very religious person, yet did not belong to any church. Perhaps the most illustrative was epistolary communication in the time span from 1911 to 1915 between Rainis and someone called Ance Rožkalne (birth name: Ripa; n.d.) residing in Dresden, Germany. It reveals that Rainis had studied Theosophical literature, Bhagavad-Gita etc. In total, Rainis had received 28 postcards[84] (see Figure 2).

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[84]   Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia), Rainis's fund, No. Rai K 163/1-28

Figure 2. A letter from Ance Rožkalne sent from Dresden on January 18, 1911.
Deciphered in modern Latvian language by Gundega Grīnuma.
Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia),
inventory No. RTMM-120339 (1)-Rainis.

Rainis with his wife, Aspazija, had an extensive library that contained the books from the variety of spheres and all that is an evidence of the vast spectrum of interests and that all certainly had served in the construction of the versatile genius of Rainis. The number of books related to the fields of philosophy, psychology, ethics and religion reach the count of 230.[85] Among many of the authors and realms that had handwritten notes made by Rainis one can mention the issues of Theosophy Society, Helena Blavatsky on Indian mysticism, ancient Egyptian religion, works on Plato, the Bible and Christianity, Occultism by Emma Balodis[86], Spiritism, Bhagavad-Gita, Ancient mystery religions and Christianity,

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[85]   Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia).
[86]   Emma Balodis – a pseudonym of Aleksandrs Balodis (1897–1961), he was a Latvian officer, officer at intelligence service, parapsychologist and a writer, the founder of Latvian society of Cosmosophy. Married to Emma Apare.

Raja Yoga[87], Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Lao-tse, on Talmud etc.

The fact that Rainis had studied Theosophical, Indian literature, Buddhism and showed interest in yoga had been already discussed by Sigma Ankrava[88], and Viktors Ivbulis in series of articles in a magazine *Karogs* (1988).[89] The Oriental influence on Rainis's literary works and poetry has also been highlighted by Suniti Kumar Chatterji (1890–1977) in his book *Balts and Aryans* where he finds influence of Karma-Yoga, Bhagavad-Gita and Vedanta philosophy on Rainis's poetry, for instance, a poem "Work and Joy" ("Darbs un prieks") and "The End and the Beginning" ("Gals un sākums")[90]. Furthermore, Kaspars Kļaviņš adds his findings of Sufi ideas being perceived by Rainis through Goethe's works – that all resulted in a fusion of Western and Eastern philosophies[91] that is all-pervasive in the collection of poems *Fire and Night* (*Uguns un nakts*), and alongside the conception of immortality and mythological symbols: solar and lunar, as well the mythological elements of Latvian folk songs are all depicted in the collection of poems *Ave sol*. For example:

> *Saulei jāiet lielā gaita,*
> *Gaisa gali nosarkuši.*
> *Saule taisa ceļa ģērbus:*
>
> *Savus sārtos zīda svārkus*
> *Novēdina vakarblāzmā;*
> *Uzvelk jaunu, baltu kreklu,*
> *Melno nomet jūras viļņos. –*

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[87] In-depth studies of *Raja Yoga* by Rainis was indicated by one of the respondents – Jānis Ziemelis, record No. 4615 in the catalogue of ANOH.

[88] Ankrava, S. Eastern Dimension in the Representation of Latvian Identity at the Beginning of Latvian Literature and Now. University of Latvia, Scholarly Papers, Vol. 779, Oriental Studies, 2012, pp. 39–52.

[89] Ivbulis, V. Sasaukšanās pāri kontinentiem. Rīga: Žurnāls *Karogs*, No. 9, 01.09.1988, pp. 162–168.

[90] Chatterji, S. K. *Balts and Aryans in their Indo-European Background.* Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1968, pp. 173–174.

[91] Kļaviņš, K. *Savienotie trauki.* Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2018, pp. 175–187.

Aizbrauc saule zelta ratos
Vīnu dzert uz sudrabkalnu;
Rokā tura divus kausus,
Labā baltu, kreisā zaļu:
Labā – ledus sniega putām,
Kreisā – salda lapu sula:
Nāvi dzert, lai atkal celtos (in Latvian)[92].

Although at a first glance, it may seem that Rainis in parallel to his studies of established religious practices and philosophies had also immersed into the lore of mysticism and occultism, it is not quite so, as he had a vast collection of newspaper cuttings on the topics related to philosophers' views on cosmogony, science, pragmatic future prophecies, for instance, an article on "Edison's views on the future of the mankind"[93], the article "Modern magic",[94] unmasking all these occult sciences and spiritism with contemporary science. All in all, this collection of articles unfolds a very pragmatic and well-educated person, however, at the same time, a romantic philosopher contemplating on the cosmogonic ontology at the dawn of the civilization epistemology of the human existence, a day-dreamer envisioning a beautiful future of the mankind.

5. Societies, organizations and their activities propagating Indic sciences in pre-World War II Latvia

In the period preceding World War II, despite the complicated geopolitical situation in the country, a number of societies and organizations were formed, which apparently collaborated at some cross-points of their ideologies propagated. A vast collection of historiographic material of yoga

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[92] Rainis, J. Kopotie raksti 30 sējumos. 2. sējums. *Ave sol*. Rīga: Izdevniecība "Zinātne", 1977, p. 56.

[93] Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia), inventory No. RTMM-1231708 Rai J 104/1.

[94] Source: Literature and Music Museum (Latvia), inventory No. RTMM-28438/3 Rai I 102/3.

movement in Latvia has been investigated by Solveiga Krūmiņa-Koņkova[95] as well as gathered by an ardent Latvian yoga history activist – Dzintars Vilnis Korns[96], therefore in this section only a list of the most influential societies with their leaders and their main area of function will be given in a chronological order, exclusively new facts will be given explicitly based on the records in the journals of meetings inter alia archive records.

In the journals of Herder's Institute in Riga (established on September 7, 1921)[97], one can find a very interesting handwritten table of weekly lesson schedule in German language that clearly displays a particular lesson of Sanskrit texts scheduled on Tuesday afternoon, and the lecturer is Endzelīns[98], despite of the fact that nobody by the name of Endzelīns was found after a close study of the sections that display the names of educators' personnel at the institute[99].

The Society of Parapsychology (*Parapsīcholoģijas biedrība*) was established in Riga in 1925[100] by Emma Apare and 4 more persons. The main goals set by this society were to explore different psychological phenomena and Oriental metaphysics. However, later on the society changed its name to "The Centre of Yoga Sciences in Latvia", its chairperson was Harijs Dīkmanis (1895–1979), Jānis Veselis (n.d.; a cousin of a writer with the same name). Dīkmanis knew Sanskrit and was learning Hindi. The main, but not the only goal of this society was to propagate

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[95] Krumina-Konkova, S. A glimpse into the history of yoga movement in Latvia. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XVII*. Latvijas Universitātes aģentūra Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2014, pp. 153–188.

[96] The interview with Dzintars Vilnis Korns, registered No. 4620 in the catalogue of ANOH.

[97] N. A. Herdera institūts audzina lojālus Latvijas pilsoņus. Rīga: *Jaunākās Ziņas*, No. 224, 1939. Available at http://www.periodika.lv/periodika2viewer/view/indexdev. html?lang=fr#panel:pa|issue:/p_001_jazi1939n224|article:DIVL357|issueType:P (retrieved 30.12.2018).

[98] LSHA Fund No. 4772, entry No. 1, 1920–1940, p. 73.

[99] Ibid., pp. 88–92.

[100] Krumina-Konkova, S. A glimpse into the history of yoga movement in Latvia. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XVII*. Latvijas Universitātes aģentūra Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2014, p. 154.

yoga as a new and alternative way to obtain physical and mental health[101] (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. A poster inviting to attend the sequel lecture "On India, Cultural and Religious Problem" by Lakšmisvar Sinh (Original name*: Laxmiswar Singha*), organized by the Society of Parapsychology.
Source: The Misiņš Library, Kārlis Egle fund.

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[101] Krumina-Konkova, S. A glimpse into the history of yoga movement in Latvia. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XVII.* Latvijas Universitātes aģentūra Filozofijas un socio-loģijas institūts, 2014, pp. 153–188.

Latvian Society of Vegetarians (*Latvijas Veģetāriešu biedrība*) was established on August 31, 1927[102]. Its main objectives are to propagate ideology and practical vegetarianism, to conduct scientific studies of vegetarianisms, to combat all forms of cruelty etc. Among the leaders of the society one can mention doctor Epplè (n.d.), doctor homeopath Haralds Lūkins (1906–1991), and doctor Augusts Vilis Kļaviņš (n.d.). On January 21, 1933, the society decided to arrange discussion evenings on "Ethical Principles of Vegetarianism", the speakers wereDr. Kļaviņš (n.d.) and Dīkmanis, whereas L. Birnbaum (n.d.) would be reading his report in February on "Vegetarian Dishes of Ancient Latvians". In the same year, on April 1 events are organized to celebrate Mother's Day in collaboration with Latvian Anti-Nicotine Society. Rudzītis is also invited to give an open lecture on his essay "Mother's Mission" (*Mātes misija*)[103]. Later, on December 2, 1933, the board decided to create a three-level program that would investigate the following points: 1) to establish an ideology of life reform; 2) to record individual observations regarding vegetarian diet; 3) to investigate diabetes and propogate a diet based on individual's caharcter, body type, health condition and occupation[104]. Although there are no direct indications of applying Ayurveda methods, yet these attempts show indirectly how they might have been perceived through teachings incorporated in yoga philosohy. At the same time, the records majorly reveal dissemination of the dietary recommendations developed by the Swiss physician at the time – Maximillian Bircher-Brenner (1867–1939)[105].

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[102] The Articles of "The Society of Vegetarians" on August 31, 1927. LSHA Fund No. 2479, The 1st entry, No. 1, 1927–1940. There is another copy of Articles in German language.

[103] LSHA Fund No. 2479, 1st entry, No. 1, 1927–1940, meeting minutes No. 5, April 1, 1933.

[104] Ibid., meeting minutes No. 15, December 2, 1933.

[105] Wolf, E. A new way of living: Maximilian Bircher-Benner (1867–1939). *At the cutting edge. Swiss Pioneers in Science and Medicine*, No. 71, (n.p.): *Karger Gazette*, 2010, pp. 11–12, DOI: 10.5167/uzh-40410. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271699495_A_new_way_of_living_Maximilian_Bircher-Benner_1867-1939 (retrieved 30.12.2018).

Memories reflected by Lūkins's son, Indars Lūkins, reveal that his father received herbal medicine from Tibet sent by Roerich family[106].

Latvian Anthroposophical Society (*Latvijas antroposofiskā biedrība*) was established in Riga on July 3, 1929 by fifteen members, and its first chairperson was doctor Arthur Weaber (n.d.), the second – Woldemar Fridrichson (n.d.)[107]. The society embraced and disseminated the ideology of Rudolf Joseph Lorenz Steiner (1861–1925) and Carl Unger (1878–1929). The number of their followers reached 45 by 1939[108].

Latvian Roerich Society (*Latvijas Rēriha biedrība*) was officially established on October 13, 1930 by doctor Fēlikss Lūkins, however, the ideas of Roerich were initiated by Vladimirs Šibajevs (1898–1975)[109] who had met Nikolay and Helen Roerich in London in 1920[110].

The aforementioned Emma Apare-Balodis's husband Aleksandrs Balodis became the first chairpersons of the Society of Latvian Spiritual Sciences (*Latvijas spiritisko zinātņu biedrība*), established on December 24, 1930, which both of them temporarily left in 1933 to re-join again, and then, along with other Russian and German activists established the Society for Promoting Cosmosophic Sciences in Latvia (*Kosmosofijas zinātņu veicināšanas biedrība Latvijā*) on December 19, 1933[111].

Vegetarian Consumer-Producer Society (*Veģetarais patērētaju-ražotāju kooperatīvs "Laikmets"*) was established on March 22, 1934 by Kārlis Stūre (n.d.), Jānis Missiņš (n.d.), Klements Vaičulenas (n.d.), Anna Brūvelis (n.d.), Katrīna Draudziņš (n.d.), Lavīze Olga Missiņš (n.d.), Eiženija Fricbergs (n.d.), Aleksejs Rencis (n.d.), Rihards Rudzītis. Soon

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[106] Lūkins, I. *Lūkiniem – 100*. Rīga: 2006. Available at http://www.mezaparks.eu/2007/05/lkiniem-100.html (retrieved 29.12.2018).

[107] LSHA Fund No. 2910, entry No. 1, case No. 1 (1929–1939), pp. 1–3.

[108] Ibid., p. 23.

[109] Latvian Roerich Society. Available at http://www.latvijasrerihabiedriba.lv/images/RXLVlat.htm (retrieved 30.12.2018).

[110] The interview with Gunta Rudzīte and Alvils Hartmanis, registered No. 4614 in the catalogue of ANOH.

[111] In greater detail the activities described in: Krumina-Konkova, S. A glimpse into the history of yoga movement in Latvia. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XVII*. Latvijas Universitātes aģentūra Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2014, pp. 155–161.

the number of members reached 27.[112] The main aims of the society were to supply consumers with genuine foodstuff of full nutritional value, harmless for health, and provide other consumables. The society neither sold nor produced meat nor meat products, nor fish and fish products[113]. In 1935, doctor Fēlikss Lūkins also joined this society. A remarkable fact to mention is that many members of the society were simultaneously engaged in the activities of Latvian Roerich Society.

Conclusion

It should be noted that the interest in Indology firstly arose in France owing to translations of Upanishads by Duperron, further blossoming in the care of German linguists, philosophers and writers: Bopp, Schlegel brothers, Schopenhauer, Goethe and Herder. However, the tide of Indology through Europe was possible owing to the age of Romanticism invoked by English poet Young and later on overtaken by Germans and, in particular, the French philosopher Rousseau, whose disciple was Herder – a German who arouse interest among the Latvian and German intelligentsia to explore the ancient Latvian culture and traditions by collecting Latvian folksongs. The remarkable reciprocal interaction and influence was established between Goethe and Herder – the shared interest of Indian philosophy and Latvian culture and traditions, and later on through Goethe's literary works irrefutable influence upon Rainis's views and literary work. Many of Rainis's contemporaries were also deeply touched and fascinated by Indian literature, philosophy, culture and yoga teachings, to the extent that several societies were established to disseminate and proliferate the ideology and doctrines rooting in the sacred texts of India. Apart from the wave of Romanticism and discovery of the family of Indo-European languages, among which Lithuanian as the closest sister of Latvian was admitted to be the nearest linguistically to Sanskrit, it was also a geopolitical situation that drew together the two nations standing, so far away geographically.

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[112] LSHA Fund No. 4698, entry No. 1, (years 1934–1937), articles, p. 13.

[113] Ibid., pp. 1–7.

It is evident that the lively interest in Indian culture was also strengthened by a visit of a professor of Ancient Indian music – Krishna Narain Swami. To sum it up, the influence of Indian culture onto Latvian intelligentsia and culture life cannot be underestimated, and therefore it requires further and more profound studies.

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Darima Amogolonova

BUDDHISM IN THE RUSSIAN DESECULARIZATION PROCESSES
(MATERIALS OF BURYATIA)

Introduction

When speaking about desecularization we keep in mind that the term refers simultaneously to methodological level[1] and to specific social practices that are very characteristic of the post-Soviet space[2]. One can see that the current situation of recent and rapidly acquired religiosity is similar in some respects to Soviet atheism as a characteristic of social consciousness: in both cases, personal choice reflects the ideological landscape, and contemporary public culture performs the function of compulsion to no

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[1]   Refusing from his previous ideas, Peter Berger stated in 1999: "Modernization has had some secularizing effects [..]. But it has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization. Also, secularization on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of individual consciousness. [..] The proposition that modernity necessarily leads to a decline of religion is, in principle, 'value free'" (Berger, Peter. Desecularization of the World. *The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999, pp. 1–18, p. 3).

[2]   Post-Soviet desecularization implies: (1.) rapprochement between the state and the churches; (2.) inclusion of religion into education beginning at the elementary school, year one; (3.) revival of religious/spiritual values in the public morality; (4.) returning religion to the central position in formation of national ideology; (5.) rapid raise in the numbers of those who name themselves believers; (6.) increasing importance of religion in social identification.

lesser degree than the Soviet ideological diktat. Under the current modern conditions, wherein in which ethnicity and public culture have (from around 2000) been largely depoliticized, the religious values – understood as a fundamental component of national culture – have become the most important marker of national space, and serve as the spiritual, moral and ideological basis for the 'blood and soil' sentiments that in the recent past fed the ideology of ethno-national memory and common goals.

Surveys of the growth of religiosity in the Buryat population have produced impressive figures, especially in comparison with the Soviet period. According to opinion polls carried out in 1982–87, the number of believers had fallen to less than 10 percent, and was even lower among the urban population. The same study found that, among students, the number of believers was 0.9 percent, and among people with higher education there was not a single believer or undecided respondent.[3]

In contrast, public opinion polls conducted in Buryatia in recent years show an overwhelming level of religiosity among Buryats, with the number of non-believers falling to almost pre-revolutionary (before 1917) levels: for example, among urban Buryat women the total number of convinced believers and undecided tending towards the faith was 96.4 percent (for Buryat men, 79.6 percent)[4], with the majority of respondents identifying themselves as Buddhists. Present-day religiosity embraces people regardless of sex, age and education[5]. An interesting example of educational level

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[3] Kruchkov, N. I. & Mikhailov, T. M. *Preodolenie religioznyh perezhitkov v Buryatii* (Overcoming religious survivals in Buryatia). Ulan-Ude: Buryatskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1987, pp. 44–47.

[4] Budaeva, D. T., Merdygeev, Z. R., Khanturgaeva, N. T., Itigelova, L. M. *Voprosy sohraneniya i razvitiya tolerantnosti, problemy grazhdanskoi aktivnosti naseleniya Respubliki Buryatiya* (Preservation and promotion of tolerance, the problem of civic engagement in the Republic of Buryatia). Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo BGU, 2010, p. 48.

[5] It is worth noting that in Soviet times, the majority of believers were the elderly residing in rural areas mainly. On the contrary, at present, it is the older people (whose best years of life were spent in the Soviet period) often call themselves unbelievers and atheists. In addition, at present the level of religiosity among urban dwellers is higher than among peasants. No doubt, this is a result of greater involvement of city dwellers in political ideology.

among believers was provided by research undertaken by sociologists in recent years. In the case of Buryat Buddhist communities, the sociologist Timur Badmatsyrenov strictly divides the believers into parishioners (*prohozhane*, i.e., those who attend datsans mainly for location reason or because of the authority of lamas, astrologers and healers who take patients at the datsans) and laity (*miriane*, i.e., those who ascribe themselves to a definite Buddhist school under the leadership of a prominent teacher possessing Buddhist scientific degrees. No wonder that most of these teachers are Tibetans who came to Russia).[6] The former are, for the most part, the adherents of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia (BTSR), although there are also other Buddhist temples-datsans headed by Tibetan lamas. The latter belong to the religious organizations that were formed by the Buddhist teachers who act independently from the BTSR. While the parishioners attend datsan sermons and participate in the common and individual Buddhist rituals, the laity is more interested in the teachings given by prominent teachers[7] who instruct in Buddhist philosophy and meditation practices. The researches show that the educational level of parishioners and laity is obviously different: among laity who names themselves Jampa Tinley's disciples 75.5 percent possess higher education and scientific degrees, while among parishioners only 45.5 percent (ibid., 71). It is worth noting that on formal grounds, Buryats are among the most educated ethnic groups in Russia. Educational level determines preferences in choosing Buddhist directions. In this respect, the question of ethnic and cultural identity seems to be the most topical.

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[6] For details, see: Badmatsyrenov, T. B., Abaeva, L. L., Aktamov, I. G., Badaraev, D. D. *Buddizm i socioreligioznye processy v Rossii i Mongolii* (Buddhism and socio-religious processes in Russia and Mongolia). Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo BGU, 2016.

[7] In Buryatia, the most renowned Teacher is geshe Jampa Tinley, formerly a Buddhist monk. He organized a religious community Green Tara in Ulan-Ude. In 2004, he returned the Gelong monastic vows to the Dalai Lama and at present acts as a lay-preacher.

1. Buryat ideology and institutionalized Buddhism in Russia

The current Hambo Lama – the Head of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia – thinks that the way to teach ethnonational dignity and the preservation of ethnicity is by strengthening the position of the Sangha through the realization of the projects he proposed and by proclaiming the administrative and spiritual autocephaly of the Russian Buddhist Church centred in Buryatia. He makes these arguments with a view to the international political context of the religion, considering the situation in Tibet and the future fate of the institution of the Dalai Lama, as well as Tibetan Buddhism as a whole. In this regard, he says, the presentation of the Buryat Buddhist church as a special form of northern Buddhism is aimed at achieving the "maximum reduction of Chinese influence on the minds of the Buryat believers in the future".[8] As a dogmatic religious justification for separation from Tibetan Buddhism, the Hambo Lama offers his own view on the history of the introduction and development of Buddhism among Buryats: "Buryats received Buddhism from Damba Darzha Zayaev, and he, in turn, got it in his first incarnation from the Buddha Kashyapa and in the second – from the Buddha Sakyamuni! Remember this!"[9] Therefore, "Buryat Buddhism has been quite self-sufficient for centuries and reached unprecedented heights [..]. Do not feel as if you were second-class people".[10]

The idea of autocephaly is inseparable from the proposed innovations (contemporary religious revival), designed to bring together the clergy and the ordinary 'flock' of believers: in addition to his opinion that celibacy for lamas is an optional condition, the Hambo Lama supports the idea of religious services conducted, not in Tibetan, but in the Buryat language (ibid.).

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[8] Mahachkeev, A. V. Dalai-lama ukazhet preemnika (Dalai Lama will point at his successor). *Moskovsky Komsomolets v Buryatii*, 19–26 December, 2007, p. 23.

[9] Hambo Lama. *Mysli naedine* (Thoughts when alone). Compiled by A. V. Mahachkeev. Ulan-Ude: NovaPrint, 2013, p. 14.

[10] Quoted by Mahachkeev, A. V. *Portret ierarha: XXIV Pandito Hambo lama Damba Ayusheev* (Portrait of the Hierarch: XXIV Khambo Lama Damba Ayusheev). Ulan-Ude: NovaPrint, 2010, p. 164.

Though the idea of autocephaly has not yet found a response in the minds of believers, still the term 'Buryat Buddhism' entered the vocabulary of ordinary people. This is well disclosed by the sociological surveys: when answering the question, which direction of Buddhism they adhere to, the majority of parishioners – 77.8 percent – choose Buryat Buddhism, while significantly fewer give preference to the Gelug School and Tibetan Buddhism – 3 and 7.6 percent, respectively. Among the laymen, the figures are opposite: 8.9 percent choose Buryat Buddhism, 57.7 and 23 percent – Gelug tradition and Tibetan Buddhism, respectively.[11] Thus, the higher educational level and interest to Buddhist philosophy among laymen imply less striving for simple rituals under the guidance of clergy.

Multiplication of the Buryat Buddhist community is not approved by the BTSR. Hambo Lama Ayusheev directly indicates that Buryats should be oriented towards Buryat lamas instead of Tibetan ones: "Tibetans come and give lectures here, give dedications – they consider that this is their Buddhism. Then what? They are foreigners: they will take away the wealth and leave for somewhere else – they do not care."[12] Such a position is similar to the period of Russian Empire when Buddhist clergy acted as a united front with the Russian state against foreign Mongolian and Tibetan lamas to protect the Buryat spiritual space. The reasons by which the state was guided were the unwillingness to allow outside subversive and espionage activities, while the Buryat lamas did not want competitors to preach on their territory.[13] At present, the state does not interfere in the religious activities of the newcomers, although it seems to be controlling them, while the Buddhist clergy still do not wish to share the spiritual

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[11] Badmatsyrenov, T. B., Abaeva, L. L., Aktamov, I. G., Badaraev, D. D. *Buddizm i socioreligioznye processy v Rossii i Mongolii* (Buddhism and socio-religious processes in Russia and Mongolia). Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo BGU, 2016, p. 70.

[12] Hambo Lama. *Mysli naedine* (Thoughts when alone). Compiled by A. V. Mahachkeev. Ulan-Ude: NovaPrint, 2013, p. 12.

[13] For details, see: Amogolonova, D. D. Buddizm v Buryatii: rossiiskoe gosudarstvo i konfessional'naya konkurenciya (Buddhism in Buryatia: Russian state and religious competition). *Strany i narody Vostoka*. Vypusk 36, 2015, pp. 5–41.

sphere with foreign competitors mainly due to considerations preventing the outflow of believers.

2. Religious belief or religiosity: theoretical approach and life veracity

The question of correlation between 'religious faith' and 'religiosity' is topical for the whole post-Soviet space and especially Russia. In this respect, beginning from perestroika in the USSR, the Russians (as a nation of the Russian Federation) have faced a dilemma to choose between rationalized modernity (with a good deal of Soviet atheism) and the 'religion of ancestors'. The latter has won a convincing victory having become a norm of socially approved behaviour and a mechanism of social adaptation. In the research of late 1990s, the sociologist Ayuna Bil'trikova showed that the phenomenon of personal belief was characteristic to 38.8 percent of Buryats who preferred "just believe in God and supernatural powers"[14] (thus giving way to mysticism and superstitions). No wonder that later the number of adherents to abstract belief inevitably decreased. Public opinion polls conducted in Buryatia in the years 2007–2009 have shown an overwhelming level of Buddhist religiosity among Buryats, with the number of non-believers falling to almost pre-revolutionary (before 1917) levels: for example, among urban Buryat women the total number of convinced believers and undecided tending towards the faith was 96.4 percent (for Buryat men, 79.6 percent)[15], with the majority of respondents identifying themselves as Buddhists.

In the recent years, thirty years after beginning of perestroika, public opinion polls provided answers to questions specifying faith with

[14] Bil'trikova A.V. *Buryatskaya nacional'naya intelligenciya na sovremennom etape* (Buryat national intelligentsia at the present stage). Ulan-Ude: BNC SO RAN, 2001, p. 74.

[15] Budaeva, D. T., Merdygeev, Z. R., Khanturgaeva, N. T., Itigelova, L. M. *Voprosy sohraneniya i razvitiya tolerantnosti, problemy grazhdanskoi aktivnosti naseleniya Respubliki Buryatiya* (Preservation and promotion of tolerance, the problem of civic engagement in the Republic of Buryatia). Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo BGU, 2010, p. 48.

observance of rituals (religiosity connected with temples and clergy) and faith without observing rituals (religiosity with occasional attending the temples or not attending them at all). It is worth noting that personal religiosity, albeit mainly in Buddhist colours, is still topical. 58.8 percent of parishioners and 64 percent of laymen, when answering the question "What is your attitude to religion?" chose the option "I am a believer observing religious cult", while 30.2 and 28.6 percent, respectively, chose the option "I am a believer but I do not observe rites of a religious cult".[16]

When discussing the notion 'religious belief', Rodney Needham as early as in 1972 blamed it for being unrepresentative and therefore proposed to forbid it in the humanities, namely, anthropology.[17] Instead, he proposed the terms 'religion' and 'religiosity' as quite suitable for scientific measurements. Later, Galina Lindquist and Simon Coleman also argued that the notion 'belief' is an unsuitable analytical tool for studying religious phenomena. Giving examples with representatives of non-European cultures, in particular, Chinese, the authors concluded that the concept of *belief* is too abstract and obscure to serve as a universalia of culture, and therefore must be excluded from scientific use.[18]

Nevertheless, the sociological methods imply availability of religious belief though in many or most cases it is a question of declarative faith conditioned by cultural climate and collective consciousness. Moreover, we cannot do without this notion as an operational term in the sense that the post-Soviet space is the area of religious neophytes for whom the faith, no matter how declarative it is, is an indispensable condition of belonging to a group i.e. constructing an ethnonational identity. In this respect, we should take into consideration a specific for Buryatia situation of religious syncretism, in which Buryat Shamanist cults and worldview consistently

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[16] Badmatsyrenov, T. B., Abaeva, L. L., Aktamov, I. G., Badaraev, D. D. *Buddizm i socioreligioznye processy v Rossii i Mongolii* (Buddhism and socio-religious processes in Russia and Mongolia). Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo BGU, 2016, p. 100.

[17] Needham, R. *Belief, Language, and Experience.* – Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972.

[18] Lindquist, G., Coleman, S. Against Belief? *Social Analysis*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2008, pp. 2–18.

coexist with Buddhism giving birth to the phenomenon of the Buryat national religion[19].

While in today's Buryat Shamanism the social base is gradually transforming while its textual narrative remains stable, the changing face of Buddhism among Buryats has acquired forms that are more visible and manifesting. It is worth noting that during its spread in the Buryat territories, Buddhism incorporated all the most significant social-regulating functions of Shamanism and its symbolical space (for example, the spirits-Masters of locality were given Tibetan Buddhist names); thus, in the public mind there is no conflict of world-view between the two forms of the national religion. This syncretistic approach rather rationally unifies the simplified Buddhist dogmas (ideas about Samsara and Nirvana or endless reincarnations) with Shamanic representations of the spirits that dominate a particular space and stipulate the necessity to give offerings to them. Additionally, there exists the belief that every person has to offer to his/her clan and family ancestors.

Buddhism presents a different case: its advanced philosophy and enormous global importance suggest that a person who declares him/herself a Buddhist must possess a high intellectual ability and morality. Nevertheless, the eastern (Transbaikalian) Buryats are confident that Buddhism is their native religion while they consider the western (pre-Baikal) Buryats[20] to be shamanists by birth because historically Buddhism

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[19]   Moreover, this syncretic belief acquires the features of civil religion of Buryatia population. Regardless religious creed, ethnic Russians (who are the majority of population) attend datsans. Among laymen who are grouping around Buddhist teachers there are more ethnic Russians then Buryats. Simultaneously, Buryats willingly attend Orthodox churches especially during the main Christian festivals like Easter and Christmas.

[20]   Formerly, up to 2008, besides the Republic of Buryatia, two Buryat subjects of the Russian Federation had existed. In the context of a state project on strengthening of vertical power in Russia, the Ust'-Orda Buryat Autonomous District merged with the Irkutsk region and the Aga Buryat Autonomous District merged with the Chita region, which after this received a new name – the Zabaikal'ski krai (region). Planning to make the Buryats a Buddhist nation, Hambo Lama Ayusheev accuses Irkutsk Buryats in being Shamanists instead of Buddhists: "Irkutsk Buryats are the cave

was not prominent in those territories. Nowadays, however, the majority of Buryats, irrespective of their regional origin, declare themselves Buddhists. Moreover, in recent years the idea that Buddhism is a kind of genetic accessory of all Buryats has taken root in public discourse.

3. Buryat ethnonational identity and pride in the context of Hambo Lama Itigelov's return

Due to the ethno-national revival, Buddhism has acquired a quality, which was not characteristic to it within the framework of traditional Buryat society, the ability to fulfil a function of wide social modelling and integration. This essentially new quality of the Buddhist religion serves various functions, enforcing a particular ethno-identity as well as creating different ethno-identities. Firstly, Buddhism as the national religion of all Buryats becomes the core of the national idea in its political aspect because the Buryat statehood in Russia appears the guarantee for preserving and translating national values. Secondly, the Buddhist revival is one of the principal components in the return to the historical, political, and cultural memory. Theoretically, this excludes the Buryats from the existing Russian national community and attributes them to a different historical and cultural group, such as the All-Mongolian and Central-Asian community. In the most global sense, the territorial space of such a community is widening to the 'worldwide Buddhist civilization' and the Buryats have obtained a most worthy place in this space as a people living on sacred territory. Thirdly, at present, when socialist reference points have disappeared, Buddhism becomes a moral imperative and the driving force behind the moral education of the Buryats in a spirit of compassion, contemplation and aversion of a bad influence on the part of the West and

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communists-shamanists [..]. Irkutsk Buryats should probably think over [the way] that they are running after shamans like in cave communism" (quoted by: Andreeva, O. "Tak govorit Hambo Lama. Kak, razvodya baranov, vyiti iz kruga pererozhdenii [Thus saith the Hambo Lama. How to get out of the cycle of rebirths by breeding sheep?]". *Russkii reporter*, No. 18–19, 2013, p. 52.

globalization. One can compare this topic of the Buryat discourse with the ever more extending role of Orthodoxy in the socio-cultural discourse of the Russian ethno-cultural majority in Russia.

I think, for the current period in the history of Buryatia, the Buryat 'nationalist' project has already completed. At the same time, despite the elites' programs on ethno-cultural revival are still far from realization, ordinary citizens seem to feel a 'residual sensation of participation' in ethno-politics, which in its latent form includes ethnic as well as religious practices. The reason for this latent politicization lies in the fact that since perestroika and down to the beginning of 2000s, due to ethnic mobilization, paradigms about ethnic community have shaped Buryat public and individual discourse. A modern ethnic cosmology was thus formed, which, being based on the idea of cultural sovereignty, is nothing more than the transformed and depoliticized idea of political sovereignty. Moreover, the political element (political sovereignty in its specific Russian connotation) has by now become a constant, and ethnicity that is still topical, concerns mainly the qualitative filling of the ethnic cultural space.

The idea of proposing Buryatia as a sacral space and the centre of Russian spirituality finds strong support in the return of the Hambo Lama Itigelov's 'Imperishable Body' (now his official title sounds as 'Precious and Unquenchable Body').[21] First placed in the Tsogchen Dugan of the Ivolginski Datsan, in 2008 the Holy Lama Itigelov found his residence in the palace built on donations. The Itigelov's phenomenon considerably contributed to the Buryat national idea with religion as its core. The sociological surveys after the 'miracle' (2002) attest that even in the

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[21] Shortly before his death in 1927, Hambo-Lama Dashi-Dorzho Itigelov told his disciples about his future return. After 75 years, in 2002, the lamas of the Ivolga datsan took his sarcophagus from the ground in the presence of forensic medicine experts. The fixed medical-physical parameters of the body corresponded and still correspond to lifetime characteristics.

conditions of depoliticized public climate, the feedback between the Buryat population and elites, first of all priesthood, remains strong.[22]

For clarity, we can refer to the sociological figures before and after Itigelov's return. Based on her fieldwork, Irina Yelaeva has prepared a table "Ranging of ethnointegrating attributes". The table shows an essential increase in the number of persons who identify themselves with Buryats by the common markers of culture, customs, and rituals – from 59.6 percent in 1996–1997 up to 71.5 percent in 2002–2003. The number of those persons who single out religion as an ethno-integrating marker increases from 35.2 percent in 1996–1997 to 46.7 percent in 2002–2003. The figures are no less impressive for the answers to the question "What conditions are necessary for the Buryat national revival?" In 2002–2003, 38.4 percent considered 'support to religion' to be the most important factor for national revival, whereas in 1996–97 only 15.8 percent took this position.[23]

Though the Itigelov's phenomenon has aroused wide-spread scientific interest in Russia, for the Buryats themselves, both the *believing* Buddhists and those who *ascribe* to Buddhism, it is much more important that "Hambo-Lama Itigelov achieved the state of a Buddha, that is absolute perfection, all-encompassing knowledge, the termination of his future rebirths in the misery of Samsara, and boundless compassion to all living beings".[24] Declared the reincarnation of the first Buryat Hambo Lama Zayaev (1710–1776), Hambo Lama Itigelov at present, when since his return sixteen years have passed, maintains the continuation of the miracle. With the approval of the highest Buddhist hierarch in Buryatia, in the end of 2016 media published a new sensational material illustrated with blurry

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[22]   The role of the clergy today was formulated by Hambo Lama Ayusheev in the following words: "the priests became the elite, having taken the place of the former ideologists" (quoted by Mahachkeev, 2010, p. 142).

[23]   Elaeva, I. E. Buryaty: repertuar identichnostei v sovremennom sociokul'turnom kontekste (Buryats: the repertoire of identities in the modern socio-cultural context) in *Buryatskaya etnichnost' v kontekste sociokul'turnoi modernizacii (postsovetskii period)*. Irkutsk: Izd-vo RPC Radian, 2005, pp. 146, 149.

[24]   Budaev, B. Hambo Lama Itigelov – nevozmozhnoe vozmozhno (Impossible is possible). *AiF v Buryatii*, No. 16, 2007, p. 8.

photos: on October 11, 2016, the monitors fixed movements in the space of Itigelov's palace when it was locked from outside and except Itigelov nobody remained inside. The conclusion was definite: Itigelov rose from his throne and walked around the palace. Hambo Lama Damba Ayusheev commented on the event as follows: 'Hambo Lama manifested himself, the Imperishable Body was moving. Hambo Lama got up and showed himself. [..] At one of the great prayers, the eminent Indian Lharamba Lama once told us that Hambo Lama Itigelov would rise with the coming of the Buddha Maidrei (Maitreya) era. However, the Buddha of the Future will come in two thousand years. Nevertheless, the Lharamba Lama did not rule out that the Hambo Lama would get up earlier. This thought existed somewhere in the depths of my mind'.[25]

Although the sensation around Itigelov and interest in him from the highest Moscow officials and many foreign celebritiesfeeds the self-esteem of the Buryatia population regardless of their ethnic identity, nevertheless, I am not inclined to think that it was the miracle that pushed the individual and public worldview to desecularization. In the post-Soviet space as a whole, religiosity is becoming a part of mentality. A specific feature of Buddhism is that thanks to its flexibility and tolerance, it can easily meet the requirements of those who need church rituals and belief in rebirth and salvation and simultaneously quite satisfies the needs of people who prefer to look for philosophic and moral basis of existence instead of rituals. Although in the eyes of Buddhist clergy the latter are of minor interest, this does not exclude them from the flock: essentially, the most of non-practicing (or nominal) believers having their own views on how the clergy should behave and what should be the forms of religious worship, in this or that way support Buddhism in Buryatia. In addition, deep transformations in the Buddhist institutions towards modernization and rapprochement with believers by means of social activities (practical compassion) promote a deepening conviction that Buddhism unites the Buryat nation and contributes to its preserving in the circumstances of rapid russification

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[25] Yan, A. Proyavlenie netlennogo tela (Manifestation of the Imperishable Body). *Inform Polis*. No. 41, October 12, 2016, p. 7.

in various aspects. This problem has existed among Buryats since remote past. At present, Buddhist clergy, namely, Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia is doing much for reviving pastoral livestock-breeding and traditional sports as well as preserving and developing the ethnic language.

Conclusion

For Buryats who are the ethnic minority in Russia, Buddhist re-vitalization implies various connotations including religiosity and faith properly and in no lesser degree than ideological senses related to identification and ethnic cultural imagination. Being the main tool for ethnic consolidation, institutionalized Buddhism in the face of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia tries its best to take both religious and secular lead in ethnic Buryatia.

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Pierrick Porchet

PROCESS OF INSTITUALIZATION IN CHINESE MARTIAL ARTS: THE CASE OF ITS RANKING SYSTEM

Introduction

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), authorities within their political project have elaborated a discourse on "popular culture" (民间风俗 *minjian fengsu*) that has led to their standardization into nationally shared and politically acceptable forms.[1] Elements labeled as 'feudal' (封建 *fengjian*) or 'sectarian' (宗派 *zongpai*) have been proscribed by state institutions, such as national sports associations.[2] These institutions are thus shaping the frame of an 'orthodox' practice showing "their will to keep control over the meaning" of these practices.[3]

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[1] On this issue, see Bugnon, P. L'art d'accomoder les ancêtres de la nation: Analyse du patrimoine culturel musulman en Chine. *Tsantsa*, No. 23, 2018, pp. 99–10; Durand-Dastes, V. La Grande muraille des contes. *Carreau de la BULAC*, 2014, pp. 1–57; Graezer, F. Le Festival de Miaofeng shan: culture populaire et politique culturelle. *Etudes chinoises*, No. 22, 2003, pp. 283–95; Graezer Bideau, F. L'instrumentalisation de la culture populaire. Le cas de la danse du yangge en Chine. *Tsantsa*, No. 13, 2008, pp. 52–60; Micollier E. Qigong et 'nouvelles religions' en Chine et à Taiwan: instrumentalisation politique et processus de légitimation des pratiques. *Autrepart*. 2(42), 2007, pp. 129–146.

[2] Chinese Wushu Association. *The rules of martial ethics*. Available at http://zgwx.wushu.com.cn/w_wdsz.asp (retrieved 20.11.2017).

[3] Graezer, F. Le Festival de Miaofeng shan, p. 291.

Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, Chinese authorities have elaborated a discourse on Chinese Martial Arts in their cultural policy, in which appears the construction of a "patriotic body"[4] embodying the nation. In 1958, the Chinese Wushu Association (CWA) was created under the supervision of the National Sport Bureau. Its mission is to "federate all the professionals and amateurs of the country" and "put in order" (整理 *zhengli*)[5] the numerous systems of techniques that are then sorted together under the generic term of *wushu* (武术). The CWA starts to commission masters with the task of synthetizing the variations within a particular 'style'[6] (门派 *menpai*) of *wushu* into 'simplified' (简化 *jianhua*) sets of techniques 'standardized' (标准 *biaozhun*) on a national level.[7] Authorities are thus reshaping *wushu* through a 'modern' perspective, formalizing the basis of a 'physical education'[8] by setting competition regulations and physical preparation (warm-up, gymnastic conception of movements, rationalized teaching method/pedagogy, etc) encouraging the youth to develop "a healthy spirit in a healthy body."[9] This political leadership over martial arts has led to the creation of a '*wushu* sport' (武术运动 *wushu yundong*) – interspersed with the Olympic ideology – which has been the main discipline supported and promoted by state institutions until today.[10]

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[4]   Thiesse, A. *La création des identités nationales: Europe XVIIIe–XXe siècle*. Paris: Seuil, 1999.

[5]   Chinese Wushu Association. *Constitution*. Available at http://zgwx.wushu.com.cn/xhzc.asp (retrieved 20.11.2017).

[6]   The concept of 'style' refers today to a "system of fighting technique [..] – bare hands or with weapons – [..] with its own theory of combat and its own personality" (王广西, *中国功夫*, 深圳: 海天出版社, 2006, pp. 205). Most often, styles are associated with a genealogy of masters from the founder to the present masters. For the socio-historic construction of *wushu* styles, see Judkins et al., 2015.

[7]   Lorge, P. *Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 234–235.

[8]   江百龙, *武术理论基础*, 北京：人民体育出版社, 1995

[9]   Liu, B., Jiang, G. 2000. Le wushu, une fine fleur de la culture chinoise. *La Chine au présent*, No. 8, 2000, pp. 27–30.

[10]   Song, J., Yue, H. Considerations on Wushu's National Culture Characteristics. *Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Sciences*. No. 5, 2016, pp. 28–34.

These new representations of martial techniques – in which knowledge is legitimized by national standards and regulations – introduce a paradigm shift in regard to the "traditional transmission framework."[11] *Wushu* is practiced within the population through local networks, consecrating "the elderly/cadet relationship especially the parent/child relationship, which express the relationship built between the master and his/her disciples."[12] In this framework, the 'master' persona – and his belonging to the genealogy traced back to the founder of the style – legitimizes the knowledge that is transmitted. During the first two decades of the PRC, Chinese authorities strongly repressed this transmission framework labeled as "feudal", in which some groups could effectively "resist the government at the local level."[13] However, in the past years, this traditional framework has recovered a new symbolic meaning in the shaping of Chinese identity, as it became a part of its National Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH). Thus, martial arts techniques – within traditional lineages registered as ICH on national lists – become cultural goods "reflecting the values and spirit of the Chinese nation."[14]

The two frameworks – institutional and traditional – are intertwined. As a result, all the masters I could observe are all more or less engaged in institutional activities. Practitioners can assume different roles depending on the social context they operate in: within the local community, an individual assumes the role of master or disciple and becomes an athlete or a coach, when he participates in competitions. This development raises the question of the impact on practitioners' habits and the way they articulate these new representations. How do they articulate the two frameworks

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[11] De Grave, J-M. L'initiation rituelle javanaise et ses modes de transmission : Opposition entre javanisme et islam. *Techniques & Culture* [online], 2007, pp. 48–49. Available at http://tc.revues.org/3032 (retrieved at 12.12.2017).

[12] Ibid., p. 3.

[13] Lorge, P. *Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 226.

[14] Bodelec, C. Être une grande nation culturelle. Les enjeux du patrimoine culturel immatériel pour la Chine. *Tsantsa*, No. 19, 2014, pp. 19–30.

in their everyday practice? How do these frameworks influence the body techniques and their representations?

This paper will discuss the institutionalization process in Chinese Martial Arts by focusing on some aspects of its 'ranking system' (段位制 *duanwei zhi*). This program – launched in 1997 by the National Sport Committee – aims to "establish a normative training system as well as evaluation standards for technical level."[15] It introduces to the traditional framework new criteria of expertise under the supervision of state institutions. Practitioners – within the traditional framework – are thus no longer evaluated by their peers within the lineage but instead by outside experts. The system has become a well-established one – in the PRC and abroad – and all the masters I could meet within traditional lineages held a rank. However, oppositional views appear in masters' discourses in regard to body techniques and their associated meanings. To illustrate the way state institutions are reclaiming meaning over the traditional framework, I will rely on institutional publications and especially the Textbook series of Chinese Wushu Duanwei system.[16] These textbooks constitute the 'examination criteria' of the ranking system. They can also "be used as teaching material for *wushu* major in the higher education, for the training of *wushu* teacher in universities, middle and primary schools as well as *wushu* schools at all levels." For this contribution, I will use the *bajiquan* textbook[17] as the main example for my argument. I will focus the analysis on the description – in the textbook – of a specific technique of this style: the elbow strike. Through this example, I will highlight discursive and kinesic discontinuities between representations of movements in the textbook and in the traditional framework.

In order to understand how practitioners articulate the new representations of martial arts techniques embedded in this ranking system, I will rely on fieldwork observations gathered in two specific

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[15] Chinese Wushu Association. *Wushu Duanwei System*. Available at http://www.wushu.com.cn/wsdw_dwzxx_xq.asp?id=50 (retrieved 17.01.2011).

[16] 国家体育总局武术研究院 （组编）, 中国武术段位制系列教程.

[17] 国家体育总局武术研究院 （组编）, 中国武术段位制系列教程 : 八极拳, 北京 : 高等教育出版社, 2011.

sites between 2017 and 2018. During the summers of 2017 and 2018, I conducted ethnographical surveys in Cangzhou City and Yongnian district both located in Hebei province. In Cangzhou City, I followed practitioners affiliated with the Wu family *bajiquan* (八极拳) lineage. In Yongnian district, I observed both Yang and Wu families' *taijiquan* (太极拳). During the ethnography, I combine participant and outside observations. I also conducted formal and informal interviews. I concentrated the observations upon the interactions between individuals – especially those that involve body gestures – in order to describe 'group life' dynamics.[18] Due to the controversial nature of the analysis, the informants cited in this paper remain anonymous.

By combining the analysis of institutional publications with on-site observation, this paper will highlight some of the ideological issues raised by the juxtaposition of the institutional ranking system with the traditional framework. I will show how different social actors compete over the meaning and values associated with Chinese Martial Arts and how this process is taking place in the materiality of body gestures performed in these arts.

This paper is a part of my doctoral research which focusses on the 'circulation'[19] of martial arts body gestures through traditional and institutional practices, as well as a collective imagery mobilized through visual arts. These body movements – when acting as interactions between individuals – are mobilizing a specific "kinesic intelligence [which is] our human capacity to discern and interpret body movements, body postures, gestures, and facial expressions."[20] As we will see in the example of the ranking system, the values and meanings associated with martial arts movements are not fixed and can vary dramatically depending on the context. They are the result of an ongoing negotiation between

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[18]   Fine, G. A. Towards a Peopled Ethnography: Developing Theory from Group Life. *Ethnography*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, pp. 41–60.

[19]   Zimmermann, B. *Waves and Forms: Electronic Music Devices and Computer Encodings in China*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2015.

[20]   Bolens, G. *The style of gestures: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative*. Lausanne: Editions BHMS, 2012, p. 1.

various actors. Therefore, this paper considers body movement in their "performative and generative dimension: they are themselves a means to generate, *construct something.*"[21] Body movements are not only a way to express pre-fixed meanings, however, while being performed, they are rather actively producing new meanings and values. Considering the political development of institutionalized martial arts and its impact on individual practitioners, martial arts gestures act as an arena of political and ideological constructions that are continually under negotiation.

1. Textbook series of Chinese Wushu Duanwei system: bajiquan

The *wushu* ranking system is organized in 9 grades: 1–3 for regular practitioners, 4–6 for advanced ones, 6–9 for experts. Each grade is associated with a specific list of techniques and theoretical knowledge that the practitioners must grasp in order to take the examination and be granted the grade. The examination is held by the CWA with experts designated by them. To support this examination system, the CWA published the textbook series containing teaching material up to the 6th grade (grades 7 to 9 are no longer based on a technical examination but rather on the scope of the practitioner's transmission). Up to today, two dozens of textbooks have been published covering a large range of *wushu* styles (*taijiquan*, *shaolinquan*, *changquan*, etc). Some instalments exclusively address the theoretical aspects, such as History or Ethics.

The textbooks are compiled by the Wushu Research Institute of the General Administration of Sport and approved by the CWA. The editing commission is supervised by high-ranking individuals within the Sport administration. Wu Bin or Xi Yuntai – both members of the approval commission – held top positions in the CWA. Yu Zaiqing – honorary head of the editing commission – is a former Vice-Minister in charge of the General Administration of Sport (1999–2011) and is currently acting as the Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee. Finally, Wu

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[21] Gibert, M-P. Façonner le corps, régénérer l'individu et danser la nation. *Parcours anthropologique*, No. 9, 2014, pp. 189–219, 211.

Lianzhi – who is both a well-respected master in the traditional framework and the national ICH transmitter for *bajiquan* – is the executive head of editing. Institutions rely on well-established Sport officials to supervise the process of textbook editing, hence keeping a close control on the content of these materials.

However, masters from traditional lineages also compose commissions. In the case of *bajiquan*, 34 individuals are listed in the editing commission. During an informal interview, a master shared his experience of the creation of the textbooks:

> *Representatives of all styles were gathered in a big hotel. There were hundreds of persons. I was with two other masters. From the morning to the evening, we were editing – movements by movements – the content for the first 6 grades. We were comparing our own way to perform each movement and decided together the text describing the movement. For each movement, they took pictures of us. We only had 10 days. It was very short! Afterward, they hired university students to take good looking pictures.*

This testimony highlights the fragile balance of inclusivity in the institutional project. On the one hand, authorities rely on an expert from traditional lineages to create the materials – articulating continuity to the traditional framework by "referring to an authentic repertoire."[22] On the other hand, the process seems rushed as all the books were compiled at one time and with an insufficient amount of time. By comparison, I have observed several masters who have created their own system of techniques, which is transmitted through the initiation. In these cases, the creation process often lasts more than one decade and sometimes required long-lasting exchanges with other masters. In addition, the process can also lack in transparency: another master told me that he was not involved in the editing process but was asked to put his name as an editor nevertheless. Finally, the re-shooting of pictures with university students, which adds

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[22] Adell, N. Pourcher, Y. De quoi le patrimoine est-il le nom? *Transmettre, quel(s) patrimoine(s)? Autour du Patrimoine Culturel Immatériel*. Paris: Michel Houdiard Éditeur, 2011, p. 15.

aesthetical criteria over the technical requirement, will be problematic, as shown below.

2. Elbow strike and its kinesic principle

The technique called 'pointing with the elbow in the horse stance' (马步顶肘 *mabu dingzhou*) is one of the most representative technique of *bajiquan*. It consists of an elbow strike while standing with legs in the position called 'horse stance'. This technique occurs regularly in all the basic and advanced routines. It is a central technique in this style. The textbook uses it as an example for principles in several parts, starting already in the second section: The basic techniques of *bajiquan*.[23] The picture illustrates the principle called: 'shrink the ribcage and straighten the back' (含胸拔背 *hanxiong babei*). This expression describes, on the one hand, the upper body structure where the ribcage is folded toward the inside making the shoulders naturally 'sink' (沉肩 *chenjian*) forward (*hanxiong*). Meanwhile, the lower back is straightened by stretching the upper abdomen backward and the lower abdomen forward, thus also pushing the pelvis forward (*babei*). This principle and the description above are shared by the traditional lineage and the textbook. However, the picture that illustrates this principle is problematic. When shown to *bajiquan* practitioners within traditional lineages, the upper body structure displayed by the young model is interpreted as wrongly performed – in regard to the *hanxiong babei* principle. Another picture shot in profile particularly reveals that the pelvis' position is not entirely pushed forward. In this example, the text describing the technique is respectful of masters' discourses, however, the body position featured in the picture is not. The question is why does this kinesic shift occur?

There are two features of the model body posture that are identified by *bajiquan* practitioner as wrong in regard to the principle. Firstly, the ribcage is more opened and stretched forward, making the shoulders pulled backward. According to practitioners, the model's elbow and shoulders

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[23] 国家体育总局武术研究院 （组编），中国武术段位制系列教程 ： 八极拳. p. 3.

are both lined up with the direction of the attack. If performed this way, the model's shoulders could suffer injuries when hitting the opponent. Secondly, the model's pelvis is slightly stretched backward, which curves forward his lower back. According to practitioners, straightening the lower back serves two purposes: 1. It creates a straight axis, around which limbs rotate to attack and defend. This straight axis improves mechanically the efficiency of the techniques. 2. It improves the *qi*'s circulation, which is central for the 'internal aspect' (内在 *neizai*) of the techniques. The two features displayed in the model's body structure are similar to those of gymnastics where movements are wide and the body structure opened – making movements more visible and thus more enjoyable for an audience. These features have been the esthetical standards – dominating the sport scene for decades – for the definition of what is a beautiful and thus correct movement. The young model – who is most certainly used to the *wushu* competition – performs the movement in a way that pleases his usual audience, that is, the judges. The latter have incorporated these esthetical standards.[24] As one master has told me: "judges mostly use aesthetical criteria and concentrate on the external appearance of the movement. We concentrate on the internal aspects of the techniques, the striking force."

Conclusion

The example of the ranking system highlights how state institutions are framing martial arts through a new normative perspective. Evaluation of the practitioner – and the expertise required to evaluate – is not only related to the elderly within one's lineage, but also to institutional experts and national standards. Institutions rely on traditional masters' expertise to produce these new materials. According to my observations, masters also easily navigate within this system as they often hold an expert rank (7–9 rank).

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[24] For a more detailed description of criteria used by judges during competition, see Porchet, P. *Processus d'adaptation des pratiques martiales chinoises au sport de compétition. L'exemple du style baji. Tsantsa*, No. 23, 2018.

However, masters are not actively engaged in the system. They rarely mention it and do not use the textbook materials in their regular practice. As a master states:

> *The popular custom doesn't need a ranking system, it needs to transmit traditional things. The ranking system requires you to perform standardized routines. These are not important for me. What is important is the original taste of the popular culture.*

In the traditional transmission framework, the institutional materials do not hold the same legitimacy as the content passed through the previous masters. It neither fits with the ritual initiation of the disciple by the master, nor with the symbolic kinship, through which these networks reproduce themselves.

Finally, the introduction of normative evaluation criteria, of technical standards or teaching material is part of the state sponsored and dominant discourse on martial arts, which is intermingled with rational and objective features of the Sport ideology. As with any discourse, the ranking system "is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center."[25] Despite the institutions efforts to push forward its ideological agenda and to unify the heterogeneous representations of martial arts, the dominance of its discourse is challenged by masters within their personal networks. Institutions are imposing new meanings and values from above, but local actors re-interpret and re-articulate these categories. Some masters produce and promote competitive discourses by publishing textbooks, web content, or other materials.

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[25] Laclau, E., Mouffe, C. *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso, 1985, p. 112.

Bolens, G. *The style of gestures: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative*. Lausanne: Editions BHMS, 2012.

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Olga Mazo

HEDGEHOG SPIRITS IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE CULTURE AND TODAY

Introduction

Chinese culture is rich in different animal- and plant-spirits or demons that can turn into human beings and communicate or interact with them. Animal spirits can transform into people of different ages, men and women. They can seduce, harm or even kill a person. The person also can kill them and, in some cases, be the cause of illness or death. Such stories were very popular; for example, the tales of Gan Bao, Ge Hong, Pu Songling, Yuan Mei, etc. The most famous spirit is a fox and the story about the fox turned into a man can be found even in the historical documents, e.g. in *Hou Han Shu*, the Book of the Later Han (87.2).

1. Sacred animals in historical texts and narratives

During the reign of Qing dynasty appeared sacred animals, a new type of animal-spirits. The most popular sacred animals were foxes, weasels, rats, snakes and hedgehogs. According to Li Wei-tsu's[1] fieldwork materials, each of the spirit has its own individual characteristics. Thus, the same animal can be a sacred animal or an animal-spirit, which can turn into human, and in some narratives the spirit can combine both characters

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[1] Li Wei-tsu. On the Cult of the Four Sacred Animals (四 大門) in the Neighbourhood of Peking. *Folklore Studies*, Vol. 7, 1948, pp. 1–94.

(regarding fox-spirits, see e.g. Tertitskiy 1991[2]). Although Li Wei-tsu gives a detailed description of sacred hedgehogs, the hedgehog-spirits have never been the main subject of research and their characteristics have not been compared. Today, the cult of sacred animals became popular again, so we can compare the narratives about hedgehog-spirits, track the changes and investigate its image in modern folklore.

The texts about hedgehogs-spirits are very rare. We found only three texts from the collections of stories compiled in the Song dynasty and several texts from the 19th century collection of stories about supernatural. The earliest texts are found in the two encyclopaedias of the 10th century (*Taiping guangji* 太平廣記 (Extensive Records of the Taiping Era), *Taiping yulan* 太平御覽 (Readings of the Taiping Era)) and in *Kui che zhi* 睽车志, the collection of stories about supernatural compiled by Guo Tuan in the second half of the 12th century. The encyclopaedias include several thousand stories, taken from the texts from the Han dynasty to the Song dynasty, many of which have related to the supernatural. *Kui che zhi* is the collection of stories about supernatural, which took place during the Song dynasty.

The three texts can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of the story that with some lexical differences is presented in the two encyclopaedias.

> *At the end of the Liao dynasty, Fei Bi from Shu harvested wheat. A storm broke out and he found a shelter in the cave. On his way back, when he was several li from home, Fei Bi saw several women in purple dresses moving towards him singing songs. He was astonished to see them in the fields and it seemed strange to him. When they come nearer, they ceased to sing, stopped a few steps away from Bi and turned back to him. Bi came closer to them and saw that they didn't have eyebrows, noses, ears, mouths, only overhanging black hair. He was so scared that fell unconscious to the ground. On the first watch his father was surprised by his absence, took a torch and went to look for him. He found Bi lying near*

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[2]   Tertitskiy, K. M. Kult lisitsy v Manchzhurii (1920–1940-e gody) (The cult of the fox in Manchuria). *Religioznyy mir Kitaja 2005. Issledovanija. Materialy. Perevody* (*Spiritual world of China 2005. Studies. Materials. Translations*), Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities, 2006, pp. 273–305.

the road. There were ten hedgehogs on his left, who scattered after seeing
the light. Bi returned home and died more than a hundred days later[3].

This story has several features that distinguish it from the other texts about the hedgehogs. First of all, the action takes place in the fields, outside the town, and in all other stories people meet hedgehogs in the houses or in the yard. The second is the appearance of the spirits: they lack eyes, mouths, ears and noses. Usually, when the animal spirit turns into a person, it looks like a human being and has the same number of organs or body parts. The stories about the animal spirit that turns into a person without a face are rare. The only mythological character of that kind is Hundun *(*混沌*)*[4], but it is not an animal spirit. The third difference is the fate of Fei Bi. He did not cause any harm to the spirits, even did not touch them, only saw them, nevertheless, that led to his death. It is the only story where the meeting with the hedgehogs ends so dramatically.

The plots of the other two stories are very similar. In *Taiping guang ji*[5] at night a guest saw a small old woman in his room, whose body was covered with white hair. He became scared and ordered servants to catch her. They found a big white hedgehog under the stone and killed it. In the second story from *Kui che zhi*[6] a man called Yao Anli spent a night in the posthouse and saw a small white-haired old man in a big hat and with a stick, who caught and ate a dung beetle in the yard. Yao Anli understood that it was a spirit and persuaded it to leave with his sword. The white man disappeared in the manure pit. Yao Anli ordered his servants to take it out. They found a big white hedgehog with an iron plate and furnace tongs, and killed it. After that the strange events in the posthouse ceased.

In these stories, hedgehogs look like small old persons, who have preserved some animal features: they appear in the houses at night, have white body hair (the result of the transformed spines), or eat insects. The white colour of their hair corresponds with the animal's colour. In Chinese

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[3]　太平广记. [宋]李昉编. – 北京:中华书局, Vol. 9, 2003, p. 3617
[4]　Hundun – the emperor of the central region in Zhuangzi.
[5]　Ibid., p. 3617
[6]　景印文渊阁四库全书. 台湾商务印书馆股份有限公司, 1986, v. 1047, p. 246 a.

tradition white colour and an unusual size (in both stories hedgehogs are white and big) are the distinguishing signs of the magic animals. In the second story the hedgehog has two accessories, an iron plate and furnace tongs, that turn into the hat and the stick. The same motive can be found in some other stories about animal spirits, e.g. in *Sou shen ji*[7] a young lady turns into an otter and her green robes and umbrella turn into the lotus leaves. The hedgehog spirits did no harm to the people; the servants, on the contrary, found and killed the hiding animals. In the second story, the hedgehog is connected with 'many strange things' that happened in the posthouse, but it is unclear, whether those things harmful to people or not.

The novel that is very similar to the previous two can be found in the book of the Tianjin's author Li Qingchen *Zuicha zhiguai* 醉茶志怪 (*Strange tales of drunken tea*) (1892).

> *One spring night a scholar from my native place read books and heard the rustling leaves outside the window. He looked outside and saw two hedgehogs that were spinning, making the wind. They rolled to the backyard and the scholar went after them. The hedgehogs turned around the corner and became two small old men, with white hair and whiskers. They looked at each other and laughed. The scholar was frightened. He asked who they were, but the old men suddenly disappeared*[8].

In this story, the hedgehog spirits also appear at night in the house yard, turn into small white-haired men and cause no harm to the person, but unlike the previous stories the scholar does not kill them.

Hence, it can be concluded that in most texts the hedgehog spirits have a lot of in common: they appear at night in the house, look like the small old person, preserve some animal features and are not hostile. People can treat them as evil spirits and kill them without any consequences.

In the Qing period, a new type of animal spirits appeared and the cult of sacred animals flourished. They were considered to be family-protectors, bringing wealth and preventing misfortune. In Beijing and its surroundings people worshiped the Four Big Families (四大门 *sì dà mén*) – foxes, weasels,

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[7]   干宝. 搜神記. - 台北: 五南圖書出版股份有限公司, 1997, p. 51.

[8]   李庆辰. 醉茶志怪. –济南：齐鲁书社, 2004, p. 109.

snakes and hedgehogs. Their cult was described in detail by Li Wei-tsu[9], who collected a lot of material for his dissertation (1941). The sacred hedgehog has red eyes, white spines and is active at daytime. It is called Immortal Bai (白仙 *Bái xiān*) and was considered to be the God of Wealth par excellence. The spirits can become immortal and get an opportunity to turn into human beings. Every family has its own way of self-perfection.

> *When a certain stage on the way to perfection is reached, the hedgehog will be compelled by its own soul-power (ling–hsing) to lay itself down on the road in the tracks of vehicles out of longing for being crushed by the wheels. The life of the animal will be saved, if the next car going that way is a lightly loaded one, otherwise a tragical end is inevitable. If a hedgehog fails to get over a crisis like this, all its previous merit-records become nothing. Many big hedgehogs lost their lives in this way. This kind of self-perfection is of a passive nature. Bad enough! For the hedgehog must go through such crucial trials three times.*[10]

The offence to the animal may result in the sickness or even death. If the sacred animal is dissatisfied, it expresses that in different ways, including possession of the person. The sacred animals cannot speak, but they can possess their statues or the person in order to express their will or claims through them. A special magician called *xiāngtóu* (香头) acts as a mediator between them and humans. This person is chosen by spirits or the spirit is his relative.

Immortal Bai is not as revengeful as other spirits and that is illustrated by the following stories.

> *Once two children of a farmer suffered heavily from dysentery. The mother asked a ghost man for help. He told her that the dysentery was caused by the ts'ai-shen yeh (God of wealth) of her house and that he would send for this spirit, so she could have a talk with him face to face. Soon the wealth god was present. He was a hedgehog. The woman then spoke to him: "Oh, ts'ai-shen yeh, you have come! Please tell me what is wrong with us." The ts'ai-shen yeh possessed the shaman (hsiang-t'ou)*

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[9]   Li Wei-tsu. On the Cult of the Four Sacred Animals (四大門) in the Neighbourhood of Peking. *Folklore Studies*, Vol. 7, 1948, pp. 1–94.

[10]   Ibid., p. 7.

and said: "There is no suitable place for me to dwell in your house. I have to stay in the forage-hut. No incense has been burnt and no offerings have been made to me. You and your husband are only interested in your food and drinking. While you were fully enjoying your dinner, I was beside you and taking part. Both you and your husband are opium smokers, your rooms are filled with the disagreeable odour. If you give up this habit, I shall protect you, as well as your children. It is not necessary to build a shrine for me. It will be enough if you burn incense three times a day in that very forage-hut. I am going to show some of my power. I shall go to your bed-room to-night and shall announce my presence by coughing three times." At night the couple was sleeping together with their daughter in the same room. The girl coughed three times in her sleep. In fact, it must have been the ts'ai-shen yeh who coughed through the girl of whom he took possession.[11]

That woman's husband Hsü had killed three little hedgehogs when he was thirteen years old. It is not sure, whether or not he had killed these animals with his own hands. But it is believed that it is a sin if a ts'ai-shen yeh is not rescued from disaster, however, this sin of omission can be easier forgiven than the sin of perpetration. Those boys threw the bodies of the three victims near a heap of wheat-straw. The old hedgehog in the straw-heap got very angry, took possession of Hsü and tortured him almost to death. People say that his life was hanging on an extremely thin thread at that time. A shaman was called who ordered the patient to eat dung and to promise the building of a shrine for the offended hedgehog.[12]

In *Zuicha zhiguai* there are several stories about the sacred hedgehogs. For example, in the ancestral temple of Li family people saw strange red lights and found out that it was an old hedgehog, as big as a 3-year-old child. It murmured something and its eyes burned like a torch[13]. This description of the spirit is very similar to the description of *Bai xian* in the narratives collected by Li Wei-tsu.

In Tianjin there was also a local cult of the Old Lady Bai – 白老太太 *Bái lǎo tàitai*. Two local legends about her are given in *Zuicha zhiguai*, in

[11] Li Wei-tsu. On the Cult of the Four Sacred Animals (四大門) in the Neighbourhood of Peking. *Folklore Studies*, Vol. 7, 1948, p. 13.

[12] Ibid., p. 14.

[13] 李庆辰. 醉茶志怪. –济南: 齐鲁书社, 2004, p. 171.

the story named 'Lady Bai' (白夫人 *Bái fūren*)[14]. Her surname Bai indicates, that she is the sacred hedgehog. The temple of the Old Lady Bai was outside the South gates. She had an appearance of the old woman and claimed her will through the female shaman (巫 *wū*). The first legend is about a woman from the Yan family, whose son fell ill. She prayed in the temple and at night dreamed about a thirty-years old lady, with white face and in white robes, who made massage for the son. The next day the boy recovered. His mother went to the temple and fell down before the Lady Bai's image.

The white face and robes correspond with the appearance of the hedgehog spirits in the Song texts, but in comparison with them she wasn't old, small and didn't have any animal features. It is interesting to mention that although the Lady Bai appeared as a young woman in the dream, in the temple there was a statue of the old lady. Unlike Beijing's *Bai xian* who was worshipped as the God of Wealth, the Old Lady Bai was famous for healing people.

The second legend is connected with another sacred animal – the White Snake, the character of the popular Legend of the White Snake. One day the shaman was possessed by the spirit who asked people in the temple who she was. They answered: "Immortal Bai". Yet, it was not the hedgehog, but the White Snake, who considered herself more powerful and significant. Such contamination became possible because both of the spirits were female immortals and both contain character 白'white' in their names.

Zuicha zhiguai also contains a story called "Young mister Bai" (白郎 *Bái láng*)[15]. One citizen called Mou found a white hedgehog as big as the earthen vessel – *ang*. He wanted to kill it, but his wife interfered. At night, when she was half asleep, a corpulent young man entered the room. His face was white and the body was covered with fringe that looked like the dry grass. He said that he was young mister Bai had come to thank her for saving his life. They spent a night together and since that night

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[14] 李庆辰. 醉茶志怪. –济南: 齐鲁书社, 2004, p. 208.
[15] Ibid., p. 159.

Bai came to the woman every time her husband was not at home. After the half a year the woman became pregnant. She had terrible pains, as if thousands of needles stuck into her body. Her sufferings were so great that the poor lady wanted to die and begged for mercy, but Bai answered that his gratitude was not complete yet. The woman continued complaining and Bai left her in anger. The family invited the magician to exorcise the evil spirit, put an altar, but the wind blew up the candles and the women died.

The young mister Bai combines the features of both spirits: the animal-spirit and the sacred animal. He has the appearance of the animal-spirit: the white face, the body covered with fringe (compare with the white hair of the old woman from *Taiping guangji*) and he can turn into the human being. But his surname is Bai, the same as the Immortal hedgehog's, and he wants to pay a debt of gratitude (报恩 *bào ēn*). It is worth noting that it is the only story where the hedgehog spirit transforms into a young man and seduces a woman.

Two major differences from the other stories about animal spirits can be pointed out. Spirits can have sexual contacts with human beings, but the woman is never pregnant with the animal and gives birth to a human child. For example, the stories of Pu Songling, where foxes marry young man and give birth to their children or the narratives collected by Li Wei-tsu, where the sacred animals become immortal, turn into humans and live among them. Besides this the gratitude of the sacred animal is usually expressed in giving something good or valuable for the person and never turns into harm. In this story the situation differs, there is a contradiction between his way of expressing the gratitude and the usual practice. Bai does not understand that he causes harm to the woman, is angry that she is not satisfied and the misunderstanding causes her death.

Thus, the following types of plots about hedgehog spirits that can turn into humans are found in the texts of the 10–19th centuries:
- meeting with faceless women in the fields that leads to the death of the person who saw them (one story);
- a man sees in the house at night the small white-haired old persons who turn into hedgehogs or hedgehogs who turn into old man. In

the earlier texts, they retain the animal features and they are killed without any consequences for the killer (three stories);

- stories about sacred animal (three stories);
- a story about young mister Bai who combines the characteristics of the two types of the hedgehog spirits. He pays a debt of gratitude to the woman who has saved his life, but it results in her pregnancy with a hedgehog and her death.

The two types of spirits have something in common: appearance of the person with white hair and white clothes, a lack of hostility towards people and absence of stories about seducing them.

2. Contemporary beliefs rooted in history

The cult of sacred animals was claimed to be superstition by the Chinese government after the *Xinhai* revolution (1911), later it was forbidden by the Japanese authorities and lost public appeal since the end of the 1970s. Today, there has been a certain revival, however, not as widespread as at the beginning of the 20th century. The fox and the weasel are still the most popular spirits, but the cult underwent some changes. The fieldwork materials of Liu Zheng'ai[16] show that in the North-Eastern China they are even more revered than the ancestors. He also points out that the foxes are considered to be gentle and kind in comparison with Li Wei-tsu's materials, but still like to drink wine, and the weasels are still quick in temper and naughty. Unfortunately, this paper does not contain the stories specifically about the sacred hedgehogs. Our informants, the Taoist priests from Baoding (Hebei province) noticed that no special shamans or magicians are called in the case of possession. Exorcism and communication with the spirits became the duties of the Taoist priests. The way of self-perfection was unified and became the same for all the animals: they could do it in only in human body, so hedgehogs did not need to lie under the car wheels anymore.

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[16] 刘正爱. 东北地区地仙信仰的人类学研究 // 广西民族大学学报 (哲学社会科学版), 2007, № 2, pp. 15–20.

In Tianjin the cult of Old Lady Bai is also still present. After ruining of her shrine, the statue was put into the Tianhou temple, the biggest Taoist temple of the city. We were told by the staff that nowadays all the sacred animals are worshipped as healers. The legends given in *Zuicha zhiguai* are still known and can be found in the Internet written in modern Chinese (e.g. see the blog of Liao Zhai from Tianjin[17].

Although the cult of the sacred animals is revived, the hedgehogs are not as popular as they were before. According to the messengers and blogs, people still remember that hedgehogs can be sacred animals, but many of them consider such beliefs as superstition. The Internet texts can be divided into several groups. The first group is the memoirs – stories about hedgehogs met in the villages in the beginning of the 20th century. In many of them, the animal was claimed to be sacred after escaping from an enclosure.

The stories of the other groups take place nowadays. Many people remember that hedgehogs can be sacred only when something good, bad or strange happens after contact with an animal and write about it asking for help or advice.

The second group of texts is written by the young people who want to take a hedgehog as a pet but relatives are against it, because hedgehogs are considered to be sacred animals, although they are not worshipped. The young people do not believe in sacred animals, so they do not go to the Taoist priests to ask for advice, but as all modern people try to find the answer on the Internet. The answers can be divided into two groups: the sacred animals are called a superstition or it is considered unsafe, because although *Bai xian* are not worshiped, hedgehogs are still known as sacred animals and cannot be treated as pets.

The third group of texts is a call for help. People or their children somehow hurt the animal and afterwards remembered that it could bring consequences, or something bad did happen immediately after their contact

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[17]   Available at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_638a904e0100hbu3.html (retrieved 01.10.2016).

with the animal. They ask other Internet users for advice to improve the situation. One of such messages is given below[18].

> *A hedgehog (Bai xian) suddenly came to my shop. I found it only some days later, and during these days the business was going very well. When I found it, I didn't want to catch it for fun, but was afraid it would die without food so asked my elder sister's husband to catch it. When my granny found out about that she ordered to let the hedgehog go free (we actually caught it to let it go). The elder sister's husband let it go in the grass near the Haihe river. Two days later the inspection came. I have serious problems now, so ask competent specialists for help. My business is legal. Please don't answer if you don't know what to do or you are a liar.*

Obviously, the sacred animals are not a part of that man's everyday life, but after the inspection came and found serious problems, he remembered about the sacred hedgehogs, the belief that it had brought wealth to the company and noted that the situation changed after the animal was taken away.

The fourth group of texts describes the opposite situation. The authors also do not believe in sacred animals but after helping the animal they were rewarded and realized that it was not just a mundane animal. For example, a young person from Tianjin found a hedgehog on the street in winter, took it home, gave food and his/her injured leg was immediately cured. Next day (s)he gave it old clothes to make a nest and found 20 yuans on the street later[19].

That narrative shows that in case of reward and gaining profit after saving the animal it is considered to be a type of talisman that brought fortune, but not as a powerful spirit. It was treated as a pet that would be impossible for sacred animals.

The fifth group of texts describes animals' escaping from the cages or closed flats on the upper floors (e.g., see http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-16-747528-1.shtml). In these stories, hedgehogs are considered to be magic

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[18] Available at https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/24038079.html (retrieved 01.10.2016).

[19] Available at https://www.douban.com/group/topic/4595955/ (retrieved 17.11.2018).

animals, the heroes of the fairy-tales, because a person who really believes in sacred animals would not consider putting them in boxes or cages.

According to the texts, we can conclude that for these Internet users the sacred animals have two distinct features: they connect with prosperity, well-being and can escape from the enclosures. But people claim them the sacred animals only after gaining/losing the profit or the hedgehog's escape.

Sacred hedgehogs also became the hero of the comics, e.g. *Bai xian goes through difficulties to become immortal* (白仙渡劫 *Bái xiān dù jié*)[20], created by the blogger Zizai xiaotian自在晓天. It is the part of the collection of comics about supernatural called the same as the encyclopaedia – *Taiping guangji*. Briefly, the plot of the story is the following.

The event took place after 1949 in the miners' village. The boy named Dong Sheng lost his parents. Once, he found a baby on the road, named her Dong Lai and decided to bring her up himself. One winter day on his way home he saw children torturing a hedgehog. Dong Sheng drove them away but at home he found out that the body of her sister was covered with abscesses that had small spines. The medicine couldn't help and the old woman suggested inviting a Taoist magician (半仙 *ban xian*, lit. half immortal). He concluded that the sacred hedgehog had possessed the girl. It turned out that the torturing by children was the last test after which the hedgehog would become immortal. But now all its previous works of practicing asceticism had been done in vain. The only way to help the girl was to dig out the graves of the boy's ancestors. Dong Sheng exclaimed that he'd better die, and the magician said that it was exactly what the hedgehog wanted. It couldn't say that directly, because if the sacred animal harmed the person to death, it would be struck by lightning and perish. The boy immediately drank some poison and died. The girl was cured. In spring, lightning flashed all the day, a big part of the forest burned down and the hedgehog was burned, too. Later, the girl's parents found her. They made a fortune and took her away from that place. Dong Lai never changed her

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[20] 自在晓天. 白仙渡劫. Available at http://heibaimanhua.com/weimanhua/kbmh/133898.html (retrieved 15.11.2018).

surname and every year came to the Dong Sheng's tomb. She never got married. Dong Lai always saw Dong Sheng in her dreams and he told her that he had become a deity (神 *shén*).

After the story, the author gives brief notes about *Bai xian*. He mentions that the hedgehog is one of the five sacred animals.

> *It is good at medicine, but besides curing people also can cause the diseases. The sacred animals can be good or bad, just like common people. Dong Sheng met with that situation and it was also a difficulty on the way to becoming immortal. Otherwise you cannot become a deity. The destiny of Dong Lai also has the motive behind it. Hopefully, everyone will not have a prejudice against the hedgehogs.*

The hedgehog spirit in the comics has a lot in common with the traditional sacred animal, but it also has attained some new features that characterize evil spirits and can be compared to the young mister Bai from *Zuicha zhiguai*.

Firstly, let's discuss the characteristics of the sacred animal.

- The hedgehog named *Bai xian* wants to become immortal and has its own way of self-perfection. If it fails, all its previous work is in vain. The way to self-perfection (torturing by children) is connected with physical pain and maybe it refers to the way of the self-perfection described by Li Wei-tsu: to lay three times down on the road under the wheels of vehicles and not die. If a hedgehog dies, it fails to get over a crisis; all its previous merit-records become nothing.
- The special person[21] is needed to communicate with the spirit, because it speaks the language that nobody can understand.
- Dong Sheng prevents the hedgehog from becoming immortal and it brings revenge, causing pain to the girl. The situation can be improved by Dong Sheng's death. Li Wei-tsu points out that if the man hurts or harms the sacred animal, it can possess a person or bring disease to the man's wife or children.

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[21] In the comics it is called 半仙 *ban xian*, but not 巫 *wu* or 香头 *xiangtou* as in the other texts.

- The author of the comics mentions that the hedgehog is one of the
  five sacred animals that can cure people, as well as cause disease.

On the other hand, the collection of comics is called *Taiping guangji*, and that refers to the animal spirits but not to the sacred animals. According to the traditional sacred animal cult, the boy acted correctly, and the boys who tortured the hedgehog should be punished. But the good deed turned into the bad deed, because neither the boy nor other villagers knew that way of self-perfection. The hedgehog's revenge is expressed by turning the girl into a hedgehog and such punishment is not typical. Maybe the author was influenced by the novel about young mister Bai from *Zuicha zhiguai* or such type of torturing was inspired by the physical characteristics of the animal. It was taboo to call the sacred animal just a 'hedgehog' or 'fox', but the magician calls it directly a 'hedgehog' or 'the hedgehog spirit'. The sacred animal can cause death of the offender, but it can never order to dig up the parent's tomb, because the filial piety is one of the most important Confucian virtues. Sacred animals are not controlled or punished by supernatural powers, so the death of its offender does not cause the death of the spirit from lightening.

So, these comics are the way of the modern reinterpretation of the sacred animal cult. Due to the fact that nowadays a hedgehog is not considered to be a powerful spirit as it was in Imperial China, it has attained some new characteristics. It is important to note that here also a misunderstanding remains between the spirit and the human, just like in the story about young mister Bai: Bai wants to express gratitude, but instead causes pain; Dong Sheng saves the animal, causing its failure to become immortal. It seems that these misunderstandings were occasioned by different reasons. Bai is an animal spirit who can transform into human being rather than a sacred animal, and the hedgehog in the comics is a sacred animal that obtains the characteristics of the evil spirit due to interruption of the tradition.

Conclusion

In the earliest texts dated to the Song period, the hedgehog spirits can rather transform into women without eyes, ears, mouths and noses or into small white-haired old persons, who retain some animal features (white colour of the hair and robes, body hair, small size, eating insects, activity at night). The first ones can cause the death of a person who accidentally sees them in fields. The latter appear in the houses, do not harm people – on the contrary, are killed by them. Later, in the stories of the Qing period, the hedgehog spirits appear as old small white-haired persons or a white-skinned man with a fringe on the body or as sacred animals. The features of both types of spirits can mix, like in the story "Young mister Bai" from *Zuicha zhiguai*.

The cult of sacred hedgehogs varies across regions. Thus, in Tianjin the sacred hedgehog was worshipped as Old Lady Bai, the healer, while in Beijing and northeastern region it was considered first of all to be the protector of the family and the God of Wealth.

Nowadays, although the beliefs of sacred hedgehogs are not as popular as those about foxes or weasels, people rather associate the hedgehog with *Bai xian* than with the spirits from *Taiping guangji*. For many people, the spirits are not a part of their everyday routine and they remember about *Bai xian* only when something good, bad or strange has happened to them after meeting the hedgehogs. The main features of the sacred hedgehogs are bringing wealth and their ability to escape from the enclosures, so they are slowly transforming from the powerful spirits-protectors of the family to the magic animals.

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Līga Sakse

ON THE JAPANESE FLORAL PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction

Japan's art history is one of the richest in the world. Contemporary Japanese floral fine art photography[1] has gained increasing global attention in the past decade and is acclaimed for its diversity. Nonetheless, at the same time Japanese artworks in a photographic medium tend to be more closely connected with spirituality than in the Western traditions. The objective is to discern what artifacts are used to communicate fine art floral photography in the postmodern period of time and what contemporary floral fine art photography has contributed to the expression of the artists' emotions and their perceptions. According to David Bate: "The question to ask – in art, at least – is not so much 'is it true?' as 'what does it do?' 'What is the effect of the story or fragments of insight that a work relates?'"[2] This article will try to outline an epistemology of floral photographic ideas through the comparative aspects of artists' concepts. Furthermore, it will strive to provide an insight into artists' statements, to consider culture-based background and to analyse the contemporary floral fine art photography in the period from 2000–2017.

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[1] Fine art photography is created in accordance with the vision of the artist as photographer.

[2] Bate, D. *Art Photography*. London: Tate Publishing, 2015, p. 121.

- The paper will seek to ascertain whether there is a connection between the self-development of the individual and Japanese cultural values. In the latter the arts have tended to be closely linked, and the specific values include:
- spiritual Confucian[3] practices of self-cultivation (the process of educating yourself);
- aspects of the Japanese view of nature;
-   historic concepts *mono no aware*[4] (物の哀れ)*, wabi–sabi*[5] (侘寂)*,* s*hogyo mujyo*[6] (諸行無常)*, nihonga*[7] (日本画)*, ikebana*[8] (生け花)*.*

Mono no aware represents the vital energy of things. This can be seen in the poem by Jiyen the Monk (1155–1225): "Let us not blame the wind, indiscriminately, That scatters the flowers so ruthlessly; I think it is their own desire to pass away before their time has come."[9] This paper intends to discover the meaning and context of the Japanese-born artists, whose artworks are floral images created by photographic techniques, and use a mixed-methods approach and case studies to analyse their individual artistic background. The Japanese aesthetic is described by Michael Kelly:

> *The Japanese aesthetic appreciation of nature has also consisted of pictorial, associational, and symbolic approaches. The long–held tradition of the Japanese aesthetic appreciation of nature, however, exhibits some distinct characteristics as well. First, the aspects of nature frequently praised for their aesthetic appeal are relatively small, intimate, tame, and friendly. Little appreciation is given to the gigantic, overpowering, frightening, or aloof. Second, nature is considered fundamentally identical to humans,*

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[3]   Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism have adopted parts of doctrine from one another during their history of evolution.

[4]   *Mono no aware* refers to a 'pathos' (*aware*) of 'things' (*mono*).

[5]   *Wabi–sabi* is a world view centered on the acceptance of transience and imperfection.

[6]   *Shogyo mujo* means *Everything changes; nothing stays the same*. This is one of the basic Buddhist concepts regarding the impermanence of all things.

[7]   *Wabi–sabi* is a world view centered on the acceptance of transience and imperfection.

[8]   *Ikebana* – Flower arrangement is an art originating in Japan.

[9]   Suzuki, D. T. *Zen and Japanese Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 390.

and the sensuous expression of this identity becomes the object of aesthetic appreciation. Finally, nature is respected for its inherent characteristics, and this attitude underlies the Japanese design principle of making use of and enhancing nature's quintessential qualities. [10]

The debates around Japanese contemporary fine art photography culture approaches resonate across the range of applications, from culture-based research, to academic research. It is especially well expressed by Sandra Buckley (2002), who writes: "The Japanese word for 'photography', *shashin*, means to 'copy truth' or 'represent' reality. Given the photograph's unique capacity to function both as a truthful document and as a constructed fiction, the twin poles of objectivity and subjectivity and their relation to 'reality' have formed the parameters for this discursive field. [..] Perhaps more than any other artistic medium, photography has played an instrumental role in exploring, representing and constructing images of what it has meant to be Japanese in the face of modernization, Westernization and industrialization". [11] This is made possible through the photographic image's ability to evoke emotions and share experience, and has been used to express what is most important to be Japanese. Following Boye Lafayette De Mente's formulation (1994): "Nevertheless, Japan's traditional culture is still so powerful that it continues to be the prevailing force in modelling and tuning the national character of the Japanese, with the result that they still have two faces – one modern and rational, and one traditional and emotional". [12]

This presents a useful benchmark for contemporary Japanese floral fine–art photography research. The flowers are part of the long tradition of still life in art. However, as photography theorist David Bates (2016) points out: "Still life remains one of the most neglected genres, not only

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[10]   Kelly, M. *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. Vol. 4* (s.l.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 279.

[11]   Buckley, S. *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture.* Article Photography by Alicia Volk. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 388.

[12]   De Mente, B. L. *NTC's dictionary of Japan's cultural code words: Key Terms that Explain the Attitudes and Behavior of the Japanese.* Lincolnwood, Ill.: Nat. Textbook Co., 1994, p. 13.

in photography criticism but also in the history of art. It is only rarely discussed, despite the fact that still life pictures are as pervasive as they are maligned".[13]

In recognition of this, it has been important to continue to research the floral still life works which are arranged in a sequence to highlight flowers aesthetics, cultural contexts, essential characteristics and the dramatic spectacle of death in all things living. "And, finally, they (*the objects of still life*) may serve as catalysts for the transgression and subversion of their own inner logic, identity, and meaning, through the re–creation and reordering of familiar yet uncannily strange everyday objects in the real world", explains Margit Rowell (1997).[14]

This research features thirteen outstanding floral artworks to highlight the plants' aesthetics, national contexts and essential characteristics, that include the classical Japanese philosophy – that of understanding basic reality as constant *change*, or *impermanence* (無常 *rōmaji: mujō*).[15] In order to appreciate modern floral fine–art photography in Japan, this paper makes the **following** selection of **artists as an embodiment of the nation's cultural ideas**: Nobuyoshi Araki (荒木経惟), Kunié Sugiura (杉浦邦恵), Ichigo Sugawara (菅原一剛), Shinya Masuda (増田伸也), Yumiko Izu (井津由美子), Mika Ninagawa (蜷川 実花), Rinko Kawaushi (川内倫子), Kenji Shibata (柴田謙司), Azuma Makoto (東信), Yōko Shimizu (清水陽子), Shu Ikeda (池田衆), Kozue Takagi (高木こずえ) and Wataru Yamamoto (山本渉). Their artworks allow us to see details [Table 1] and explore the potential of Japanese floral fine–art photography in the period from 2000–2017. If the method of exploring the artist's statements are applied in a research setting, it may assist in understanding the artist's interior: most artists do not separate an approach to art and aesthetics from self-cultivation processes, religious practices, as well as ethics. The choice

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[13] Bate, D. Photography: The Key Concepts. Second edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, p. 137.

[14] Rowell, M. *Objects of desire: the modern still life*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1997, p. 130.

[15] Translation of *Impermanence* in Japanese *rōmaji: mujō*. It is one of the essential doctrines and a part of three marks of existence in Buddhism.

of methods and the analysis of data bring us findings which allow us to advance the following questions:

1. Is there a link between *Japanness* and the logic of the depiction of flowers nowadays?
2. If there is an element of Japanese aesthetics in the modern context?
3. What are the main trends reflected by contemporary floral fine art photography?
4. What impact has floral artwork photography had on the dynamic development of the future perspective of art in general?

Finally, we will try to highlight the ideas of the artists' individual concepts before Tōhoku (東北地方太平洋沖地震 *Tōhoku–chihō Taiheiyō Oki Jishin*) the tsunami in 2011 earthquake and closely connected with the interpretative value in the post-earthquake period.

1. Contribution of contemporary Japanese photography in the form of floral motif

Nobuyoshi Araki (荒木経惟 nickname Arākī アラーキー Nobujoši Araki, b. 1940) is a Japanese photographer, prolific artist whose works are emblazoned across the international artistic spectrum and include the publishing of over 500 books. "Araki's approach goes against much of modern Japanese culture, however, which is obsessed with the new".[16] Along the lines of traditional Japanese art, his photography assimilates aspects of Japanese style paintings *nihonga*. An American art historian of Japanese art Ernest Fenollosa[17] (1853–1908) pointed out the following as characteristics of *nihonga* and evaluated its excellence: "1) It does not seek realism; 2) It does not have shadows; 3) It has an outline; 4) The colour tone is not rich; 5) The expression is simple." See Figure 1.

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[16] Phaidon. *Plant – Exploring the Botanical World*. New York: Phaidon Press Inc., 2016, p. 289.

[17] Ernest Fenollosa gave his lecture on *The New Theory of Art* at the Dragon Pond Society "Ryuuchikai" in 1882.

The photograph *Painting Flowers* (2004) shows a bouquet of flowers with coloured liquid symbolically exploring sexuality.

Figure 1. Nobuyoshi Araki, Painting Flowers, 2004 © Nobuyoshi Araki

He produced floral photographs with naturalistic mimicked flowers, pictured with dinosaur toys and bird motifs containing the element of a worldview that is centred on the acceptance of transience and imperfection – the traditional Japanese aesthetic *wabi–sabi*.[18] "The term *wabi–sabi* suggests such qualities as impermanence, humbleness, asymmetry, and

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[18]   *Wabi–sabi* – two terms originating from Zen Buddhist meditative practices describe degrees of tranquility: one, the repose found in humble melancholy *(wabi)*, the other, the serenity accompanying the enjoyment of subdued beauty *(sabi)*. *Wabi* means transient and stark beauty, *sabi* means the beauty of natural patina and aging.

imperfection. These underlying principles are diametrically opposed to those of their Western counterparts, whose values are rooted in the Hellenic worldview that values permanence, grandeur, symmetry, and perfection", thus Andrew Juniper provides an explanation of *wabi–sabi*.[19]

Installation artist and photographer Kunié Sugiura (杉浦邦恵 Kuṇie Sugiura, b. 1942) experiments with light led to the development of the photo gram. In this artist's practice, Sugiura explores shadows as substance in her life–size striking photo grams. Sugiura's elements for producing the photo gram *Trochoids Positive* (2000) are photographic paper, the chemicals used to fix the images and semi–transparent plants and light. "The footprint, like a photograph or photo gram, is a recording of a past reality, since the footprint that is firmly in the present – in other words still being made – would be invisible, hidden under the foot itself".[20] Her concept of capturing light on empty and unfinished spaces on light–sensitive paper evokes feelings of the transience of nature. She gives the depth to the photo gram's background by pouring hot water over randomly selected areas of the surface. As the artist's statement encapsulates: "Sugiura's photo–canvases introduce a new hybrid between painting and photography. These are delicate imprints of flowers, placed on photographic paper, then exposed to light to reveal eerie yet beautiful shadows reminiscent of the traditional forms of her native Japan." And again, "Pretty and decorative, they lack the power of the silhouette portraits, which convey arrestingly the spirit of their subjects without the overload of information often conferred by the lens".[21]

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[19] Juniper, A. *Wabi Sabi: the Japanese Art of Impermanence.* Boston: Tuttle Pub., 2003, pp. 15–18.

[20] Arning, B. *MIT List Visual Arts Center from Making Time Stutter.* Catalogue essay for Kunie Sugiura, Dark Matters/Light Affairs, a retrospective exhibition at the Frances Lehman Loeb Art Center at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, NY. May 2000. Available at *https://www.cpw.org/artist/kunie-sugiura/* (retrieved 03.03.2018).

[21] Glueck, G. *The New York Times, Art in Review; Kunié Sugiura – "The Artist Papers and Other Works".* January 18, 2002. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/18/arts/art-in-review-kunie-sugiura-the-artist-papers-and-other-works.html (retrieved 19.10.2018).

Ichigo Sugawara (菅原一剛 Ičigō Sugavara, b. 1960) creates his formula of compounded emulsion for a glass print – a unique process combining a wet plate with digital techniques adapted for this contemporary era. "He studied under Kazuo Miyagawa[22], the director of photography for the filmmaker Akira Kurosawa[23], while attending Osaka University of Art. During this time, he became enamoured by the expression of dazzling light in Kurosawa's film *Rashomon* and has since then been seeking his own ways of expressing light and warmth through photography. [..] He built the unit with Motoyuki Kubo[24], one of the best printers in Japan, to create his own formula of compounded emulsion for glass print".[25] Sugawara's photograph *Fuji* from *Bright Forest* series (2009) presents the reflection of the world through his contemplative approach to the *Tsubaki*[26] as an intrinsically sacred essence reflecting a mystical experience. Sugawara (2010) states in the press release:

> *The blossoms, though all of the same genus, have grown into their own unique personalities through time much like humans. The Tsubaki have a special status in the tea ceremony, which was developed as a transformation process of the self with its own aesthetic based on quietness, respect and harmony. I am still spending my days faced with various objects. When I work with something new and different, I find, fortunately, bright places, a warm place on the other side of the forest. And that arises almost as a logical necessity and has a great deal of explanatory power.*[27]

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[22] Kazuo Miyagawa (宮川 一夫 *Miyagawa Kazuo*, 1908–1999) was an acclaimed Japanese cinematographer.

[23] Akira Kurosawa (黒澤 明 *Kurosawa Akira*, 1910–1998) was one of the most prominent and influential filmmakers in the history of cinema.

[24] Motoyuki Kubo established 久保元幸印画研究室 Motoyuki Kubo Printing Laboratory.

[25] Sous Les Etoiles Gallery. *Ichigo Sugawara. The Bright Forest*, December 9, 2010–Feb. 11, 2011. Available at http://www.souslesetoilesgallery.net/exhibitions/ichigo-sugawara (retrieved 02.11.2018).

[26] *Camellia japonica* or *tsubaki*, a species of flowering plants.

[27] Sugawara, I., *Fuji from Bright Forest* series, 2009. Available at http://ichigosugawara.com/photographs/tsubaki/ (retrieved 04.11.2018).

Figure 2. Shinya Masuda, Hanafuda Shouzoku #3, 2017 © Shinya Masuda

Fine art photographer Shinya Masuda (増田伸也 Šinja Masuda, b.1965) creates a digital photo collage *Hanafuda Shouzoku #3* (2017) by using rotting flowers and food as a result of personal experience (Figure 2). Masuda (2017) describes in the series' description: "The idea of this work came to me when I found rotten food inside a box that my mother had sent me from my hometown. I felt so sorry when I thought of my mother's affection towards me. The process of a food rotting and losing its form is taken for granted, but I strongly felt that I want to express my mother's love in some kind of form. I portrayed the rotten food as the dead soul and chose one of the Japanese card games 'HANAFUDA' as a dress *(SHOUZOKU)* to send off the dead. When I was a child, my grandmother said 'Anything with a shape will eventually be gone', and what she told me has remained in my mind to this day. Back then, I had no doubt that some things would definitely last forever. There is a Buddhist term, 'Shogyo Mujyo'. 'Shogyo'

means every bit of every phenomenon in this world, and 'Mujyo' means nothing lasts as it is, and constantly changes".[28]

Currently working in New York, Japanese-born Yumiko Izu (井津 由美子 Jumiko Idzu, b.1968) finds her roots in the nation's visual culture. By choosing to highlight the detail of a fully opened white tulip in soft monochrome tones against a white background Izu's *Secret Garden Blanc 72* (2008) photograph is rich with associations. The Japanese are lovers of such categories like semi–light, semi–dark, gentleness and softness. The pieces from her *Secret Garden* series are sensitive in texture, very light coloured in semi–tones. She produced large-scale pigment prints for studying the interplay between life and death which are published by *Serendia Contemporary* in the monograph *Resonance* in 2016. Rui Kodemari (2016) writes: "Yumiko Izu's *Resonance* pulsates with the life memories of one woman's time here on earth. It is an inner wilderness where the sediments of time, washed by water and cleansed of all impurities, stretch to limitless horizons. In this landscape, flowers without roots and skulls without flesh sing paeans to life".[29] The cultural heritage of her native memory allows working originally with the basic concept – in nothingness, there is everything.

Well–known Japanese photographer and film director Mika Ninagawa (蜷川実花 Mika Ņinagava, b. 1972) created the photo series *Everlasting Flowers* in 2000–2006. The *Everlasting Flowers* series is a vivid portrayal of artificial flowers in a cemetery seen through the symbolism of floral motifs and look into ritual symbolism of flowers. Over the years her photographs have become mainstream and known for her brightly and vibrant colored portraits of natural flowers. She shapes a unique atmosphere in her photography, music videos and movies. The artist in the press release for the exhibition *Earthly Flowers, Heavenly Colors* explains: "Possessing

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[28]　*The 2nd Place, Shinya Masuda, Japan.* Available at https://www.worldphoto.org/fr/sony-world-photography-awards/winners-galleries/2017/professional/shortlisted/still-life/2nd-place (retrieved 14.10.2018).

[29]　Kodemari, R. *Yumiko Izu monograph "Resonance" published by Serendia Contemporary.* Available at http://www.howardgreenberg.com/publications/resonance (retrieved 26.03.2018).

a strength that draws near to life's essence, she is very popular among younger generations and other audiences for the colourful, dream-like, and beautiful worlds that both draw from her keen sensitivity to impermanence and the darkness that lies in the shadows of the bright".[30]

Table 1
Table of used artifacts, aesthetic objects and the author's individual context (2019)
© Courtesy of Liga Sakse

Surname, name	Title (Year)	Technique	An artefact	The author's individual context
Nobuyoshi Araki	*Painting Flowers* (2004)	Analog film and direct print	Sexuality	Paints flowers with colored liquid
Kunié Sugiura	*Trochoids Positive (2000)*	Photogram	The footprint recording of a past reality	The photograms evoke feelings of beauty in their unfinished and empty spaces
Ichigo Sugawara	*Fugi* from *Bright Forest* series (2009)	Unique process combining the wet plate with digital techniques	An intrinsically sacred essence reflecting a mystical experience	The work uses a transformation process of the self with its own aesthetic based on quietness, respect and harmony
Shinya Masuda	Hanafuda Shouzoku #3 (2017)	Collage	Anything with a shape will lose its form	Buddhist belief that nothing lasts as it is – everything constantly changes
Yumiko Izu	*Secret Garden Blanc 72* (2008)	Pigment print	Life-memories	Studying the interplay between life and death using light colored flowers

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30 Ninagawa, M. Press release for the exhibition: *Earthly Flowers, Heavenly Colors.* Available at https://www.city.takamatsu.kagawa.jp/museum/takamatsu/info/contact.files/07.pdf (retrieved 02.04.2017).

Surname, name	Title (Year)	Technique	An artefact	The author's individual context
Mika Ninagawa	*Everlasting Flowers* (2006)	Colour photo	Fake flowers and artificial flowers	Takes a look into both the aesthetic and ritual symbolisms of flowers
Rinko Kawaushi	*Illuminance* (2011)	Colour photo book	Collective unconscious	By sharing the memories using photography takes consciousness somewhere far away
Kenji Shibata	*Locked in the Ether* (2016)	Digital lambda printer	A single moment	By freezing flowers into large ice blocks shows the inevitable passing of all things
Azuma Makoto	*Exobiotanica* (2014)	Several GoPro cameras	Space flight	To recognise flowers as living things by seeing them into the stratosphere
Yōko Shimizu	*My Brooklyn Studio* (2016)	Photo-synthegraph printed on a leaf by photosynthesis	Natural and scientific phenomena that are timeless	Printing graphic images on plant leaf by photosynthesis
Shu Ikeda	*Innocent Prayers (2013)*	The method of photograph-cutting	Reality in a new shape	Using cut-out techniques reinventing reality in a new shape
Kozue Takagi	*Ground* (2009)	Digital manipulation	The discovering of the world	Images are digitally mixed as collages representing the artist's confrontation with the world
Wataru Yamamoto	*Leaf of Electric Light* (2012)	A process known as Kirlian photography	The energy field of living organisms	Documenting nature as a psychological image – the idea to document ambiguity

Kenji Shibata (柴田謙司 Kendži Šibata, b. 1972) has been creating photographs by freezing flowers into ice blocks, seen as an earthly imitation of libido. Chan (2014) writes: "They're floating in limbo, lost somewhere ineffable, blushing still with colour and life".[31] The spirit of *Japanness* has been channelled by Shibata's floral images where dead flowers have been *cementing* in the ice structure and photographed, through which their last breaths are immortalized. Shibata's artefact for photography series *Locked in the Ether* is a single moment towards the inevitable passing of all things. His artworks feature flowers literally frozen in time, cut down and preserved in ice to both save and destroy their beauty. One aspect that Shibata aims to address is the relationship between aesthetic objects – flower and ice, underlining their material.

Like many of her artists' compatriots, Rinko Kawauchi (川内倫子 Rinko Kawaučhi, b. 1972) has studied graphic design and photography. Kawauchi has kept poeticism in mind during the image–making process for her twenty photo books. One of her artworks is the photo book *Illuminance* (2011). *Unsee–Magazine* (2017) about her artworks writes: "Synergizing natural colour tones and lighting, Rinko Kawauchi's milky–hued images have always revealed the optical similarities amongst overlooked everyday occurrences"[32] and photography critic Phkenji Takazawa (2016) explains: "One of the distinguishing characteristic of Kawauchi's work is the way she brings to the surface and enables us to discover things we normally take for granted because they are too ordinary by them into photographs. [..] One aspect of the innovativeness of Rinko Kawauchi is that she has made manifest this kind of sharing of memories using photography, or in other words the existence of the collective unconscious. And this point is precisely the reason why Kawauchi's work has been able to go beyond

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[31]   Chan, S. *Kenji Shibata Photographs of Frozen Flowers Float in Limbo Between A State of Beauty and Decay.* Available at http://www.beautifuldecay.com/2014/12/16/kenji-shibata-photographs-frozen-flowers-float-limbo-state-beauty-decay/ (retrieved 17.04.2018).

[32]   Rinko Kawauchi. Presented by Christophe Guye Galerie. *Unseen–Magazine* Issue 4/2017, p. 100. Yamamoto, W. *Artist Statement.* Available at http://wataruyamamoto.jp/profile/ (retrieved 11.09.2018).

the framework of Japanese photography and gain such a strong following internationally".[33]

Figure 3. Azuma Makoto, Exobiotanica – Botanical space flight – Date: July 15, 2014 / Place: Black Rock Desert, Nevada, USA © AMKK

The Japanese artist Makoto Azuma (東信 Makoto Azuma, b. 1976) revisited space – launching a large bouquet (Figure 3) into the stratosphere. Members of *AMKK* (*abbr. AMKK; meaning Azuma Makoto Botanical Research Institute*) used several GoPro mirror less cameras to capture atmospheric and gradual changes in the environment, and how the flowers react to the minus 60-degree Celsius temperature. De La Cruz (2014) outlines: "Azuma designed the frame to dangle beneath a helium balloon that would carry a lavish bouquet of flowers into stratosphere. He used brightly colored flowers from around the world so that they contrast

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[33] Takazawa, P. *Photographs as a Medium for the Memories of Strangers.* 2016. Available at http://rinkokawauchi.com/unit/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2016_Gallery-916.pdf (retrieved 05.09.2017).

against the darkness of space".[34] The arrangement of flowers reached an altitude of up to 30,000 meters and the flowers were never found, though, the device was retrieved about 8 km from the launch site. Azuma sees beauty in the whole circle of life: "In Japan, in *ikebana* (*the Japanese art of flower arranging, or the way of flowers*) they say you listen to the voice of the flower, so to speak. It's important to live as such. The point is not to see flowers as objects, but as living things. Listen to the plant's voice. Be conscious of it. [..] I wanted to take flowers and plants into an impossible environment where they could never exist. And seeing this very striking visual visualization – this juxtaposition – really makes you think. People who were never interested in flowers before will now see this and become interested".[35] *AMKK* through the experimental methods fuses nature, pursues the infinite potential of plants and draws the text from Ikenobo: "The fundamental aims of flower arrangement that stands above the shape, the colour and the beauty of formation, are to express men's sympathy towards the tiny life of plant and their expectation for its future. *Ikebana* is created being based upon the noble and spiritual interchange between men and flowers."[36]

Promising young Japanese photographer Shu Ikeda (池田衆 Šū Ikeda, b.1979) has been fashioning photographs using his cut-out techniques in addition to create unique shapes and voids. He produced photo–collage pieces such as *Innocent Prayers* (2013) cut-out photograph, mounted on acrylic 52 × 78 cm. On the one hand, the cut hole on the image surface creates previously invisible movement of shades and, on the other hand, look like traditional Japanese paper cutting called *Kirie* or *Kirigami*.[37] "Tz'u Jen once explained that successful paper – cutting results from mastery

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[34] De La Cruz, P. *A Japanese Artist Launches Plants Into Space*. Available at https://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/flowers-in-space-azuma-makoto-exobiotanica/ (retrieved 20.07.2016).

[35] Mazurek, B. *Meet Makoto Azuma, the Outrageous Florist to Dries Van Noten – and Man Who Launched a Bonsai into Space*, 2017. Available at *https://www.gq.com/story/the-man-who-launched-a-bonsai-into-space* (retrieved 05.09.2018).

[36] Ikenobo, S. *Ikebana*. Osaka: Hoikusha. 1975, p. 1.

[37] *Kirigami* literally meaning 'cut picture'.

of the three steps in the technique: sketching the design, clipping, and mounting the cut-out. The work depends on skilful execution of all steps and also on the imagination of the artist".[38] In particular, by collecting the cut-outs taken from photographs Ikeda represents individual cropping of a reality. Ikeda explains: "I used to work with shapes and light, but now I want to explore more elements, to explore more of the external world, like situations and actual life".

Yōko Shimizu (清水陽子 Jōko Šimizu) is a contemporary Japanese artist and biochemistry researcher who has been pushing the boundaries of art through artistic science by experimenting with expressions that combined science and art. Shimizu was born in Japan and grew up in New York where as a child she was inspired by the art scene. "She studied Biology and Chemistry in Kobe University to utilize scientific phenomena and principles in art".[39] Shimizu and *Lab+1e* created artwork *My Brooklyn Studio* (2016) by printing a graphic image on a plant by a process of photosynthesis. Graphic print films are attached onto plant leaves allowing chloroplasts to create starch based on the graphic patterns. The lab's art installations showcase a delicate natural process that illuminates the infinite possibilities for both, technological advancement and artistic expressions. She outlined this in the article *Inspiring Art with Science and Science with Art*: "I like to study and experiment with natural and scientific phenomenon that are timeless, limitless and filled with inspiration. I think we have yet to learn so much about the universe, there are still many more beautiful things beyond our imagination. [..] In *Lab+1e*, we create installations that integrate art and science. Our main focus is on the timeless principles of nature and the universe that have existed before mankind and will continue to exist after our time".[40]

By layering images Kozue Takagi (高木こずえ Kozue Takagi, b.1985) has been making visible the intricate illusion that weaves reality and fiction

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[38] Deng Gong, Y. *Zhongguo jian zhi yi shu*. Taibei: Zhonghua Minguo guo li li shi bo wu guan. 1976, p. 113.

[39] Shimizu, Y. *About the Artist, Concept/Inspiring Art with Science and Science with Art.* Available at http://yokoshimizu.com/gallery/ (retrieved 05.08.2017).

[40] Ibid.

together. Being one of the prominent young Japanese artists she is mainly recognized for her *Ground* series. Kozue's technical method for creating an image is to scan a group of the monochrome negatives photographed on film and then to convert digital images into colored ones. Kozue states: "The repeated cycle of life and death, of life being born for the dying and returning to the earth to be born again".[41]

Wataru Yamamoto (山本渉 Vataru Jamamoto, b.1986) has been *writing with light* using the process of kirlian photography – the technique has been known as electrography, electrophotography, corona discharge photography (CDP), bioelectrography, electro photonic imaging (EPI) and kirlianography. As Laycock, Vernon, Groves and Brown (1989) writes about the technique: "It is named after Semyon Kirlian, who, in 1939, accidentally discovered that if an object on a photographic plate is connected to a high–voltage source, an image is produced on the photographic plate".[42] In photograph *A Violet Leaf 4* from the series *Leaf of Electric Light* (2012) Yamamoto captured the energy field of a leaf using a high voltage to generate an electric discharge. These discharges were recorded photographically. "The living aura theory is at least partially repudiated by demonstrating that leaf moisture content has a pronounced effect on the electric discharge coronas; more moisture creates larger corona discharges. As the leaf dehydrates, the coronas will naturally decrease in variability and intensity. As a result, the changing water content of the leaf can affect the so-called Kirlian aura".[43] Yamamoto describes this in his artist statement: "In fact, however, the resulting images differ depending on the thickness of the photographic subject, the amount of water in it, and conditions of

[41] Kozue Takagi *"Fragmented Emotions" Featuring Kozue Takagi and Shu Ikeda*, 5 November – 9 December 2010. Available at https://blindspotgallery.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Press–Release_Fragmented-Emotions_ENGLISH.pdf (retrieved 02.08.2018).

[42] Laycock, D., Vernon, D., Groves, C., Brown, S. *Julie McCarron – Benson in Skeptical – a Handbook of Pseudoscience and the Paranormal.* Canberra: Imagecraft, 1989, p. 1.

[43] Boyers, D. G., Tiller, W. A. Corona Discharge Photography. *Journal of Applied Physics.* Vol. 44, No. 7, 1973, pp. 3102–3112.

the environment in which the subject is photographed. In these images, there is a material reality, which differs from visually perceived reality".[44] As Yamamoto has been proving, this is still useful in photographing objects in new light. "I aim to document neither humans nor nature but what exists between them. It is the essential ambiguity of photography, as both an optical process of "writing with light" and psychological representational technique of "copying truth," which I use to document such images. All of my works are an attempt to answer whether it is possible to document ambiguity".[45]

2. Final remarks

These examples give the idea of different layers of experience that are revealed: Ninagawa's, Takagi's and Yamamoto's photo works are the perfect vehicle for understanding *Japanness*, recover a Japanese special sense of beauty – *mono no aware* and evokes a gentle sadness, awareness of the transience of all things heightens the appreciation of their beauty. Through studying Araki's working experience and creative achievements, we have been discovering important insights of *nihonga*. *Kirie* paper cutting tradition remains relevant in Ikeda's works. Zen Buddhism has an influence on modern Japanese floral photography by term *shogyo mujyo* in Masuda's collages. The main principles of composition in Orientalal Art – the clarity of light and the empty space aspect – have been assimilating in Japanese contemporary fine art photography forms by Sugiura, Kawaushi, Shibata, Izu, Shimizu, Sugawara and Azuma. Moreover, within a mission of expanding art activities pursuing infinite potential of plants, Azuma and *AMKK* depicts brightly colored flowers from around the world in space with sensitivity to changes of seasons. Each of analysed artwork originates from the Japanese view of nature, which is a fundamental aspect of Japanese aesthetics.

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[44] Yamamoto, W. *Christophe Guye Galerie. Wataru Yamamoto biography.* Available at https://christopheguye.com/artists/wataru-yamamoto/biography (retrieved 16.10.2018).
[45] Ibid.

It is worth reflecting on summary of author's ideas and individual concepts before Tōhoku (東北地方太平洋沖地震 Tōhoku–chihō Taiheiyō Oki Jishin) earthquake and the tsunami in 2011 and in the post–earthquake period. The 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku was a magnitude 9.0–9.1 (M_w) undersea. Yet, it is important in realizing the full potential of artists to remember that the Japanese have experienced this mega thrust earthquake – greater than that of any other recorded in Japan's history. Despite the disruption and the cataclysms, this sense of conflict between humankind and earth lead the compatriots to contemplate about the earth and enrich creative practice. For example, the artist Ikeda has been deeply affected by the devastating Tōhoku earthquake: "I used to work with shapes and light, but now I want to explore more elements, to explore more of the external world, like situations and actual life"[46]. The post-earthquake period in the table (Table 2) signifies a whole new set of basic artist's individual concepts: to share the memories, to document ambiguity by the energy field of living organisms, to reinvent reality in a new shape, to see the bouquet of flowers in space, to examine the natural and scientific phenomena that are timeless, to capture the inevitable passing of all things and to fix the things with a shape, because nothing lasts as it is – everything constantly changes.

Table 2
Ideas of the author's individual concepts till Tōhoku earthquake in 2011 and post-earthquake period (2019) © Courtesy of Liga Sakse

Year	Surname, name	Ideas of the author's individual concept of floral fine-art photograph
2000	Kunié Sugiura 杉浦邦恵	The idea to record a past reality by artificial footprint
2004	Nobuyoshi Araki 荒木経惟	The idea to reflect sexuality by painted floral bouquets
2006	Mika Ninagawa 蜷川実花	The idea to take a look into both the aesthetic and ritual symbolism of flowers

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[46] Shu Ikeda. Web Review BY Nelson Tsui, Blindspot Gallery. Available at http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/WebExclusives/VOIDShuIkeda (retrieved 01.08.2018).

Year	Surname, name	Ideas of the author's individual concept of floral fine-art photograph
2008	Yumiko Izu 井津由美子	The idea to study the interplay between life and death through light coloured flowers
2009	Kozue Takagi 高木こずえ	The idea to represent confrontation to the world and earth by collages – digitally mixed images
2009	Ichigo Sugawara 菅原一剛	The idea to reflect an intrinsically sacred essence and share a mystical experience
		Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011
2011	Rinko Kawaushi 川内倫子	The idea to share the memories using photography and transport consciousness somewhere far away
2012	Wataru Yamamoto 山本渉	The idea to document ambiguity through the energy field of living organisms
2013	Shu Ikeda 池田衆	The idea to create reality in a new shape with cutout photograph
2014	Azuma Makoto 東信	The idea to recognise flowers as living things by seeing a bouquet of flowers sent into the space
2016	Yōko Shimizu 清水陽子	The idea to examine natural and scientific phenomena that are timeless
2016	Kenji Shibata 柴田謙司	The idea to capture the inevitable passing of all things by freezing flowers into ice blocks
2017	Shinya Masuda 増田伸也	The idea to fix the things with a shape, because nothing lasts as it is – everything constantly changes

Conclusion

The results of this paper have revealed ambiguous patterns of concepts among artists' works till Tōhoku earthquake and post-earthquake period. However, with regard to personal creativity, artists use floral fine art photography as an important expression of Japanese cultural values. Those Japanese-born artists who consider personal freedom more important than equality feel simultaneously attached to a local identity, with their creativity

emerging from their national context, traditional culture, spiritual sense of beauty and influences from international experience of art. Looking at the Azuma's work, the photograph from space has a significant impact on the field of art from a future perspective. Japan's floral fine art photography has been gaining attention because of the expression of unique visual narratives, Japanese's cultural values and aesthetic appreciation of nature. Transcending traditional floral photography boundaries, it is a clear Japanese artists' understanding of the notion of 'aesthetic' is a pervasive component of their art forms.

The analysis of artistic and individual concepts before Tōhoku earthquake and the tsunami, and in post-earthquake period has revealed the ability of Japanese artists to imagine spaces in artworks and to open up a spiritual dimension. With regard to findings of individual artist's creativity, the analysis shows what changes happened in post-earthquake period in the following aspects:

1. On the one hand, the logic of depicting flowers exhibits elements of the modern context and innovations, but on the other hand it incorporates the spirit of Japanness. It does so by the important part of Japanness in its approach to death, with the sense of transience of all human beings;

2. The elements of Japanese aesthetics and an ideal of *emptiness* from Zen Buddhism philosophy develops modern aesthetic and visual culture. The elements of the Japanese terms *shogyo mujyo, wabi–sabi, nihonga, ikebana, mono no aware* aesthetic and sentiment of *nothingness* remain relevant in contemporary Japanese photography;

3. The Japanese artist's identity, cultural values and individual backgrounds has a positive impact on the symbolic dimension as well as on the creativity. The main trends have been outlined for floral motifs, that they serve as a symbolic reminder of the transience of all things and mortality.

4. There are tendencies of the future perspective for artists who have become researchers in artistic science by experimenting with expressions that combined science and art. They use a creative

approach in a totally new way of expression through plants and large-scale international art projects. The team of artists established effective working relationships within their own research laboratories and institutes.

The origins of Japanese aesthetics are spiritual and linked in Zen Buddhism. Similarly, the artworks present the Japanese photographers' approach to philosophical paradigms and the complexity of aesthetics. Therefore, the Japanese new tendencies of a floral photography have a future perspective in visual communication in the whole art scene. A worldview centred on the acceptance of transience and imperfection provides a clear framework for artistic skill development. All artworks of the analyses represent some piece of the essence of Japan's culture with most of them evoking a gentle sadness characterized by the term *mono no aware*. It is especially well expressed by philosopher Roger Scruton (2000), who writes: "Without tradition, originality cannot exist, for it is only against tradition that it becomes perceivable".[47]

Finally, this paper has proposed a comprehensive description of Japanese floral fine–art photography with particular attention paid to the artist's statement, with a focus on aesthetic values and the key concepts of *shogyo mujyo, wabi–sabi, nihonga, ikebana* and *mono no aware.* However, these concepts are very deep. "Photographers in Japan are more likely to see creativity coming from their national context, the global art experience and the traditional culture. The Japanese cultural background has a positive impact on the symbolic dimension as well as on the still life's creativity and innovation of the idea of the *memento mori*."[48]

Connections have been found between the cultural tradition in which the arts have tended to be closely connected with the Confucian practices of self–education and Zen philosophy represented through the floral motif in photography. It is well summarized by the Gian Carlo Calza: "In the Japanese tradition, the components of universe contain in themselves the

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[47] Scruton, R. *Modern Culture.* London, New York: Continuum, 2000, p. 45.
[48] Sakse, L. *Principles and Logic of the Depiction of Flowers in Vanitas Phototography.* Culture Crossroads, Vol. 12, Riga: LKA, 2018, pp. 72–84.

very nature of gods that inhabit it; its spiritual and material aspects are therefore not separate, and as there is no dichotomy between human beings and the natural world cultural concepts take a different form in Japan".[49] As we saw, the artists' adoptions of the power of flower into art forms and the beauty of plants is a fundamental theme in Japanese conceptual floral photography. The ancient elements of Japanese aesthetic incorporated with an individual motivation and uniquely concept of artists has been significance influence of the modern content and crucial factor of Japanese identity.

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Deng Gong, Y. *Zhongguo jian zhi yi shu.* Taibei: Zhonghua Minguo guo li li shi bo wu guan. 1976.

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[49] Calza, G., C. *Japan style.* London: Phaidon, 2007, p. 156.

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Tomasz Sleziak

SAGES – DEAD OR ALIVE?
RELEVANCE OF CONFUCIANISM IN STUDIES
OF SOUTH KOREAN MODERNITY

Introduction

In the almost 100 years between 1864 and 1962, Korea saw extensive changes in its socio-political arrangements. The enthronement of king Gojong of Joseon and the start of the first five-year plan of the Republic of Korea (otherwise known as South Korea) collectively appear to embody a transition between the pre-modern and modern, between monarchy and republic, between agriculture and heavy industry, and between Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and (at least nominal) democracy. But is this really the case? What do these terms truly signify in a theoretical sense? What type of methodology should be applied for studying this particular Korea in transition, and the one visible in mass media today? Indeed, study of development of any particular culture or a country should not be reduced to outlining mere dichotomies. Simple, binary oppositions seldom occur in the East or in the West, and any prospective scholar of historical sociology and economy should not be encouraged to draw lines on a political-geographic basis either. In regard to an already politically-divided area such as Korean Peninsula – and not exclusively by the 38th North parallel – the maintenance of unbiased research perspective is particularly difficult. Still, in order to build an academically viable framework linking a developmental history of a state with sociological data of its citizens, and ideologies that

regulated relationships between them, narrowing of topical spectrum and focusing on a set of particular, traceable notions is required. In Korean case, the legacy of Confucianism and its influence on rapid growth of Republic of Korea's technologies and business as well as the social changes which followed them post-Japanese occupation (and, in extension, post-Korean War) is one of the matters most frequently discussed by native and foreign scholars alike. With the increasing influence of global powers (in political, military and economic sense) both south and north of the DMZ, and gradual integration – or adaptation – of hitherto unknown notions of capitalism, communism, democracy, multiculturalism, globalization, equality, human rights and other values commonly identified with the 'West' to Korean reality, it is natural that multiple academics and research institutes have been continuously attempting to resolve real or perceived paradoxes stemming from these processes. Confucianism in all of its aspects assumed a key role within analyses resulting from these studies, with multiple attributes or functional roles being assigned to it. No official consensus has been formed to date in regard to this topic; the formerly singular orthodoxy of Joseon era – the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism – continues to be interpreted in various, at times radical ways, and more often than not in accordance with a particular collective or individual interest. Systematic classification of divergent views is perhaps a top task for any scholar working in the field of comparative historical sociology and establishing more comprehensive connections between the aforementioned false dichotomies – possibly transforming them into realistic premises for research papers – would greatly add to investigations of both Joseon's and modern Korea's development histories. This paper will make an attempt at addressing these goals, with Confucianism and its pragmatic functions in Korea's growth into a world-class economy being the primary topic of the enquiry. In the following paragraphs, Joseon (1392–1910) and its orthodox ideology – the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism – will be elucidated in terms of connections they may have with the unprecedented development of South Korea.

1. Confucianism in Joseon era

There are multiple possible approaches towards research concerning Joseon Korea's social history, the most prevalent ones among them being detailed investigations of extant primary documents and application of compatible methodologies – sociological, anthropological, philosophical, economic, and others. Only through their integration, however, the gaps in data and the underlying inconsistencies can be corrected through construction of academically valid frameworks. In this regard, the multiple intellectual strains of Confucianism should not be viewed only as philosophies, collections of ethical norms or quasi-legal doctrines. The meanings and pragmatic functions of the Cheng-Zhu heritage were multitude, especially in Joseon, and in order to fully see the developmental aspects of this complex thought system that may answer questions concerning Korean modernity, the activities of the state in relation to its ideological orthodoxy should be explained in more detail.

The Korea under Yi Dynasty's reign was, in administrative and political contexts, based on practical applications of genealogy as the signifier of an individual and group position within social hierarchy, and on the particular stratum of scholar-officials called *yangban* (Kor. 양반, Chin. 兩班, lit. 'both sides' of the civil and military officialdom) – including noble lineages themselves and the advisory, inspectorate and censoring organs of the government employment at which the literati were uniquely predisposed for – as protectors of the royal authority and national harmony. Consequently, it is the *yangban* class, embodying both the Confucian state's highly regulated (though not necessarily rigid) status stratification system and the almost exclusive political-administrative domination within the state's apparatus, that figures prominently within the majority of both primary and secondary resources on Joseon era (while the term *yangban* may be traced to Goryeo era, it has not been directly connected with Confucian establishment until the advent of Yi dynasty), at the expense of commoners and lowborn social strata. Additionally, the position of the pre-modern Korean within the wider geographic and socio-political context is a topic which has oft provoked multiple academic controversies.

For instance, since Joseon's ruling spheres regarded the state as deferential to its imperial suzerain and the source of culture – Ming China – a researcher of East Asia may pre-emptively conclude that the stratification systems of Joseon society was a derivative of the Sinocentric notions of sadae (Kor. 사대, Chin. 事大, lit. serving the great), hwairon (Kor. 화이론, Chin. 華夷論, lit. doctrine of culture and barbarians) and Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, the term "little China" (sojunghwa, Kor. 소중화, Chin. 小中華, lit. "small culture of the centre") being repeatedly attributed to Korea under Yi Dynasty. Additionally, knowledge of the basic details of Joseon's history may lead one to the conclusion from 1392 to 1910 the society and political establishment of Korean Peninsula had embodied Arnold Toynbee`s concept of the "universal state"[1] or C. Wright Mills` "power elite"[2], in which the opposition between hereditary *yangban* stratum and impoverished lowborn and commoner people was the essence of social, legal and political reality in the state. While this perspective may not be entirely based on wrong premises, an important point to note is that on the elementary level, the Neo-Confucian ideology was seemingly accepted by all notable social strata in Joseon, or otherwise thoroughly inculcated into non-elites by edification policies enacted by the government. Crucially, these policies usurped shamanism as the source of regulations for spiritual worship and a justification for some of the stratification systems (as well as the taxation system directly related to them) through promotion of social harmony and obedience. The edification policies essentially had control and preservation of stability at their core, with non-elites being of particular concern; from late fourteenth century onwards, Confucianization of the Peninsula had a notably practical nature – socio-administrative structures construed by the *yangban* scholar-literati supporting the government represented the dualism of 'harsh' legalism and 'soft' Confucianism. This methodology in which law and ethics constituted two parts of the

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[1]   Toynbee, Arnold. *A Study of History. The One-Volume Edition Illustrated*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 267.

[2]   Wright Mills, Charles. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 152.

governing rationale was also common in imperial China. The development of the Korean state and its inhabitants was thus intricately tied with the way Confucianism was disseminated and presented to the populace – the strategies embodied by the edification mechanisms thus deeply influenced the lifestyles of Koreans in Joseon era.

Among the most significant of these "control-through-edification" policies in the countryside were the *hyangyak* (Kor. 향약, Chin. 鄉約), or community compacts. The main principles on which the *hyangyak* were based accentuated reciprocity: bilateral encouragement of virtue, communal vigilance, maintenance of propriety and mutual assistance in times of difficulty[3]. The emphasis on dissemination of virtue and propriety within the compacts further indicates Confucian undertones of practical functions of the *hyangyak*. As Martina Deuchler illustrates in her book, however, enforcement of Confucian values in community compacts had no relation to the modern notion of social equality. Presenting the documents of the Ward Compact of Naeseong (*naeseong tongyak*, Kor. 내성 동약), Deuchler notes that one of its main initiators, Yi Mun-Gyu, instructed, among other provisions, "clarification of primary and secondary lines of descent" and "differentiation between elite and non-elite"[4]. This is a yet another example of the policies enacted by the dominant *yangban* class, who did not wish to provide access to its ranks to "undesirables" (though the non-elites were indispensables to the scholar-literati), as well as of the role served by promotion of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism among non-elites as one of the means of softening the hardships of pragmatic law and administration as guided by the ruling spheres. This spirit is also discernible in pre-modern Korean legal documents, which, true to Han-era Chinese methodologies, allotted an important role to ethical norms within penal provisions.

[3]   Kwon Nae-Hyun. Some Arguing Points on Proliferation of Patrilineal Family & Relatives in Late Joseon Dynasty. *The Journal for the Studies of Korean History*, No. 62, 2016, pp. 247–268.

[4]   Deuchler, Martina. *Under the Ancestors` Eyes Kinship, Status and Locality in Premodern Korea*. Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London, Harvard University Asia Center, 2015, p. 143.

The delineation of social structures incorporating local communities was accepted, at times also subjected to criticism and revision by Korean scholars to increase their applicability to the social environment of Joseon. As Cho Kwang postulates in his article, the official rationale behind both the *hyangyak* and other forms of top-down, government-controlled edification initiatives, were exposition of Confucian approach to the public and the private; life within a morally positive environment would produce righteous and wise individuals, who in turn would positively influence their neighbours[5]. Moreover, the precept of *minbon* (Kor. 민본, Chin. 民本, lit. people as the base) was a reinforcement to the *hyangyak* system, given that local, mostly agricultural communities were meant to be the lifeblood of the country; still, as Kwon Jeong-Ho remarks, this theory by all means did not imply democracy or equality[6]. At the same time, the *hyangyak* and other forms of centrally-steered initiatives in local areas allowed a degree of public, if at times covert, economic activities by communities, primarily towards increasing group well-being, but also for profit of entrepreneurial individuals. This topic is deeply important in regard to development of Korea's pre-modern and early modern economy.

As observed by Jun, Kang and Lewis in their paper about the local economy of late Joseon era, Confucian institutions were typically indulgent towards economic activities of the rural commoners, in contrast to the dedicated merchant class, which was in turn kept under strict supervised under prevailing cultural (since a Confucian gentleman should not take actively take part in market activities) suspicion[7]. However, the pressure of ascriptive status – in this instance, banning merchants or their offspring

[5]   Cho Kwang. *Joseon Hugi Yuhak Jeontong eso Kong gwa Sa oe Munje* (*The Public and the Private in Confucianism in Late Joseon Dynasty*), Deukjip Nonmun II, pp. 157–172.

[6]   Kwon Jeong-Ho. A Study on the Social Welfare Ideas in Traditional People-Oriented Political Thoughts of Chosun Dynasty Focused on Chung Dojeon and Chung Yakyong. *Review of Korean and Asian Political Thoughts*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 09/2014, pp. 81–120.

[7]   Jun Seong Ho, Lewis, James B. and Kang Han-Rog. Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: A View Suggested by Adam Smith. *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 68, No. 1, Mar., 2008, pp. 244–282.

from participating in military or civil examinations is a matter that has not as of now presented an overarching academic consensus. Furthermore, success in examinations could not guarantee a stable status, pointing to the complex reality in which economy played an important background role to traditional status, education system, and individuals' desires for office. Naturally, studies and examinations required substantial resources, and life in unemployment was even harsher in this regard. Land and media of exchange (predominantly grain and cloth) were the primary means of supporting one's livelihood in Joseon, and although pre-modern Korea's merchants were not as influential as elsewhere in Asia, their wealth provided them with a substantial advantage in this sense[8].

In regard to responsibilities allotted to non-elites, taxation would naturally act as a diminishing factor in the case of commoners peddling their produce on the market, but otherwise it does indeed appear that improving one's life opportunities and local reputation through these activities was a credible and permissible way for late Joseon's agriculturalists to reach social and financial security vis-à-vis the taxation system and encroaching interests of the *yangban* class. The collectives of mutual assistance (*gye*, Kor. 계, Chin. 界), though their administrative roles opposed (or parallel) to the *hyangyak* system were shaped only in late eighteenth and early nineteen centuries, had for a long time been an integral part of Korea's rural communities, and the improvements they provided regarding work organization, division of expenses, and aid for their members who experienced difficult situations must not be disregarded. The functions of the community compact were also partially covered and expanded in scope by lineage associations, with the main reasoning behind these collective activities being the securing of a group's (family/organization/group of households) livelihood and its' general stability, and not the maximization of individual profits[9]. These outlooks,

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[8]   Evan, Gregory N. Korea's Aristocratic Moods: Re-Examining Choson Social and Political History. *Asian Studies Review*, June 2011, Vol. 35, pp. 253–262.

[9]   Jun Seong Ho and Lewis, James B. Accounting Techniques in Korea: 18th Century Archival Samples from a Non-Profit Association in the Sinitic World. *The Accounting Historians Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 1, June, 2006, pp. 53–87.

in turn, further indicate that collectivism was the legally safest route for achievement of both group and individual prosperity, and that under the pretence of following Confucian ritual conduct increasing one's tangible (coinage, banknotes, certificates, agricultural produce such as rice or beans, cloth, etc) resources and local standing could be achieved more easily – less morally dubious way – than by members of the hereditary merchant class. The existence of state-supported granary system operating on the principle of reciprocity potentially supports the argument for a degree of symbiosis between Confucian ideology and basic market economy, as Kang and Choi observe in their paper: "[T]he economic principle of redistribution is of particular relevance, as an economic system predicated predominantly on the principle of redistribution presupposes the existence of a political centre that effectively collects and distributes the goods of society. Here, one might argue that the economic system of late *Choseon* resembles such an economic system and that the late *Choseon* state represents a paradigmatic case of the posited potent political centre. To be sure, the principle of reciprocity was a valued driver of economic transaction in the peasant communities of the *Choseon* society, and Seoul and other urban centres witnessed active and growing market exchanges. Be that as it may, the late *Choseon* state successfully established and maintained a powerful and centralized redistributive system that collected and distributed the bulk of national goods, and the granary system was at the heart of that system"[10].

The scholarly opinions and primary data outlined above do not, at any rate, dispel the general tendency that in Joseon era, if one had personal plans related to societal, the most plausible way of bringing them into fruition would be through association with an administrative structure (including government through submission of grain donations), noble lineage or an occupational stratum. Even so, private land property along with financial resources was an important aspect of local environments. Similarly to pre-modern China, an organization ('sib', as Max Weber put it) would not be always able to safeguard the interests of its members

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[10] Kang Sangsoon and Choi Johee. Confucian Business Ethics in Korea: Pre-Modern Welfare State. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2016, pp. 422–438.

in some cases, such as against exceptionally rich peasants, or, ironically, non-propertied ones; interestingly, Weber elucidates on this matter by stating that the latter constituted a danger of a higher degree to solvent and otherwise standard commoners due to the existence of the relatively few, yet, extremely powerful, large estates in the imperial China, resulting from "the absence of state sanctions guaranteeing property"[11]. In Joseon, the "village poor" and "usurers", as described by Weber, could be considered to have combined into the *hyangni* stratum, which did not exhibit any substantial characteristics of unity of interests and were forbidden by law to receive any official salary for their services; more prosperous groups among them attempted to forge or modify extant genealogical records in order to make their standing more competitive in local areas against the interests of affluent commoners and *yangban* lineages. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the outlooks of the Confucianism-influenced establishment were at best vague towards members of *hyangni*, and their economic activities – oftentimes dubiously legal – were typically ostracized by the ruling spheres and local scholar-nobility. Through observance of this local web of conceptual and tangible relationships, we may reach a preliminary conclusion that Confucianism was not decidedly against trade or other market activities; to achieve moral and legal legitimacy, they were reinterpreted through an administrative-philosophical framework within which various forms of social mobility could be achieved by non-elites.

Additionally, it may be assumed that even as far as the upper social strata and groups directly associated with the *yangban*, most importantly *seoeol* (Kor. 서얼, Chin. 庶孼; descendants of commoner or lowborn concubines of the *yangban*) are concerned, the pathways leading to positive status mobility and stability within set ritual norms, laws or pragmatic (i.e. economy-related) circumstances only rarely had a purely traditional dimension. This is supported by the opinion of Kim Sun Joo, who observes that the *hyangni*, secondary sons and northerners (from Pyeongan, Hwanghae and Hamgyeong provinces) alike were concerned by insufficient

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[11] Weber, Max. *The Religion of China Confucianism and Taoism*. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 94.

or non-existent (in the case of local clerks) salaries and general living costs, especially those related to their work and education, such as traveling to the capital to take part in examinations. This constitutes further evidence that although money and profit were certainly not the most popular nor encouraged themes in the official discourse pertaining to inter-class relations in Joseon era, and were frequently covered by a more orthodox rhetoric, their importance to non-elites should not be disregarded; the extant data on this subject should call a more thorough attention to it in future studies[12]. Kim's outlook is supplanted by Eugene Park's extensive research on secondary status groups, in which he notes the high levels of importance of the *jungin* specialists not only for the functioning of the state's basic institutions, but also for the financial capabilities of the statesmen themselves: "Besides the importance of their services, the huge economic capital that many *chungin* had accumulated – especially interpreters and physicians who profited much from Korea's official trade with China – was something neither the state nor its proprietor, the aristocracy, could ignore. They provided political funds for aristocratic statesmen and financial support for the government"[13]. It may be said that modern-day occupations as varied as those of accountants, technicians, stockbrokers and physicians are equally important to functioning of any society as the *jungin* were in Joseon era.

As can be seen based on these historic details, Confucianism existed in complex relation with the state, its administration and the economic system. Conducting business and seeking profit were typically disapproved of in Confucian polities, yet in the case of Joseon, they nevertheless constituted an important domain of individual and group activities. While it cannot be conclusively affirmed that the market economy of late Joseon was a singular, if certain at all, forerunner of modern South Korea's unique

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[12] Kim Sun Joo. Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements by Marginalized Status Groups in Late Chosŏn Korea. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 68, No. 1, Jun., 2008, pp. 135–168.

[13] Park, Eugene Y. Status and "Defunct" Offices in Early Modern Korea: The Case of Five Guards Generals (Owijang), 1864–1910. *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 41, No. 3, Spring, 2008, pp. 737–757.

version of capitalism, it nevertheless proved by the sole fact of its existence that the social stratification system, as rigid as it was, allowed a degree of personal entrepreneurship as a way of forming alternative paths to attaining local power, participation, influence and limited mobility. Additionally, Confucian values promoted by Joseon's government were significantly inculcated into practically entire society, remaining in minds of Koreans and influencing development of the state to this day. This undisputable fact must be taken into account while analysing the presence of Confucianism within South Korea's economic growth.

2. Confucianism and the modern South Korean economy

One of the major points of content among Koreanists is the degree to which citizens of modern Republic of Korea adhere to principles of Confucianism. Kim Seong-Kon believes that "[I]t would be incorrect, therefore, for Westerners to hastily stereotype Korea as a Confucian society. Today's society is radically different from its predecessor during the Joseon Dynasty, which indeed was heavily influenced by Confucian philosophy. In fact, Koreans no longer subscribe to Confucian philosophy and few Koreans read the works of Confucius these days. Korean society is a place where Asian and Western culture co-exist, and where a curious mixture of capitalism and socialism prevails"[14]. While his outlook on the apparent presence of socialism within social and administrative dimensions of Korea is disputable, it is nonetheless certain that on the educational level, the importance of Confucianism has largely waned, especially among younger generations. On the other hand, Confucianism as an "un-proclaimed" system of thought can be more easily traced in organizational contexts of Korea's business, politics and administration. Therefore, no analysis of South Korea's development history can omit the topic of *jaebeol* conglomerates (Kor. 재벌, Chin. 財閥). It is to them that the modern

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[14] Kim Seong-Kon. Is Today's Korea Really A Confucian Society? *Korea Herald,* available at: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000927&ACE_SEARCH=1 (retrieved 05.11.2018).

Republic of Korea primarily owes its economic success and global status, successively rising from the 1960s onwards[15]. The major conglomerates such as Lotte, Lucky Goldstar (LG), Hyundai and Kia have not only extensively branched out into multiple business areas and industries – often vastly different from the seemingly main specializations of these *jaebeol* as they are presented in Western media – but their direct connection with patrimonial mode of Korean governance came to form the basic framework behind socio-political arrangements of South Korea's economy. Gilbert Rozman observes that the – as shown above on the example of Joseon's administrative system – paradoxical nature of „merchant Confucianism" resulted in modern Korea in a dualistic form of authority, on the one hand associated with the *jaebeol* leadership, on the other with interventionist policies of state's institutions[16]. Cha Seong Hwan describes the intricate connections between business, politics and Confucian tradition of South Korea in more detail; with the government having the exclusive rights to shaping the country's economy through control over banks, loans, foreign capital, etc, and with the maintenance of personal – often nepotistic – connection networks, the official policies and preference towards specific industrial activities could be easily realized by the subservient *jaebeol*[17]. These connections seem to be at odds with the relationship between ruling spheres of Joseon and private forms of business, but at the same time they echo the familial spirit of Confucianism and the crucial value of loyalty (*chung*, Kor. 충, Chin. 忠). Furthermore, the interconnecting morality, division and delegation of work, humane (*yin*, Kor. 인, Chin. 仁) relationships between the management and workers, distribution chains and customers, and so on, could be approved by Confucian scholars – most importantly, Mencius – and like Edward Romar emphasizes, the resulting profit "transcends individual gain and individual success has a significant

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[15] Chang Kyung-Sup. *South Korea under compressed modernity – familial political economy in transition*. Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2010, p. 101.

[16] Rozman, Gilbert. Can Confucianism Survive in an Age of Universalism and Globalization? *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1, Spring, 2002, pp. 11–37.

[17] Cha Seong Hwan. Myth and Reality in the Discourse of Confucian Capitalism in Korea. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 3, May/June, 2003, pp. 485–506.

collective component"[18]. Kim Andrew Eungi adds in his research that "[T]he emphases on self-discipline, diligence and hard-work are other precepts of Confucian value system that proved eminently important for South Korea's economic development. A strong work ethic, stressed at all levels in the workplace and educational system, is derived from such Confucian concepts as *euiyok* (Kor. 의욕, Chin. 意欲) or will, an internal drive to accomplish and to succeed, *huisaeng* (Kor. 희생, Chin. 犧牲, lit. sacrifice) – sacrificing for the sake of the company and the nation – *sungshil* [Kor. 성실, Chin. 誠實, lit. sincerity], and *ilchegam* (Kor. 일체감, Chin. 一體感, lit. "a sense of oneness"). Expressed collectively, these values have enabled Koreans at all levels in the organization to work hard on behalf of the company and the nation"[19]. Of course, given the aforementioned inculcation of Confucian values in Korean society during the over 500 years of Joseon era, it could have been possible to induce national growth and workers' productivity by merging these values with government propaganda, and this is precisely what has happened in Korea during the authoritarian era. In his other paper, Kim, along with Park Gil-Sung, focuses on the practical function nationalistic ideology and Confucianism served in convincing the populace that there is a reason to their subordinate work, that the government's intentions are good, and that rapid industrialization achieved through group harmony is the proper course of action[20]. Naturally, the nationalistic component of the state's propaganda had strong anti-communist undertones. Control and redirection of popular sentiment towards a direction desirable by the government has strongly been rooted in administrative spirit of Korea throughout its history – being most notably embodied in edification (*gyohwa*, 교화, Chin. 教化) policies

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[18] Romar, Edward J. Virtue Is Good Business: Confucianism as a Practical Business Ethic. *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 38, No. 1/2, At Our Best: Moral Lives in a Moral Community, Jun., 2002, pp. 119–131.

[19] Eungi, Kim Andrew. Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: A Sociological Survey. *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Jun., 2002, pp. 291–310.

[20] Eungi, Kim Andrew and Gil-Sung, Park. Nationalism, Confucianism, Work Ethic and Industrialization in South Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2003, pp. 37–49.

of Joseon-era central and local institutions[21] – but it was only during and after the Korean war that the appearance of the new "indigenous" enemy in the form of the anti-capitalist North lead to new dynamics – including the ones rooted in the ethnolinguistic aspect of Korean culture – between the populace of the Republic of Korea and its authoritarian governments. The definitions of the "nation" or the "people" have certainly played an integral role as part of these dynamics.

The notion of *minbon* has been as present in the modern era as it was in Joseon, and it too was an integral element of the official narrative; nevertheless, the reality of the government's domination, experiences of occupation period and the ideological conflicts of Cold War forced the reformulation of *minbon* into *minjung* (Kor. 민중, Chin. 民衆, lit. the masses or the public) by South Korean intelligentsia in the 1970s as a form of counteracting the authoritarian rule. The populist nature of the *minjung* movement, organized with the aim of unifying interests of all disenfranchised and disjointed social strata with an additional intent of promoting real democratic values, did not, however, represent a particularly new activist methodology; the leaders and key participants within it utilized ideology just as much as the government did in its practices. As Hagen Koo aptly remarks, both the state and the popular movements utilized ideology and mass propaganda, most importantly Confucianism and nationalism, as the means of manipulating perception of class/status integrity – and the anti-communist sentiment acted as the crucial modifying factor to these phenomena, as emphasized by the term *minjung* itself[22], the adoption of which was possibly in order to avoid the use of the controversial term *minjok* (Kor. 민족, Chin. 民族, lit. the people); as interpreted by communist theoretical frameworks).

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[21] Joo Nam-Joo. Jungjongdae Chogi Gwanjalsa oe 'Punghwagwan' Hwaldong (The Gwanchal-sa magistrate's Activity as an 'Edification Officer (Pung'hwa-gwan, 風化官),' in the early years of King Jungjong's reign). *Yeoksa wa Hyeonsil: Quarterly Review of Korean History*, No. 106, Dec., 2017, pp. 249–289.

[22] Hagen, Koo. Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Aug., 1991, pp. 485–509.

Throughout the social and technological development of South Korea, references to pre-modern terminologies and philosophies were used by all prospective and factual leaders or political parties in order to consolidate the society's acceptance for their practices. Confucianism can be perceived in multiple ways in this regard – for example, as a unifying way of thought which, however, could lead to gradual suppression of liberalism and democratic principles. Park Chong-Min and Shin Doh Chull's research clearly presents this danger: "Authoritarian rulers in Korea often exploited Confucian ideals and values in order to justify non-democratic political institutions and practices. Even democratic political leaders were tempted to rely on the Confucian legacy to legitimize the arbitrary use of state power for political purposes. To the extent that the Confucian tradition of hierarchical collectivism and benevolent paternalism provides the basis of popular nostalgia for authoritarian rule, the new Korean democracy may degenerate into a delegative or an illiberal populist democracy, if not outright authoritarianism"[23]. Collectivism and paternalism are indeed accepted today by the majority of Koreans, and the structure of *jaebeol* conglomerates directly mirrors values and preferences of the entire Korean society[24]. Interpretation by the employees of their higher-in-ranks as "elder brothers" and the CEOs as "kings" or "fathers" is not codified into law or any official guidelines, but is still accepted as a norm. Additionally, the acceptance of the *jaebeol* system leads to its increased role as a virtually "do-it-all" super-authority, grounded on the high level of trust the conglomerates receive from the populace that accepts the Confucian cultural heritage, and potentially causes an effective "institutional void" where division of business and practically all other domains of daily life becomes unclear[25]. This variant of authoritarianism may also be considered

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[23] Park Chong-Min and Shin Doh Chull. Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy in South Korea? *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 3, May/June, 2006, pp. 341–361.

[24] Chakrabarty Subrata. The influence of national culture and institutional voids on family ownership of large firms: A country level empirical study. *Journal of International Management*, Vol. 15, No.1, 2009, pp. 32–45.

[25] Ibid.

one of the main cultural reasons behind the endemic corruption and nepotism in modern South Korea.

Corruption as a major signifier of South Korea's socio-political culture is frequently linked by multiple scholars with Confucianism as well as the extant remnants of Joseon-era social stratification system. For instance, Hwang Kyung Moon theorizes that the Confucian value of "grace", or reciprocity, coupled with the legacy of the *hyangni* class and the aforementioned tendency for authoritarian rule by Korean establishment, may collectively be considered a major inspirational source for corruption in modern times[26]. It is especially the nepotism that is deeply contingent on traditional Korean family traditions associated with Confucianism; reciprocity is particularly visible in the aforementioned *jaebol* structures and their relations with the sphere of politics. Sah Dong-Seok adds to these conclusions that, firstly, the majority of South Korean presidents, or their relatives, has been embroiled in corruption scandals, secondly, the history of institutional briberies in Korea indeed stretches much further back than the proclamation of the Republic, and lastly, the undue concentration of power – often guaranteed by law – in the hands of leaders, including presidents, is highly abnormal on its own[27]. Oh Young-Jin further remarks – referring to the latest scandal involving the former president Park Geun-Hye – that family and friends cannot only support and reinforce life pathways of individuals, but can also can socially detrimental effects: "The family ties go opposite directions – the positive side providing a rallying point to achieve a common goal, while the negative being from the remnants of old Confucian tribalism that identifies an individual's interest with the family or a certain group with their flaws often looked away from"[28]. It should be remembered, though, that in the first few centuries of Joseon era, the Neo-

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[26] Hwang Kyung Moon. Historical Origins of Korea's Political Corruption, in Korea Times. Available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2016/02/137_197187.html (retrieved 20.10.2018).

[27] Sah Dong-Seok. Power and Corruption. *Korea Times*, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2008/12/202_36277.html (retrieved 30.10.2018).

[28] Oh Young-Jin. Korea's Original Sin – Family. *Korea Times*, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2016/12/202_220728.html (retrieved 15.10.2018).

Confucian orthodoxy did not entirely dismantle the preceding traditions and systems of thought; many of the more basic, underlying aspects of society, such as putting emphasis on group rather than individual interest, were simply given new justifications and doctrinal contexts. Consequently, while Confucianism may be considered a factor preserving corruption and nepotism on Korean Peninsula, it has never been a direct, prime cause of these malpractices.

Other significant problems of South Korean economy and society connected to both the *jaebeol* system and Confucian heritage are retirement, pension system and welfare of the elderly. At present, demographic low is visible in Korea; fertility rate has been steadily decreasing since 1960s due to increased life expectancy stemming from economic growth, and the traditional model of extended family has been superseded by nuclear one[29]. As Park Nam-Ho of the Sungkyungwan University once said in an interview, the disappearing reverence for Confucian code of conduct and rites, especially those emphasizing respect and support towards elders, is to be blamed for the fact that in modern South Korea the younger generations seldom devote attention to their parents and grandparents comparable to their counterparts of the monarchic past[30]. This negative social phenomenon in turn leads to the increasingly visible problem of homeless or otherwise impoverished and lonely elders. The successive governments so far expressed little practical interest in providing care for the rising number of the elderly, viewing the problem as a purely private one, in accordance with traditional Confucian perspective, which advocated for children and grandchildren caring for their parents and grandparents. As Howard Palley notes, "[T]he government's rationale for fostering "Confucianism" and family responsibility appears to be disingenuous. At times, Korea's political leaders appear to be convinced by their own rhetoric that supportive income and social services would undermine the Confucian

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[29]   Yun, Sukmyung. Rapid Ageing and Old-Age Security in Korea. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2005, pp. 240–262.

[30]   Lee Hyo-Won. Confucianism is in Synch with Modern Times. *Korea Times*, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2010/05/113_66746.html (retrieved 01.11.2018).

tradition of family care for the elderly-although such policies are being developed in Singapore and Japan"[31]. Thus, much of the care services have become the domain of the private sector, with most of the carers being women – following provisions from pre-modern Chinese and Korean instruction manuals – whose traditional responsibility was taking care of their parents and parents-in-law. As such, with the government unwilling to shoulder the responsibility and with the coverage of the pension system being highly limited, the women often find themselves not only burdened with extensive household responsibilities, but also in the midst of conflict between their personal career and traditional expectations[32]. Resolution of this and other of the outlined problems remains a crucial task for Korean as well as foreign policymakers, academic analysts and civilian activists.

Conclusion

In this paper, the author briefly presents the complex relationship between Neo-Confucianism of Joseon era, the economic reality and livelihoods of the main social strata, and trace connections between selected socio-economic phenomena of the old Korea and the development history of the modern Republic of Korea, for the purpose of ascertaining the importance of Confucian studies for research of 'pragmatic' aspects of socio-political and economic realities of East Asian states. In the course of this work, several conclusions have come to mind. Firstly, regardless of the particular mode of governance, Confucianism has been frequently utilized by ruling spheres and influential groups or individuals to push forward various initiatives of national or local nature. Secondly, while the degree of acceptance of often rigid and conservative Confucian values in Joseon by members of all status groups has been generally high, stable

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[31] Palley, Howard A. Social Policy and the Elderly in South Korea: Confucianism, Modernization, and Development. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 9, Sep., 1992, pp. 787–801.

[32] Sung, Sirin. Women Reconciling Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea. *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol. 37, No. 4, August 2003, pp. 342–360.

lives and financial security were the primary drive of the populace. While Confucianism was generally negative or ambivalent about seeking profit, the practical social structures construed with the philosophy in mind have typically provided central or local communities with at least partial freedom for seeking economic advantages. Thirdly, Confucianism in modern times has provided multiple advantages to South Koreans. It consolidated the nation, gave reasonable impetus for industrialization and collective work towards development of the common good, and reinforced the power of conglomerates, which eventually became the main economic engine of the country. On the other hand, just like in Joseon era, it also served as a tool of manipulation by the government and multiple self-righteous groups, whose arbitrarily-declared push towards democracy was frequently underscored by Confucianism-inspired demagoguery. All in all, the Neo-Confucian heritage should not be considered merely a static, impractical or "feudal" – as it is still unfortunately described from time to time – but rather a flexible system of thought that has undoubtedly served a crucial role in social, legal and economic development of Joseon, and greatly influenced the growth of South Korea into what it is today, both in a positive and negative sense.

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Kaspars Kļaviņš

KOREAN DANGUN AND LATVIAN BEARSLAYER –
TWO BEAR-MAN HERO MYTHS

Introduction

Intercultural relations are among most topical contemporary problems, which, along with the rapid development of globalisation processes, are increasingly drawing the attention of scholars, diplomats and entrepreneurs engaged in the current political and economic conjuncture. Problems of capitalism with their genesis in the West, emergence during the period of colonialism and current escalation in uninterrupted international conflicts in both the 20th and the 21st century have brought forward a multifaceted reaction in the societies of Far and Middle East, which have frequently used the alternatives of the ancient historical and religious-philosophical heritage of their cultures alongside many ideas born in the West (especially Europe), which used to significantly influence the fates European nations in the context of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and Nationalism, for a reviewed definition of their identity and self-assurance. Industrialisation, foreign occupation, social inequality, glorification of the past and mobilisation of national self-confidence – all these processes were known to many European states and nations. They are no less topical in the contemporary Arab world, India, China and elsewhere. It is surprising, how similar these spiritual processes can be regardless of all the differences in lifestyles, social communication and system of values. A vivid example

of this is the Korean and Latvian foundation myths and their application in the genesis process of modern Korean and Latvian nations.

1. Korean Dangun

According to the Korean Foundation Myth, a king of heaven, Hwanin, sent his son Hwanung to earth where he married a bear-woman, as a result of which they had a son born named Dangun – the legendary founder of the nation named Joseon and the first Korean kingdom 24 centuries before the birth of Christ. The Dangun era lasted some 1200 years, and was succeeded by the Kija era for 99 years, after the ancient Joseon was split into many tribal states.[1] This legend is told in the "Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms" ("Samgukyusa") (1285) written by Il-yeon (1206–1289).[2] The interest of Koreans in this myth was kindled later, after the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592 and the Manchu War of 1636, when criticism arose regarding the Qing Dynasty in China, and Korean scholars wanted to establish the origin of Korea's own history as a country that differed from China.[3] However, like in Europe, the Korean Foundation Myth underwent a real flourishing during the time of modernisation at the end of the nineteenth century, when Korea aspired to becoming a modern state, as it encountered Western powers. According to Kim Soo-ja: One can fully agree with Irina Sotirova that the Dangun cult was not prominent before the 19th century, but

> *With the onset of Western influences at the beginning of 20th century, the need for a strong national spirit to resist outside cultural and military attacks became stronger. It was at that time that the myth was reinterpreted by Korean nationalists and Dangun was placed in the*

[1]   Park, Byeng-Sen. *Korean Printing: From Its Origins to 1910.* Seoul: Jimoondang, 2003, p. 24.

[2]   Hyong Sik Shin. *An Easy Guide to Korean History.* Seoul: The Association for Overseas Korean Education Development, 2010, p. 46.

[3]   Kim Soo-ja. The Modern Korean Nation, Tan'gun, and Historical Memory in Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century Korea. *International Journal of Korean History*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Aug. 2014, p. 217.

centre of the theory of a homogenous nation with a common bloodline and ancient history. From then on, the myth became the subject of scholarly and pseudo-scholarly works by South Korean and North Korean researchers, and as a result, a whole new science was created, seeking the roots of the Korean nation.[4]

Throughout Europe, the 18th and 19th centuries were a time of writing epics. 'National epics' frequently were not written by the 'nation' itself, but by specific persons who, besides incorporating folkloric elements in their writing, often contributed various historical and romantic motifs. Let us call to mind, for example, James Macpherson's *The Works of Ossian* (1765), Elias Lönnrot's *Kalevala* (1849), Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald's *Kalevipoeg* (1857 and 1861), Wilhelm Jordan's "Die Nibelungen" (1867), and others. To complete the picture, let us remember the role of the William Tell legend in the evolution of Swiss self-confidence, the novels by Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) in that of Britain. Taking into account that the modern nationalism emerged as a specifically European phenomenon, the literary-political, visual (in art) and musical (including operas, theatre performances, films, etc.) mechanism of national myth genesis also developed there. In the Korean case, Western influences arrived both directly (as a result of Christian missions) and indirectly (via Japan). Japan, which had started transformation to a Western-type society earlier than other Far Eastern countries, had itself adopted numerous ideas from Europe, especially Germany, including the 'spirit of nation', 'folklore' and other interpretations of phenomena pertaining to the modern national identity, transplanting them to Korea, which was under the Japanese control since 1905, and in 1910 became its colony. In this respect, the influence of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), the "folklore father of Europe" who was the first to create a theory of a unified and universal

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[4]   Sotirova, I. Tangun and Tangra and their Role in the Attempt to Reconstruct Pro-religion in Bulgaria and Korea. The 18th International Conference of CEESOK (Central and Eastern European Society of Koreanology). *New Voices in Korean Studies from the Baltic States, Central and Eastern Europe.* Conference Papers. Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University, 2019, p. 14.

'spirit of nation' (*Volksgeist* in German),[5] at the same time devising new terms, such as "folksong" (Volkslied in German) was profound.[6] Korea borrowed these terms from Japan (or more precisely, they came about through the mediation of Japanese poet Mori Ogai (1862–1922)), taking into account that *minyo* in Korean is an equivalent to the 'people's song' (*Volkslied*), which appears in Ko Wimin's *Classification of Korean Folksongs* (1916).[7] Quite paradoxically, Koreans made use of this arsenal of ideas for the preservation of their identity in the circumstances of colonialism, thus facilitating an independence movement for which one of the central places was occupied by the image of Dangun and the Foundation Myth, which performed the role of a national epic. One can fully agree with Roald Maliangkay, that

The upsurge of anti-Japanese awareness brought changes in the way Dangun was remembered. Such memory was related to the sense of community and patriotism based on national consciousness instead of emperor-centered loyalty and patriotism of the past.

Evidence to this, among others, is the Korean Selfstrengthening Society (established in 1906), which tried to involve millions of members in order to strengthen the Korean national spirit 4000 years since Dangun and Kija.[8] The other Korean hero Kija is also important, albeit in a slightly different context, this theme will not be addressed in the current article. Although national myths in both East and West are, in the majority of cases, a result of interpretations of the Modern Period, their roots in the authentic materials of folklore, ethnography, history and religion (or religions) cannot be denied. A hero of bear origin (let us remember that Dangun's mother is a bear-woman) is known to North American Indians,

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[5]   New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Available at: https://www.encyclopedia. com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/volksgeist (retrieved 03.03.2019).

[6]   Burke, P. *Popular culture in early modern Europe.* Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009, p. 23.

[7]   Maliangkay, R. *Broken voices: postcolonial entanglements and the preservation of Korea's central folksong traditions.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press, 2017, p. 64.

[8]   Ibid., p. 222.

many Siberian peoples, the Ainu of Japan, etc.[9] The Ainu people, for example, have a legend about a bear-goddess marrying a human[10]. In Siberia, the bear motif is closely linked to shamanism, at the same time also to be understood in the context of totems.[11] Historians also relate the Dangun story to an outside group that was worshiping the heavenly deity and Bear Woman as a symbol of an indigenous bear-totem tribe.[12] Notably, in Korea, the analogies of the Foundation Myth also appear in popular beliefs, as reflected in legends and tales, which is evidence that the bear phenomenon is rooted in the most ancient layers of the folk-religion. For example, the Gomanaru Pine Forest (home of Ungsindan Shrine) has a connection with a legend about a she-bear who fell in love with a young man. "The bear trapped the man in her cave and bore cubs with him. But, longing for human society, the man escaped across the river, which led the bear and her cubs to plunge into the Geumgang in despair and drown. The restless spirits of the bears brought powerful storms that often sunk ships, so the residents built Ungsindan and held rituals there to appease them. This apparently led to the area being called Gomanaru or Gomnaru, meaning "Bear Ferry."[13] At the same time Dangun has maintained its importance in the Korean self-confidence and identity to our day. For example, in "An Easy Guide to the Korean History" of 2010 it is written that the story about Dangun is "[..] not simply a myth but the beginning of Korea's long history."[14]

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[9]   Hoffmann-Krayer, E. (ed.). *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens.* Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1927, pp. 882–886.

[10]   Ibid., p. 883.

[11]   Ibid.

[12]   Lee, Peter H. *An Anthology of traditional Korean literature.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017, p. 513.

[13]   Morning Calm. *Korean Air.* November 2018, Vol. 42, No. 11, pp. 52–53.

[14]   Hyong Sik Shin. *An Easy Guide to Korean History.* Seoul: The Association for Overseas Korean Education Development, 2010, p. 45.

2. Latvian Bearslayer

Similar tales of mythical warrior-heroes, born as a result of relationships between bears and people, can be found in the mythology and folklore of European peoples, for example, in Pyrenees and the Baltics. While the French *Jean de l'Ours*, Basque *Xan de l'Ours* or the Catalan *Joan de l'Ós* appear as folk heroes only in fairy tales, stories and legends[15], in Latvia, thanks to the epic poem *Bearslayer* (*Lāčplēsis* in Latvian) (1888) by the poet Andrejs Pumpurs (1841–1902), this hero of folktales became the cornerstone of the Latvian national identity during the time when Latvians were emerging as a modern nation, thus becoming one of the major foundation myths for the Republic of Latvia founded in 1918. The Bearslayer even keeps his bear ears as a token of his half-bear origin. The origin of this folk hero is described as follows in the epic poem of A. Pumpurs:

> *...., deep within the forest wild,*
> *Strong suckling at a she–bear's milky breast,*
> *Was found a strange and mighty human child.*
> *And of this child foretold the god's firm will*
> *As hero, later, lofty he would climb*
> *His name with fear all wicked ones would fill,*
> *All evil–doers, in the coming time.*[16]

Speaking about the authenticity of the sources of the Bearslayer legend one has to agree with Justyna Prusinowska that Andrejs Pumpurs created his hero on the basis of Latvian folk-tales belonging mainly to the types 650A and 301B.[17] Although A. Pumpurs integrated the events in Baltic in

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[15] Duhourcau, B. *Guide Des Pyrénées Mystérieuses*. Paris: Sand & Tchou, 1978; Anonymes, Histoires et Légendes du Languedoc Mystérieux. Paris: Sand & Tchou, 1976.

[16] Pumpurs, A. *Bearslayer: The Latvian Legend*. Translated by Cropley, A. A. Cropley, A. Cimdiņa and K. Klavins (eds.). Riga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2007, p. 41.

[17] Prusinowska, J. They are Still Coming Back. Heroes for the Time of Crisis. Literatūra un reliģija. Ieva Kalniņa (ed.). Riga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2018, p. 70.

the 13ᵗʰ century in his composition, just like the Korean Dangun, Lāčplēsis is not a historical figure. Only in the Korean case the used source itself was written down much earlier (in the 13ᵗʰ century), while the Latvian epic hero is an image of the 19ᵗʰ century national romanticism created on the basis of a comparatively small folklore material. Yet it is interesting that for Latvians, just like Koreans, the 'Spirit of Nation' and collection of folk lore was also based on the influence of the aforementioned German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who actually developed his folk culture theory exactly in Latvia. He spent five years (1764–1769) in Riga (the present capital of Latvia) as a teacher at the Dome School. Latvian state did not exist at the time – instead, there were the German Baltic provinces, which had been a part of the Russian Empire since the 18ᵗʰ century and were exposed to contradiction between strong trends of Pietism, Liberalism, on the one hand, experiencing a desire for reform, but on the other hand, living in class conservativism. Herder in Riga was concerned with recession of Latvian popular culture before the advance of Germans,[18] thus providing an ideological basis for the subsequent Latvian peasant and townspeople emancipation fights. Similarly to Korean case, where Dangun became a certain symbol in the formulation of the national identity as opposed to the Sinocentric view of the world and the Japanese colonization, the representatives of the Latvian national romanticism and social modernisation used the image of Bearslayer against the political and economic monopoly of the German aristocracy. However, neither the "Latvian" nor "German" societies were united. Paradoxically, it was specifically the reform-craving educated German-speaking elite (including the clergy) that yielded the first representatives who fought for "releasing Latvians" from "German slavery", thus sowing the seeds of the later Latvian nationalism. Thus, for example, Garlieb Helvig Merkel (1769–1850) in his famous publicist work *The Ancient History of Livonia* (*Die Vorzeit Lieflands*) of 1799[19] defined the basic elements of the "ancient Latvian motifs", namely,

[18] Burke, P. *Popular culture in early modern Europe.* Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009, p. 40.
[19] Merkel, G. H. *Die Vorzeit Lieflands: Ein Denkmahl des Pfaffen- und Rittergeistes.* Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1798–1799.

that the ancient Latvians were free, democratic people living in harmony with nature before the arrival of the cunning, aggressive Westerners: German merchants, ministers, and knights. Andrejs Pumpurs in his epic *Bearslayer* (1888) expressed just the quintessence of many previous epics. Most of these works revolve around the heroic struggle of the "originally free, pagan ancient Latvians" against the "aggressive German crusaders" that ends tragically with the "enslavement" of the former in the 13th century. This stereotype, which has little in common with actual Baltic medieval history, was already established by J. G. Herder's interpretation of history. Supplemented by the French Enlightenment and Jean Jacques Rousseau's ideas in particular, Herder's interpretation marked the beginning of a characteristically Baltic romantic tradition. This tradition differed from motifs of medieval knights expressed elsewhere in Europe. But by glorifying pre-Christian values, it nevertheless fit right in with the themes of romantic literature that admired Celtic druids, ancient Germanic tribes "untouched" by the Roman Empire, and North American Indians.

Unfortunately, the authentic folklore material, which is much more interesting both in the aspects of scientific and intercultural studies, did not provide the representatives of Latvian national romanticism (in their opinion) with sufficient materials for praising the ideal of heroism. Latvian folk songs (around 2 million verses have been collected in Latvia), like the poetry of Korean peasants, basically reflect the world outlook of ploughmen, tillers and planters. Even Krišjānis Barons, the greatest collector of Latvian folklore, was angered by the "girlishness" of Latvian folk songs and was frustrated that they lacked the "heroic motifs" he was searching for.[20] At the same time, the arsenal of the Latvian nation lacked the discourse of a colonial superpower, which the Dutch, Brits, the French, Spaniards and Portuguese were so proud of in Europe at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Heroism was primarily understood to be the fight of ancient Latvians against external conquerors, that is,

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[20] Baron, K., Wissendorff, H. *Chansons nationales lataviennes.* Mitau: H. J. Drawin-Drawneeks, 1894, p. XXI. Krišjānis Barons formulated his opinions regarding the loss of ancient Latvian epic motifs, which he said could not be found in the songs sung by girls and women, in the introduction to the first edition of "Latvju dainas".

"Germans". As an absolute analogy, the Korean notion of the folk, *minjok*, was similarly born of opposition to colonial aggression by imperial powers such as China, Russia and Japan around the nineteenth century."[21] At the same time, let us remember that according to the ideology of Latvian nationalists, "foreign ("German") slavery" continued in Latvia over the entire 19th century – until establishment of the first independent republic in 1918, taking into account that before that this territory was the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire, in which the political and economic monopoly was is the hands of Baltic German aristocracy.

From the standpoint of intercultural understanding the Korean Dangun and Latvian Bearslayer show similarities in the intellectual history of both nations during the period of modernisation, while the actual similarities between the Korean and Latvian folk cultures may be revealed only through studies of authentic historical, archaeological, ethnographic and folklore materials. Without doubt, a lot of similarities appeared there, too, for example, the "sacred tree" worshipcult, which also has been interpreted in Dangun and Bearslayer legends. According to Choi Joon-sik,

> *The sindansu (divine tree that appears in the myth of King Dangun) might well be considered as the archetype of Korean divine trees. In that story, this tree on the peak of a holy mountain serves as a ladder when Hwanung, a son of the Emperor of Heaven, descends to Earth. It seems only logical then that people believed that such a tree would protect them from outside evils."[22] As authors of the research "Korean Popular Beliefs" stated – "The most common among the divine objects of village beliefs is the divine tree. Because it is a tree where the Village deity is worshiped, it is in a different class from common trees.*[23]

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[21] Maliangkay, R. *Broken voices: postcolonial entanglements and the preservation of Korea's central folksong traditions.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017, p. 64.

[22] Choi Joon-sik. *Folk-religion. The Customs in Korea.* Seoul: Ewha Womans University Press, 2006, p. 111.

[23] Yi, Yong Bhum; Lee, Kyung Yup; Choi, Jong Seong; Boudewijn Walraven. *Korean Popular Beliefs*. Paju, Seoul and Edison: Jimoondang, 2015, p. 29.

On the other hand, sacred trees and sacred forests existed in Latvia even in the 17th and 18th centuries.[24] For instance, the annual report of 1725 of the Jesuit Council, along with conclusions on worshipping trees, quotes the following prayer addressed to a linden, "Good morning linden, how are you? I brought you a gift: do not touch my children, do not touch my cattle, my pigs, do not touch my health and bring me no harm."[25] Nobody laughed at the sacred trees or otherwise showed any disrespect, because the people strongly believed that a misfortune might arise as a result. By establishing a sacred tree, the man established a protector for himself who safeguarded him in difficult times.[26] Furthermore, we learn that men worshiped oaks and women – lindens, which fully coincides with the mythological Latvian folksongs representing extremely ancient beliefs of the Indo-European world. Pieces of wax, crumbs of metal, coins, food (eggs) were sacrificed to the idol trees. All gifts were brought at particular times and buried under the roots of the tree. The process was accompanied by ritual wording.[27] In *Bearslayer* by A. Pumpurs, the holy oak trees appear as a place where ancient Latvian priests performed fortune-telling:

> *Close by the grove upon the Hill,*
> *Around the sacred oak tree's bole,*
> *The priests and chieftains talked their fill*
> *Of war and peace, and fate's dark role.*[28]

When comparing the importance of Dangun in the communist North Korea with the place of Bearslayer in the ideology of Latvian socialists and communist, certain parallel features can be traced there, too. Only in the Latvian case it is related to separate works created on the basis of

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[24] Kleijntjenss, Jozefs. *Latvijas vēstures avoti jezuītu ordeņa archīvos*. Rīga: Latvijas Vēstures Institūta apgādiens, 1940.

[25] Ibid., p. 391.

[26] Ibid., p. 288.

[27] Ibid., p. 287.

[28] Pumpurs, A. Bearslayer: The Latvian Legend. Translated by Cropley, A. A. Cropley, A. Cimdiņa and K. Klavins (eds.). Riga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2007, p. 242.

A. Pumpurs' epic by the eminent poet Jānis Rainis (1865–1929), one of the founders of socialist symbolism in the world literature. In his drama Fire and Night (Uguns un nakts in Latvian) of 1907 he provides, according to his ideal of social-spiritual development of the humankind, a new definition of the functions of the epic heroes created by the representatives of Latvian national romanticism. Unlike North Korea, where Dangun myth rather serves the needs of Korean national mobilisation, Rainis' Bearslayer is meant to be a message for the entire humankind.

3. National religions

In cases of both Korea and Latvia, new religions have been created on the basis of national ideology and myths. In Latvia, it is the neo-pagan religious movement "Dievturi" ("God's keepers") founded in 1925 by an artist, art theorist, designer, archaeologist and ethnographer Ernests Brastiņš (1892–1942). This movement 1926 was recognized as a religious organization – and pretended to be a revival of the native religion of the Latvians before Christianization in the 13th century. Only instead of using a national hero (for example, Bearslayer) it makes use of extensive folklore materials in its attempts to reconstruct the world outlook of ancient Baltic people, yet includes stereotypes of pseudo-mythology and national romanticism. Agita Misāne provides an accurate characterisation of this partly scientific, partly nationally romantic creation by comparing the Latvian "God's keepers" to the inter-war period (1918–1939) pre-Christian revivalists:

> While present day Neo-pagans are usually at ease with the fact that their rituals are of their own creation the inter-war period revivalists evoked recent practices, beliefs and values as if they were ancient, original and unique. Hence, a more general term – 'pre-Christian revivalism movement' is preferable.[29]

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[29] Misāne, A. Dievturība Latvijas reliģisko un politisko ideju vēsture. Religiski-filozofiski raksti X / 2005 Issue No: 1, Riga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2005, p. 117.

Conclusion

The Korean national religion used as its basis the foundation myth hero Dangun himself. The movement emerged earlier than in Latvia, already at the very beginning of the 20th century, in 1909 when Na Cheol (1864–1916) started his teaching about God the Father, God the Teacher and God the King. According to Na Cheol, God the King actually is the Korean hero – Dangun. The explanation for this is that God the Teacher came to earth and mated with the bear-woman to produce Dangun, who, when he ascended to heaven, became God the King.[30] As a result, this religious movement, which comprises several groups from its very beginning, is qualified as Dangunism. Although Dangunism may claim to have links with the Korean shamanism, it is still a modern creation, which, like the Latvian "God's keepers" cannot be considered as representatives of authentic ancient traditions.

The parallels of Latvian and Korean national heroes and epic works run very close, sharing similar traits as well as circumstances at the roots of their formation.

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[30] Peterson, M. *Korea's Religious Places.* Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2016, p. 101.

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Linas Didvalis

"THE MOST WARLIKE NATION" FROM "HEAVENLY BEAUTIFUL" ISLANDS: JAPAN IN MATAS ŠALČIUS'S TRAVELS

Introduction

The paper seeks to analyse the connections between Japan and Matas Šalčius (September 20, 1890 to May 26, 1940) who was a traveler, writer, journalist and prominent political figure in the inter-war Lithuania. Dynamic fate of Šalčius allowed him to start exploring distant lands comparatively early in his life. What made his explorations important is that he was eager to bring his knowledge and experiences back to Lithuania and share them by publishing articles and books. During his life, Šalčius often chose Asia as a direction for his travels and visited Japan three times: for several weeks in 1915, for around a year in 1918, and, finally, for several days in 1933. This makes Šalčius an important figure, because visits to Japan were rather rare among Lithuanians at that time, making such early encounters between Lithuania and Japan historically important. Furthermore, there exists an open question who was the first Lithuanian to ever visit Japan. Šalčius falls among the candidates who could be considered, adding significance to his travels to Japan.

There is a lack of more extensive research about this aspect of Šalčius's life. Overall, except for Šalčius's political activities during the years of the

First Republic of Lithuania (1918–1940),[1] systematic approach to his other activities is still very much lacking. Šalčius's visits to Japan are mentioned only briefly in the texts of Vyšniauskas,[2] Mieliauskienė,[3] and Arlauskienė.[4] Slightly more details are provided in the writings of Pranckevičius,[5] Tarailienė,[6] and Statinis.[7] Except the latter, all these sources are short articles published on the Internet, and none of them are academic papers. As a result, this research seeks to fill the existing gap in academic literature.

The paper is largely a historical research that relies on two source bases: Matas Šalčius archive collection held in Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania[8] and online databases of Japanese newspapers.[9] The archive collection is the only known extensive accumulation of items related to Šalčius's life, consisting of 873 items. It was gathered by Šalčius's family and donated to the library in 1995–1997 by Šalčius's daughter Raminta

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[1]   See, for example: Žemaitytė-Veilentienė, A. *Mato Šalčiaus vaidmuo Lietuvos šaulių sąjungoje.* Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos istorijos fragmentai (conference material), 2002; Kelmutis, A. *Minint Šaulių sąjungos 35 metų sukaktį.* Naujienos, 1954; Anušauskas, A. *Lietuvos slaptosios tarnybos (1918–1940).* Vilnius: Mintis, 1993.

[2]   Vyšniauskas, M. *Tolimieji Rytai Lietuvos tarpukario spaudoje bei kelionių aprašymuose.* 2014. Available at http://www.kamane.lt/Kamanes-tekstai/Istorija/Tolimieji-Rytai-Lietuvos-tarpukario-spaudoje-bei-kelioniu-aprasymuose (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[3]   Mieliauskienė, H. *Mato Šalčiaus pėdsakų beieškant: nuo Čiudiškių iki Gvajaramerino.* 2013. Available at http://www.sraigunas.lt/rasliavos/straipsniai/mato-salciaus-pedsaku-beieskant-nuo-ciudiskiu-iki-gvajaramerino/ (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[4]   Arlauskienė, A. *Matas Šalčius.* 2006. Available at http://geografija.lt/sena_svetaine/index5190.html (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[5]   Pranckevičius, K. *Saulė šviečia lygiai visiems.* 2010. Available at http://www.xxiamzius.lt/numeriai/2010/04/28/atmi_01.html (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[6]   Tarailienė, D. *Per Japoniją į Ameriką (ir atgal).* 2018. Available at http://blog.lnb.lt/lituanistika/2018/06/04/per-japonija-i-amerika-ir-atgal/ (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[7]   Statinis, G. *Pasiklydęs Amazonijoje: Mato Šalčiaus klajonių pėdsakais.* Versus aureus, 2008; also Statinis, G. *Mato Šalčiaus biografija.* N. d. Available at http://misijalietuva100.lt/2016/03/30/mato-salciaus-biografija (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[8]   The collection is kept in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Unit, collection code – F 189. A part of the collection is digitalized and made freely accessible via epaveldas.lt database. If possible, links to this database are provided when referencing the sources.

[9]   The main ones are Maisaku (Mainichi Shinbun), Kikuzo II Visual (Asahi Shimbun) and Yomidas (Yomiuri Shimbun).

Šalčiūtė-Savickienė. In addition, digitalized Lithuanian heritage database epaveldas.lt was also extensively used to check facts and gather additional information.

The structure of the paper is organized in four parts. The first three parts deal with the three visits that Šalčius had to Japan in 1915, 1918 and 1933. The fourth part is dedicated to discussing the findings of this paper in comparison with other existing writings that mention ties between Šalčius and Japan. The paper is finished with conclusions and suggestions for further research directions.

1. The first visit (1915)

The reasons for Šalčius to visit Japan for the first time lie in Lithuania's complicated history at the first half of 20th century when the country was still under the tsarist regime. After graduating from Marijampolė Gymnasium and finishing preparation courses for teachers, from 1908 Šalčius began teaching in different parts of Lithuania. From early on, Šalčius was affected by Lithuanian national awakening ideas and developed a highly critical political position, especially regarding situation of education in Lithuania. In 1914, he had an opportunity to share his thoughts with a larger audience during a teachers' gathering in Moscow. This did not pass unnoticed and upon return to Lithuania Šalčius received news that his teaching license is revoked. After he was punished for expressing his views openly and not allowed to continue his teaching career, he decided to show ultimate protest by leaving the territory of the Russian Empire.[10] This coincides with the time of World War I, when Šalčius was drafted into the Russian army and had to travel to Moscow. There he is waiting to be called for active service and, in the meantime, finds an opportunity to escape serving in the army. Šalčius leaves Moscow by train and travels to Vladivostok with the Siberian railway.

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[10] Žemaitytė-Veilentienė, A. *Mato Šalčiaus vaidmuo Lietuvos šaulių sąjungoje.* Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos istorijos fragmentai (conference material), 2002.

Šalčius describes his journey in his travel essay "My Journey to America" (in Lithuanian: "Mano kelionė į Ameriką"), which remained unfinished and unpublished.[11] At the beginning of the essay, Šalčius presents his journey as a very unusual one because all other Lithuanians travelled to the United States (US) by boat through the Atlantic Ocean. Meanwhile, Šalčius was taking the eastern route through Russia, Japan and the Pacific Ocean. Although the introduction of the essay tells the readers that the author succeeded in implementing the initial plan and visited Japan, due to unknown reasons the manuscript ends while Šalčius is still describing Siberia, and there is nothing written about his stay in Japan.

The exact date when Šalčius leaves Moscow and arrives to Japan is not clear. The remaining documents allow us to tell that happens in the first half of 1915, most probably in late March or early April. In "My Journey to America", Šalčius does not mention any exact dates of his travel but describes that he was crossing Siberia on the way to Japan in "early spring". After Japan, Šalčius travels further and arrives to the US at the end of May of the same year.[12] This information allows us to tell that Šalčius spent up to six weeks in Japan.

There is very little information where Šalčius stayed and in what activities he was engaged during the visit to Japan. One remaining postcard from that time comes with an unknown location image,[13] one with a view from central Japan – Chikubu Island (竹生島) that is appreciated for its scenic beauty, and the third one carries Yokohama's view (see Fig. 1).[14]

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[11] Šalčius, M. *My journey to America*. 1916. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002488124 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[12] Šalčius, M. Postcard to Lithuanian community in Chicago telling them about Matas Šalčius arrival to San Francisco, US. May 28, 1915. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002481974 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[13] Šalčius, P. Postcard to Matas Šalčius's brother Petras Šalčius sent from San Francisco, US. November 3, 1915. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002481786 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[14] Šalčius, M. Postcard to M.A. Olszewski. May 28, 1915. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002481974   (retrieved 28.10.2018).

Figure 1. Matas Šalčius's postcard to M. A. Olszewski informing him
that he has arrived in San Francisco, 1915
Source: Matas Šalčius archive (collection code F 189) in the Rare Books and
Manuscripts Unit of Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania.
Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002481974

It is not clear how the views on the postcards represent Šalčius stay in Japan. For example, Chikubu Island of lake Biwa (琵琶湖) is not far away from the ports when arriving to Japan from Vladivostok and can be visited on the way to Kyoto or Tokyo. The third postcard allows us to guess that Šalčius was either living in Yokohama or only arrived there to board the ship going to the US. Except the postcards, Šalčius says very little about his experiences in Japan in his remaining correspondence. There is also no evidence found that Šalčius published articles either in Lithuanian, Japanese or American newspapers of that time.

The most evident legacy of Šalčius's stay in Japan in 1915 is his friendship with a young Japanese man Sukeo Murata.[15] Murata was

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[15]   Sukeo Murata always signed in romaji leaving few clues how his name should be properly written in Japanese. Possible variations are these: 邨田資雄, 邨田資夫, 邨田祐男, 邨田助雄, 村田資雄, 村田資夫, 村田祐男 or 村田助雄.

20-years old at that time, starting his studies in a university and eager to learn English. Exchanging letters with Šalčius was probably a good and interesting practice to him. The archives have 18 postcards and letters addressed to Šalčius who was already living in the US at that time. The contents are rather simple: Murata is describing his life and challenges he has with studies, showing his interest in American life and European situation, including Lithuania. For example, one postcard dated June 25, 1917 mentions how Murata attempted to meet Lithuanian physician and politician Jonas Šliūpas who was visiting Japan that year.[16] In more rare cases, Šalčius and Murata touch more sensitive political topics, such as "anti-Japanese fever" in the US. Correspondence, however, ends in the second half of 1917, just before Šalčius's second visit to Japan. The reasons why they stopped writing to each other remain unclear.

At the moment of writing, Šalčius's travel in 1915 is the earliest known visit of a Lithuanian person to Japan. An even earlier visit could be suspected during the Russo-Japanese War which brought many Lithuanian soldiers close to Japan and some were possibly taken as prisoners of war and held in camps in Japan. This hypothesis, however, is not based on any evidence and has to be verified in future research. In general, the period before Japan's de facto recognition of Lithuania in 1919 lacks any active interaction between the two countries. The current knowledge shows that there are only three recorded cases of visits to Japan: in 1915 and 1918 by Šalčius and in 1917 by aforementioned Šliūpas who travelled with his daughter Aldona.

2. The second visit (1918)

After skipping an interesting but for this paper irrelevant part of Šalčius's stay in the US, we can move on to his second visit to Japan. It was prompted once again by Šalčius's attempt to escape military service. In October 1917, Šalčius received a call to the US army which stated that

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[16] Murata, S. Postcard to Matas Šalčius. Matas Šalčius archive, item F189–482.

he can be drafted to fight in the World War I at any moment.[17] Similar to the situation in Russia, call to the military prompted Šalčius's decision to leave the country he was asked to serve. The exact date when Šalčius left the US and arrived to Japan is unknown but it must have been at the very beginning of 1918.[18]

Šalčius most likely arrived from the US to Yokohama port and then found a place to stay in Tokyo. This can be assumed from his book that was published much later *Visits to 40 Nations* (in Lithuanian: *Svečiuose pas 40 tautų*) where he describes the beauty of Japan when mount Fuji (富士山) becomes visible after long days spent in the Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile, Tokyo is presented in a short unpublished story *Japanese Boy Kumataro* (in Lithuanian: *Japoniukas Kumataro*), which actually starts with words "I lived in the capital of Japan, Tokyo", and then continues to describe the life of a family living nearby.[19]

Judging from the documents that remain from that time, Šalčius was immersed in Japanese life and culture. That is evident from his elaborate writing in the book *Visits to 40 nations*[20] (discussed in more detail in the next part) and a few other remaining items. For example, the archive has a photo showing Šalčius dressed in yukata and enjoying Japanese tea (see Figure 2).[21]

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[17] Notice from the US Military department to Matas Šalčius, October 13, 1917. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002478953 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[18] In *A. a. Matas Šalčius Amerikoje* published in June 13, 1940 issue of Trimitas, Karolis Račkauskas-Vairas mentions that Matas Šalčius visited his office in Boston at the beginning of 1918 asking for help to leave the US. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/vbspi/showImage.do?id=DOC_O_39328_1&biRecordId=4059 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[19] Šalčius, M. *Japoniukas Kumataro*. Matas Šalčius archive, item F189–208.

[20] Šalčius, M. *Svečiuose pas 40 tautų (VI dalis: Didysis Tolimųjų Rytų pasaulis)*. Kaunas: Raidė, 1936.

[21] A photo of Matas Šalčius with traditional Japanese clothes. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002493384 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

Figure 2. Matas Šalčius (first from the right) with Japanese traditional clothing, Japan, 1918
Source: Matas Šalčius archive (collection code F 189) in the Rare Books
and Manuscripts Unit of Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania
Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002493384

Despite these very vivid cases, there is too little information than we could expect from one year's stay in Japan. Considering that Šalčius was actively involved in journalism and public speaking in Lithuania and the US, the same can be expected from him while he was in Japan. Despite that, no evidence was found to support this assumption. Careful search in Japanese newspaper databases[22] revealed no results suggesting articles written by Šalčius. When it comes to the year 1918, his own archive was not helpful either, which is unusual considering the fact that Šalčius tended to collect memorabilia of many of his activities.

Similar to the arrival date, it is difficult to establish an exact date when Šalčius left Japan and travelled back to Lithuania through Siberia. It must have been in late 1918 or very early 1919. He was certainly back

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[22]   Search performed in June, 2018 in the following databases: Maisaku (Mainichi Shinbun), Kikuzo II Visual (Asahi Shimbun) and Yomidas (Yomiuri Shimbun) focusing on the year 1918.

to Lithuania in February of 1919, because the existing documents show that he started working as a teacher in Linkuva gymnasium at that time.[23] Overall, Šalčius spent in Japan about one year.

3. The third visit (1933)

The third visit to Japan was the shortest but has the longest story that led to it. That is because visiting Japan was part of a much larger travel that Šalčius started in November of 1929 with a goal to explore Eastern Europe and Asia. The first half of the journey was done on a motorcycle (see Figure 3) together with another prominent Lithuanian traveler Antanas Poška.

Figure 3. Matas Šalčius on a motorcycle right before his journey to Asia, Lithuania, 1929
Source: Matas Šalčius archive (collection code F 189) in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Unit of Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002493386

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[23] Statement by Linkuva gymnasium that Matas Šalčius works there as a teacher. February 20, 1919. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002478955 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

Their ways later separated, and Šalčius travelled alone by using trains, boats and other means of transportation. In 1932, Šalčius arrived to China and spent substantial time in the Northern part, observing Japanese invasion and the establishment of Manchukuo (满州国 *Manshūkoku* in Japanese or 滿洲國 *Mǎnzhōuguó* in Chinese).

Šalčius left Harbin city in November 9, 1932[24] and was granted permission to leave Manchukuo in November 11.[25] Then he travelled to Shanghai where on November 22 he received a visa from the US embassy.[26] At that time Šalčius had a plan to go to the US and stop in Japan on the way. As it became evident later, this plan was never realized and later had to be changed into a new one.

The archives provide no documents from that time with information that could supplement the story that Šalčius tells in his book *Visits to 40 Nations*.[27] There Šalčius explains that he boarded a ship from Shanghai that took two days and a half to reach Nagasaki due to bad weather conditions. There Šalčius met a journalist from Osaka Mainichi newspaper (大阪每日新聞 Osaka Mainichi Shimbun) who wrote about him a short and apparently erroneous article which irritated Šalčius. The archive collection does not have a copy of this article, and it was not possible to find it in Mainichi newspaper electronic archive database.[28] Šalčius then describes the life of Nagasaki, especially taking into account Japan's westernization and modernization aspects.

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[24] Questionnaire filled by Matas Šalčius leaving Harbin, China, November 9, 1932. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002479024 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[25] Permission to leave Manchukuo issued to Matas Šalčius. Dated November 11, 1932. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002478096 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[26] Matas Šalčius's Declaration of Nonimmigrant Alien, Shanghai, China, November 22, 1932. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002479044 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[27] Šalčius, M. *Svečiuose pas 40 tautų (VI dalis: Didysis Tolimųjų Rytų pasaulis)*. Chapter 5.

[28] Search performed in June of 2018 using Maisaku (Mainichi Shinbun Online Database) using various keywords based on the story in Matas Šalčius book.

From the story in the book it seems that Šalčius stayed in Nagasaki for around two days and then boarded the same ship with which he arrived at Kobe.[29] In Kobe Šalčius was right away stopped by Japanese officials who announced him *persona non grata* due to negative portrayal of Japan in his newspaper articles published in China. The next day Šalčius was forced to leave Kobe and return to Shanghai. It seems that Šalčius was back to China in the first half of January of 1933.[30] He stayed in China for around a month and then travelled through Hong Kong to the Philippines. It is known that Šalčius had already been there since the second half of February, because of remaining recommendation letters[31] and announcements about his open lectures.[32]

Although this third visit to Japan was very short, in his book Šalčius wrote about the country extensively and in much detail, covering such topics as geography of the islands, natural disasters (frequent earthquakes, typhoons, landslides), Japanese history from since the beginning to the current expansion, language and culture, most popular customs (bathing, dressing, wedding and funeral), peculiar aspects of communication, living conditions, and finally – political situation, expansionist ambitions, and aggressive policies towards neighbouring countries. On the one hand, Šalčius is praising Japan's beauty, elaborate culture, politeness of the people and country's contemporary development. He describes things in Japan as "beautiful, elegant and eye-catching" and the nature as "heavenly beautiful" while noticing that some views are so magnificent that he "will

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[29] Matas Šalčius mentions in his book that he was going by a ship that stops in several Japanese ports, making it convenient to explore the country.

[30] Recommendation letter issued to Matas Šalčius by a company in Shanghai. January 17, 1933. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002483826 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[31] Recommendation letter issued to Matas Šalčius in Manila, the Philippines. February 28, 1933. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002483849 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[32] Announcement about Matas Šalčius speech in the Philippines on the question of Manchuria. March 19, 1933. Available at http://www.epaveldas.lt/object/recordDescription/LNB/C10002479026 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

not be able to ever forget them in [his] life".[33] On the other hand, Šalčius is criticizing Japan for the recent foreign policies and even says that Japan is a killer nation with an aggressive mindset that makes the national the most warlike among all countries in the world. Related to that, Šalčius considers the growth and modernization of Japan unprecedented and thinks that recent achievements and victories boosted Japanese confidence to such a degree that they feel as the most powerful country not only in Asia but increasingly in the whole world. He writes: "In 1913, the Japanese used to bow down to the ground when meeting someone from Europe. In 1923, the Japanese used to give them a simple nod. Finally, in 1933, the Japanese expect the Europeans will bow to them."[34]

Although Šalčius does not tell that explicitly, he must have based the information he wrote in the book on more than his short visit to Japan in 1933. It is clear from his articles published in China that the visit to Manchukou and Korea built rather critical position of Šalčius towards Japanese foreign policy of that time. This is reflected in the political aspects of Japan described in the book. On the other hand, deeper knowledge about Japanese history, culture, customs and daily life must have originated from the time when Šalčius lived in Japan for more than a year in 1918. For example, Šalčius tells in the book how beautiful is mount Fuji with a snowy white cap when arriving by ship to Yokohama from the Pacific Ocean. This he could experience himself when traveling from the US to Japan in the winter of 1917–1918, but certainly not in 1933, when he was expelled from Japan in Kobe and did not even reach Kanto area.

Besides the story told before about the encounter with Osaka Mainichi journalist, there is no other information showing that Šalčius cooperated with Japanese media as a journalist. Considering his critical stance towards Japan, it would not be a surprise that local newspapers were not allowed to or had no interest in working with him. Although the archives give

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[33] Šalčius, M. *Svečiuose pas 40 tautų (VI dalis: Didysis Tolimųjų Rytų pasaulis)*. Chapter 5.

[34] Ibid.

several pieces of evidence that Šalčius was actively contributing articles to newspapers in China, no such information exists regarding Japan.

4. Debate with existing writings

This paper seeks to trace Šalčius's journeys to Japan and activities there based on primary sources available in the archives and by searching for Šalčius's legacy in newspaper articles of that time. Although there are no other academic articles that focused on this before, as it was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there are several articles published on various Internet websites that briefly discuss Šalčius's visits to Japan. This raises a question, how accurate they are, and what additional information we can learn from them.

Pranckevičius's[35] article is based on memories recalled by Šalčius's daughter Raminta Šalčiūtė-Savickienė. The article does not elaborate on the first and third visit to Japan, but mentions the second one in greater detail. It is said that during that time Šalčius met Sukeo Murata who was a journalist working in a big Japanese daily newspaper, and that a close friendship and cooperation between the two lasted for many years. Such an interpretation is rather doubtful because, as it was explained before, Šalčius met Sukeo Murata already in 1915 and exchanged letters only till the end of 1917. Furthermore, Murata was a young student rather than a journalist who made a career in an influential newspaper.

The article written by Tarailienė[36] focuses specifically on the first and second visit to Japan. The information there is mostly correct except for some small inaccuracies, such as a statement that Šalčius visited China on the way to Japan in 1915. There is also information that is based on unspecified sources. For example, "Here [in Japan] Šalčius found Lithuanian diaspora, got familiar with local journalists who helped him to publish articles on Lithuania in Japanese newspapers, and interacted with

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[35]   Pranckevičius, K. *Saulė šviečia lygiai visiems.*
[36]   Tarailienė, D. *Per Japoniją į Ameriką (ir atgal).*

university students."[37] This statement is not further elaborated and lacks any explanation about its sources.

Finally, the article by Statinis[38] also suggests that Šalčius visited China on the way to Japan in 1915 and published his articles in local newspapers in 1918. Three newspapers are mentioned: Tokyo Nichi Shimbun (東京日日新聞), The Japan Advertiser and Hochi Shimbun (報知新聞). Similar to Pranckevičius's and Tarailienė's articles, the acquaintance with a local journalist who helped Šalčius with getting published also appears in Statinis's text. However, since these statements are not supported by any sources, their factual accuracy is questionable.

Overall, there are three types of claims made about Šalčius that can be found questionable or entirely erroneous: 1) the countries that Šalčius visited on the way to Japan in 1915; 2) Japanese people with whom Šalčius maintained close contact; and 3) the activities in which Šalčius was engaged during his longest stay in Japan in 1918. The first one is the easiest to resolve because Šalčius himself provided a clear list of locations he visited on his way to Japan at the beginning of his travel essay "My Journey to America". China is not mentioned there.[39]

The second claim is related with the name Sukeo Murata with whom Šalčius indeed exchanged a lot of letters. There is no evidence in the archive to think that Murata was a journalist or that Šalčius kept in touch with him longer than a couple of years (1915–1917). There was a great chance that Šalčius got acquainted with many other Japanese people in 1915 or 1918, but the evidence is yet to be found to support this assumption. In the archive, Murata is the only Japanese person with whom Šalčius exchanged letters.

The third claim is the broadest and the most difficult to resolve. Regarding Šalčius's publications, as was mentioned earlier in the paper, extensive search done in prevalent newspapers of that time in Japan shows no signs of news articles that explain Lithuania's situation in more detail

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[37] In Lithuanian: "Čia M. Šalčius surado nemažai išeivių iš Lietuvos, susipažino su vietos žurnalistais, kurie padėjo publikuoti jo straipsnius apie Lietuvą Japonijos spaudoje, bendravo su aukštųjų mokyklų studentais."

[38] Statinis, G. *Mato Šalčiaus biografija.*

[39] Šalčius, M. *My journey to America.*

than we can expect if Šalčius was involved in writing them. Naturally, there is a number of articles that provide basic information about the dynamic developments of European politics at the end of World War I. The name of Lithuania is mentioned in that context several times but without much nuance. This means that either Šalčius worked with smaller newspapers in Japan and published there or our expectation that Šalčius was active as a journalist is erroneous in itself.

Other activities in which Šalčius has been engaged in 1918 are even more unclear. The Lithuanian diaspora in Japan is a very little researched topic, making it difficult to evaluate Tarailienė's claim that there was a Lithuanian community in Tokyo which Šalčius could join. Even more challenging is verification of meetings between Šalčius and local university students or public lectures that Šalčius could have given in Tokyo. There are no items in the archive that could help with this task, and alternative approaches to verify such claims are necessary.

Conclusions

This paper has concluded, leaving more unsolved puzzles than the questions it has succeeded to answer. It is evident that although the materials accumulated in the archive are very helpful in tracing Šalčius's travels, there are also numerous gaps which can lead to unfounded assumptions and misinterpretations. Despite that, Šalčius's legacy is clear and substantial: he was among the first Lithuanians who built connections with Japan and increased awareness about this country in Lithuania. Even more importantly, Šalčius depicted Japan in a nuanced way thanks to his more positive impressions during his first two visits and rather negative experience when he observed Japanese invasion in China and was expelled from Japan in 1933. This allows Šalčius to tell the readers that Japan is not only a distant land with exotic culture but also a country undergoing rapid modernization and westernization, with imperialist ambitions and political importance even for Lithuania.

There are several potential directions for future research on this topic. Firstly, a more detailed examination of newspaper articles both in Lithuania and Japan is needed to clarify the scope of Šalčius's publications on Japan in Lithuania and on Lithuania in Japan. It is likely that Šalčius contributed a few articles to smaller and regional newspapers in Japan, especially in 1918, which are more difficult to obtain. Similarly, digitalized versions of Lithuanian newspapers do not provide many clues about Šalčius's publications. Therefore, more work is needed with newspaper archives both in Japan and Lithuania.

Secondly, a more extensive research on early Lithuanian communities in Japan would help to better understand how much Šalčius was part of their activities. Although there are sporadic reports about individual Lithuanians visiting and living in Japan during the inter-war period, the information has not been analysed systematically. As it was mentioned earlier, the question who was the first Lithuanian to visit Japan stands unanswered, as well as broader questions about cooperation between individual Lithuanians living in Tokyo, Kobe and other cities.

Finally, a complicated task to gather letters sent to other people by Šalčius could help to fill many gaps in knowledge about his life. The archive right now mostly offers us to read letters that Šalčius received himself, but from them we also know that Šalčius wrote hundreds of letters to different people around the world telling them about his travels and activities. Some of the recipients of Šalčius's letters are influential people of that time whose belongings, including correspondence, could be donated for archives and made publicly available one day. This and other approaches would allow future researchers to add more pieces to the yet unsolved puzzle of Šalčius's visits to Japan.

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Savannah Rivka Powell

DIVINE ACTS OF POWER: INTERSECTIONALITY OF GENDER AND SPIRITUALITY OF *MIKO*, AINU AND RYŪKYŪAN TRADITIONS OF JAPAN

Introduction

The practices of *Miko*, Ainu and Ryūkyūan traditions of Japan have changed dramatically over time. While the *Miko* tradition is to some degree aligned with the mainstream dominant culture, the Ainu and Ryūkyūan cultures tend to be under-represented and viewed as 'other' within Japanese society. Institutionally, Japan recognizes the Ainu as indigenious people through a resolution passed in 2007. Tokyo-based Kyodo News published an article claiming that there had been discussion in August of 2017 of passing a law with a similar acknowledgement, however, no such measure has officially been announced.[1] The Ryūkyūan people in Okinawa are often viewed as a sub-group in Japan, and therefore they are rarely framed as an Indigenous minority. There have, however, been movements such as that of activist Shinako Oyakawa who has petitioned the UN forum for the recognition of the rights of Ryūkyūan people as indigenous (Magee, 2018).[2]

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[1] Kyodo News+, Japan to Stipulate Ainu as Indigenous People in New Law. Tokyo, Japan: New Kyoko, 2017.

[2] Magee, Seana K. Okinawan Activist Fights for Rights of Indigenous Ryūkyūans at U.N. Forum. New York: *The Japan Times*, 2018.

1. *Miko* traditions

In her 2011 publication "The Disappearing Medium: Reassessing the Place of *Miko* in the Religious Landscape of Premodern Japan", scholar Lori Meeks provides an in-depth historical analysis of these roles. As *Miko*, women acted as religious leaders and spiritual mediums. These traditions can be traced to the prehistoric Jōmon era (14000–300 BCE). *Miko* performed ritual music and channelled Deities and the spirits of the dead. Some were affiliated with shrines and employed by the elite while others known as *Aruki Miko* would have travelled for work. *Miko* roles encompassed a wide spectrum including those employed at large prominent shrines or formal courts, those with stable employment at smaller shrines, and entirely itinerant *Aruki Miko* who relied on donations from individual patrons. All *Miko* would have provided services which included some combination of musical performance and divine service.

Figure 1. Fourteenth-century scroll painting *Ishiyamadera engi:* Important Cultural Property, Ishiyamadera Temple, Shiga Prefecture depicting a Miko performing music at the gates of a prominent shrine
Source: (Meeks, p. 228.)[3]

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[3]   Meeks, Lori. The Disappearing Medium: Reassessing the Place of *Miko* in the Religious Landscape of Premodern Japan. *History of Religions*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2011, pp. 208–260.

The fourteenth-century scroll painting (see Fig. 1) *Ishiyamadera engi* (Important Cultural Property, Ishiyamadera Temple, Shiga Prefecture) depicting a *Miko* performing music at the gates of a prominent shrine is an evidence of the strategic ways that women in these roles displayed their power (Meeks 2011, 228).

"This *Miko* has claimed a space between the two Deities guarding the main entrance to the Ishiyamadera, a pilgrimage destination popular among the elite [..] Japanese scholars have identified these women as *Aruki Miko* who travel from place to place, playing music, telling stories, and performing divining trance for pilgrims."[4] Rosaldo (2007) provides a framework in which women are acknowledged as culturally important, influential, and even powerful, yet lacking the culturally valued authority exhibited by men (Rosaldo, 17). Much as outlined by the theories of Rosaldo, *Aruki Miko* may have expressed power but did not necessarily exhibit political or socially sanctioned authority due to elements of social organization. The roles of *Miko* eventually faced strict systemization and political regulation in Japan. By examining the power displayed by *Miko* one can gain a sense of the threat they may have posed to the ruling elite.

Discussion of the roles of women as *Miko* have often been omitted from the study of Japanese religions. Meeks named a number of scholars including Yamakami Izumo, Yung-Hee Kim, and Kuroda Hideo who agree that female mediums and *Miko* have maintained a constant presence in Japanese religious life (Meeks 2011, 209). By exploring the roles of women as ritual specialists one gains an understanding of the prominent positions women once held in Japanese society and religious life. It is important to note that there were some active male *Miko* in premodern Japan beyond the boundaries of the capital. An analysis of the *kanji* compounds most commonly used for *Miko*, 巫女, reveals the use of the character for female. Men in these roles would have used *kanji* containing masculine markers,

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[4]   Meeks, Lori. The Disappearing Medium: Reassessing the Place of *Miko* in the Religious Landscape of Premodern Japan. *History of Religions*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2011, p. 228. See also Shikusawa and KDNJBK, *Nihon jōmin seikatsu ebiki,* 3, p. 229.

although the gender-neutral terms *kine* and *fugeki*, 巫覡, were used as well (Groemer 2007, 28). While male and female ritual specialists may have been responsible for different religious duties or even worked in pairs, there is evidence that Yamato kings (250–710 CE) preferred that these roles be filled by female *Miko*.[5]

The Tokugawa *bakufu* issued a series of edits and laws starting in the early seventeenth century intended to gain control over religious professionals and consolidate them under a hierarchical system among Buddhist temples (Groemer 2007, 31). Meeks explains that, despite evidence that Buddhism has incorporated ritual practices with origins in these folk traditions, historical analysis of the doctrine and institution of Buddhism has often omitted the influential elements of *Miko* practices. In *The Religious Traditions of Japan 500–1600,* Richard Bowring (2005) discovered a similar theme among scholars of Japanese religions who examined intellectual traditions; the study of *Miko* ritual practice was often excluded as a subject for serious academic inquiry (Bowring 2005, 99–104). The very study of *Miko* traditions presents a challenge as they were not typically active as writers or record keepers, thus supplemental materials such as artistic depictions and writings by observers must be referenced to gain an understanding of their historically intangible heritage.

Although *Miko* traditions were born out of what would become mainstream Japanese society, they were often presumed to be socially and politically marginalized as was presented in the works of Bernard Faure in his 2003 analysis of gender and Buddhism in premodern Japan. According to Faure, "*Miko,* like courtesans (or *Asobi*), were 'marginals' who occupied liminal, semisacred spaces" (Faure 2003, 304). Much as discussed by Eriksen (2010), this may be understood in terms of social classifications and structures of inclusion and exclusion (Eriksen, 32). This may have been the case for some *Miko*, such as *Aruki Miko* who held no affiliation with a shrine and travelled periodically for work. Although scholars regarded

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[5]   Meeks, Lori. The Disappearing Medium: Reassessing the Place of *Miko* in the Religious Landscape of Premodern Japan. *History of Religions*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2011, p. 209.

Miko as skilled performers and practitioners, they were frequently depicted as of lower-class origin and engaged with some form of prostitution. Amino Yoshihiko's work on political and social roles of non-agrarian workers revealed that those who may have been perceived as 'marginals' often had access to the elite classes (Meeks, 212). Faure presented research pointing to similar themes, leading Meeks (2011) to question the assumption of *Miko* as being involved with prostitution. She concludes that there is limited reliable evidence of *Miko* regularly engaging in such activities and instead points to documentation that reveals them as frequently intermingling with elites. I would like to propose that due to the diversity of *Miko* roles and practices, their statuses likely varied across the social stratum.

Meeks (2011) explains that following Chinese legal precedent, the Japanese state began to suppress the practices of spirit mediums not affiliated with state-recognized shrines in the seventh and eighth centuries resulting in the loss of authority for many *Miko*. In 718 CE the Yōrō Codes were established by the Japanese state as an attempt to secure control over religious practices considered threatening. The intent was to create a complex network of formally recognized state shrines while fostering a system of official titles and ranks privileging male officiants.[6]

Spiritual roles for women were greatly diminished and religious authority was replaced with activities surrounding domestic tasks. Rosaldo (2011) has pointed to the relegation of women's roles to the domestic sphere in many societies as a form of female subordination, much as can be seen here with the limitations placed on *Miko* practices (Rosaldo, 19). In this case, one may also consider the stigmatization faced by those who travel regularly as part of a lifestyle such as the *Aruki Miko*. Perceived dangers or threats have often been projected onto travellers. This could have impacted attitudes towards *Miko* and the desire to limit their movement. The persistence of these fears is present in many regions of the world

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[6]   Meeks, Lori. The Disappearing Medium: Reassessing the Place of *Miko* in the Religious Landscape of Premodern Japan. *History of Religions*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2011, p. 213. Under the Yōrō Codes a number of *Miko* were charged with the crime of "bewitching the common people" and send into exile in the late eighth century.

where Roma people, refugees, immigrants, and others who need to travel regularly are often viewed with distrust. Even today these attitudes have led to political actions and the establishment of stricter policies.

The state shrine system effectively domesticated *Miko* and many came to be regarded as the 'housewives' of the Gods rather than as mediums who channelled them during rituals. *Miko* status was further reduced with the advent of Buddhism as priests known as *Yamabushi* took over summoning activities once carried out my *Miko*. As shrines became more systematized through state control, *Miko* lost most of their political and institutional prestige.

In attempts to discredit and suppress the activities of female ritual specialists, some elites with the support of the state began promoting images of them as threats to public order or as 'crazy people.' Interestingly the men who held similar roles were not regarded in such a manner. Despite these struggles, evidence shows that *Miko* found ways of redefining their social and religious roles. An examination of the transcripts of Buddhist reformer Eison (1201–1290) who was adopted and raised by a *Miko* practitioner, reveals that "*Miko* were active, well-connected players in the social life of temple-shrine complexes" (Meeks 2011, 218). Writings of Eison describe *Miko* as economically independent, owning land, and as prominent respected members of their communities.

Despite suppression by certain elite groups and the Japanese government, the rich traditions of *Miko* have managed to persist into modern day. The role of *Miko* may be observed primarily within the State Shinto system in the limited form of Shrine assistants or symbolically during staged festivals and ritual events. By examining *Miko* roles one gains an understanding of how these women have adapted to historical circumstances by continuously shaping and reshaping their identities. Although *Miko* may have lost social and political status through the development and implementation of the modern State Shinto system, there are still those who carry the tradition of ritual specialists based on the teachings of *Koshintō*. This encompasses the traditions of the Jōmon period (14 000–300 BCE) based on original animism practices of Japan. Women

carrying on the tradition of Spirit mediumship and channelling of Deities has continued in a manner similar to *Koshintō* practices in rural areas.[7]

The existence of these traditions was explained to me by a religious practitioner of Japan whose family's lineage is intertwined with the State Shinto Shrine system. While this individual openly described awareness of these vernacular traditions, the direct family affiliation with the State Shinto system meant that to share such information required that I maintain their anonymity. The survival of these traditions is a testament to the adaptability and creativity of *Miko* practitioners who have managed to forge niches which permitted them to continue attracting patronage. Scholar Eri Hirabayashi conducted ethnographic fieldwork from 2005 to 2007 on *Miko Mai Shinji* rituals which have been continuously practiced despite the passage of time and a changing society. Hirabayashi presented the thesis that tradition itself may be preserved through adaptation.[8] She concluded that the "continuation of these ritual practices, thereby, allows for the honouring of tradition through its ability to adapt and change and, therefore, to be truly contemporary" (Hirabayashi 2010, 196).

2. Ainu traditions

The Ainu are descendants of the Satsumon culture (700–1200 CE) and emerged as a distinct group around the mid-twelfth century. Scholars Sakurako Tanaka (2000) and Obayashi Taryô (1994) confirm that there is evidence that Ainu had interactions with the Emishi (Tanaka, 18). The Emishi are connected with the ancient Jōmon people of northern Honshū, the largest central island of current-day Japan. Expressions of Japanese nationalism may be found in the celebration of Jōmon as the ancestors of the Japanese and as a historical means of justification for their dominance

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[7]   Anonymous Japanese Religious Practitioner. Personal interview. 19 February 2018.

[8]   Hirabayashi, Eri. *The goddess dances beyond time: An exploration of continuity through change in contemporary Japanese ritual, with specific reference to the miko mai shinji.* Limerick Ireland: University of Limerick, 2010, Chapters 3–4.

over Honshū and the surrounding territories. This may be related to Eriksen's conceptualization of ethnicity as reinforcing a certain perspective or worldview (Eriksen 2002, 2). According to scholar A. Slawik (1994), the historical Emishi language is considered to be a member of the same linguistic family as the language spoken by the Ainu people. Linguistic elements of Emishi and Ainu along with ecological and religious beliefs have maintained continuity through the Ainu culture of northern Honshū (Tanaka 2000, 17).

Ainu traditions were heavily impacted by pressure to assimilate into Japanese mainstream culture. The pressure to conform to mainstream Japanese society stems from a stigmatized Ainu identity. This is similar to the process of assimilation and acculturation described by Eriksen (2010) and the dynamics he observed of the Sami living in Norway who sought to blend in with the dominant culture (Eriksen, 33). Ritual practices of the Ainu were able to survive by associating with mainstream Japanese customs. Many Ainu practices became affiliated with Buddhist temples and other state-organized religions. Midwives have become many of the maintainers of Ainu traditional ritual practice among the people (Tanaka, 2003).

Media platforms seeking to generate interest in Ainu tourism in the Hokkaidō region capitalize on a more patriarchal image of Ainu tradition in which male elders claim roles as ceremonial masters (Tanaka, 2003). This may be due to the patriarchal nature of Japanese culture which emphasizes the leadership of men. Ainu women may be present in touristic staged folkloric performances but are rarely depicted as spiritual leaders. Some male Ainu elders have gone so far as to denounce the authenticity of female practitioners and to refer to their ceremonies as 'unofficial' and as carried out by 'false' ritual specialists. During her fieldwork Tanaka identified dual forms of ritual practice. That which was more visible in the public realm was regarded as 'traditional' and 'authentic.' Traditions being practised among the people and particularly by female ritual specialists was accused of being 'inauthentic.'[9] These gender dynamics may be viewed

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[9]   Tanaka, Sakurako. *The Ainu of Tsugaru: The Indigenous History and Shamanism of Northern Japan*. British Columbia: The University of British Columbia, 2000, pp. 12–13.

in the framework presented by Rosaldo (2007) in which men dominate the public sphere (Rosaldo, 17–18). This also represents an intersection of ethnic and gender issues; as Ainu struggle to maintain their traditions and be visible in Japanese society, female tradition bearers face additional challenges when they are treated as subordinate.

The traditional territories of the Ainu have been difficult to define, particularly along the southern border in regards to the relationship between the Indigenous population of Honshū and Hokkaidō which is the largest northern island of Japan. The Japanese government made declarations and policy statements which dictated official regions where Ainu would be permitted to live. The Meiji government (1868–1912) designated Ainu as the "former indigenous people of Hokkaidō." In 1899 the government implemented a strict colonial law known as the *Hokkaidō Kyudojin Hogoho* or the Former Indigenous People's Act (Fujimura-Fanselow 2011, 239). This act was designed with the intent of assimilating the Ainu population of northern Japan. By using the phrase "former indigenous" in the title of the legislation, the law emphasized that Ainu were now citizens of the rapidly modernizing nation of Japan. Indigenous people are often excluded from visions of modernity, rather being viewed as static in their cultures and traditions. In this example the Ainu people did not fit within the vision of the Japanese modern nation and thus had to be addressed through the process assimilation, thereby eliminating the Ainu cultural elements, which were perceived as an obstacle in the march towards modernization.

This act underwent some changes in the 1930s, when some of the more unscrupulous sections were repealed, however, it remained on the books until 1997 when it was then replaced by the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law. Unfortunately, this law failed to address the political demands of the Ainu population, nor did it provide any land or resource rights (Tanaka, 2003). Since its implementation, this law has primarily served to incite disputes concerning notions of self-determination and the very definition of Ainu culture itself. In August of 2017, the Japanese government released a statement of plans to stipulate the Ainu as indigenous people of Japan for the first time (Kyodo News, 2017).

Contact with and settlement by the Japanese during their colonial advance into Hokkaidō appears to be directly correlated to the decline in the status of women in Ainu culture. The gradual change in the status of women began in the last half of the Edo period (1603–1868) and continued to decline in the early Meiji period (1868–1912) with the increased colonization of northern Honshū and immigration of the Japanese into traditional Ainu territories (Tanaka 2011, 26–27).

The traditional roles of women in Ainu descent lines were essential, thus girls were valued members of the family. Women were the transmitters of culture, identity, practice, and language. Ritual practice was also passed from one generation to the next through the female descent line. Ritual traditions absorbed foreign influences but did not lose their essence and remained part of the common livelihood for many people. Assimilation and contact with Christianity and Buddhism impacted these practices. Even so, certain elements of female-centred symbolic activities, such as the worship of fire, remain intact.[10] Traditions surrounding family structures certainly impact gender relations and societal status. Indigenous family heritage practices are central to maintaining these traditions. The disruption of descent lines among the Ainu appear to have had a disparaging impact on the overall status of women within society.[11]

Tanaka (2000) is an Indigenous scholar who has engaged with the study of Ainu ritual practices academically and has come to live the traditions. Tanaka's research emphasized the shifting gender dynamics within Ainu traditions. This ritual tradition was framed within her research as a relationship between human behaviour and the natural environment which provides a model of culture-nature symbiosis. This may be described as a socio-ecological approach. Tanaka addressed the problems

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[10] Tanaka, Sakurako. *The Ainu of Tsugaru: The Indigenous History and Shamanism of Northern Japan*. British Columbia: The University of British Columbia, 2000, p. 29.

[11] Tanaka (2000) corroborates this with evidence found during her fieldwork among Ainu in the Nibutani region. She also spoke of how this disruption of descent lines was impacted through intermarriage, which she experienced personally in her own family, as she was raised as a Japanese person. It was only when she began conducting research that she discovered Ainu practices among her own family members.

that may arise when traditional culture is viewed as static with the belief in an ancient pure form yet to be discovered by salvage ethnographers. She emphasized the importance of recognizing these traditions as living and evolving with a consciousness for the survival strategies and responses of the tradition bearers who have had to adapt to a contemporary globalizing society.

Tanaka found evidence in classical Ainu literature that women enjoyed a considerable degree of equality and freedom prior to Japanese cultural intervention. Women were known to be engaged with trading and fought in battle with swords while carrying babies on their backs.[12] This is in stark contrast to the male-centred Ainu model of more recent times such as that which may be found among those living in the Nibutani region who told researchers that there had been no female ritual specialists and that women were not permitted to go to the mountains, converse with strangers, or pray to their Gods.

Beyond the disruption of women's traditions, Ainu language is endangered as many Ainu are educated in state schools and speak standard Japanese. The traditional Ainu culture has been severely impacted by pressures to assimilate into Japanese culture and society. Indeed, there are limited opportunities for the positive assertion of Ainu identity. These issues are further compounded by those who idealize concepts of Ainu ethnic purity. There is, however, a gradual movement towards acceptance and even celebration of the diverse forms of Ainu identities. Although many of the women's traditions were corrupted through the process of colonization, ritual practices have been preserved in midwifery (Tanaka, 2003).

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[12] Tanaka, Sakurako. *The Ainu of Tsugaru: The Indigenous History and Shamanism of Northern Japan*. British Columbia: The University of British Columbia, 2000, p. 29. This is based on earliest collected Ainu oral epics in Phillipi 1979 recorded by English missionary John Batchelor in the 1880s. "The epic of Kotan Utunnai": "I (the hero's elder sister) took you / from your mother's / back and / tied up tightly / my baby-carrying cords. / After that / I wielded my sword / all around / your mother…" (Phillipi, 1979, pp. 368–369). "The Woman of Poi-Soya" who fights, trades and hunts in the mountains herself, although this is presented as unusual (Phillipi, 1979, pp. 300–365).

3. Ryūkyūan traditions

On the southern islands of Japan in the area known as Okinawa, traditionally referred to as the Ryūkyū islands, is yet another spiritual tradition. In these regions, women held many religious leadership roles, including as priestesses and ritual specialists. Although the Ryūkyū islands have long been considered an official part of Japanese territory, many Ryūkyūans feel distant from the Japanese systems of power and status. This may be due in part to what Eriksen (2010) called cultural and geographic social distance (Eriksen, 31). These islands are in the southernmost region of Japan and had operated independently for centuries. Regardless of a history of contact, and conquest by China, Japan, and the United States, the people of Ryūkyū have maintained a distinct identity and culture.

Monika Wacker (2003) postured that the cultural belief in *Onarigami*, or the spiritual power of women, has ensured that women maintain vital social and political roles in the Ryūkyū Kingdom (15th–19th centuries). Ambilineal descent structures fostered a somewhat balanced society despite the division of labour. This balance of power remained relatively intact until the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries when female religious power began to decline. Recent trends show a revival of women's spiritual identities such as *Onarigami*. The term used to refer to female ritual specialists capable or blessing or cursing, *Onari* or *Unai*, derives from the ancient Ryūkyūan language for woman and *Kami* or *Kan* meaning Deity in standard Japanese. Thus, *Onarigami* may be directly translated as a divine woman or female Deity.[13]

Throughout the period that the Ryūkyū Kingdom operated independently, belief in *Onarigami* provided the foundation for the hierarchy of priestesses who wielded religious power. During the sixteenth century, a well-structured state religion united priestesses throughout the kingdom in a hierarchy led by a female relative of the king. The kingdom was divided into three sections, each directed by a priestess. These state

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[13] Wacker, Monika. Onarigami: *Holy Women in the Twentieth Century*. Nagoya, Japan: Nanzan University, 2003, p. 339.

priestesses were known as *Noro* or *Nūru* in the Ryūkyūan language. The *Noro* would report to the state, collect taxes, and oversee village priestesses. All of the priestesses received yearly stipends from the regions they governed, grain offerings, and gifts from the court (Wacker 2003, 341). Men were less commonly involved with these activities and ceremonies, however, brothers or men of families with local historical ties were more likely to be included.

Family affiliation determined a woman's eligibility to becomes a priestess. The founding families of villages, or those with lineage which had established a historical bond with a founding or royal family line could also become priestesses. These traditions were passed down matrilineally until the beginning of the twentieth century. If a decision was needed in the case of multiple prospective priestesses, divination by rice grains would be used to determine who was to become the new priestess.

Women were central as religious specialists in the household as well. Daily rites to the hearth Goddess were carried out by a matriarch of the home; typically, the eldest woman, mother, or wife of the patriarch of the home, while sisters of patriarchs performed monthly rites. This fostered connections between mothers and daughters-in-law as traditions and responsibilities would be maintained by the eldest woman of the house. These women were also responsible for the care of their younger sons' houses by supporting their daughters-in-law. The hearth Goddess plays a central role in the home by providing protection to all inhabitants.

The relationship between the elder woman of the house and the hearth Goddess was key to maintaining familial harmony. Modern homes often construct an altar on the northern wall of the kitchen for offerings. In a manner similar to Ainu traditions the fire Deity of the hearth along with the ashes represents the most important sacred element of sanctuary space within the home. Ashes are used for blessings and protections in various life events such as births, marriages, and deaths.[14]

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[14] Wacker, Monika. Onarigami: *Holy Women in the Twentieth Century*. Nagoya, Japan: Nanzan University, 2003, pp. 342–343.

The role women play in household rites may be related to Rosaldo's (2007) examination of authority found in the domestic roles of women. Her theories focused on cultures in which this may have been limiting, however within the structure of Ryūkyūan society, these positions retained both power and authority. Wacker exemplifies the fact that women of Ryūkyūan society are not necessarily oppressed despite patrilineal practices and a gender-based division of roles. "The case of historical Okinawa – the kingdom of Ryūkyū with its state religion led by women – is a good example of men and women building together a prosperous society without one sex completely dominating the other" (Wacker 2003, 356). An essential element of this balance appears to be not only the status within the domestic sphere as ritual practitioners but the political status associated with positions held by women in the public sphere.

Although the potency of female power in traditional culture may have shifted with exposure to mainstream Japanese culture in the seventeenth century, researchers are recognizing a shift towards the old ways of the Ryūkyū Kingdom in which women exhibited authority in both public and private spheres. Many of these traditions have survived in the smaller villages and are upheld as family practices. Priestess traditions are also being revived through community festivals modelled after the ceremonies of the old Ryūkyū Kingdom. Women are reclaiming their roles as spiritual leaders as part of this religious revival. "Reviving their traditional identity as *Onarigami* in the modern context is the Ryūkyūan way to equal opportunities" (Wacker 2003, 356).

Conclusion

The Ryūkyūan traditions were impacted by the influences of the dominant society of Japan much as can be seen with Ainu culture. Although *Miko* traditions were aligned with the dominant culture, they have a long history of strict government regulation. Ainu and Ryūkyūan traditions were impacted by similar legal movements. The women of these traditions have displayed power that may have presented a threat

to the ruling elite. The imposition of state-sanctioned religion caused a decline in the traditional practices of these groups particularly in regards to women's roles as spiritual leaders and ritual practitioners. While *Miko* were able to find ways to adapt, the Ainu and Ryūkyūans struggled with pressures to assimilate into mainstream culture. The old religion of Ryūkyū is experiencing a resurgence which women are actively engaging with to reclaim their roles as spiritual leaders. Ainu people are still fighting to be recognized as Indigenous people of Japan while working to navigate complex concepts and systems of ethnic identity. These traditions encompass diverse geographical and cultural expressions which challenge assumptions of homogeneity within Japan.

The impacts of religious universalization through state regulations and political policies can be observed throughout the history of these traditions. Although these processes may have differed in the implementation of each individual tradition examined here, the overall impact on the status and roles of women appears to have a clear correlation. Recognition of the similarities in these historical movements may provide insights as to current trends, particularly those which aspire for the restoration of such traditions and a movement towards gender equity in religious spaces within Japan. Honouring the differences of each tradition while recognizing the similarities in these movements has great potential moving forward.

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Kristina Dolinina

THE STYLISTIC SCHOOLS IN *KATHAK* DANCE: TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

Kathak[1] is one of the classical dance styles currently recognized and practiced in India and beyond. This dance style has developed from performing traditions of northern central India. *Kathak* dance, being part of syncretic North Central Indian cultural environment, could not avoid different historical, social, political influences. In the long run, the dance style developed as an extremely versatile, synthetic performative practice, revealing the mosaic of worldviews, identities, ethnicities and belongings.

The classical[2] form of the dance was revived, institutionalised, nationalised, 'purified' and 'sanitised'[3] along with the other music and dance forms in the processes of reforms and freedom movement, while searching for authenticity and national identity in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Few 'chosen' hereditary performers and their

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[1]   The etymology of the name comes from from Sanskrit word *kathā*, meaning 'story', 'narrative'.

[2]   The use of the term *classical* is controversial in the context of Indian dance traditions. In the treatise on performing arts *Nātyaśāstra* (5th century BCE to 5th century CE), we can find terms *desi* and *mārgī*, which can be considered having approximate meaning of *folk* and *classical*. In addition, the term *śāstrīy* can be used, meaning 'related to valid treatises on performing arts'.

[3]   Morcom, A. *Illicit Worlds of Indian Dance: Cultures of Exclusion.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 112.

narrative entireties now represent the dance, leaving behind unsuitable traditions, marginalised in the turns and twists of cultural politics, power and status shifts.

Mapping the *Kathak* performing communities, looking closer in to self-representation and living stories of performers, their activities and places, this study aims to investigate the relationship between tradition and transformation in the light of changing economic and socio-cultural conditions, as well as abilities and methods of *Kathak* performers to adapt to surrounding world. Following ethnomusicologist Daniel M. Neuman, to depict the changes in the form, content and aesthetics of the dance and steps that the dancing community takes in accordance to vicissitudes of environment, I will use the term 'adaptive strategies'[4].

The object of the study is *gharānā*[5] institution – the stylistic school of the dance form and unit of socio-artistic organization. In the field of *Kathak* dance, the term distinctly appeared only in the beginning of the 20th century. *Gharānā*s were connected to particular courts and outstanding dancers of the tradition. The concept of *gharānā* in dance was borrowed from musical *gharānā*s of North India. Nowadays, the *gharānā* phenomenon raises a lot of discussion, regarding its significance.

Article shows that the concept of stylistic school is newly (re)created phenomenon, adapted by dancers and dance scholars and projected back to the past, becoming an act of politics of representation. In the beginning of 20th century *gharānā*s provided illusion of authenticity and ancient roots for its members and served as warrant of authority and financial sustainability in changed conditions of patronage system and spectatorship.

Nevertheless, in the times when dance was proving itself to be worth of the status of one of the national arts, it was important for performing families and crucial for the art form to establish aforementioned rights of belonging.

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[4]   Neuman, D. M. *The life of Music in North India. The Organization of an Artistic Tradition.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

[5]   The word *gharānā* comes from Hindi *ghar*, meaning home, lit. 'of the house'.

Gharānā is only one example in entirety of features of the *Kathak* dance form and dancing community, that are constantly evolving, blurring, transforming and standing in long line of adaptive strategies of given tradition. Features that keep the tradition ever changing and living.

Article trough the analysing of *gharānā* concept proves that the transformations of the dance community and dance form became and still are necessary and unavoidable.

Nowadays, modern India is described by such term as 'fast development', 'globalisation', 'mass media dissemination', and 'spread of consumerism culture'[6]. Dance field is also becoming aggressively competitive and market-oriented. In these conditions and in recent institutional setting of dance education (as opposed to traditional teaching model from teacher to student – *guru-śiṣya paramparā*), the borders of *gharānās* are disappearing, styles are mixing, giving the new forms and expressions for the dance. *Gharānā* concept, thus, while being important in creating the dance vocabulary in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, now exists more as symbolic testimony of domination and authority.

The literature on the subject can be roughly divided in two streams. The early writings on *Kathak* were mostly concerned with the dance history and questions of 'antiquity', 'authenticity' and 'Indianness'. Influenced both by colonial views and ambitions of independent nation, authors like Kapila Vatsyayan, Mohan Khokar, Nirmala Joshi, S. K. Saxena etc., were aware of the importance of reinventing, classicising and codifying the arts as part of ongoing national project. On the other hand, increasing number of recent anthropological studies scrutinise the subject more accurately, looking for valid historiographical evidences (Margaret E. Walker), placing the art in the realm of "ethnographic presence" and illustrating " how one mode of cultural praxis takes on new highly divergent meanings in the

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[6]   Appadurai, A., Breckenridge, C. A. Public Modernity in India. In *Consuming Modernity. Public Culture in a South Asian World*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.

heteronomous contexts"[7] (Daniel M. Neuman, Phillip Zarrilli, Lalita du Perron, Janet O'Shea, Anna Morcom) and opposing to "dominant narrative"[8], believed and followed by dancers and scholars alike (Pallabi, Chakravorty). In my study I will continue the efforts of later works, avoiding blind believe in constructed history and unchangeable tradition of *Kathak* dance. Instead, my purpose is to observe the recent transformations of form and community, the "refashioning (of) the classical dance of Kathak in multiple ways", influenced by "globalization of India's public sphere" and rise of "heterogeneity of voices"[9].

After introductory section of the article I overview the concept of *ghrarānā* and history of particular schools, employing the method of historiographical analysis. In the later chapters of the study I built my arguments, referring to postcolonial discourse and anthropological theory and methodology. The study is based on material from ethnographic fieldwork conducted from December 2017 to April 2018 in various Kathak communities in central northern territories of India and my own experiences as Kathak student and practitioner in Delhi from 2003 to 2010.

1. Ongoing dialogue between tradition and transformation

Along with ongoing evolution of art forms, influenced by changing environment and individual creative reality, there are ongoing evaluation processes, guided by patron/institution and audience, that are constantly framing the art forms in between the dichotomies of classical or not, authentic or not, historical or not, timeless or not. The criterion for the

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[7]   Zarrilli, B. P. *When the Body Becomes All Eyes. Paradigms, Discourses and Practises of Power in Kalarippayattu, a South Indian Martial Art.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 4.

[8]   Chakravorty, P. *Bells of Change: Kathak Dance, Women and Modernity in India*. Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2008.

[9]   Chakravorty, P. Global Dancing in Kolkata. In Clark-Deces I. (ed.). *A Companion to the Anthropology of India*. Available at https://www.academia.edu/5423783/ Global_Dancing_in_Kolkata_A_Companion_to_the_Anthropology_of_India (retrieved 27.02.2018).

evaluation is nothing else but the proportion of permanent and variable constituents of the artistic tradition. In other words, the examination always "results in the discussions of "what must be fixed" versus "what can be changed", and "what has to remain the same as earlier" versus "what kind of innovations" could be made without violating the very "nature" of given art form[10].

Like in any other art, in *Kathak* the dance technique the aesthetics of movement and proper visual representation of suitable content are the main indicators of value. Along with the dance grammar, all surrounding socio artistic organization is very important for evaluation. Particularly in the situations, when substantial socio political and historical changes are taking place.

To illustrate the recent changes and tensions arising between tradition and transformation, I would like to give one example of such discussion. In one of the leading internet sites, dedicated to classical Indian dance – narthaki.com, on 16th of July, 2017, an article about stylistic schools in *Kathak – gharānās* appeared[11]. Article presented opinions on the importance and relevance of stylistic schools in changing scenario of the dance form by well-known dancers and choreographers. Almost all of them spoke about significance of the phenomenon in particular times – revival of classical Indian dance form Kathak in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Some stressed the importance of keeping clear boundaries between the stylistic schools even in recent times, while some mentioned only historical value of naturally blurring lines between *gharānās* in recent times.

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[10]   Ryzhakova, S. Dancers – musicians – audience interaction in traditional Kathak performance: Cultural meaning, social function, historical shifts. *Nartanam. A Quarterly Journal of Indian Dance.* Vol. XVI, No. 2. April-June 2016. Hyderabad: Sahrdaya Arts Trust, 2016., pp. 99–115; 100.

[11]   Banerjee, U. K. *Sparkle of Kathak – Gharana or Otherwise.* Available at http://www.narthaki.com/info/easterneye/ee22.html (retrieved 11.02.2018).

2. The *gharānā* institution: historical perspective

Looking deeper into the phenomenon of *gharānā*, one notices few controversial issues, related to history of dance and politics of representation. In the field of *Kathak* dance, the term distinctly appeared only in the beginning of the 20th century. The 12th volume of *Mārg*[12], issued in September 1959, dedicated complete chapter to the subject of *Kathak* stylistic schools[13]. Short historical introduction of schools was outlined in the magazine along with the genealogies of main families. *Gharānā*s were connected to particular courts and outstanding dancers. In this way, *Lucknow gharānā* originates from the court of Avadh (*Oudh)* and shapes itself into the individual outstanding style during the time of patron Nawab Wajit Ali Shah with the help of great dancers – Bindadin and Kalka Prasad. Only one family of performers carry the flag of *Lucknow gharānā* and nowadays the school is represented by legendary dancer Pandit Birju Maharaj.

In case of *Jaipur gharānā*, there are few families in Rajasthan, which are responsible for framing the stylistic school[14]. The name is linked to the court of Jaipur and it seems to be quite an invention. Few scientists are stating, that the decision to connect the school name not to the eminent *guru*[15], but to the name of the centre of patronage was made in 1895[16]. There was a meeting of *kathakas* organized at that time by Maharaja Sawai Madho Singh of Jaipur "to drown all the differences about the gharanas"[17].

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[12] Khokar, M., Saxena, S. K. 'Natavara', Joshi N., Scools of Katahk. *Mārg. A Magazine of the Arts.* Vol. 12–4, Bombay: Marg Publications, 1959, pp. 10–18.

[13] In the magazine only three *gharānā*s are mentioned. Raigarh *gharānā* is still not included, but the article on contribution to Kathak by Raigarh Raja is published ('Rasdhari'. *Mārg,* 1959, pp. 21–22).

[14] In *Mārg* magazine and in later literature five different genealogies are given (Joshi, 1959, pp. 16–18).

[15] 'Teacher' in Hindi language

[16] Kothari, S. *Kathak. Indian Classical Dance Art.* New Delhi: Abhinav Publication, 1989, p. 50; Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective.* England: Ashgate, 2014, p. 107.

[17] Kothari, S. *Kathak. Indian Classical Dance Art*, p. 50.

In her study, Margaret Walker is mentioning another version of the story, based on her conversation with dancer Rajendra Gangani in 2002, which placed "the decision to divide the *gharānās* in the court of Raigarh"[18]. As there are no written historical evidences regarding the particular division, the whole process is a bit of mystery. Historical evidences are lacking in constructing the histories of separate schools.

Another *gharānā* already mentioned in 1959 issue of Marg Magazine is *Janakiprasad* or *Benares gharānā*. It is presented here as bifurcation of Rajasthani artistic tradition, developed in Benares by Janaki Prasad and his disciples. The article speaks also about the offshoot of this *gharānā* in Lahore, developed by Ganeshi Lal's (son of Janaki Prasad) third son Gopal Das. It is interesting that following this article, the name of *Lahore Gharānā* is mentioned in early literature on Kathak as important dance centre and has absolutely vanished from later books[19].

An important place in literature is given to the patronage of Raigarh court in the beginning of 20th century. However, only quite late it was considered a separate school – *Raigarh Gharānā.*

According to Margaret Walker, exactly the patronage of Raigarh court was an important stimulus in the emergence of *ghrarānā* phenomenon. During the rule of Raja Chakradhar Singh, many eminent dancers and musicians met in the court and had an opportunity to observe each other's art. This led to the need and importance of self-representation, which, in the opinion of Margaret Walker, gave and impulse to *gharānā*:

> *Although we may never know for sure, I propose that the gharānā division took form in the 1939s at the Raigarh court. In response not only to rapidly changing patronage but also to the context of cultural contact and exchange, the Lucknow and Jaipur dancers realized that separate identities and styles would be advantageous and also offer a certain sense of security.*[20]

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[18] Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*, p. 107.

[19] Ibid., p. 107.

[20] Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*, p. 107.

So, even if belonging to *gharānā* proves authenticity and ancient roots, it is newly created phenomenon, adapted by dancers and dance scholars and projected back to the past, becoming an act of politics of representation.

The concept of *gharānā* in dance was borrowed from musical *gharānās* of North India. Socio-musical organization was a relatively early phenomenon, represented by *khandānī* system of traditional soloist and accompanying musicians. It is important to mention here that in case of hereditary performers, the musicians and dancers were very closely related and connected by family ties. It is very clear even today – usually the members of the same family are involved in different performing arts: some play *tabla*[21] or accompanying instrument and some dance. Good example in this case is very vast performing clan of Kathak-Mishra's in Uttar Pradesh. Daniel M. Neuman in his very detailed study of music in North India states:

> *Gharanas were conceived in the mid-nineteenth century and born in the twentieth. Yet once having been born, they assumed an appearance of being ages old. [..] One could perhaps say that gharanas were born out of a union of earlier lineages and earlier styles, and integrated them as a unified expression of social and cultural features.*[22]

Musical *gharānās* are connected to four *banīs* or styles, which are related to four important musicians of Akhbar court. Although *banī* is not really tied to particular lineage, but is purer stylistic concept, relation to *banī* verifies "the *idea* of stylistic ancestry, in other words a tradition"[23].

We can accentuate few more basic properties of *gharānā*. Technically, it should represent unique and distinctive aspects to differ from the other's style. As literature on dance gives it, *Lucknow Gharānā* is depicted by 'subtle' and 'expressive' elements, soft and graceful style, "emphasis

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[21] The percussion instrument, consisting of a pair of drums, used in *Kathak* dance and some other classical, popular and folk traditions.

[22] Neuman, D. M. *The life of Music in North India. The Organization of an Artistic Tradition.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 146.

[23] Ibid., p. 148.

on a lyrical quality"[24]. Such elements as *angbhav* (emotion in the body), *gat* (gait), and *palta* (pattern of notes) are specialities of this school. In comparison *Jaiput Gharānā* is depicted by rhythmic virtuosity, speed and complicated rhythmic patterns. Unique elements of the school are *kavitt* (recitation of poetic text with movement), *paran* (rhythmic pattern based on *mridanga* percussion) etc. *Janakiprasad* or *Benares gharānā* is usually said to be quite raw with the "differences in body postures and execution of dance movements"[25]. The speciality of the school is *natwari bol* (rhythmic syllables), created by Janaki Prasad and different from *tabla* or *pakhavaj bol*, used in other schools[26]. *Raigarh Gharānā* is associated with creative compositions of Raja Chakradhar Singh, although the style is depicted as fusion of two main stylistic schools[27].

On a social level, *gharānā* is outlined by factors of descent, learning and marriage[28]. Traditionally in hereditary families, without YouTube internet channel and fast trains, when the knowledge was kept secretly within the extended family, it was guaranty of uniqueness of the style and logically the favour of patron. In the process of nationalization of the musical tradition in North India, the *gharānās* as educational institution were very much criticized by revivalists Vishnu Narayan Bhatkahande and Vishnu Digambar Paluskar[29]. With the decline of courtly patronage, *gharānās* became the institutions of legitimation and warrant for new patronage. Marriage served very important role in engineering beneficial relations within extended family. It helped to retain the particular musical-dance

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[24] Singh, S. S. *Indian Dance. The Ultimate Metaphor*. Hong Kong: Ravi Kumar Publisher, New Delhi: Bookwise, 2000; Khokar, A. M. *Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2004; Kothari, S. *Kathak. Indian Classical Dance Art*, p. 51; Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*; Massey, R. *India's Dances. Their History, Technique and Repertoire*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 2004.

[25] 'Natavara' Scools of Katahk, p. 15.

[26] Kothari, S. *Kathak. Indian Classical Dance Art*, pp. 61–64.

[27] Ibid., pp. 71–74.

[28] Neuman, D. M. *The life of Music in North India*. The Organization of an Artistic Tradition, p. 161.

[29] Bakhle, J. *Two Men and Music: Nationalism in the Making of an Indian Classical Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

knowledge within the family and to ensure the financial sustainability. The issue of descent seems to be most controversial one. In order to label a particular tradition as *gharānā* the requirement of three generations of prominent performers must be fulfilled. As the belonging to lineage is constructed back in time and historiographical evidences are insufficient, the narrative of descent can be easily manipulated, forgotten or forcefully silenced. This is the most fertile ground for the politics of identity to emerge.

If we consider all the necessary parameters of *gharānā*, we arrive at the conclusion that in Kathak the division into particular *gharānās* can look quite artificial. *Jaipur Gharānā* includes five families without particular connections and is too wide to be labelled as *gharānā* on a social level, giving importance to certain historical time of strong patronage of Jaipur court and some stylistic particularities. Some families are very new in performing profession and would fail the requirement of three generations. *Janakiprasad* and *Raigarh Gharānās* also lack arguments to be called proper *gharānās*. Only *Lucknow Gharānā* can be called *gharānā* in its complete sense. Therefore, we can state that *gharānā* phenomenon arises at certain historical moment and "revolves around attempts to demonstrate the authenticity, age, and consequent purity of a lineage and the body of knowledge associated with it"[30].

The concept of *gharānā* is associated with few more terms, exterminating kinship: *k͟hāndān, birādarī, parivār*. *K͟hāndān* and *parivār* to be considered as synonyms to *gharānā*, *k͟hāndān* meaning 'family, lineage' in Urdu language and *parivār* – deriving from Sanskrit and meaning 'family, household' in Hindi. *Parivār* is used in some cases instead of *gharānā*, like in case of *Dagar parivār* (famous family of *dhrupad* vocalists). *K͟hāndān* is more associated with Muslim hereditary musicians in North India. *Birādarī* is wider term, depicting 'brotherhood' or community of traditional endogamous "hereditary specialists"[31]. It is larger than extended

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[30] Neuman, D. M. *The life of Music in North India.* The Organization of an Artistic Tradition, p. 167.

[31] Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*, p. 30.

family, but, as Daniel Neuman suggests, it includes "individuals who share a common ancestral place of origin and between whom there are potential or existing marriage links"[32]. Consequently, the immense performing community of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, that has links to *Lucknow Gharānā* of dance (also to *Varanasi Gharānā* of *tabla* payers and other performers)*, is the *Kathak-Mishra birādarī* – very diverse group of hereditary performers. As Walker puts it,

> *The variety of artistic activities – vocal and instrumental music, dance and drama – combined with the range of contexts – urban, rural, devotional, secular, folk and classical – support the conjecture that the members of the birādarī who most often identify themselves as Kathaks have a long tradition of shifting genres and identities in relation to changes in politics and patronage.*[33]

To illustrate various interconnections within the *gharānā/birādarī* and identity shifts, I would like to give few examples from my fieldwork trip to Raghav Pandit village, near Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The family residing in the area is a part of quite vast Uttar Pradesh and Bihar *kathavācak*[34] performing community. There is an NGO and the school named "Kalika-Bindadin Paramparik Kathak Natvari Lok Nritya Kala Kendra", which was established by two brothers Ashok Tripathi and Tripurari Maharaj with the help of government funds, gained from useful family connection to recently very famous *Kathak* maestro – Pandit Birju Maharaj – the doyen of *Lucknow Gharānā*. This connection is purposefully popularised and undoubtedly helps the community in getting financial and informational support. On the other hand, as Margaret Walker mentioned in her study, the urban Kathaks can always point the finger towards their rural counterparts and *kathavācak* tradition as the prove of authenticity. During my visit to the village in February 2018, small program was organized by Ashok Maharaj and his brother Tripurari Maharaj.

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[32] Cited in: Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*, p. 30.

[33] Ibid., p. 31.

[34] From Sanskrit, meaning 'storyteller'.

Figure 1. The author in conversation with Ashok Maharaj during the performance, organized at school in Raghav Pandit village. The images on the walls of the auditorium depict eminent members of *Lucknow Gharānā*
Source: Author's personal archive. Photography by Jovita Ambrazaityte

Performance made and impression of artificially planed event to prove some vivid performing life in the village. Program was lacking authenticity and natural environment. Interestingly, that during my visit Ashok called himself by the title Maharaj, although in other literature he appears as Ashok Tripathi. This is quite often a practice of honorific upgrade in Mishra family and can serve as example of politics of representation, when the identities are shifted by the change of name. During the same visit one of the informants mentioned that there was a discussion regarding the marriage of one of the Trupurari's sons to the daughter of Arjun Mishra, representative of another performing Mishra family from Lucknow. Even if the marriage did not take place, the intention of marriage, most probably, was an attempt to relate family to *Lucknow Gharānā,* as the most authoritative institution with the tradition. Generally speaking, young

generation of performing artists from rural areas are trying to find their places in bigger centres or at least get their dance education from big institutions, in order to get more possibilities to perform and earn name and money. Moreover, every performer, as it was mentioned earlier, must relate to the certain *gharānā*, to be included in the legitimate tradition.

3. Adaptive strategies

I shall now overview the transformations of tradition in different aspects form, content and socio-cultural surrounding of *Kathak* dance.

Repertoire

The particular order of performance/presentation was constructed in the mid-20th century and holds the support by educational institutions and created history as main model till recent times. The elements of repertoire used in rural setting by traditional *kathavācaks* – storytellers and items, danced in the courts of patrons in North India were incorporated in newly created presentation pattern, but to quote Margaret Walker: "many dancers are unaware of this and simply accept it as an unquestioned part of 'traditional' performance practice"[35]. The mode of presentation was constructed and items were included in accordance to orientalist/colonial romantic approach towards authentic, ancient Indian history and culture, which was taken over by revivalists and reformists in the processes of nationalisation, institutionalizations and 'mythologization'[36] of the arts. For example, some items like *vandana*[37] were made necessary and unquestionable in the performance. The main reasons of such codification – establishing of institutions where dance teaching curriculum leading to pattern of presentation had to be created. Nowadays, with the democratisation and globalisation of the art form the traditional ritualised

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[35] Walker, M. E. *India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective*, p. 3.
[36] Skiba, K. Performing Sacred in Kathak Dance. In Stasik, D. (ed.). *Polish Contributions to South Asian Studies*. Warsaw University, 2017.
[37] The first idem of the dance repertoire, invocation to Hindu deity.

pattern of presentation is often replaced by multiple performance modes, suitable for occasions and expectations of sponsors and audiences.

Daily practise and knowledge transmission

Elements of *gharānā*, *riyāz*[38], *teyārī*[39] and *guru–śiṣya paramparā*[40] are elements of daily practise and main vehicles of dance knowledge transmission.

Figure 2. Daily practice at Bhatkhande Music Institute Deemed University,
Lucknow, in the class of Prof. Kumkum Dhar
Source: Author's personal archive. Photography by Jovita Ambrazaityte

They are entangled into the web of legends and narratives from past about super human practises, mythological lineage connections and saintly teachers. Traditionally, disciple (as mentioned before, usually from

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[38] In Urdu, meaning 'practise', 'discipline', 'training'.
[39] In Hindi, meaning 'readiness'.
[40] Traditional system of knowledge transmission from teacher (*guru*) to student (*śiṣya*); *paramparā* means 'lineage' in Sanskrit.

the extended family) would live with the teacher, not only learning the discipline, but also getting knowledge about all the environment of dance and becoming legitimate member of dancing community. Nowadays the traditional educational system is replaced by institutions. Despite this, *guru-śiṣya paramparā* holds its position within the teaching institutions, creating double layered educational system. Most of my informants, albeit occupying administrative position in such institutions as Bhatkhande Music Institute Deemed University, Banaras Hindu University, Kathak Kendra New Delhi, Gandharva Mahavidyalaya New Delhi, admit that institutional education will never be able to yield the same results in the teaching process as traditional *guru-śiṣya* system. One of the main reasons – institutional preparation can never lead to the perfection and train excellent solo stage performers. In addition, half-traditional half-institutional teaching methodology is not able to build dancers individuality, in accordance to the different body and varying ability each student has. I suppose, in *guru-śiṣya parampara* this quality of teaching was implicit in the teacher-student relationship, as through total dedication of the disciple, the teacher would get to know the student's individuality and transmit the required knowledge very consciously. As far as I noticed, only few teachers today are really paying due attention to the individual body. I would like to mention here an important phrase of Kumudini Lakhya, one of the leading *Kathak* choreographers today, stating that: "it is much more valuable to become bad original, with own distinctive style, than be perfect photocopy of *guru*"[41]. On the other hand, the institution can prepare a huge number of Kathak teachers for the schools, thus popularising the dance form and making it available for bigger number of young people from middle class background. Therefore, we can say that institutions are providing only minimal dance knowledge, and only *guru* can pass the esoteric knowledge, loaded with devotion, dedication for the dance and the teacher. There is another side of the question too, when particular important knowledge is shared only inside the family and socially more supported are again family members, as the help of *guru* for young

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[41] Personal communication during the fieldwork at Kadamb Centre for Dance in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, December, 2017.

upcoming dancer's career is significant factor. Therefore, teachers act like protégés and logically enough, if they come from a hereditary performing family, they choose their own family members to guarantee economic stability for their craft. I see this as a continuation of *gharānā* institution, but only in a very narrow sense of "publicity and marketing [..] also a method of controlling the style and maintaining ownership"[42].

Urbanisation of tradition

With the establishment of main cultural institutions in the urban centres, most of the hereditary performers would start teaching in these institutions, bringing their families along to settle in the cities. In addition, cities with developed commercial sector have had and still retain more possibilities for the performances. Sometimes the result of such migrations would be a near desertion of the local villages, where performing communities used to dwell. The recent study of scholar and dancer Shovana Narayan[43], where she is looking for *Kathak* origins in some more or less abandoned villages in UP, that have word *Kathak* in their names, proves that such migrations have always taken place, as performing communities would look for new or better patrons, more profitable performance spaces. In Sujan Garh village in Rajasthan, where the Gangani family is from, only a few family members lately support themselves with agriculture. All the dancers from the family are living and teaching in Delhi or abroad[44]. The same situation was observed in other places, for example, Raghav Pandit village.

As an example of adaptation to the competitiveness in urban setting, I would like to mention expansion and domination of *Lucknow Gharānā* over the entire dance form.

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[42] Walker, M. E. India's Kathak Dance in Historical Perspective, p. 32.

[43] Narayan S. Kathak. In Raghuvanshi, Alka (ed.). *Dances of India Series*, New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2004; Kathak. *Indian Classical Dance Series.* Gurgaon: Shubhi Publication, 2012; Mapping of Kathak villages. Unpublished manuscript.

[44] There is an opinion that taking up the dance as profession in this family is a quite recent step but very productive: every second or third name in music and dance community in Delhi comes from Gangani family.

Figure 3. The doyen of *Lucknow Gharānā* with the students, during his 80th birthday celebration in Lucknow on 4th February, 2018
Source: Author's personal archive. Photography by Jovita Ambrazaityte

Pandit Birju Maharaj along with his family and disciples are taking quite active position in expanding school's dominating role. The Kalashram institution is established by Maharaj and his disciples not only in Delhi, but also in many small centres all over India. By starting the franchise of Kalashram or relating the institution by name to Birju Maharaj (Pt. Jai Kishan Maharaj's school name is Birju Maharaj Parampara) and his family or *Lucknow gharānaā*, the practitioners are trying to connect to famous brand and in this way get support in funding and spread of information. On the other hand, Birju Maharajs' style is also expanding and taking the prior positions claiming 'authenticity' and benefitting from its advantages.

The hegemony of Birju Maharaj style thus is established by covering biggest cities and laying claim to vast North Indian territory. The recent initiative of Kalashram Kathak Contest 2017 includes in its program

semi-final competitions in Kolkata, Guwahati, Lucknow, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad, Delhi and Mumbai. In Mumbai the grand finale takes place, where the winners "feel like stars. The King of Kathak himself crowns the youngster with Pt. Birju Maharaj crown"[45] (from the Kalashram Kathak Contest FB post on 2017.12.26).

These popularizing events bring boom of publicity and a lot of motivation for the young dancers and they are again the adaptations of dancing communities and institutions to the changing conditions and increasing competition in the field. However, it is important to retain the required artistic level of the enterprise, which not always happening. Using the name of undoubtedly big artist and franchising it does not guaranty the quality.

Very important reason of emerging transformations is changing patron and spectator in the globalised urban context. From the time when revived art forms started helping to fulfil the image of upcoming nation, the state became one of the main patrons. Institutional support and private initiative[46] replaced the mediation of princely court in development of performing arts. The music and dance conferences started to be organised, the education in new institutes required teaching personnel, later on, Indian cultural festivals all over the world were taking place, TV and in Bollywood productions started more involving dance. Some attempts to professionalise dance took place with productions of Ram Gopal, Uday Shankar, Madame Menaka dance companies at the beginning and middle of 20th century. Simultaneously, notable changes took place in the spectatorship. From chamber, elitist atmosphere of princely mehfil to state supported conferences and later to the educated middle-class audience in the institutional auditoriums or corporate events. It brought logical changes to the form and content of performance. Today's audience, except art connoisseurs, critics and other dancers, being a part of consumerist

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[45] From the Kalashram Kathak Contest Facebook post on 2017.12.26.

[46] Private support and initiative had a much greater role in the processes of institutionalization and revival of arts in India. It can be seen as a continuation of long tradition of feudal support of arts in a different manifestation.

culture, are looking for recognisable and relevant concepts and themes[47] and impressive visual spectacle.

The other important change is instigated by separation of musical and dance forms. Usage of recorded music instead of life music on the stage, brings transformation in improvised solo performance format. Traditionally, dancers and musicians were either from one performing community/family and spent lot of time practising together or, in case of non-hereditary performers, dancers would employ the particular musicians, in order to be able to improvise on stage. Nowadays the tendency is towards the group compositions. As was mentioned before, the institutions are giving dance education not meant for the solo performance and preparing big number of medium level dancers. They are very suitable for group performances, but the education, preparation and experience are not sufficient for such dancers to 'hold the stage' in a solo performance. Another factor is the stage itself. Performances today usually are held in more or less professional big platforms, that requires bigger number of dancers. Again, the audience is expecting lots of visual excitement, so the choreographies involving big number of dancers answer the expectations.

Literary content

Another adaptive strategy is changing of traditional literature or the text used in dance. The performers come with innovative themes or usages of traditional narratives. For example, Shovana Narayan used Draupadi's story in connection to the theme of awareness about the earth or made brave interpretations of modern poetry texts in the choreographies. Another notable examples include the choreographies of Kumudini Lakhya, which are innovative and rooted in individual experience, as well as the Kathak-based contemporary dance productions of Aditi Mangaldas. These artists usually are non-hereditary performers, having a wider educational background and more mixed social experiences. As one of my informants

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[47] This change in expectations of audience is very interesting topic and require a separate presentation, as there is a pronounced shift in aesthetic perception of concepts involved in arts, for example, femininity.

noticed, in case of hereditary performers the dance knowledge along with literary narratives was "infused in their body from the childhood with listening, watching and living in musical atmosphere"[48]. For non-hereditary ones it requires "more effort to receive the knowledge", to "fight" for it, usually obtaining it from the books, different teachers, through the understanding etc.[49]. These differences are visible in the approach towards the dance text.

Until recently, it was usual that hereditary performers'knowledge was not limited only to dancing, instead, they could also play percussions or sing, like Birju Maharaj or some other *gharānedār*[50] performers. Usually dancing and accompanying artist are from the same *gharānā* or *birādarī*. In contrast, the contemporary artists are becoming more narrowly specialised, and the dance production requires a work of a bigger team, as can be loaded with numerous supporting elements like lights, scenography, and recorded music. This points towards the process of professionalization of artistic tradition and blurring lines of *gharānā,* as more and more professionals are coming from outside the *gharānā* system.

To use all available support on the stage requires big funds also, so it is possible only with corporative or institutional support or big investment from the performer's side. Today, only 10% or less of the dance and music shows are ticketed, the rest are free for audience. People in India are ready to pay big money for dinning out, for cricket end film shows, but not yet for the classical dance and music performances. I was also surprised that ticketed shows are happening less often in Delhi than in other cities. As the biggest institutional centre, Delhi is overloaded with performances, usually sponsored by government organizations. But the changes in this sphere are rapidly coming in. Further professionalization and adaptation of artistic tradition could be interesting topic of the other article, particularly

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[48]   *Guru* Kumkum Dhar, Head of Dance Department, Batkhande University, Lucnow (Personal communication, February 2018).

[49]   *Guru* Vidhi Nagar, Head of Dance Department, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi (Personal communication, February 2018).

[50]   Belonging to *gharānā.*

nowadays with media connecting artists over the globe, with the stage as big as the world and global consumer market.

Conclusion

Observing the changes in socio-cultural context and the ways how the changes influence the dance community and form, we can assert that transformations are unavoidable. Speaking about *gharānā* institution we can observe late and purposeful formation of the phenomenon, with the illusion of being ages old and something very 'true' and 'authentic'. Following Margaret Walker, it seems that the line of *gharānā* emergence comes in parallel with the descent of court patronage and in search of other possibilities of patronage. Also, in the processes of reinvention of musical and dance traditions, *gharānā* served as a vehicle of authoritative knowledge, suitable form and content. It can be also stated that the rise of *gharānās,* not only as stylistic schools, but also as socio-cultural artistic organizations with the rights of belonging, facilitated the marginalization process of unsuitable traditions, such as *tawaif* culture or domination of Muslim hereditary musical tradition.

Nevertheless, in the time when dance was proving itself to be worth of the status of one of the national arts, it was important for performing families and crucial for the art form to establish aforementioned rights of belonging.

As the study shows, g*harānā* is only one example in the entirety of features of the *Kathak* dance form and dancing community, that are constantly evolving, blurring, transforming and standing in long line of adaptive strategies of given tradition. These features keep the tradition ever changing and living.

At present, the borders of *gharānās* are disappearing. *Kathak* dance is no more in the hands of hereditary performing families and the educated, the performers not "having Kathak in their blood" seek the knowledge very desperately, often from teachers of different schools. Therefore, styles are mixing, yielding the new forms and expressions to the dance. *Gharānā*

concept thus, while being important in creating the dance vocabulary in the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century, now exists rather as symbolic demonstration/testimony of domination and authority, supported by main institution like Kathak Kendra, where the representatives of at least two *gharānās* are necessarily employed to this very day.

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Marja-Leena Heikkilä-Horn
Maynadi Kyaw

FROM "GIRAFFE WOMEN" TO "LONG-NECKED KAREN". KAYAN WOMEN'S JOURNEY TO AGENCY IN THE THAI-MYANMAR BORDERLANDS[*]

Introduction

The current article is dedicated to the traditions and studies of the particular group of women living traditionally in eastern parts of Myanmar (former Burma) in the vicinity of the present Thai-Myanmar border. There has been quite a confusion concerning the names that have been used about this ethnic group. In our recent interviews, the women emphasised their preference for the term 'Kayan'. Yet, a Kayan man, who published his autobiography in 2003, called his people by the name 'Padaung' and mentioned only briefly that they also can be called 'Kayan'.[1] James George Scott and Percy Hardiman (1900) in their *Gazetteer of Upper Burma* used the term 'Padaung'. Major C. M. Enriquez in his book *Races of Burma* (1933) also used the term 'Padaung'.

[1] Pascal Khoo Thwe, 2003.

1. Naming names – from "Giraffe Women" to "Long-Necked Karen"

The Kayan are a linguistic subgroup of the Karen people and belong to a smaller subgroup of the Karenni/Kayah people. The names of the various 'Karennic' groups are equally confusing particularly with the recent changes in the spelling: the Karen group is now known as 'Kayin' and is again divided in various subgroups. One of the larger subgroups are the Karenni or Red Karen – referring to the choice of colour of their robes – now known as 'Kayah'." In the Thai tourism industry, the Kayan are often called 'long-necked Karen'. Kayan itself is divided in four sub-groups:

1) Kayan Lahwi (Padaung)
2) Kayan Ka-ngan (Yin Baw)
3) Kayan Geku[2] (Geyba)
4) Kayan Latha (Zayein) (U Kyaw Than 2009: 18).[3]

Kayan people may, however, reject the term 'Karennic'. Some do not wish to be under the family of Karens. Language policies are thus an essential part of identity politics as discussed by Tadayuki Kubo (2014). The Kayan have rejected the new Karenni alphabet created in 1963 by the chairman of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Htet Bu Phe and adopted in the refugee camps run by the KNPP. The Kayan complain that the new alphabets represent a form of Kayah hegemony or "Kayafication" and prefer the old alphabet created by the missionaries (Kubo 2014).[4] Pascal Khoo Thwe (2003) mentions that the Italian Catholic missionaries created the Padaung alphabet (Khoo Thwe 2003: 9).

The name 'giraffe women' appears to be an entirely Western colonial-era invention. The early Italian missionaries did not call the Kayan women 'giraffe women'. The term 'giraffe women' was popularised particularly

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[2]   The word 'Geku' in the literature is also spelled as Gekhu, Ghekhu or Keku.
[3]   There are different lists of the languages with a variety of spellings. This list originates from a Burmese language book by U Kyaw Than, 2009.
[4]   Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) split from KNPP and mainly comprises Kayan, who criticize the "Kayah-centric KNPP" (Kubo 2014).

through the colonial exotification, when the British circuses exhibited the 'giraffe women' for public entertainment.

2. Background and Earlier Narratives

James George Scott and Percy Hardiman (1900) were among the first British colonial officials exploring the present Karenni/Kayah State. Their *Gazetteer* has remained a classic work as it is among the first ones describing the ethnic diversity of Burma/Myanmar. At the same time, the text is a prime example of the colonial racialisation, a tradition that still tends to dominate even contemporary studies. They used the name Padaung but as an alternative presented also the term Kekawngdu[5]. They also claim to have 'discovered' that there were actually two different groups of Padaungs: *Padaung proper* and the *Keku Padaung*, the latter born into mixed marriages of Keku Karens and Padaungs. The *Padaung proper* allegedly call themselves Kekawngdu and explain that they have migrated from the south. (Scott & Hardiman 1900: 536).

Scott and Hardiman (1900) were the first Westerners describing the Padaung women: "They wear a neck band of brass rod, which varies from five to 25 coils according to the age of the woman." According to Scott and Hardiman, the appearance of a Padaung woman with her small head, long brass bound neck and sloping shoulders "inevitably suggests a champagne bottle" (Scott & Hardiman 1900: 537).

Other early narratives from the region originate from the Italian missionaries. The Italian Pontifical Institute of Foreign Missions (*Pontificium Institutum Missionum Exterarum – PIME*) founded in Milan Italy (1850) was active in British India and Burma. Italian missionaries called the local population *cariani*. According to Piero Gheddo (2007), the missionaries started to develop Latin alphabet to the Karen languages (Gheddo 2007: 23). The Catechism was translated into 'Padaung' in 1911 (Gheddo 2007: 73).

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[5]   Scott and Hardiman, 1900, p. 535.

Padre Rocco Tornatore reportedly visited "his Padaung" parishioners (*i suoi padaung*) in 1886 during the Third Anglo-Burmese War feeling assured that the British were going to win the war and all the priests would be able to stay (Gheddo 2007: 75).

Paolo Manna (1872–1952) published the first ever anthropological study about the Padaung calling them 'Ghekhu' (*I Ghekhu – Una tribu cariana della Birmania Orientale*") in 1902 (Gheddo 2007: 98 *fn* 7).

The first missionary to reside in Loikaw was another Italian priest, Padre Bartolomeo Peano, who has described his life and visits to the Padaung in Pekhon (Gheddo 2007: 207–208). The Padaung author Pascal Khoo Thwe (2003) describes how an Italian missionary, Padre Carlo, who actually was on his way to China, was captured by Pascal Khoo Thwe's grandfather. After some confusion, he was asked to stay in the village for the rest of his life and he "in due course converted the whole village to Catholicism" (Khoo Thwe 2003: 25).

British military recruiter Major C. M Enriquez (1933) travelled across Burma in search of soldiers for the British Indian army. The Padaung men impressed him 'most favourably' and he described them as "sturdy, industrious and cheery". He bases much of his information on James George Scott's book *Burma. A Handbook of Practical Commercial and Political Information* from 1906. Enriquez, guided by his belief in the ideology of 'martial races', praised the Padaung as "the best of all the hill races in this neighbourhood". He described the Padaung women as "being known for wearing high metal collars which help them develop long necks and deform themselves in the process" (Enriquez 1933: 72).

Otherwise, surprisingly little was written about the Kayan women during the colonial era, probably due to the fact that present-day Karenni/ Kayah State was treated as a nominally independent protectorate of Britain and it was not directly linked to the other areas of the British-ruled Frontier Areas.

The present Karenni State was divided into small principalities led by petty princes who mimicked the more powerful Shan princes or *saophas*

and called themselves *sawphyas*.[6] The British government recognized and guaranteed the nominal independence of the Karenni States in a treaty with the Burmese king from 1875, by which both parties recognized the area as belonging neither to the Burmese nor to the British. Consequently, the Karenni States were never fully incorporated into British Burma. The Karenni States were ultimately recognized as tributaries to British Burma in 1892, when their rulers agreed to accept a stipend from the British government.

The independence movement led by Aung San persuaded the Karenni chiefs to join the new state in the making. The hastily drafted constitution of Burma from 1947 summarises the dilemma faced by the new state: "The territories that were heretofore known as the Karenni States, *viz*. Kantarawaddy, Bawlake and Kyebogyi shall form a constituent unit of the Union of Burma and be hereafter known as the Karenni State" (Constitution of the Union of Burma 1947, Chapter 1; 7).

Kayan women became known as 'giraffe women' during the British colonial era and some women were taken to Europe to be exhibited in various 'freak shows'. Pascal Khoo Thwe describes how in 1936 a "white man turned up in Pekhon in the company of some Indians from Loikaw". He invited two elderly ladies with some of their friends along their husbands to go to England. Nobody had any idea what the purpose of the invitation was but the Italian priest had been 'vehemently' against their plans. The ladies were taken to London with *Bertram Mills Circus* and exhibited as 'freaks' (Khoo Thwe 2003: 28). The Kayan women thus became objects of the colonial gaze, which some scholars argue still continues in the tourist camps at the Thai-Myanmar border.

After having been paraded in the circuses of Europe, it is hardly surprising that the Kayan women felt 'camera shy', when the Danish adventurer and journalist Jørgen Bitsch visited them in Burma in the late

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[6]   See Edmund Leach (1954) on similar influences the Shan had on the Kachin social organizing. James C. Scott (2009) continues the discourse on how highlanders mimicked the political system of "what they conceived to be the Shan and Burman models" (Scott, 2009, p. 122).

1950s. He had heard the wildest stories about the Kayan women from a Burmese business man in Singapore. The Padaung that time had a fierce reputation and the business man even claimed that the Padaung had been, until recent years, nomadic head-hunters, who had killed one of his uncles. (Bitsch 1964: 7–8).

The book by Jørgen Bitsch, published in 1963 in Danish *Hvorfor smiler Buddha* (Eng. transl. *Why Buddha Smiles*, 1966), was one of the first books after the colonial era producing photos of the Padaung people. His first observations of the Padaung women took place in Mong Pai in the Shan State, where he noticed that the women seemed to carefully evade his cameras. (Bitsch 1964: 75). Bitsch finally succeeded in meeting the evasive Padaung ladies, who greeted him with a friendly smile and by sticking out the tongue, which his interpreter explained was the way to show friendship among the Padaung (Bitsch 1964: 90).

3. Contemporary discourses on the Kayan

The population of Kayan people is approximately 100 000 in Shan and Kayah States of Myanmar. Some 60 000 Kayan people live in southern-most region of Shan State in Pekhon settlements and about 40 000 people in Kayah State in Pan Pet settlements, close to the of Shan State.

The settlement of Kayan people in Thailand started in 1983 from the village of Lay Mile from Kayah State into Huay Pu Long camp near the Thai border. At that time, tourists from Thailand crossed the border from Mae Hong Son to see them at the camp. Gradually many people fled to the border of Thailand when the military offensive was intensified after the failed democracy uprising in 1988. At first, six Kayan households moved into a camp previously called Nam Pin Din (present Huay Pu Keng) in Mae Hong Son in 1989. Kayan people went to settle in many places as far as Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai. Most of the Kayan people in the camps of Thailand originate from nine villages of Kayah State (Khon Eden Phan 2004: 128).

4. Why do you wear the coils?

The traditional explanations for wearing the brass coils are repeated by several observers from Jørgen Bitsch (1964) to U Min Naing (2000: 140) and Pascal Khoo Thwe (2003: 18–19). The reasons allegedly are; to imitate the Mother Dragon of the Kayan tribe; to distinguish themselves from other races as an identity marker; to protect the women from being kidnapped by other tribes; and to protect them against the attacks from wild beasts such as tigers in the jungle.

Martin Smith (1991) suggested one more reason for the coils; the lowlanders have traditionally raided the highlanders as slaves to work in rice fields and construction in the kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia. The Kayan women's brass coils similarly to the Chin women's facial tattoos allegedly helped to distinguish the groups from lowlanders to "prevent abductions" (Smith 1991: 32).

Interestingly, the Kayan women themselves barely mention these reasons repeated by the scholars. Most of the women interviewed could not explain the purpose of wearing brass coils and most presented personal reasons for wearing the coils. Only one person mentioned that it was to protect the women from being kidnapped. The four main reasons for wearing the coils presented by the Kayan women were: the market value in the brass coils; peer pressure; beauty; and preserving the tradition.

The most important reason for wearing the brass coils appears to be the material and spiritual value in the coils. The brass is a sign of wealth and shows that property has been inherited from generation to generation. In the Kayan society, like in many traditional Asian societies, often only boys are educated. Therefore, most men in the Kayan villages could speak Burmese whereas the women at the same age and the same social status could not necessarily understand Burmese[7]. The only option for a woman to improve her life was to find an educated affluent husband. About six decades ago, a girl wearing brass coils was regarded as an excellent match.

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[7]   Personal observations by Ms. Maynadi Kyaw on 16th and 17th January, 2017.

To marry a woman with brass coils and a long neck, the young man would have to pay a considerably large amount of dowry to the bride and her family. Mu Dee[8] (55) from Yway Kan Plow village proudly pointed out that her husband had to give a dowry of one buffalo, one hunting-gun, and three rice paddy fields to her family because of her long brass coils. Another woman explained that she received two silver coins as dowry because of her brass coils.

U Maung Thaike[9] (54) from Hanbu village points out that although his mother wore the brass coils, his sisters have never worn them as the price of brass became very high. Women who used to wear the brass coils started to sell them for money. His own mother was one of them.

Jørgen Bitsch (1964) arrived into a similar conclusion: the longer the neck the higher the price of the bride at the matchmaking market. He repeated another popular myth, how a punishment for a woman, who has been unfaithful to her husband, was to lose her coils. Without the coils, she would not be able to keep her head upright and would die (Bitsch 1964: 78). Pascal Khoo Thwe (2003) contradicts the story by telling about his grandmother, who took off her coils after which "it took her a couple of days before she could support her head" (Khoo Thwe 2003: 19). When it comes to the power of sexes, the old village headman Ahu Ho Gong, pointed out to Bitsch, that no man can be the boss of the women; "the women do what they want to". This tempted Bitsch to speculate whether the group had been matriarchal until after a fierce battle, where many men were lost, polygamy was introduced (Bitsch 1964: 78)[10].

Three other important reasons given by the interviewees for wearing the coils are: peer-pressure, beauty, and preserving tradition. Most women who have been wearing the brass coils explained that they started wearing the coils because of peer-pressure, whereas some women admitted that it

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[8]   Interview 16th Jan., 2017.
[9]   Interview 17th Jan., 2017.
[10]   There appears to be no confirmation to this speculation in the literature, even if even Scott & Hardiman give an impression that matrilocality was practiced to certain extent (1900: 537).

was more for the beauty purposes.[11] When Mu Dee[12] and Mu Kle (74)[13] were young in their village in Pekhon, they said all the women in the village wore the brass-coils. The number of women Mu Dee recalled wearing the coils was about sixty. She wanted to wear them too because other girls of her age were wearing them. Mu Kle said they looked so beautiful that she wanted to look like them. She sold her brass coils six years ago when she moved into a new village, where no one practised the tradition. However, she still finds the brass coils very pretty and she wants to wear them again if there is a chance. Another woman, Mu Ka Lei (60)[14] from Yanku village explained that she also wanted to wear the coils when she saw many women wearing them when she was young. Her parents also wanted to pass the tradition on to her and her sisters.

The Kayan women, who have been in the tourist camps in Thailand, have learned to appreciate the unique cultural value of the brass coils, when encountering tourists whose primary reason to visit them is to see and photograph the Kayan women with their coils.

Mu Mee (66)[15] recently came back from Chiang Rai in Thailand, and emphasised that she wanted the younger generations to continue the tradition regardless of modern times and values. Ma Thein (40)[16] from old Pan Pet village in Deemawso confessed that she only started wearing the coils recently as more tourists started to arrive in her village. The village now promotes local tourism and, hence, the idea of preserving the tradition originates from the Kayan women who have recently returned from Thailand.

Most of the women interviewed emphasised that they were wearing the coils predominantly for personal reasons in order to preserve the unique tradition to the future generations.

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[11] This line of thought is well narrated in a 2012 film "Kayan Beauties" by director Aung Ko Latt.

[12] Interview 16th Jan., 2017.

[13] Interview 17th Jan., 2017.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Interview 18th Jan., 2017.

[16] Interview 13th Dec., 2016.

5. Why do you not wear the coils?

Jørgen Bitsch (1964) in his book notes that the tradition of wearing the brass coils is disappearing. Kayan women's tradition is at a critical stage as the numbers of women who choose to practice the tradition of wearing brass coils has declined. In this part of the study, we will focus on the decline and the revival of the tradition. Our interviews with the Kayan informants indicate that the decline in the tradition is determined by a variety of both external and internal factors.

Martin Smith (1991) gives an example of an external factor when the armed wing of the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP)[17] openly discouraged the custom of Kayan women to elongate their necks with the brass coils. This was allegedly for security reasons in the battle with the Myanmar army. According to Smith, fewer than 100 women continued the tradition (Smith 1991: 353–4).

Other external factors include Roman Catholic missionary proselytising in Burma. Kayan women gradually abandoned their traditional customs as they converted into Christianity. What disturbed the missionaries was probably not the brass-coils as such but the animistic rituals connected with the tradition. Scott and Hardiman (1900) also pointed out that "some of the women who have been converted to Christianity have been induced to lay aside the brass coil necklace" (Scott & Hardiman 1900: 537).

U Maung Thaike[18] mentioned hearing a story about a whole village converting into Christianity after Catholic missionaries had cured people who were suffering from small pox in 1885–1890. The number of the women wearing the coil has continued to further radically decline: there were about eight women with brass coils in the 1970s in his village, but the number was reduced to half by 1980s. Among the villages of Pekhon settlements, most villages converted into Christianity and an architecturally

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[17]   KNLP was established in 1964 and was led for two decades by a Rangoon University student Shwe Aye (a k a Nyaint Lu Tha). Smith, 1991, p. 353.

[18]   Interview 17th Jan., 2017.

magnificent Catholic Church dominates the centre of a village amongst the modest bamboo huts.

Another important external factor has been the education provided by the central government of Myanmar in the villages. After the seventh grade in their own village, the students have to travel to a faraway city and stay either in dormitories or with relatives. Mu Thone (60)[19] from new Pan Pet settlement said her granddaughter only wears brass coils when she is on holiday as she is shy to wear them at school. Htoo Yin (56)[20], a college graduate, added that she never thought of wearing brass coils because she wanted to go to school. She went to a Karen Baptist school in Yangon and now works as a kindergarten teacher in a Kayan village. The tradition of wearing brass coils is regarded as 'outdated' and a hindrance for the pursuit of 'modernity'. According to Khon Eden Phan, wearing brass coils in Myanmar is gradually declining, as it is simply "incompatible with current social trends". (Khon Eden Phan 2004: 124).

There are several internal factors for the women to abandon or entirely reject the brass coils. The reasons presented by the interviewees include the idea of an 'outdated' tradition; prioritising education; lack of peer-pressure; discomfort and inconvenience of the practice; and the rising cost of the brass coils.

Young women who have never even considered wearing the coils explained that the practice is a 'thing from the past' and has no appropriate value in modern society. Ma Win (21)[21] and Khin Hnin Htet (20)[22] also pointed out the lack of peer pressure. They never considered wearing the coils because there was no one around them wearing the coils and they wanted to go to school. Ma Win finished the ninth grade away from home in Aungban, Shan State and Khin Hnin Htet finished the seventh grade in her own Yanku village. Katarina (60)[23] from Hanbu village also

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[19]　Interview 18th Jan., 2017.
[20]　Interview 13th Dec., 2016.
[21]　Interview 16th Jan., 2017.
[22]　Interview 17th Jan., 2017.
[23]　Ibid.

argued that wearing brass coils is 'outdated' and cannot comply with present modern society.

Another reason for the decline in the practice is the rising price of the brass. Some women took their coils off to sell the brass and some cannot even afford to buy brass. U Maung Thaike[24] explained that his sisters have never worn the brass coils because the brass became too expensive. Only the people with high income can invest in the brass coils and are able to adorn themselves with silver and brass coins on necks, hands and legs. His mother reduced the rings of the brass coils by selling some of them. The brass sold was used in making hunting guns. In Yway Kan Plow village, Mu Kle[25] also sold her brass coils six years ago to a village gun maker when she needed money, although she still thinks that the coils make a woman pretty.

In the interviews conducted in Pekhon settlements, four out of eight interviewees had worn brass coils but had taken them off. Some women confessed that they decided to take them off due to discomfort and pain resulting from wearing them whereas some explained that they were lazy to polish the brass rings. In Pekhon settlements, three out of eight interviewees explained that they had to take off the coils after giving birth. It was not comfortable to take care of the baby or engage in household chores while wearing the coils. The three women explained that they felt happier because they could move more freely and no longer had the trouble of polishing them. Mu Dee[26] added that she had a hard time taking a bath, and it was cumbersome to pay respect to Buddha when she had the coils on her neck. Mu Nay (56)[27] confessed that the rings were unbearably heavy and were a burden when working on the farm and taking care of her children, so she felt happier and more comfortable without her rings.

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[24] Interview 17th Jan., 2017.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Interview 16th Jan., 2017.

[27] Ibid.

6. Revitalizing the tradition – or becoming victims
in a 'human Zoo'?

The impact of tourism on the tradition is visible when two areas, with a frequent contact with tourists and an area without, are compared. In Myanmar, the villages in Pekhon settlement are off the tourist track because they are on the mountains far away from the city. People live in very isolated areas even far away from the neighbouring Kayan villages. However, the villages in Kayah (Karenni) State are only an hour away from the capital city Loikaw, and are easily accessed by car. The villages in Pekhon area are only accessible by motorbike and it takes three to four hours to reach the nearest village[28]. The villages of Pan Pet settlements in Kayah State have visitors who are interested in the Kayans, whereas neither domestic nor foreign visitors go to Pekhon settlements of Shan State. Another place mentioned in this study is the tourist camp in Mae Hong Son, Thailand, in which Kayan women host the tourists and display their handicrafts.

The tourist industry in Mae Hong Son has had a positive impact on the Kayan women in terms of encouraging them to preserve their cultural traditions. Amongst the three main villages discussed in this study: Pekhon, Pan Pet, and Mae Hong Son, the highest number of women wearing brass coils is in the Thai camp in Mae Hong Son. The Canadian professor Philip Dearden (1991) points out that "Tourism, specifically various forms of small-scale, indigenous tourism, can play a role in sustainable development in certain situations. Cultures of ethnic minorities and even dominant societies can be revitalized by the awareness that outsiders find their dress, ceremonies and way of life to be interesting. Outside interest may well stimulate certain pride in ethnic identity rather than lead to total assimilation" (Dearden 1991: 7, 9).

Contrary to the popular belief that having contacts with the outside culture can lead to a loss of one's own culture, Kayan women in tourist camps seem to take pride in their practice. A woman from a tourist village

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[28]   Personal observation by Ms. Maynadi Kyaw when travelling in the region.

of Inle Lake and three interviewees from Huay Pu Kaeng village in Mae Hong Son explained that they were determined to wear the brass coils "until the last day of their life"[29]. Ma Pan (33), Ma Mu Thae (32) and Ma Mu Buu (39) all emphasised that they wanted to preserve their unique cultural tradition because it is in serious decline. Furthermore, they admitted that tourists only came to see them because of their tradition of wearing brass coils.[30]

Another important impact of tourism is that it generates a stable income for the hosts compared to agriculture. Women who have experienced living in Thai tourist camps, or are still in the camps, admitted that they lived very comfortably with the income from tourists and can afford to "stay in the shade". Five out of seven women interviewed in the Pan Pet settlement near Loikaw, have returned from the Thai tourist camps. The returnees with their experience in tourism industry brought the idea of cultural tourism to their hometown by establishing a site where the domestic and foreign visitors can come and see them. They engage in the same activities as in the tourist sites in Thailand like singing, weaving traditional scarfs, and displaying souvenirs while wearing their traditional costumes. Many women have returned from Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai in Thailand or the border town of Ruili in China to Muse in the Shan State, Myanmar.

Many Kayan women from Pan Pet villages who had gone to Thailand, were not necessarily refugees or victims of war, as they did not move to Thailand during a period of intense fighting. Rather, they were economic migrants in search of better opportunities. The women themselves explained that the main reasons for moving to Thailand were economic and educational opportunities. They usually went with relatives who were already in the tourist villages or were working elsewhere in Thailand. Mu Thone (59)[31] went to Thailand when her cousin married a Thai man and encouraged her to come and sell handicrafts to tourists. She went to Chiang Mai for two months selling handicrafts and posing for the tourists.

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[29] Interview with Moe Kayar 16th Dec., 2016.
[30] Interview 15th Feb., 2017.
[31] Interview 18th Jan., 2017.

Figure 1. Maynadi Kyaw with a Kayan lady, August 2014

However, she came back, as she did not like the situation where she was not allowed to travel freely to visit relatives living in other villages.

Mu Li (47)[32] lived in Thailand for ten years, and the main reason for her to go to Thailand was to earn enough money to support her children's education. She proudly pointed out that she was able to see all her children to complete their studies with the income she earned from the tourist village. One of her daughters still lives in a Thai camp and one goes to the university in Yangon. She came back because her children were now economically independent and could support themselves. All the women who had gone to tourist villages of Thailand and China emphasised that they earned a high stable income and lived a comfortable life with running water and electricity supported by solar panels.

Three women interviewed in Huay Pu Kaeng village in Mae Hong Son explained that they had no intention of going back to Myanmar because they felt that Huay Pu Kaeng was their home. Ma Pan[33] first

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[32] Interview 18th Jan., 2017.
[33] Interview 15th Feb., 2017.

moved to a refugee camp when she was six years old, as her family escaped from a conflict in their village in Kayah State. Since then, she has never been back and does not remember much of her birthplace. Her mother, sister and her own family of four now live in the village and she feels that their life is comfortable in Thailand. The more tourists come to visit them, the easier their life is. Two other women, Ma Mu Thae and Ma Mu Buu,[34] also admitted that they rarely visit Kayah State as it is a costly long trip. However, Ma Mu Thae has gone back twice during the Kayan New Year festival in April whereas Ma Mu Buu and Ma Pan have never been back[35].

There are some extremely negative perceptions regarding the tourist villages displaying Kayan women. Some scholars and human rights activists have termed the tourist sites 'human zoos' as they display humans in a confined area, inviting the foreign gaze. American journalist Seth Mydans (1996) wrote an article in the *New York Times* with the rather condemning head-line "New Thai Tourist Sight: Burmese 'Giraffe Women'". In the article, he admitted that the Padaung women themselves were actually quite happy in the tourist village and were earning easy money. In 1996, when the article was written, there was a controversy about the villages, as Thai tour companies created competing settlements to attract foreign tourists. One tour operator had 'lured' 12 women from a refugee camp to a new settlement, where he then charged the visitors 12 USD to view the women (Mydans, October 19th 1996). Pascal Khoo Thwe (2002) condemns the tourist camps after returning for the first time from the United Kingdom to Mae Sariang at the Thai border. Scholars like Alexander Trupp (2011) and Jessica Theurer (2014) also condemn this type of ethnic tourism and point out that the Kayan women have become victims of 'othering' (Trupp 2011: 139) and 'hostages' in the camps (Theurer 2014: 56). A more recent work by Phone Myint Oo (2018) condemns the "Commoditization of Culture in an Ethnic Community". The study is based on his visits to the villages in 2008 and interviews with Kayan men (Phone Myint Oo 2018: 18–19).

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[34] Interview 15th Feb., 2017.

[35] Ibid.

Figure 2. Kayan Padaung lady in the tourist village in Mae Hong Son,
Thailand, December 2014

Contrary to the narrative about the 'human zoos', the Kayan women themselves wished that more tourists would come to their village. Ma Pan from Huay Pu Kaeng village admits that she has heard about the 'human zoo' controversy but does not agree with the narrative. She pointed out that the situation had improved considerably from the times when the articles about the 'human zoos' were published. Ma Pan and other two women of Huay Pu Keng prefer more tourists to the village because their income depends on the number of tourists[36]. Kayan men now guard the village,

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[36] Interview 15th Feb., 2017.

and all households share the entrance fees collected. Foreigners have to pay 200 Thai *baht* per person, whereas Thais do not have to pay anything.[37] The income derived from the entrance fees solely depends on the number of tourists and fluctuates according to the tourist season. The highest peak of the tourist season falls on November, December and January, when each of the 40 households can earn up to 3.000–4.000 *baht*. Sometimes, individuals earn extra if they manage to sell their handicrafts and if they get small tips when posing for the photos. This business idea some Kayan women returning from Thailand have imported to the new Pan Pet village in Myanmar, where they have established a similar tourist village.

Conclusion

Scholars like Erik Cohen (1996) point out that despite the negative side-effects of tourism, it still may help preserve a cultural tradition at least to some extent (Cohen 1996: 27). Kayan women with contacts to tourism industry practice wearing the brass-coils in contrast to the women in the villages, which are isolated and far from the tourist track. However, tourism should be developed to help maximizing the profits to the Kayan people. Additionally, other economic and educational opportunities need to be granted by Myanmar and Thai authorities.

Contrary to the infamous narrative about the 'human zoos', many Kayan women themselves emphasise that tourists generate income and bring them more benefits than harm. In the traditional Kayan gender roles, women normally were engaged in the household chores, weaving, taking care of children and farming but the women feel empowered by the tourism industry, as the tourists come to see them, and not the men. Villages with domestic and international tourists are able to preserve their tradition compared to the villages with no exposure to tourism. It is obvious that in the case of Kayan, the impact of tourism can be beneficial

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[37] Personal experience visiting Huay Pu Keng, Mae Hong Son on 15th Feb., 2017. 200 Thai baht equals roughly 6 USD.

to their community, particularly if the tourist revenue is managed properly and by the Kayan women themselves.

The colonial narrative on loyal warrior-like 'martial races' and brave highlanders has shifted into the current human-rights paradigm according to which the Western nations now have the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) their former colonial objects from the present intrusive tourist gaze. Based on our numerous interviews over the years with Kayan women, we would argue that rather than being victims of a post-colonial gaze, the Kayan women have become the agents of their own performance of Kayan culture, tradition and handicraft.

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Raminta Lisauskaitė

ASIAN REFUGEE WOMEN: ADAPTING FEMALE LIFESTYLES

Introduction

By integrating Muslim immigrants coming mainly from Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Caucasus, Lithuanian society is inevitably facing cultural differences determined by values and different lifestyles deriving from completely different ethnic origin, religion, education and social status. Gender anthropology concentrates on social interactions affected by peoples' gender, identity, roles and other aspects that are overseen when looking from the general perspective. By employing anthropological approaches and ethnographical considerations of differences in values and lifestyles, this paper provides an opportunity to take a closer look at the cross-border encounters of asylum as 'engendered sphere'.

Hereby, the results of the research conducted while volunteering in two Lithuanian NGOs – "Caritas" and Lithuanian Red Cross in 3 different Lithuanian cities over the period of six months (November 2015 – April 2016) are to be presented. The research was conducted using methods like participants observation – the researcher observed and took part in the events, helped in day-to-day routines at the integration centres, where a great deal of material was gathered. Participant observation were followed by five interviews with Muslim women who had been granted asylum, the majority of whom were from Southern or Western regions of Asia: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Caucasus etc., who were living in

Lithuania for more than two years, aged 20–50. In addition, interviews were carried out with three social workers, who have a long experience in refugee integration. The interviews were aimed at obtaining a deeper understanding and knowledge of the obstacles refugee women have to overcome, their expectations and adjustment to new environment. The main goal of the research was to find out, how Muslim women adjust their Islamic lifestyles to Lithuanian society and what are the sociocultural causes thereof. By extension, it was also inquired how the women who were granted asylum construct their Islamic identities in host society, if they use adjustment strategies, and, if so, what are these strategies.

1. Muslim women in Lithuanian context

In a wider context, studies on Muslim women living in western Europe, the US, Australia or Canada is not a new research field, the examples include Van Nieuwkerk, Karin (2004) "Veils and Wooden Clogs Don't Go Together"; Kassam, Shelina (2001) "Marketing an Imagined Muslim Woman: Muslim Girl Magazine and the Politics of Race, Gender and Representation, Social Identities"; Guedes Bailey, Olga (2012) "Migrant African Women: Tales of Agency and Belonging". Muslim women who arrived and settled in western European countries as a research focus have been chosen by Synnøve K. N. Bendixsen ("The Religious Identity of Young Muslim Women in Berlin" (2013)), Parin A. Dossa ("(Re)imagining aging lives: Ethnographic narratives of Muslim women in diaspora" (1999), Indra Doreen ("Not a Room of One's Own" (1999)), and others. All the aforementioned countries have a long history of Muslim migrant reception and integration.

The Lithuanian context is worth mentioning here. Lithuania, a post-Soviet country that adopted the law on refugee status only in 1997, started their social integration programs for refugees as late as the year 2000[1]. The country has one of the lowest numbers of foreigners residing in its territory

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[1]   Žibas, K. *Lietuvoje prieglobstį gavusių užsieniečių socialinės integracijos tyrimas.* Vilnius, 2013, p. 3.

in Europe, and for many asylum seekers it is a transit country towards
Western Europe. In terms of migration, Lithuania represents the outskirts
of European Union and "due to the limited immigration, Lithuanian
society is very homogeneous, with only 1.5 percent of foreigners, the
majority of whom come from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus or other culturally
similar countries."[2] Historically, Lithuania is a predominantly Catholic
country. However, it has moderate number of other ethnic and religious
minorities, such as Russian Orthodox, Sunni Muslims – Tatars, Karaits,
and Jews. Despite the existence of historical Muslim community in
Lithuania (whose members have been living here for more than six hundred
years), Muslim migrant communities still have to face prejudice, and
need to overcome the barriers and obstacles of integrating to Lithuanian
society. To look statistically into Lithuanian asylum situation, in 2015
there were 291 applications for asylum, only 86 received positive answer,
in 2016 – 425 asylum applications and 195 positive answers, in 2017 –
599 and 293 positive decisions. Most applications in 2015 were received
from citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and Russia, in 2016 – Syria, Russia,
Afghanistan, in 2017 – Syria, Russia and Tajikistan[3].

There is a limited number of Muslim women living in the country,
the absolute majority of whom came to Lithuania with their husbands or
families. The number is changing due to the fact that for many asylum
seekers Lithuania is a transit country and people choose to leave after they
receive a residence permit and entry to Schengen zone to search for better
opportunities and due to other reasons.

Therefore, as revealed by the research, in seeking asylum in Lithuania,
Asian Muslim women have to adapt the multitude of identities to adjust
to the new settings of the host country, i.e. Lithuania. They have to re-
think, re-establish or even re-brand their religious and ethnic belonging

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2   Bruvonskis, Sønsterudbråten. Asylum, integration and irregular migration in
Lithuania. Policy and practice at the edge of the European Union. Available at https://
www.fafo.no/index.php/zoo-publikasjoner/fafo-rapporter/item/asylum-integration-
and-irregular-migration-in-lithuania (retrieved 07.03.2018).
3   European Migration Network. Migration in Numbers. Available at http://123.
emn.lt/en/#immigration (retrieved 19.01.2018).

depending on circumstances and people surrounding them, which makes the identity building situational. In addition, one has to bear in mind that identity building "implies a claim to be judged and to judge oneself, by those standards that are relevant to that identity"[4]. An important theoretical ground in an analysis of the experience of female asylees and constructed identities is the theory of intersectionality. This theory is handy when attempting to reveal a connection between socio-cultural categories and identity[5]. Women who have been granted asylum, fluctuate among several identities and categories: gender, class, ethnicity, religion, social roles. Theoretical approach of intersectionality allows looking at the situations in which one or other category or identity combinations are used[6].

Following the analysis that applied intersectionality as a theoretical approach to Asian refugee women experiences, specific strategies of adaptation to life in hosting Lithuanian society unfold. It encompasses the ways their sense of belonging is constructed, how they are adapting their Asian Muslim woman lifestyles to new cultural and religious settings, as well as how they re-establish markers of their status.

First of all, Asian Muslim women build their identity on religious grounds – commonality is constructed around what is to be called 'culturally Muslim' – arriving from countries where Muslim cultural norms prevail, whilst ethnic or national communities in hosting country are rather small. The religious identity unfolds through religious practices such as applying principles of *haram/halal* ('not permitted'/ 'permitted') or principles to follow in their everyday lives. The religious commonality for the Muslim women does not necessarily derive from religion and Islamic dogmas. This stands first and foremost as moral values guiding everyday practices and behaviour. This commonality is shared by all research participants

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[4]   Barth, F. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The social organization of culture difference. „Introduction". Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969, p. 14.

[5]   Knudsen, S. Intersectionality – A Theoretical Inspiration in the Analysis of Minority Cultures and Identities in Textbooks. In *Caught in the Web or lost in the Textbook*. The Netherlands: International Association for Research on Textbooks and Educational Media (IARTEM), 2006, p. 61.

[6]   Ibid., p. 65.

despite their country of origin or religiosity. *Haram/halal* principles are applicable to their female roles as moral woman behaviour and represents family honour: honourable behaviour implies being a good wife and a good mother. Life of women is oriented towards and defined by strict family functions. Their female roles are built with regard to husband and family, which results in acting according to certain values, 'a code of conduct', such as the principle of 'no handshake nor touching of the opposite sex':

> *Every woman should behave according to her situation, religion, social status – honourable, decent, according to her possibility. Such are the things and for our women life is a little bit harder. Yet we are used to all that and this becomes a habit and you cannot do anything about it.*
> (Chechen)

In addition, Asian Muslim women roles, identity and lifestyle in host society are expressed through a certain dress code. Female dress is an identification marker or tool, either to stress the religious identity and status or to distinguish oneself from other groups:

> *Previously I wore a headscarf, where my hair and ears and forehead could be seen, I was mistaken for Roma.*
> (Chechen)

Other dress practices are also applied, such as the prohibition to wear trousers, which is considered an indecent behaviour:

> *– And even young women do not wear them?*
> *– No no, this is not allowed, if young woman will wear trousers, then she will be held 'bad'.*
> (Chechen)

> *Women wear headscarves, not very open clothes, to look decent, non-vulgar. Not to draw attention. To be covered, including head.*
> (Chechen)

Dressing practices are applied in different societal environments to upkeep the predefined moral values that are followed and, in some cases, imposed by the community members. The most important rule, according to the informants, is 'not to stand out from the crowd'. One should not

draw attention to oneself, as that is perceived a 'sin'. Following certain dress code requirements also represents the honour of the community, the member of which a certain woman is.

Headwear of Muslim women is a highly debated topic not only in hosting societies, but also among Muslim women themselves. By coming to a new, non-Muslim environment, women have to rethink their identity markers. More precisely, they have to consider whether they really want to stress their religious identity or ethnic identity by wearing a headscarf or hijab, which might make women noticeable or even a target of hate, stigmatisation and discrimination. As noted by one of the informants, "to wear a hijab is not an easy decision" (Chechen). Some of the Asian Muslim women have decided not to wear any headwear after coming to Europe or Lithuania in particular, as there are very few Muslim women wearing a headwear here and this sometimes causes negative reactions.

Through dress and behavioural practices, Muslim women also build distinction, expressing or stressing one element of identity over the other: ethnic versus religious identity. Additionally, the construction of identity is inseparable from practices such as negotiation of belonging in terms of 'we' / 'them' notions ("we, the Afghans and them the 'Arabs' etc.", or Chechens versus Afghans/Arabs etc.). A clear distinction between religion and tradition exists. While religion is a unifying factor, tradition is a differentiating factor:

> Only religion is unifying Afghans, Chechens, Arabs, all the other things differ.
> (Chechen)

Muslim women belonging is also being constantly negotiated spatially by using the distinctions such as 'home', 'one's own' or feeling 'local' at some place:

> When I went to Chechnya, I have always thought, 'when I will come back 'home'. I don't know, my 'home' is kind of there, but it's good to go there, to visit there, to see around, but I am attracted to some completely other place (i.e. Lithuania – R. L.)
> (Chechen)

The notion of 'home' is always perceived dialogically with the location the informants are living in, as well as their wellbeing in that place. Different romantic and emotional epithets are attached to the perception of 'home' – be that the country of origin or the country of reception. 'Home' is where informants want to return to, 'home' is something they miss after leaving the country. Hosting country becomes 'home' depending on the time spent in the country and the warmth of the climate, as well as personal experience in that country.

2. Belonging and transnationalism

Spatial belonging also goes beyond the directions associated with the country of origin or the country of reception. Belonging in most of the cases is transnational in a form of social ties among family members and countrymen living in different European and non-European countries. The research revealed the importance of these ties and transnational belonging.

Belonging is transnational, when it crosses borders: social ties are being transported and migrant people become community boarder carriers: first, familial, then ethnic, then – national. These transnational belonging practices play important role in problem solving, helping, controlling, asking for advice, taking over the experience, earning reputation etc. This involves and connects people transnationally: first of all, relatives, then ethnic or national community.

> *Every Afghan here or in other European countries, or in Afghanistan have their relatives, who tell one (if one does not know), how to do something. One seeks an advice from their acquaintances. You see, here lies a tradition and trust like this. It doesn't matter how old I am; if someone is older than me, it doesn't matter how much knowledge I have, I will always ask an elder, will it be my father or uncle, or someone else, even if s/he lives far away from me, I will call him/her anyway and will ask for advice, for his/her opinion.*
> (Afghan)

In this manner, they belong not only to local communities but also to transnational ethnic communities. For people whose bond is not so

strong with hosting society, building transnational bonds is easier and quicker. Also, it is easier to terminate them. In some cases, being part of transnational ethnic community is the only way of belonging to ethnic community at all, especially in the places where these communities are rather small.

3. Adapting to new environment

In order to adapt to the new environment, society, new lifestyle and norms, in addition to having to overcome stress leaving one's own home, one must also deal with the negative attitude of a receiving country. In a country, where cultural diversity is not common and considered easy to adapt to, cultural closure is inherent and directed toward 'different looking' migrants.

The sociological research of Lithuanian society shows that Chechens, Muslims and refugees in general are among the group of people, against which the most notable social distancing occurs. Since the majority of refugees in Lithuania are Muslims (Chechens, Afghans, Africans etc.), they are the most likely to face hostility of the receiving society[7]. The environment in hosting (Lithuanian) society is hostile, according to Muslim women I spoke with. Almost all of them spoke about being bullied because of their religious practices, or clothing, or in most of the cases – because of wearing a hijab.

> *During Ramadan, I always wear hijab, I cannot wear it all the time, but for one month, I wear it. During that month, I got in the bus and all passengers got out of the bus on the very next stop. The bus driver stopped the bus and said to me in English "you disturb people", I said in Lithuanian: "I am Lithuanian" and paid no attention to that.*
> (Afghan)

Asian refugee women are trying to 'smoothen' their transition from society of their country of origin to host society. In order to do that, they

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7   Žibas, K. *Lietuvoje prieglobstį gavusių užsieniečių socialinės integracijos tyrimas*. Vilnius, 2013, pp. 17–18.

use adaption techniques. Firstly, to overcome the lack of goods and services they are used to in their original environment, which are of religious/cultural nature. The adaption takes place on several levels. This applies to adapting consumption practices such as food (halal meat and other products), as well as celebration of religious festivals.

> *If there is no halal meat, I buy chicken or beef from a supermarket.*
> (Chechen)

The second major reason for Asian Muslim women to adapt to new surroundings is the experience of discriminated practices in hostile intolerant environment of Lithuanian society. The spheres where they are discriminated against the most are employment and housing.

> *If you live in a country, where there are few Muslims and you have to work, it is complicated. Nevertheless, I try to keep going and don't forget my fate.*
> (Afghan)

> *There was a family from Iraq. When they first arrived to Lithuania and went out with hijabs, people would spit on them and throw garbage at them, because the woman was covered, then the woman took the hijab off.*
> (the same informant?)

Muslim women rethink their 'new' identity very dialogically, i.e. with regard to the relationship between themselves and hosting society after coming to different environment. Especially if it is a country where the majority of people are of different faith, different traditions and different culture. As a result of experiencing a shift of identity or certain negative encounters, Muslim women are adapting their dress-code to new, Christian majority environment:

> *when coming to Europe, my husband told me to take off my hijab and put on jeans. When I first time went outside in jeans, I felt naked.*
> (Dagestani)

The adaption techniques women use are situational – dependant on certain circumstances. Women choose different adaption techniques in

order to find job, to find a place to live or join the social life. It is also clearly divided between public and private spheres. It is important to note that life-spheres as well as roles are strictly segregated between woman/man spheres. Important role is played by what is called 'community policing'[8], when community members follow the 'decency' and honour of women of their own community. The main principle women follow in trying to adapt to new environment is 'not to stand out from a crowd' and 'not to draw attention to herself'. This is applicable in both, dressing as well as religious practices, such as adapting local food and eating habits to haram/halal principles. In words of one of the informants, "you have to close your eyes against many things here".

The adaption practices of Asian refugee women in host society can be differentiated by using Hirschman's theory of *exit*, *loyalty* and *voice*[9](Hirschman, 1970), as well as C. Kinnvall & P. Nesbitt-Larking[10] models of identity and adapting – retreatism (superficial engagement into receiving society, silent discontent, no direct voicing of complaints), essentialism (own perspectives and raising of values beyond other's, shutting off in own's circle from 'alien' (accepting country) culture, religion), and engagement (connection of two cultures, dialogue)[11].

Women living in intolerant environment, having experienced discrimination at work place, on the streets, in institutions, are expressing their discontent and grievances by using the voice or essentialism strategy. They express their discriminatory experiences using certain narratives. Women also choose to whom they express their experiences and grievances. They themselves explain the discriminatory practices of Lithuanian society as driven by stereotypes and biases such as 'all the Muslims are terrorists', or those stemming from an image of being a representative of

[8]   Bendixsen, S. The Religious Identity of Young Muslim Women in Berlin. An Ethnographic Study. *BRILL: Muslim minorities,* Vol. 14., Leiden, 2013, p. 245.

[9]   Hirschman, A. O. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

[10]   Kinnvall, C., Nesbitt-Larking, P. *The Political Psychology of Globalization. Muslims in the West.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

[11]   Ibid., pp. 27, 63, 73.

'underdeveloped', 'third world' country etc. The reactions, according to the informants, were caused by the appearance – skin colour, clothing and headwear, and by everyday practices that differ from the local ones. The feelings that women are experiencing because of discriminatory practices are disappointment, frustration and despair, as they are cut from basic resources and needs. Namely, a chance to get a job, accommodation or to establish social ties with receiving society. Their response to this situation is expression of 'quiet discontent' and closure to the secure circle of in-group, people with the same experience and the same problems. That way, the interaction with hosting society is reduced to no or limited inclusion into Lithuanian society.

Another practice Asian women use to adapt to local society is a dialogue – to negotiate or to discipline those who are expressing negative attitudes towards the 'different looking', the 'Other'. According to the informants, the language is the most important asset in establishing the dialogue with hosting society. Language is a way for Asian Muslim women to communicate their needs, values and to defend their position. Dialogue, the important condition of which is the language understandable to both parties, helps to reduce the tension between the sides. It helps in negotiating their rights, equality, seeking job position and even changing the public opinion on migrants. Some Muslim women are engaged and willing to participate in sociocultural life, but in order to do that, they have to make concessions, compromises. In other words, to smoothen or to adapt their stance regarding religion, ethnicity, tradition, they feel a need to adapt and not to 'fall out' from a local context: "you need to get used to things", "you need to explain to people" etc. This way they express their principle of not attracting attention to themselves, as well as avoiding the unnecessary attention and conflict. Accofrding to Hirschman[12] and Kinnval & Nesbitt-Larking[13], these Asian Muslim women use loyalty or

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[12] Hirschman, A. O. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 18.

[13] Kinnvall, C., Nesbitt-Larking, P. *The Political Psychology of Globalization. Muslims in the West.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 73.

engagement strategy. The women showed their will and ability to adapt their religious practices in certain circumstances:

> *If I don't have a place to pray five times a day, I pray once in the morning and then four times in the evening, Allah will forgive.*
> (Chechen)

Asian Muslim women have to switch between their different identities – their religious and familial duties in different situations, while trying to build commonality and avoid exclusivity within the host Lithuanian society.

A significant part of Asian Muslim women living in Lithuania are avoiding the dialogue and the contact with the host society, consciously or subconsciously. These women live in a state of temporality and use retreatism or exit strategy. They rather choose to live in the position 'in between' – between their country of origin and projected place of better living conditions, or so called 'state of limbo' – neither here, nor there. The experience, social climate, and psychological state make them feel or choose to live in a state of indifference and temporary residence. These women retreat to safe circle of people of the same nationality, the same religion and the same destiny. They remain indifferent to any efforts to include them into the host society: they do not try to learn the local language or find a job, or in most cases, these women imitate these processes of learning or searching. Cultural disorientation is characteristic to them: they look at the surrounding environment, the processes around them through the lens of their own culture, and have a short-term view towards their future. This invisibility strategy of the existence in the hosting society or this adaptation technique of Muslim women might be temporal. It is also common for women who have recently arrived to the country and have yet to learn the language, learn to orient themselves in the new surroundings, gain the competence of the new culture.

> *It seems that these women, living in the state of temporality, choose to silence their will, need, expectations and even ability to deal with their own destiny.*
> (Fieldnotes)

Some of these women choose to retreat and leave the host country. The reasons for that might be inability to adapt to new environment, hostile and unwelcoming atmosphere, fear, financial struggles to survive or even post-traumatic stress.

Conclusion

The research on Asian Muslim women's adaption to host society: techniques, changing lifestyles and sociocultural reasons thereof showed the multitude of intersecting identities the interviewed female participants use to change, remake and adapt their everyday practices in order to make their living in hosting Lithuanian society. To be a part of Lithuanian society, Muslim women have to tone down their religious and ethnic 'markers', and sometimes even to sacrifice or adjust their usual practices to culturally and traditionally different environment. These women construct their belonging around different sociocultural categories: race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, womanhood, familial role. At the same time, they build transnational belonging through transnational bonds, relating families, relatives, friends and countrymen around the globe. Belonging practices of Asian Muslim women are expressed by dress and headwear as well as behaviour practices led by culturally inherent religious norms. By living in hostile environment, Muslim women have to adapt their lifestyles to new societal norms and they choose between three different strategies depending on situation: expressing their discontent, 'tattling'; engaging and taking part in the sociocultural life of host society, building a dialogue and communicating with host society or living in the state of temporality/transition and even leaving the host country. These three ways of behaving in new circumstances can be paralleled with Hirschman and Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking (that correlate with each other) adjustment models: voice or expression of discontent, closure or essentialism; loyalty, dialogue or engagement and retreatism or exit. Asian Muslim women living in Lithuania tend to choose several of these strategies or gradually switch from one strategy to another according to situation.

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Evgeniia Drozhashchikh

SPACE RACE 2.0. SHIFTING TO ASIA

Introduction

The 21st century is the era characterized with the shift of key political, economic and social activity centres to Asia. If the world we have recently lived in was either unipolar or uni-multipolar[1] in terms of profound experts,[2] what we witness today is the erosion of the previous West-centred world order with the tendency being dissemination of power between new sovereign, majorly Asian actors.[3]

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[1]   Where the US plays the first fiddle but still has to listen to major regional powers for the sake of dealing with global problems.

[2]   Bogaturov, A. G., Averkov, V. V. Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii 1945 Shakleina, T., Baykov, A. (eds.). *Megatrendy: osnovnye traektorii evolucii mirovogo poryadka v XXI veke* (Megatrends: key trajectories of evolution of the world order in the 21st century). Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2014.

Mainly disputes around Chinese influence, terms of Chinese aid and territorial claims.

Moltz, J. C. *Asia's Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks*. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 46.

Loginov, E., Loginov, A. Kosmos kak strategicheskiy prioritet v borbe za mirovoe ekonomicheskoe liderstvo v XXI veke (Space as the strategic priority in the struggle for the world economic leadership in the 21st century). *Nacionalnye interesy: prioritety i bezopsnost (National Interest: priorities and security),* 2010, № 25(82), 2008, pp. 52–61, (The History of International Relations 1945–2008). Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2012, p. 13.

[3]   Kokoshin, A. and Panov, A. Makrostrukturniye izmeneniya v sisteme mirovoi politiki do 2030 goda (Macrostructural changes in the system of world politics). Moscow: URSS, 2016, pp. 4–64.

Let us take a brief look at Asia's profile. The UN World Prospects 2017 report shows that by now China and India remain the two most populous countries of the world comprising 19 and 18 per cent of the global total respectively, while in 2024 both are expected to have roughly 1,44 billion people.[4] Between 2018 and 2050 China, India and Nigeria will account for 35% of the growth in the world's urban population.[5] Then as the experts of the Brookings Institution emphasize in the report "The unprecedented expansion of the global middle class – an update 2017", an overwhelming majority of new entrants into the middle class will live in Asia.[6] This will result in significant geographic distributional shifts in markets, which means China and India will account for an ever-greater market share and thus, will set their agenda.

According to the data of PwC, by 2050 China and India will be the ones to head the GDP at PPPs ranking with China's share of the world GDP at PPPs projected to amount to 20% and India's to 15%.[7] At the moment both China and India are in Top-10 of global total reserves (including gold) holders with China taking the first place (3,235 trillion dollars in 2017), being followed by Japan (1,264 trillion dollars in 2017).[8] Meanwhile according to the 24th Global Financial Centres Index, centres in the Asia Pacific region are gradually rising in the ratings continuing the

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[4]   UN World Population Prospects. The 2017 Revision: Key findings and advance tables. New York: United Nations, 2017, p. 5.

[5]   UN World Urbanization Prospects. The 2018 Revision: Key facts. New York: United Nations, 2018, p. 1.

[6]   Kharas, H. The unprecedented expansion of the middle class. Global Economy and Development Working paper 100, February, 2017. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf (retrieved 09.09.2018).

[7]   PwC. The world in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue? Available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf (retrieved 09.09.2018).

[8]   World Bank Statistics: Total reserves. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD (retrieved 07.01.2019).

trend lasting for already several years with steady increases witnessed for Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. [9]

All in all, Asia continues to be the most dynamic region of the global economy with the forecast growth at 5.6% in 2018 and 2019, demonstrating complementarity of national economic systems and natural resources. [10] A so-called "unity in diversity" embraces high technologies of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, industrial hubs of Vietnam and Malaysia, energy resources of Indonesia and the Philippines, human resources of China and India, all contributing substantially to re-enforcing competitiveness of Asia in the world economy and international trade.

Asia's profile in the military realm looks seemingly promising. "The Military Balance 2018" report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicates that in 2017 four Asian countries were among Top-10 states with the highest military expenditures (among them are China, India, Japan, South Korea). [11] It is remarkable that this was the first time India's defence budget has surpassed the one of the United Kingdom. At the same time the Asian states especially China and India are well represented in the lists of military exporters and importers respectively. For instance, as follows from SIPRI 2017 report, from 2007–2011 up to 2012–2016 China's export of major conventional arms increased by 74%, therefore, raising the country's share in the global total from 3.8% to 6.2%. And India's import statistics made the country the largest importer of conventional arms in 2012–2016 with 13% of the global total volume (a 43% leap from 2007–2011 to 2012–2016). [12]

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[9]   The Global Financial Centres Index 24. London: Z/Yen, 2018, p. 5.

[10]   Regional Economic Outlook. Asia Pacific: good times, uncertain times, a time to prepare. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2018, p. ix.

[11]   The Military Balance 2018. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 1st edition, 2018.

[12]   Yezhegodnik SIPRI 2017: vooruzheniya, razoruzheniye i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost. Perevod s angliyskogo (SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, disarmament and international security. Translation from English). Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2018, pp. 285–292.

Genuinely, there is a solid number of statistical and empirical evidences demonstrating exponential rise of Asia.[13] The question that follows is whether the Asian region that is already experiencing such a surge in economic and military might is ready to hold high the banner of development and stability and offer a model of world order to guarantee transition to a peaceful stance. Dwelling on this we have to keep in mind that the region is simultaneously becoming highly explosive due to the unveiling struggle for the spheres of interest accompanied with the smouldering hotbeds of tension, to name a few – between China and India, China and Japan, China and ASEAN members, North Korea and South Korea – all altering the regional security architecture.[14]

Undoubtedly, these conflictual knots require multi-angled analysis. In this article the author attempts to unveil the nature of conflictual potential existing between the countries in the outer space dimension.

1. Space race in Asia. Posing questions

"If there is a space race – it is in Asia", states James Lewis paving the way for pondering in three directions.[15] First is that if we assume that states strive for getting space assets what are their inner motives and intentions?

Generally, the space domain is regarded to be the most influential 'global common'. It is the one to enable creation of a single information area needed to guarantee control over outer space for the aim of achieving political and military goals as well as boosting civil socio-economic progress. Adhering to this view, the scholars Loginov A. and Loginov E. reckon that space systems have become an element of the new "information-determined

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[13] Shakleina, T., Baykov, A. (eds.). *Megatrendy: osnovnye traektorii evolucii mirovogo poryadka v XXI veke* (Megatrends: key trajectories of evolution of the world order in the 21st century). Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2014.

[14] Mainly disputes around Chinese influence, terms of Chinese aid and territorial claims.

[15] Moltz, J. C. *Asia's Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks*. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 46.

mode" and being capable of relaying information flows (while information is perceived as the strategic national resource of the 21st century) open unprecedented access to impact world politics and economics.[16] The system is properly operating as long as space-faring nations produce space-related innovations as a result increasing competitiveness and improving a political image of states. Another pundit Zhuk E. believes that space assets play a prior role in constraining opponents from provoking conflicts at the same time giving the floor to breakthroughs in economic and social applications of space technologies.[17]

James Clay Moltz states it clear that the major reason for the current US overwhelming global strength and influence are space technologies.[18] Satellites speed up all layers of communications around the world, GPS spacecrafts help navigate business and military missions, "weather and remote-sensing satellites boost agricultural production and warn of coming disasters".[19] Meanwhile military satellites guarantee information-based support for conducting warfare. Thus, the author concludes, "no other country enjoys the advantages that the United States currently reaps from space".[20]

Developing the 'motives' idea precisely for the Asian states, James Clay Moltz accumulates them as scientific and technological, security and prestige incentives.[21] To broaden the thesis he hints at countries' determination to gain economic and social benefits from application of advanced technologies and to secure these assets and enable potential deterrence of

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[16] Loginov, E., Loginov, A. Kosmos kak strategicheskiy prioritet v borbe za mirovoe ekonomicheskoe liderstvo v XXI veke (Space as the strategic priority in the struggle for the world economic leadership in the 21st century). *Nacionalnye interesy: prioritety i bezopsnost (National Interest: priorities and security)*, 2010, № 25(82), pp. 52–61.

[17] Zhuk, E. Kosmicheskaya deyatelnost i voprosy obespecheniya informacionnnoy bezopasnosti (Space activities and issues of providing information security). Moscow: Nauka i obrazovanie, 2010, pp. 36–37.

[18] Moltz, J. C. The politics of space security: strategic restraint and the pursuit of national interests. Stanford, C A: Stanford University Press. 2008, pp.1–9.

[19] Ibid., p. 1.

[20] Ibid., p. 1.

[21] Moltz, J. C. Asia's Space Race, p. 40.

the opponent. As for prestige – it points to the need for being if not the first one globally (which is hampered with almost unachievable Soviet and American 'firsts') but to excel successes of the regional neighbours.

According to Joan Johnson-Freese, space-faring states regard space as a critical source of their military, geopolitical, and strategic commercial interests.[22] Space achievements may add weight to the country's prestige and autonomy. Fraser McDonald believes that outer space is not remote from everyday lives and makes great stakes to control the Earth's orbit[23] while in the "Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs" Colin Gray and John Sheldon back this view.[24]

In opinion of Michael Sheehan, "the exploitation of space refers to the actual use of space as another political theatre, where states in the long term might seek to exploit cosmic resources for their power potential, but in the short term exploit space because of its ability to produce 'force multiplier' effects on their existing terrestrial military capabilities or as an economic asset."[25]

All in all, it follows that "the space technology becomes a major element in a state's hard and soft power" in the terms of Sheng-Chih Wang.

The second direction to think over is why there is a shift to Asia rather than strengthening of the Russian and US positions. The answer is that both space leaders are relatively losing ground. In recent years Russia witnessed several severe failures: in 2010 three GLONASS satellites were lost by the start of the booster Proton-M, in 2011 automatic Mars station Phobos-Grunt stopped existing and in 2018 first since 1975 Russia's manned spacecraft did not reach the International Space Station finishing the mission with the emergency boarding of the astronauts in Kazakhstan. It seems that the Russian program now undergoing revision

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[22] Johnson-Freese J. Space as a strategic asset. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 7.

[23] MacDonald, F. Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 2007, № 31(5), p. 606.

[24] Gray, C. S., Sheldon, J. B. Space power and the revolution in military affairs. A glass half full? *Air and Space Power Journal*, Montgomery, AL, 1999, pp. 23–38.

[25] Sheehan, M. *The international politics of space.* Routledge, 2007, p. 18.

and reconsideration of budget allocation does not allow the state to uphold its grand space power status as the one possessed previously.

As for the US space program, withdrawal of the Space-Shuttle program in 2011 and freezing of the Constellation program are accompanied with the volatility of the moods in the American Administration. At one time, George Bush aimed to be back to the Moon by 2020 and set there the constantly habitable Moon base – as the bridge to Mars.[26] The second time Barack Obama scaled back this "Moon plan" and rejected work on spacecraft Orion and booster Ares needed to put into orbit a manned spacecraft though declared Mars as the new goal.[27] The third time, Donald Trump announced that he would make a leap forward analogous to the 1960-s predecessors and that the Americans would reach the Moon by the end of the decade.[28] Whatever the case, despite the entrepreneurial endeavours of SpaceX and Blue Origin, none of them managed to catch up with the successes of the 20th century. Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the space program will develop being dependent on the political perturbations.

Against this backdrop conducting a manned flight by China; launching a successful Mars probe by India; delivering to the Earth asteroid grunt samples by Japan; launching the self-constructed satellites by South Korea and North Korea and other achievements demonstrate the growing interest of the Asian states to space innovations and at the potential they have to unleash. Thanks to the relative ease of technologies' acquisition (the Asian states may apply to the know-how revealed already 50 years ago), they may skip some investigation stages, extrapolate and analyse the

[26] President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program. Available at https://history.nasa.gov/Bush SEP.htm (retrieved 07.09.2017).

[27] Remarks by the President on space exploration in the 21st century. Available at https://www.nasa.gov/news/media/trans/obama_ksc_trans.html (retrieved 07.09.2017).

[28] Trump vows that the U.S. will go back to the moon, but how? Available at https://www.cbc.ca/radio/quirks/trump-vows-that-the-u-s-will-go-back-to-the-moon-but-how-grinch-s-growing-heart-and-more-1.4444499/trump-vows-that-the-u-s-will-go-back-to-the-moon-but-how-1.4444506 (retrieved 07.12.2018).

mistakes of the spacefaring nations of the 20th century and come up with new high-tech decisions.

The third direction for thought on the basis of James Lewis' statement is that why cannot these Asian states, mastering their 'space skills' be in the 'competition' rather 'race' status? The answer is a) in the specific national interests lying behind space programs b) in the so-called 'techno-nationalism' of the Asian states preferring technological autonomy to cooperative engineering models c) in the lack of experience in the sphere of managing space activities: conflict prevention mechanisms emerged during the Cold War period (bilaterally) almost without consultations with the Asian states. We will see how these three points work in practice briefly considering the case of space rivalry between China and India concluding with implications this may pose to the international security. The below offered answers unequivocally deserve broader interpretation and may serve as the guiding lines for the deeper analysis.

2. China-India knot

What are the national interests underpinning the development of the Chinese and Indian space programs?

1. For China the orienting point is, undoubtedly, the one reiterated by Xi Jinping during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China – it is a firm commitment to the proclaimed goal of rejuvenating the Chinese nation – generally known as the China Dream. It presupposes turning China into "a global leader in terms of national strength and international influence". China halted being in the shadow and actively extends its sphere of interests to Latin America, Africa, the Arctic region and more importantly to its Asian neighbours pushing forth "Belt and Road Initiative". Before going global by 2049 China seeks to achieve a "moderately well-off" (Xiaokang) society by 2021 which means the country wants to unleash fully its economic and scientific potential. This refers to improving the inner political and economic stance of the country now entering "the new era", meeting increasing needs of the multi-ethnical

population and ensuring leadership of the Communist Party of China geared toward developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The long-run objective is based on the assumption that progress made will serve as the foundation for further elimination of social disparities and inequalities and the factor of constant multi-dimensional rise. A concept of rise in international influence in its turn is accompanied with the motion of demonstrating an "ability to inspire and contribute to global peace and development" and, therefore, reshaping global governance system to a fairer and more just model for all.

In reflecting upon the 'means' of fulfilling the Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping raised the issue of aerospace innovations to contribute to both aspects of the nation's rejuvenation in economic welfare and international stance. President Xi once articulated his position on the importance of developing space technologies in 2013. At that time, he attended a ceremony for Chinese astronauts of the Shenzhou-10 space mission saying that the astronauts "carried the space dream" of the nation, and talked to them as they orbited Earth space module Tiangong-1, saying that: "The space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space".[29]

Interestingly in the interview to CNBC James Andrew Lewis, a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expressed a belief that the Chinese space claims aren't only a discourse – they have the solid ground behind them. He shared that the Chinese demonstrate that sort of persistence that would allow them to get to the Moon earlier than the Americans will during the ongoing space race. We may assume that this refers to the whole list of projects declared by the China National Space Administration involving establishment of a national crewed space station, landing a rover on the far side of the Moon by the end of 2018, launch of the first Mars probe by 2020, and construction of space-based solar power station.

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[29] Xinhua, Backgrounder: Xi Jinping's vision for China's space development. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/24/c_136232642.htm (retrieved 02.09.2018).

2. Experts dealing with the issues of the Indian space exploration focus on the basic pretext of the country's development: an ideological one, expressing a distinct position towards the necessity to preserve Common Heritage of Mankind (through unambiguous support for the points of the Moon Treaty) and to use space for implementation of domestic interests. The 'father of Indian space program' Dr. Vikram Sarabhai said that although India did not strive for competing with "economically advanced nations" it would step forward to benefiting from peaceful use of new technologies. Addressing the UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1968, he declared that: "Several uses of outer space can be of immense benefit to developing nations wishing to advance commercially and socially".[30]

In a successive manner in May 2014 the government of Narendra Modi came to power prioritizing development policy with the means of the domestic market and social consolidation.[31] Modi addressed the nation saying that economic resources of the society shall be used for the benefit of the poor. He initiated maximum domestic production attracting small businesses and launched "Make in India" project that covers 25 sectors of the economy, space being among them. This presupposes that the country will switch to the national production of the critical infrastructure.

While India strives for development of the space program adapted to the needs of the Indian population, the space innovations are seen as the means of resisting both the Chinese leadership and the Chinese hard power threat. India cannot but be anxious about the Chinese rise and China's 'offensive defense policies'. In terms of Arun Sahgal China is applying a strategy of 'concirclement' (more precisely – a String of Pearls) trying to surround India (through nuclear aid to Pakistan, building a power Gwadar, assisting to Nepalese Maoists and supporting ties with Myanmar

[30] Clegg, E., Sheehan, M. *Space as an engine of development: India's space programme. Contemporary South Asia*, 1994, 3:1, pp. 25–35.

[31] Turin, G. India: nachat s maloy (India: to start with the smaller). In *Russia in global affairs*, 2018. Available at http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Indiya-nachat-s-maloi-19366 (retrieved 30.08.2018).

hunta).[32] India truly fears China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, but mostly it is cautious about new Chinese-led infrastructure projects that may benefit Chinese interests at the expense of the regional neighbours.[33] In the category of infrastructure fall not only bridges, railways and ports but also space assets that can be provided by China to the Asian states on the Chinese terms.

As for the hard power threat – India was genuinely impressed in a negative way by the Chinese anti-satellite missile test in 2007. It appears that China is building up such offensive capabilities that could be used against other countries' space-based assets, including India and others. To be ready to repel the potential attack from above the Earth India needs to deep down in space research.

General importance of the national space program for the country's prestige is vividly proved by the fact that the 11th president of India (2002–2007) was a person who was engaged in creation of the first Indian carrier SLV-3 to conduct the first independent launch of the Indian satellite in 1980.

What is the stage of technological development of the countries' space programs?

1. Right after the Sino-Soviet split China submerged into deploying a full-fledged space program. Today it possesses four space launch facilities (Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang and Wenchang) and benefits from having completely Chinese-manufactured Long March family of launch vehicles regarded to be as highly reliable.[34] A range of satellites is extensive, it spans the gamut from weather (Fengyun) and navigation satellites

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[32] Rogers, J. From Suez to Shanghai: the European Union and Eurasian maritime security. *Occasional Paper*, March 2009, № 77, p. 17.

[33] Xie Tao. *Chinese Foreign Policy with Xi Jinping Characteristics*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. Available at http://carnegieendowment. org/2017/11/20/chinese-foreign-policy-with-xi-jinping-characteristics-pub-74765 (retrieved 12.09.2018).

[34] During 1997–2011 from 112 launches only one failed and another one was entered into an improper orbit.

(Beidou/Compass system) to earth observation (Ziyuan, a product of cooperation with Brazil) and reconnaissance (Yaogan) satellites, from civil and military communications satellites (ChinaSat and Shentong) to an array of small satellites. All in all, by April 30, 2018 China possessed 250 operating satellites in orbit (in comparison with 859 of the US and 146 of Russia with the total number of 1886). Meanwhile already in 2016 China made an equal number of launches with the US (22 launches) having surpassed Russia (17 launches).[35] In 2017, according to Gunter's Space Page, there was a shift back: 20 US launches against 18 by China (20 by Russia and 5 by India).[36] Nonetheless, it depicts both China's aspiration and capability of keeping up with the pace of the spacefaring leaders.

The mentioned Beidou navigation system made China the third country to arrange transmission of the user's location. According to the White Paper 2016, Beidou navigation satellites will offer positioning, velocity measurement, timing services to customers in the Asia-Pacific region. Prospectively, the system will cover "countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road [..] advancing the ground-based and satellite-based augmentation systems in an integrated way".[37]

The immensity and diversity of efforts mounted by China led the country to become the third nation to achieve manned space travel: China sent its first astronaut into space in 2003, then the Chinese astronauts conducted a spacewalk in 2008. This was the first step towards a more ambitious three-stage project of building the national space station. The second step was the launch of the orbital laboratory and testing docking – it came true with the launch of Tiangong-1 visited by a series of Shenzhou

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[35] Kitai vpervye dognal SSHa po kolichestvu kosmicheskih zapuskov v god, Rossiya na tretem meste (China first reached the US in the number of launches, Russia is on the third position). Available at retrievedhttps://rns.online/military/Kitai-vpervie-dognal-SSHa-po-kolichestvu-kosmicheskih-zapuskov-v-god-Rossiya--na-tretem-meste-2016-12-31 (accessed 05.04.2018).

[36] Orbital Launches of 2017. Available at https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_chr/lau2017.htm (retrieved 01.10.2018).

[37] White Paper on China's space activities in 2016. Available at http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm (retrieved 20.09.2018).

spacecraft till it started re-entry over the Pacific Ocean in 2018. Further on, China's Tianzhou-1 cargo spacecraft successfully docked with Tiangong-2 space laboratory in 2017. The space station thus has a solid background to be developed by 2022 and was already underpinned with the Chinese invitation for all United Nations Member States to participate in its space station project.[38]

The lunar exploration was carried out since 1995 in terms of Program 863 which was aimed at developing high-technology industries. One of the tasks on the agenda was to gain access to helium-3 (abundant on the Moon) for utilizing it as ecologically clear energy resource for Atomic power station. In late 2013 the state completed the first since 1976 "lunar soft landing" with the Chang'e-3 craft and its Jade Rabbit rover. Accomplishment of the stage with soft landing experience raised the technological and political weight of the country as the previous similar extraordinary achievement was demonstrated by the Americans 47 years ago with Surveyor program). Following the suit, China performed an experiment with deorbiting the automatic lunar station from the Moon back to the Earth in 2014 – as a result the state appeared to be the third country in the world possessing the technology of lowering an apparatus after a flight to the Moon. The last stage presupposes the launch of Chang'e-5 on a heavy launcher CZ-5E to get the probe of the Moon soil. 2025–2030 may mark manned landing to the Moon.

In 2010, Ye Peijian, Commander in Chief of the Chang'e program and an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, claimed that China had all the prerequisites for exploring Mars. However, the first trial was a failure: China's Yinghuo-1, Mars-exploration space probe, and Russia's Phobos-Grunt spacecraft launched together in 2011 from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, to visit Mars' moon Phobos burned in the atmosphere. The experiment was not reversal for China anyway, it simply revealed that there is a room for perfection before the PRC sends a landing

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[38] UN and China invite applications to conduct experiments on-board China's Space Station. Available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2018-unis-os-496.html (retrieved 01.10.2018).

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probe to Mars in 2021 (and catches up with the USA). China has already declared advancing meteorological satellites Kuafu (placed at Lagrange Point) to make missions to Mars safer.

The country launched an orbital Hard X-ray Modulation Telescope. Furthermore, during presentation at the International Space Development Conference (Toronto, Canada) in 2015 representatives of China Academy of Space Technology reported that the country had cognized the value of the solar energy in 1990–1995. And indeed, in 2013 it was announced as the national goal that extraterrestrial energy shall determine the future of the Chinese economy; up to 2025 the country schedules the demonstration of a 100-kW solar space station on a low earth orbit, by 2050 – the first commercial space solar station shall function on a geosynchronous orbit.

Consecutive and dynamic development of the country's space program leaves no doubt that China is a leading spacefaring nation of today. Though spending almost 7 times less than the US on space program ($4,91 bln against $35,96 bln in 2016)[39] it seems to be able to cut this gap: whether it be a plan for a manned space station (an urgent need for the country barred from participating in the International Space Station by the US), a manned mission to the Moon by 2030 or a (un)crewed Mars exploration (by 2060). The scholars A. Guscha and N. Romashkina note that the peculiarity of the current development stage of the Chinese space program is that plans to enhance financing by increasing state investments and creating mechanisms for attracting capitals with the means of non-governmental allocations for implementation of the space projects.[40]

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[39] Government expenditure on space programs in 2016 (2018). Available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/745717/global-governmental-spending-on-space-programs-leading-countries/ (retrieved 12.09.2018).

[40] Gushcha, A., Romashkina, N. Raketno-kosmicheskaya deyatelnost razvivaushchihsya stran i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost (Missile and space acitivities of the developing countries and international security). *Index bezopasnosti (Security Index)*, 2008, № 4 (87), Vol. 14, pp. 83–94.

Now the country combines state control with increasing the level of commercialization of the space industry. [41]

It is noteworthy that China pursues the goal of producing and selling space apparatuses cheaper than other market actors. Already in 1993 it offered launch services for $30–55 mln that amounted to 30–75% of the price set by the ESA for Ariane launch, 50% of price required by the USA for launching Atlas, 25% of Titan and 70% of Delta launches. Low prices were conditioned by cheaper labour, cheaper materials used for constructing launch facilities and higher reliability. If China goes on following the path of 'low prices and high quality', the country may gain additional recognition in the international space technologies market.

2. India is another locomotive of the Asian space programs' development. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) started to elaborate its program as applications-oriented (in cooperation with the USSR). In 1975 India launched its first satellite called Aryabhata. It was conducted with the purpose of gaining experience in building and operating a satellite in space. Now India has about 55 operating satellites including those providing telecommunications (INSAT), remote sensing (ResourceSat, CartoSat, OceanSat series), and keeping meteorological payloads (KALPANA, INSAT).

In 2016 India launched its reusable launch vehicle (RLV-TD) making deeper analysis of autonomous navigation, hypersonic speed and the re-entry process to resort to in future decades. Apart from this India possesses two operational launchers: Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) for launching Low Earth Orbit satellites and Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) to launch heavier Geosynchronous satellites into orbit. In 2017 India managed to launch PSLV-C37 rocket with 104 satellites (103 nanosatellites plus Cartosat-2D) aboard and in this way set a new record on the number of satellites brought to the outer space at one

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[41] White Paper on China's space activities in 2016. Available at http://english. gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm (retrieved 20.09.2018).

time (the previous record belonged to Russia with 37 satellites aboard at once). What still needs to be improved regarding launch vehicles is their loading capacity. By now they enable by 4 tonnes of payload mass.

ISRO is establishing a regional satellite navigation system called Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). As stated on the official website: "The main objective (of IRNSS) is to provide Reliable Position, Navigation and Timing services over India and its neighbourhood, to provide fairly good accuracy to the user". Up to the moment there are nine satellites in the series. We may expect that the number will only grow with the increasing degree of competitiveness with the Chinese Beidou for the consumers.

The country draws precise attention to dedicated scientific satellite missions. In 2008 India carried out its first lunar mission Chandrayaan-1encouraged by the opportunity of utilizing extra-terrestrial resources eventually allowing to detect water on the lunar surface. Chandrayaan-2 will supposedly be launched to the Moon in early 2019 and is configured as a two-module system comprising an Orbiter Craft module and a Lander Craft module carrying the Rover developed by the Indian Space Research Organization.

Though to some extent dependent on the US support the Mars Orbiter Mission (2014) was successfully deployed. Despite the fact that it was criticized for a lack of capacity required for delivering more payloads, the Mangalyaan spacecraft made India the 1st Asian country to reach Mars and the 4th one (after the US, Russia, the European Space Agency) to land on the Red Planet in general. Devised thanks to cooperation between ISRO (responsible for launch vehicle, payloads and the craft) and scientific and industrial community (to work on separate needs for serving the launch), the probe demonstrated a well-functioning mechanism of public-private partnership.

It is noteworthy that the launch was a really 'high-profile venture': it came at a low cost (approximately $73 million). The mission was admitted to be the least expensive inter-planetary one ever, thus, laying the ground for positioning India as the competitive provider of low-cost services. All

in all, exploration of deep space fortifies Indian claim for the role of a great power.

Today the state's space program (though not being reflected in any single space program by the time – there are two separate documents carrying the vision of the state: on remote sensing and communications satellites) includes joint projects of eco-monitoring, commercial launches of small-size satellites, elaboration of carriers with higher loading capacity. In 2015 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India will undertake its first manned space mission by 2022. He promised that as India celebrates its 75th year of its independence, there will be an Indian astronaut aboard the Indian manned space vehicle Gaganyaan.[42] Up to the moment the critical technologies, in particular, Crew Module System, Crew Escape System, Environmental Control and Life Support System, launch vehicles are developed while the crew module was preliminary tested in 2014.[43] On the whole, much work is to be done in four years, and if India manages to implement the mission it will become the fourth country to put humans into outer space and another country to have the technological capacity needed to affect the global governance of outer space.

As for building up the national space station – in 2017 the Chairman of the ISRO Kiran Kumar mentioned that India has the capability to develop a space station though underlined that the project shall have direct impact on the Indian population – the reason to stop for a while and weigh all the pros and cons.[44] Currently there have been no statements indicating that India would engage in such a large-scale project.

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[42] Rajagopalan, R. What's Next for India's New Space Ambitions? Available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/whats-next-for-indias-new-space-ambitions/ (retrieved 15.09.2018).

[43] Kumar, C. PM vows to put Indians in space by 2022, ISRO begins the long trek. Available at retrievedhttps://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-vows-to-put-indians-in-space-by-2022-isro-begins-the-long-trek/articleshow/65414878.cms (retrieved 15.09.2018).

[44] India Can Develop A Space Station, Says ISRO Chief. Available at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-can-develop-a-space-station-says-isro-chief-1661593 (retrieved 15.09.2018).

Remarkably, being eager to play the role of the key and ideally sole carrier for the South Asian states, India offers launching satellites to space at dumping prices. Regardless of that even at these prices not all the countries were capable of elaboration and launch of satellites, India pushed an initiative South Asia Satellite Program which implies participation of South Asian states (except for Pakistan) in exploitation of satellites developed by India and operating under the Indian control. The first satellite of this type was GSAT-9 which entered the orbit in 2017.

Why shall the race be conflictual?

The previous two points illustrate that both China and India have a prominent interest in developing independent space programs and both are making substantial progress whether it be construction of multi-purpose satellites, exploration of the Solar system or achievement of (or approaching) manned space missions. Why cannot we guarantee that the space race will be a peaceful one, without negative repercussions?

One of the answers is the inherent dual character of the space technologies. Martel W. and Yoshinara T. note that about 95% of space technologies are dual-use thus the sphere of their application does not necessarily depend on the nominal division of institutions they are accountable to.[45] If so then the more countries develop their space programs, the more vulnerable they both perceive themselves and the more vulnerable they theoretically make their adversaries. With space assets which are an inalienable part of our life, states are threatened by potential cyberattacks and other unfriendly activities. Low level of space systems' resiliency makes countries suspicious to mutual successes. The more tests one party conducts – the less protected the second party sees itself – the more states are submerging in the spiral of security dilemma. This is a vicious circle that is difficult to overcome and that poses an enormous threat to already politically antagonistic China and India.

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[45] Martel, W., Yoshinara, T. Averting a Sino-U.S. space race. *The Washington Quarterly*, 2003, № 26:4, pp. 19–35.

The second answer is more of a historic character. It is true both China and India signed almost all of the main 'space documents', including 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty"); 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Rescue Agreement"); 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"); 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention").[46] But the intrinsic problem that comes to the fore is that all of these documents were signed and ratified by China and India when they played an inconsiderable role in the space governance. In fact, they joined agreements that were accorded by the USSR and the USA based on the capabilities and vision of these two nations.

Neither they experienced genuine, comprehensive negotiations on managing space issues nor they took part in negotiations regarding managing possible harmful effects of space competition, especially in the military realm. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (which prevented nuclear testing in space), Outer Space Treaty (which barred weapon of mass destruction from deploying in space), arms control negotiations were a result of bilateral Soviet-American talks that both defined the rules of game and helped jointly analyse the potential risks of unfriendly behaviour in outer space. China and India, as well as other Asian states if finding themselves in a hostile situation regarding outer space will undoubtedly suffer from the lack of experience of communications and of consultation norms.[47] Absence of such a working conflict-prevention mechanism for space may cause serious misunderstandings between the states, probably not yet aware of the existing red lines and limits of destabilizing deployments.

No cooperation culture poses a risk of failure in conflict avoidance, enabling spillover of disputes over space activities into the military

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[46] Exclusion is 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Treaty").

[47] Moltz, J. C. Asia's Space Race, p. 31.

dimension endangering people's lives in the regional and global scopes. Any incident may end with disruption of critical infrastructure, disabling spacecrafts, emergence of numerous orbital debris.[48]

In addition to the above-mentioned, not deepening into the issue which deserves detailed coverage and elaboration in a separate article the author would like to attract the reader's attention to the factor of 'strategic cultures' inherent to states, influencing the future decision making process of the countries' leadership.[49] This especially comes to the fore in the case of India and China having a long-lasting history turning them into states-civilizations. In particular, the ambiguity of the Chinese culture undermines the assumption of peaceful perspectives of the space race. Undoubtedly, the country's behavioural patterns are based on the teachings of Confucianism presupposing the foremost significance of Five Constant Virtues and favouring harmony and peace over conflict.[50] Still the collective memory of humiliation and the fact the Chinese leaders "are predisposed to deploy force when confronting threats to China's core interests" pose a risk of a first strike against the potential adversary, on terms of "active defense" and "just" military action.[51] Likewise, on the one hand, India's political philosophy derives from the notions of humanity and non-violence based on Dhammapada (4–3 centuries B.C.) and then expressed in the Jawaharlal Nehru's policies implying respect for international law and institutions, military restraint and cooperation.[52] On the other hand,

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[48]   Already at present there are 29000 objects larger than 10 cm, 750000 objects from 1 cm to 10 cm and millions objects less than 1 cm as estimated orbital debris.

[49]   The well-fitting definition of "strategic culture" proposed by Colin Gray is: "the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience". Gray, C. Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back. *Review of International Studies*, 1999, 25(1), pp. 49–69, 51.

[50]   Johnson, K. D. China's strategic culture: a perspective for the United States. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, p. 3.

[51]   Ibid., p. 10.

[52]   Singh, H. *India's strategic culture: the impact of geography*. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2009, p. 7.

India's Arthashastra treatise (4–3 centuries B.C.) intertwined into the state's political behaviour prioritizes practical benefit and stipulated by it political activities and administrative directives. Developing this statement, pundits Harjeet Singh and Sarang Shidore make it clear that depending on the geopolitical context and domestic constraints the use of force may be deemed necessary and justifiable by the Indian government for the sake of preserving the country's strategic autonomy.[53]

Broadly speaking, this points out the potentially conflictual nature of the rivalry in space embedded into cultural and historical backgrounds of the considered states.

Conclusion

The 21st century will unequivocally witness the unprecedented rise in political and economic influence of the Asian countries. The Easternisation is an emerging trend that penetrates all the major strongholds of the Western world and grasps the minds of politicians and scholars raising discourse of the need to act East or make a pivot to the East. But what still needs more detailed consideration is the race for the space leadership originating in Asia. In the highly-informatized world, critically depending on the space infrastructure, development of the national space programs is of foremost importance. And as it was during the Cold War period, outer space is still 'the global common', superiority in which provides political leadership as if the competition in space dimension may be "the continuation of political objectives by other means" (paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz).

The Asian states generally driven by the prestige and security motives as well as aspiration to benefit most from the application of space technologies on the Earth have peculiar national interests behind the development of space programs. In case of China these are two centenaries to be fulfilled by 2021 and 2049 correspondently, for India – desire to

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[53] Singh, H. *India's strategic culture: the impact of geography.* New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2009, p. 5; In partnership with the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University. Available at https://www.eastwestcenter.org/ events/the-evolution-indias-strategic-culture-and-us-india-ties (retrieved 12.01.2019).

respond to domestic needs and preserve the current regional balance of power. To achieve these goals the states are actively running for successes of the first space race: constructing satellites, improving launch vehicles, stepping up programs intended to explore the Solar System, gaining knowledge of how to 'churn out' manned space missions and even dwelling on the build-up of the space stations.

And the thing is not that by now these projects are mainly duplicating the ones of the USSR/Russia and the USA; the more vital are the pace these space programs grow up, the firm intention of the Asian states to 'conquer' the new sphere of interest, the readiness of the governments to jump at these financially-burdensome initiatives. At this point, when realizing that the Asian states, having the conflictual background with their neighbours, are intensifying space activities we are confronted with the security issues. Access to space will be essential in maximizing economic and military interests for these nations, thus, their race to space will be a striking feature in the coming decades.

For this reason, it the prior task of the officials and scholars dealing with space policy to develop scenarios of how the space race between the Asian states may evolve, pondering over the mechanisms that could prevent the worst scenario envisaging disruption of the space infrastructure. The lack of contact tools and communication channels for unprecedented and emergency cases threatens the initially advantageous space race shifting to Asia (enabling renaissance of the space age) with the unexpected punch line.

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Māris Kūlis

PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND VALUES IN FACE OF MODERN TERRORISM
(ISLAMIC STATE AND AL-QAEDA)

Introduction

"I come from Finland, a "Christian" nation where the people do not strongly adhere to their corrupted religion", in the propaganda magazine *Dabiq* of the terroristic state-like organization the Islamic State tells a woman identifying herself as Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah. She continues with diagnosis of the present situation: "Most of them say they are Christians but don't really practice their false faith. They might go to church when there's a wedding or a funeral, but most of them don't know much about their distorted religion, even though they are proud of it."[1] Of course, such a description is neither new, nor original in the secular world, but it has a different meaning if analysed in a specific context – against the backdrop of all the atrocities performed by the Islamic State.

Violent Islamic radicalisation has become a widely known phenomenon in the European Union (EU). Together with local religious converts in the EU, the influx of returnee 'foreign terrorist fighters' and sleeper cells have become a real threat to large parts of Europe while Latvia has been mostly spared by it. Consequently, the decision by a young and shy Latvian boy

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[1]   al-Finlandiyyah, Umm Khalid. How I came to Islam. *Dabiq*, No. 15, p. 36.

named Mārtiņš to join the Islamic State provoked turbulent discussions among experts from various fields and the general public alike. Later, the news that the former leader of the Islamic community of Latvia Imrāns Oļegs Petrovs had joined the Islamic State added even more fuel to the discussions.[2] Obvious violence and bloodshed in the war in Syria and Iraq provoked a plenitude of questions which could all be reduced to a simple "Why?" Speculations emerged that the men and women of all ages and nationalities who have been tempted to join the Islamic State do so for money, sex, or out of plain stupidity. However, the stories told by these very individuals suggest that such a viewpoint is not sufficient.

Contrary to the widespread opinion promoted by journalists and non-experts in mass-media, contemporary radical Islam is a part of today's world culture. The ever-increasing speed of globalization, the disappearance of national borders, and the merging of cultures is a process of twofold effect. On the one hand, people have new opportunities to develop themselves and their values. It stimulates economic growth, tolerance for minorities, openness, basic freedoms, inclusive society, etc.[3] On the other hand, it challenges (and endangers) many classical values and the usual order of things. It is a very broad process and one of its sides are the reactionary movements of modern Islamic terrorism with their specific means of attraction. Particularly, the emergence of the Islamic State can be interpreted in relation to events and ideas in the field of philosophy,

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[2]   On the factors determining the political participation of Muslim youth in Latvia, see: Stašulāne, Anita and Jānis Priede. Politiskais un pilsoniskais naratīvs: Latvijas musulmaņu jauniešu politiskās līdzdalības noteicošie faktori. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti No. XVIII*, 2015, pp. 62–86.

[3]   Public opinion survey "Standard Eurobarometer 89" (spring, 2018) shows that majority (53%) of respondents considers that the Member States of the European Union are "close" in terms of shared values. A more concrete analysis shows that the top value is "peace" (45%), followed by "human rights" (42%), and in the third place – "respect for human life" (37%). Subsequent values are as follows: "democracy" (27%), "individual freedom" (24%), "equality" (21%), "the rule of law" (18%), "tolerance" (16%), "solidarity" (16%), and lastly three values are mentioned by fewer than one in ten respondents: "respect for other cultures" (9%), "self-fulfillment" (9%), and "religion" (5%,). See: Standard Eurobarometer 89. Available at https://bit.ly/2sRPb8z (retrieved 02.02.2019).

culture, politics, and economics in the last few decades in both the Middle East and the whole globalized world.

During the last decade, one of the most spectacular and well-known manifestations of political Islam have been the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda emerged as a small ideological movement, in some sense, as a club of intellectuals – bloodthirsty, but, nevertheless, intellectuals. However, the Islamic State was swift and skilful to profit from both the situation in Syria and Iraq (war, lack of civil society, social and religious segregation, etc.) and cultural situation in the West. It was and still is a populistic movement. Therefore, it could be stated that the emergence of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State is not the cause, but rather the consequence of a certain social and cultural order.

Explanation could be linked to the so-called 'Postmodern situation' where classical Western values are lost or changed. Jean-François Lyotard described it as a disintegration of meta narratives or distrust in general ideas and general concepts. In philosophy the postmodernist situation means that specific ontology has lost its authority, ontology which was interlocked with narratives characterized by belief in the progress of humanity, in the reason and truth, in the divine (idealistic, absolute) universality. The deliberate deconstruction of old values and ideals or simple reality of social evolution can be particularly traumatic to the people who are searching for the Absolute truth, the divine providence, and stability of universal values.[4] While the Western liberal philosophy and political agenda of the European Union proudly offers 'history without history' and 'happiness here and now', the Islamic radicals offer a worldview where God is still alive and divine miracles can provide the meaning of life.[5] Western modern political-philosophical ideas, often highly valued in the West, at the same time are challenged and disqualified by the modern violent Islamic movements.

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[4]   Rubene, M. Postmodernisms. *Grāmata*, No. 12, 1991, pp. 3–7.
[5]   For interpretation on differences in the understanding of history, see: Kļaviņš, Kaspars. Lost Antiquity and Permanent Present. Understanding of History in the Western and Middle Eastern Tradition. *Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti No. XXII*, 2017, pp. 92–128.

This paper intends to explore theoretical interpretation that could provide a better understanding of the Islamic State's (or any other radical Islamic terroristic group's) successful recruitment efforts by investigating ideas common to modern liberal Western thought and modern military jihadism. Namely, particular attention will be drawn to the concept of identity (plurality; lack of; crisis; overcome of) and the idea of cosmopolitanism. The argument will be supplemented with references to texts of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and some radical Islamic scholars.

1. Ambiguous values

One of the ever-lasting problems of Western societies (but not limited to the West) is the question of **identity** – is it something essential, or rather a fluid social construct? Various theories of identity have been accepted and adopted. To name just a few, one could speak about ethnic, national, civil, societal, local, subcultural, linguistic, sexual etc. identities. The widespread interpretation of the 21st century Western liberal world is the idea that almost everything could and should be interpreted as a mutable social construct and that includes not only gender issues, but national, ethnic and religious identities as well. The idea of 'national state' understood as more or less consolidated ethnic group is giving way to meta- or supranational (for now – just theoretical) institutions. Philosopher and anthropologist Clifford Geertz comments: "To an increasing degree national unity is maintained not by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation."[6]

In contrast to the symbolic or civic model, there is an ethnic model of a nation in which origin is determined and therefore cannot be (easily) changed. Here identity is based on the concept of unity in the language, culture, traditions, land, country etc. This model is based on the idea that the innate culture is permanent. The ethnic model, unlike the civic one,

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[6] Geertz, Clifford. *The interpretation of cultures: selected essays.* New-York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 260.

does not allow to choose one's identity arbitrarily. Wherever the individual is located and whatever it does, it remains attached to its native community. It follows that nations (communities) are based on a common origin, i.e. belonging to a historical 'superfamily'. Philosopher and sociologist Anthony Smith compares the two approaches: while the Western civic concept stresses the role of law, ethnic model emphasizes common descent, vernacular languages, traditions and customs.[7]

The philosophical and cultural situation in the late 20th and in the beginning of 21st century can be described (of course, not exclusively) as a trend that continues to push for the goals set by the postmodern philosophy. This state is eloquently described by sociologist Zygmunt Bauman: "*Liquid modernity* is the growing conviction that change is the only permanence, and uncertainty the only certainty."[8] He speaks about contemporary state, where a person can shift from one social position to another in a fluid manner. In his words, nomadism becomes a general trait of human as it flows through life like a tourist, changing places, jobs, values and even political or sexual orientation.

The idea of fluidity of identity is legitimate at a theoretical level, but it has many opponents on the ground who feel disgusted and alienated by the idea that, for example, Islam and relationships with God are just a social construct founded by random causes.

Moreover, the significant role of culture and cultural heritage is widely accepted among Europeans. As shown by the public opinion surveys in Europe, the role of culture and cultural heritage is very high. The results of the survey "Special Eurobarometer 466: Cultural Heritage" (2017) confirm that the vast majority of Europeans (84%) feel that cultural heritage is important to them personally, and 90% believe that it is important to their country, as well as cultural heritage is considered a crucial part of European identity by 80% of respondents. Considerable majority of Europeans (88%) believe that cultural heritage should be taught in schools.[9] Consequently,

[7]   See: Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity*. London: Penguin, 1991, p. 11.
[8]   Bauman, Zygmunt. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. iix–ix.
[9]   Special Eurobarometer 466: Cultural Heritage (2017). Available at https://bit.ly/2BRcama (retrieved 28.10.2018).

by recognizing the importance of culture, Europeans (including Latvians) are respecting the fact that their identity is dependent on the cultural background which cannot be easily changed, even if they accept the social constructivism as a theoretical possibility. Culture is a fundamental forming element in the development of any identity and thus the importance of cultural background to the respondents suggest that identity mostly is not understood as something fluid and changeable.

The interpretations of identity are topical in the context of Islam and Islamic radicalism. For example, propagandists of the Islamic State write in their journal *Dabiq* that the West had been ruled by philosophies, which are at "all-out war with the fitrah". They list Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, Durkheim, Weber, and Freud as culprits of the ideology that "since the days of the so-called French Revolution in the West and thereafter the October Revolution in the East" strives to produce generations void of any traces of the *fitrah* ('fitrah' is explained as inborn human nature). In other words, void of any strong identity. Anonymous author expands his or her statement: "Children – and even adults – were taught that man's creation was the result of pure chaos, that history was the result of conflicts merely over material resources, that religion was the fabrication of simpleminded men, that the family social unit was adopted merely out of convenience, and that sexual intercourse was the ultimate reason behind man's decisions and actions."[10] The author of the article concludes that such actions have led to the destruction of all facets of the *fitrah* in the Christian lands and therefore by destroying the basis of religiosity the Christians have exterminated the divine morality. Thus, the supposed consequences are dire: "[Western woman] is the willing victim who sacrifices herself for the immoral "freedoms" of her people, offering her fitrah on the altar of secular liberalism."[11]

Similar attitude and interpretation of global political and philosophical process is expressed in the so-called "Al-Qaeda Handbook", a computer file found by Manchester Metropolitan Police during a search in the house

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[10] "The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near-Extinction of the Western Woman." *Dabiq*, No. 15, p. 20.

[11] Ibid., p. 25.

of a suspect in 2000. The unknown author begins the text with almost poetic and mournful account of the poor, almost devastating situation of the Islamic society. Author continues and presents one of the culprits: "But they [the local rulers] did not stop there; they started to fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity. Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found some that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the [religious] council, and the prophet – God bless and keep him – propagandized communism."[12]

The contrast to Western values and the Western way of life is frequently mentioned in the texts of the Islamic State. An article "Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You", written by anonymous author in the propaganda magazine *Dabiq*, presents and accounts for six reasons for the hatred against West. Foremost, the author stresses, it will be nothing new, it has been said repeatedly, but the reason of ignorance among the Westerners is simple, namely, the political elite of West is hiding the truth because of political correctness, political advantages and plain fear to step outside the mainstream narrative.

All the reasons can be divided in two parts: the fourth, fifth and sixth reasons are material. Namely, they are crimes (in a broad sense) against Islam, war (bombardment, killing, etc.), that consequently leads to interpretation that war against West is a defensive war.[13]

However, the first three reasons are theological and value-oriented. The very first and so considered the main reason is the interpretation of faith and God – the dispute on the oneness of God, the role of Jesus as a son or prophet etc. The third reason is atheism. While religious Christian from the viewpoint of the Muslim should be regarded as a fool, atheism in the eyes of the Islamic State is something much worse because it denies the fundamental divine and sacral values.[14]

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[12] Al-Qaeda Handbook, translation in English, p. 8.

[13] "Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You." *Dabiq*, No. 15, pp. 31–32.

[14] Ibid.

The second reason is much more concrete: "Your secular liberalism has led you to tolerate and even support 'gay rights', to allow alcohol, drugs, fornication, gambling, and usury to become widespread, and to encourage the people to mock those who denounce these filthy sins and vices. As such, we wage war against you to stop you from spreading your disbelief and debauchery – your secularism and nationalism, your perverted liberal values, your Christianity and atheism – and all the depravity and corruption they entail."[15] The anonymous author makes clear that the war is not just fight for the access to natural resources or 'worldly possessions'; it is rather a fight to stop the Western influence and to "protect mankind from your [Western] misguided concepts and your deviant way of life."[16] While, of course, the attributed sins are as common in the West as in the Islamic states, the message is clear – the moral ideals should not be challenged and discussed.

One of the most notorious jihadi scholars Sayyid Qutb stated, here paraphrased in more modern language, that the main reason for concern is not the military dominance of Western powers, but the cultural offence, and it should be countered. He noticed that modern Western states try to separate private identity and public behaviour as two very distinct realms. Be it ethnic, cultural, sexual – any private orientation is of no concern to others, i.e., it is not a public issue. Qutb denies any such distinction, and in the case of Islam, stands up for the monolithic union of public and private life. According to Qutb, Islam is and can be only public – there is no private Islam. He strictly states that any Islamic state is obliged to implement *sharia*, and *sharia*, according to Qutb, is "everything legislated by Allah Almighty for ordering man's life; it includes the principles of belief, principles of administration and justice, principles of morality and human relationships, and principles of knowledge."[17] Consequently, *sharia* is understood not as merely judiciary principles, but as a set of comprehensive

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[15] "Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You." *Dabiq*, No. 15, p. 32.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. A. B. al-Mehri (ed.). Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and publishers, 2006, p. 120.

rules for all the aspects of life. Furthermore, he condemns the sciences and philosophy of West by linking the decline of Christianity with emergence of modern sciences. He writes: "Hostility of the scientific community toward the Church did not remain limited to the Church or to its beliefs, but was directed against all religion, so much so that all sciences turned against religion, whether they were speculative philosophy or technical or abstract sciences having nothing to do with religion"[18] However, in Qutb's eyes, here lies even more danger, namely, he sees a "a well thought out scheme" with objective "to shake the foundations of Islamic beliefs and then gradually to demolish the structure of Muslim society."[19]

Qutb's example can be applied to many other cases. In a broad sense, here is exposed the long-standing question of identity. Are traditional practices, ideas or rites just a private 'hobby', 'leisure activity' or do they have a public, social role? The question of national identity is of greatest concern in many nations worldwide today, including Latvia. Despite the efforts of modern European political agencies, institutions and political leaders to spread cosmopolitan and multicultural ideas, the longing for strict and enduring identities is still well represented in public. Islamic radicalism tries to fill the void created by identity crisis. It tries to fill the need for strict identity limits, to mark clear borders and provide a moral compass.

Another main concept that is closely connected to the issue of identity is **cosmopolitanism**. One way to describe the current political scene of the European Union is the distinction between states that welcome closer integration and openness (e.g. France, Germany) and states which strive for more isolationism (e.g. Hungary, Poland). This distinction is illustrative in the topic of cosmopolitanism: apparently, a significant part of Western (European) society welcomes post-national thinking and cosmopolitan ambitions. Moreover, the European Union, *united in diversity*, openly encourages the politics and philosophy of post-nationalism. This is reflected in contemporary social philosophy. For example, Jürgen Habermas

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[18] Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. A. B. al-Mehri (ed.). Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and publishers, 2006, p. 128.
[19] Ibid.

advocates for the post-national state, in which shared identity is attached to non-territorial values of constitutionalism and democratic rights.

Cosmopolitan aspirations are not new, they were expressed by Enlightenment philosophers (I. Kant, G. V. F. Hegel, J. Lock, T. Hobbes, Voltaire, etc.) who strove to overcome old authorities (church dogmatism) and to push for, in Kant's words, man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. This concept has been supplemented with concepts of equality, tolerance, etc. However, the aims of Kantian Enlightenment are widely disputed[20] and now often substituted by individual, emotion-based freedoms[21]. While contemporary cosmopolitanism is indeed related to Enlightenment ideas, it is different, and in the context of globalization, even more topical than ever. Therefore, it is Islam that provides an alternative kind of cosmopolitan utopia which seemingly promises global brother/sisterhood without the problems of liberal market-oriented societies.

While Islam is often described as a traditional and conservative religion, it certainly has numerous innovative and progressive aspects, including orientation towards the cosmopolitan world order. In the early 20th century, the Pakistani Islamic scholar, philosopher and preacher Maulana Abul A'la Maududi defended the position that Islam is not just a religion as a system of beliefs and rituals, but rather stated: "Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals."[22] One such world-wide ambition is the creation of a global Islamic society – *Ummah*.

The aspiration of the Islamic State to establish a caliphate seems to be an example of the global ambitions of extreme Islamic radicals. Shortly after the conquering of Mosul (Iraq) the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in his speech called on all the Muslims in the whole world to come to the "Caliphate". He urged: "Therefore, rush O Muslims

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[20] See: Kastijo, Monika. *Eiropas apgaismības liktenis.* Rīga: LU FSI, 2016.

[21] See: Šuvajevs, Igors (ed.). *Bēgšana no brīvības? Ērihs Fromms un Latvija.* Rīga: LU FSI, 2014.

[22] Maududi, Abul A'la. *Jihād in Islām.* Beirut: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1980, p. 5.

to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. [..] The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory."[23] His statement closely resembles the position of Qutb who writes: "[Islam] came to elevate man above, and release him from, the bonds of the earth and soil, the bonds of flesh and blood – which are also the bonds of the earth and soil. A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the Shari'ah of Allah is established and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with Allah Almighty."[24] The cosmopolitan or super-national understanding of Muslim community, *ummah*, of course, is not unique to Qutb or Islamic radicals because, to put it simply, it is one of the basic principles of the Islam. However, the difference is that Qutb's understanding of *ummah* is all-inclusive and not merely religious community. Therefore, it is in direct conflict with existing political order of the world which is mostly divided across the ethnic lines.

The dissolution of the Caliphate by modern Turkish state in the 1924 was a traumatic event in the Islamic society worldview. While Ottoman Empire did not enjoy unanimous support among the Muslims, it still was the one and only highest-level official state-like entity representing Islam and Muslims. From then on, various groups have been talking about the necessity of reestablishment of Caliphate but almost none made any concrete steps to fulfil the ambition. The "Dream of Caliphate" was in the agenda of al-Qaeda as well. Therefore, the announcement by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed by supporters as *amirul-mu'minin*, was an ideologically and symbolically significant moment: "O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah's grace – you have a state and Khilafah [Caliphate], which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab,

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[23] *Dabiq*, No. 1, p. 11.
[24] Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. A. B. al-Mehri (ed.). Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and publishers, 2006, pp. 132–133.

the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal, in one pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood."[25] While majority of Muslims in the whole world did not subject to the call of the al-Baghdadi and considered him an impostor, his announcement still gained a lot of attention and provoked strong emotional, both rejecting and supporting, reactions.

2. Hijacking of values

The concept of cosmopolitanism, of course, is not a cause (*per se*) of radicalisation. Then where is the challenge of Western philosophy and Western values? The hypothesis is that the terrorists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the contemporary cultural situation have reinterpreted philosophically loaded concepts of 'identity' and 'global citizenship'. Of course, these are not exclusively Western concepts. However, they are deeply rooted in the Western philosophy, they have political influence and they are topical to people. The Islamic radicals have been fast to discover this. The thesis of this paper is that cosmopolitism is rather a 'soil' – shaped by Western philosophical ambitions, but hijacked by fundamentalist Islamists or *jihadis* who promise a post-national world that still respects solid identities, concrete traditional values, the dignity of God, the universality of truth, etc. Qutb thinks without compromises: "There is nothing beyond faith except unbelief, nothing beyond Islam except *Jahiliyyahh*, nothing beyond the truth except falsehood."[26] So the Islamic radicalism has turned the quest for identity and the concept of cosmopolitism into a call to banner in promise of reinvented worldview where cosmopolitanism is not utopia of tolerance but rather a global mosque. However, identity is reinvented not as something liberating but rather a beacon for everyone who desires strong borders, orienteers and

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[25] *Dabiq*, No. 1, p. 7.
[26] Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. A. B. al- Mehri (ed.). Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and publishers, 2006, p. 144.

values. Such a worldview could be tempting to numerous people in wide spectrum – from nationalists to conservatives.

This could be explained theoretically by referencing to the current ideological situation in Europe, as well as in the whole EU, including Latvia. The postmodern philosophy has done a lot to deconstruct and dissolve the old myths and ideals. However, the problem is that the new ideals are not yet born. Of course, Western liberal, democratic, republican, secular ideals are still alive, but they have lost the universalistic philosophical backing grounded in the Enlightenment and Modernism. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, we live in the times of *interregnum*, meaning the period when old ruler is dead but the new one has not yet arrived. National states in the EU often risk becoming formless secular individualistic societies without cultural heritage and thus losing moral, ethical traditions. Such situation – dependence on abstract laws and not the historical mores – is universalistic only on papers. Then it would be an enormous fallacy to think that Muslims – from radical to moderate – would abandon their traditional and socially inherited mores in favour of bandwagon filled with universal, jet abstract, theoretical, imagined law of the secular and democratic West. To paraphrase the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche, the West killed the God and put the human in the throne, but radical Islamists, the terrorists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, want to revive God even if it means to sacrifice blood of endless innocent civilians.

The citizens of contemporary nation-states in the EU (and beyond) are not safeguarded from the temptations to return to the 'old ways', traditional virtues, social habits and mores, even if it means to give up at least some of the values that are widely regarded as progressive and thus essentially necessary for the survival of the modern European society (tolerance, solidarity, respect for others, the rights of minorities, individual freedom and rights, etc.). In such a light, words of anthropologist Scott Atran sound ominous: "But, so far, we find no comparable [to Kurds and fighters of the Islamic State] willingness among the majority of youth that we sample in Western democracies. With the defeat of fascism and communism, have

their lives defaulted to the quest for comfort and safety?"[27] His question can be expanded: is the youth of Western societies even opposed to some of the actions perpetrated by Islamic terrorists? The fatigue of consumerism, constant rivalry and endless competitions, the rejection of the perceived superficiality of the West, of feminism, of gender equality can and often leads to the opposite – to the imagined comfort of traditional way of life and the clear, jet illusory borders of classical values.

Conclusion

Postmodern philosophy should not be blamed as a single perpetrator of the cultural processes that characterize the 20th century, as it only described the given reality. And this reality, of course, can be depicted as an unseen economic development, widespread emancipation and rise of tolerance. Yet, the dark side of the liberating, secularizing and democratizing progress is the moral confusion. The clarity and inner spiritual strength of the Islamic State – regardless of whether just imagined or real – smashes the indecisive and chaotic ideals of contemporary West.

The challenge of the Western philosophy regarding the values is of the utmost importance.[28] Studies of radical Islam and terroristic organizations are mostly limited to narrow fields; be it politics, criminology or military sciences. There are good reasons to do so and such approaches are not to be discarded. However, radicalism, terrorism and Islam can and should be studied from a more distant viewpoint with wider perspective, namely, to see it as a part of cultural processes on the background of philosophical and theological ideas.

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[27] Atran, Scott. "Why ISIS has the potential to be a world-altering revolution." *Aeon Essays* (online), 15 December 2015. Available at https://aeon.co/essays/why-isis-has-the-potential-to-be-a-world-altering-revolution (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[28] On the dynamics between Islamic and Christian religious communities in the late 20th century and the early 21st century and on the pre-conditions for a successful interreligious dialogue, see: Stašulāne, Anita. Kristiešu un musulmaņu attiecību dinamika. *Acta Universitatis Latviensis*. 2015, nr. 803 Oriental Studies, pp. 87–101.

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Leons Taivans

ANTROPOLOGIST GEERTZ, GENERAL SUHARTO AND THE ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIM INDONESIA

Introduction

It would be hard to find a successful Islamic democracy in the world map. Yet, there is at least one great exception. It is Indonesia with population of around 260 million, of whom close to 90% are Muslims. After the military dictatorship was overthrown in 1998, the democratic institutions were restored and the democratic image of the country was re-established. In the great extent the state of Indonesia is an artificial body of islands with different ethnicities living there, and embracing different religions. Its history boasts with ancient empires which spread their Buddhist, or Hindu culture to the distant parts of the vast archipelago. This diversity is sometimes explained as the basis for the modern democracy. The author of a book devoted to Islamic deviations challenging the fundamentalist Islam in modern Indonesia George Quinn[1] believes that Indonesia is something of a historic replica to old Andalus, which was conquered by Arab Muslims in 711.

In the early decades of the twenty-first century a quiet revolution is happening. The centre of Islamic energy is shifting – has *already* shifted – far to the east. Indonesia is the new Andalus. It was once a peripheral land

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[1] See: Quinn, George. *Bandit Saints of Java. How Java's Eccentric Saints are Challenging Fundamentalist Islam in Modern Indonesia.* Monsoon Books, 2019.

in the world of Islam, but no longer. With Islam at its centre it is building unprecedented prosperity within well-established democratic institutions.

Like the old Andalus, Indonesia is multi-religious. Hinduism, Christianity, Confucianism and Buddhism, plus some indigenous primal religions, manage a *modus vivendi* side-by-side with the majority faith of Islam. True, Indonesia is no utopia of religious tolerance. But despite spot-fires of communal conflict and the smouldering of old ethnic tensions, despite regular reports of religious bigotry and periodic acts of religious inspired terrorism, and despite growing Islamic conservatism, slowly and precariously a social order is emerging based on a secular constitution, the rule of law, and flawed, but resilient, religious tolerance that is adapting well to the environment of modernity.[2]

Our point is very much the opposite. 'Environment of modernity', 'secular constitution', the 'rule of law' to a great extent, are the product, or the derivative of religious history, its development, as the recent history of Indonesia demonstrates, but not *vice versa*. "Growing Islamic conservatism" as witnessed by George Quinn, is endangering the traditional religious tolerance of the country.

The third Millenia has discovered a new dimension of Islamic history in Indonesia. During the long reign of Sukarno (1945–1966) and gen. Suharto (1966–1998) the official **historiography** painted the religiously motivated political divisions as sectarian and terroristic movements opposed to the newly achieved independence. During the reign of its two first leaders Indonesia was established as a secular country ruled by military where different religious groups enjoyed more or less equal politically limited rights. Indonesia in this respect was very similar to the majority of Islamic countries, where secular military elite provided the pragmatic leadership, whereas Islamic politicians were forced to lay low and compromise with the ruling secular authorities.

After public protests, which forced President Suharto to step down in 1998, Indonesia performed the transition from an authoritarian state to a

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[2]   Quinn, George. *Bandit Saints of Java. How Java's Eccentric Saints are Challenging Fundamentalist Islam in Modern Indonesia*. Monsoon Books, 2019, pp. 20–21.

democracy. For the first time in forty years, Islamic parties and organiza-
tions – including some inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood –
were free to propagate their ways of thinking. The new situation ended
the separatist rebellion in Aceh, providing the province with the right to
draft its own Islamic legislation. The result of democratization was the
growing influence of Islamic orthodoxy and radicalism. Islamic orthodoxy
and political Islam are inseparable: Islam is called 'practical religion' where
spiritual goals are equal with quite tangible political aims. To consolidate
the archipelago nation General Suharto had introduced Islamic education
as the compulsory subject in the public schools of all levels. Islamic indoc-
trination performed by state had powerful results. The older adherence to
traditional religious habits and explanations expired, the orthodox Muslim
identity became more clearly understood and expressed in public. [3]

Research undertaken during the post-Suharto era has discovered that
the official historiography has presented a simplified picture of events.
New writings represent a more polychromic picture, where we discover that
during the decades of repressive regime Islamic political organizations never
abandoned struggle for Islamic state, opposing the secular ideology which
seemed to be close to Communist, or Western neo-colonial system of ideas.
Good example of this sort of research is presented in the books by Chiara
Formichi *Islam and the Making of the Nation,*[4] M. C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation
and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History,
c. 1930 to Present*[5], the research reflected in the monograph *Islam, Politics
and Change: the Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto* by Kees van
Dijk, Ahmad-Norma Permata, Syaifudin Zuhri, et al.,[6] to mention only
few of them.

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[3]   See: Ricklefs, M. C., *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social,
Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to Present*. NUS Press/University of Hawai'i Press,
2012, p. 269ff.

[4]   Formichi, Chiara. *Islam and the Making of the Nation*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

[5]   Ricklefs, M. C. *Islamisation and Its Opponents.*

[6]   See: Dijk, Kees van; Permata, Ahmad-Norma; Zuhri, Syaifudin et al., *Islam,
Politics and Change: the Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto*. Leiden University
Press, 2016.

The democratic changes, as it was mentioned already, have created new and considerable political opportunities for Indonesian political Islam. In the Islamic literature the period was labeled *Reformasi* ('Reformation'), a gentle hint at the reform of Muslim doctrine of faith. Indonesian *Reformasi* contrary to the period in the history of Christianity doesn't mean the liberalization and rationalization of the religious doctrine, but the return to the fundamentalist version of Middle East Islam. Simultaneously it means to return to the idea of Islamic state which was popular during the years of early history of Indonesian independence. Islamic principles of statehood became especially active in the political context of recent general election.

Islam is not the religion devoted *par excellence* to otherworldly matters. The Renaissance of Islam (*Reformasi*) has greatly divided contemporary Indonesian society into two principal parties, the nominal Muslims and the fundamentalists. Before the General Election (April 2019) the latter kept upper hand in political rallying. It means that division based on religious feelings can move the society towards major undemocratic changes. The case of 2017, when the mayor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, under the pressure of Muslim popular movement was sentenced to a two-year prison term for 'blasphemy', indicated a probable decay of democratic values among the majority of the population. [7]

Before the Ahok's case in July 2016 mobs burned and ransacked at least 14 Buddhist temples throughout Tanjung Balai, a port town on Sumatra, following reports of a complaint by Meiliana, a Chinese Buddhist woman, about a mosque's noisy loudspeakers. Meiliana was charged with insulting Islam and in August 2018 she was sentenced to 18 months of jail for blasphemy. In September 2018 authorities in the Bireuen district in the province of Aceh banned men and women from dining together unless they are married or related in order to 'help women be better behaved'. Elsewhere in Aceh there have been public whippings of people found guilty of a range of offences including homosexuality, gambling and drinking

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[7]   Short report of the event is available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/jakarta-governor-ahok-found-guilty-of-blasphemy-jailed-for-two-years (retrieved 28.10.2018).

alcohol. Of similar concern is the role of the seemingly ill-informed and powerful Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majlis ulama Indonesia*, *MUI*), which in August 2018 questioned whether such vaccines as those to prevent measles-rubella and polio are *halal* (Religiously allowed), resulting in a considerable undermining of public health programs.[8] This illustrates the increasingly widespread hold that Islamism has on Indonesia's political and social landscape. There are more evidences of this sort. To understand the underwater currents and its dynamics it is necessary to reflect on the historic peculiarities of Indonesian Islam.

Students of Indonesia used to know about Java, the main island of Indonesian archipelago, through the analysis developed by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his *Religion of Java*[9]. This study saw Javanese society as being made up of three components: the *priyayi*, a thin top layer who were the aristocracy in the great extent belonging to ancient Hindu-Buddhist beliefs mixed with Islam; the *santri*, or pious Muslims; and the *abangan*, by far the majority of Javanese who, albeit being Muslim, drew on Java's heritage and had a syncretic view of the world that expressed itself through shadow theatre *wayang* with its Hindu epics and through mysticism.

To understand the shift in religious orientation of Indonesian population towards orthodox Islam it should be taken into consideration the occupational element of Geertz's religious categories. The *abangan* were ordinary villagers, the *santri* petty traders and independent farmers, the *priyayi* were state officials. In 1950s Java, these variants found political expression in *aliran*, Indonesian for ideological 'stream' or 'current'.[10] In

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[8]   Available at https://www.insideindonesia.org/review-ricklefs-on-islamisation (retrieved 08.02.2019).

[9]   See: Geertz, Cl. *Religion of Java*. New York: The Free Press, 1960.

[10]   The term *aliran* is borrowed from Javanese religion, where this was the name of mystical groups, or sects, which grow around person of a guru. His science, or *ngelmu* may have been taught to him by his father or another guru, or may derive from the study of Javanese ethical and mystical literature. But the real source of this knowledge is his *wahyu*, the revelation he received as a result of his successful and conscientious practice of the mystical discipline (See: Mulder, Niels. *Mysticism in Java: Ideology in Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Kanizius, 2005, p. 52ff). During the first two decades of Indonesian

Java, there were four large *aliran* – *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (National Party of Indonesia), *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Communist Party of Indonesia), *Masyumi*, (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, – Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) and *Nahdatul Ulama* (Ulama's Revival) – representing the *priyayi*, *abangan*, Muslim modernist, and *santri* (Muslim traditionalist) variants, respectively. *Abangan* and *priyayi* orientations gradually aligned into a unit as opposed to the *santri*.[11] All these components in a greater or lesser degree were present among multitude of non-Javanese Indonesian Muslim population as well. During the recent decades the abovementioned division by Cl. Geertz has greatly changed because of the active urbanization and decay of the traditional way of life. This demographic and social process was accompanied with respective switch from traditional pre-Islamic beliefs in countryside to more updated and modern religious outlook of the urbanized milieu.

Urbanization itself was a result of a profound economic and socio-structural change. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the boom was mainly provided by the sale of petroleum and natural gas. With declining prices on the world market, the government was forced to switch policies incrementally towards an export-oriented industrialization. The rapid development entailed the expansion of a hitherto tiny middle class and the emergence of a substantial stratum of industrial workers coming from countryside. Urbanization and individualization and the rising social and geographic mobility have weakened traditional religious and respective social bonds. Increasing educational levels and the enhanced availability of information have produced a migrant urban population increasingly more independent of the advice of traditional authorities. The mass media, such as TV with its religious shows and indoctrination have undermined the traditional authority of ulama and *pesantrens* ('schools of santri', i.e. traditional religious boarding schools) in countryside.

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independence the religious gatherings were partly replaced by political meetings and mass media.

[11] Geertz, Cl. *Peddlers and Princes*, University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 1.

The flow of migrants from countryside to cities is accompanied with a change of religious background of *abangans*. As mentioned already the individuals in the early years of independence were mobilized by 'currents' of public opinion, called *aliran*. The system of *aliran* degraded simultaneously with the process of migration. Andreas Ufen labels this process as 'dealignment.'[12] He argues that a weakening of *aliran* (*dealiranisasi*) or dealignment of political parties is under way even nowadays. This dealignment is indicated by disappearance of the ideological cement and the organizational base has been eroded.[13] Another salient social factor exacerbating the dealignment is the shift in educational patterns. In the 1950s, education was of the utmost importance. Therefore, *aliran* were closely connected to and were reproduced by certain educational institutions. Traditionalist Muslims had their networks of *pesantren*, modernists their *madrasah*, and secular forces their national and Christian missionary schools. Under the *New Order* (1966–1989) this link was partly broken.

With Suharto's *New Order* the government made attempts to control religious life. This was an attempt to control both the actions and the thoughts of the people. *Pancasila*[14] was drummed into the population, but in such a way that it was part of a larger Islamization agenda within the regime's social control policies. The regime's aim was effectively to have more social control via more Islam, and to call it all *Pancasila*. Suharto

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[12] Ufen, Andreas. From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., March, 2008, pp. 5–41.

[13] Ibid., p. 5.

[14] *Pancasila* is the official, foundational doctrine of the Indonesian state. *Pancasila* comprises two Old Javanese words originally derived from Sanskrit: *pañca* ('five') and *sīla* ('principles'). It is composed of five principles: Belief in the One and Only God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*); A just and civilized humanity (*Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab*); A unified Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*); Democracy, led by the wisdom of the representatives of the People (*Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan, dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan*); Social justice for all Indonesians (*Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia*"). The Muslim response to the doctrine see: Ismail, F. Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations: An Account of Muslims' Responses. *Studia Islamika*, 3(4), 2014.

won the support of many Islamic leaders. Considerable integration of
state structures and Islamization of religious organizations was among the
fruits of the Suharto era. Islamists in particular found the regime quite
congenial. Both Islamists and the regime's leading elements felt threatened
by globalization, liberalization and democratization.[15]

The military academies and secular universities with their reformist
agendas mixed students with traditionalist and modernist religious
backgrounds. Religious education at state schools in connection with the
nationwide *santrinisasi* narrowed the divide between *santris* and *abangans*;
and religious schools, even the once very traditional *pesantren*, accepted and
introduced the official national curricula.[16]

The weakening of traditional religious authorities was supplemented
by new religious incentives. The combined effects of mass education,
urbanization, social differentiation unleashed the emergence of new
audiences for Islamic books and newspapers. The pluralization of the
1970s and 1980s resulted in the destabilization of traditional religious
authority. Alongside *ulama* populist preachers, neo-traditionalist Sufi
masters and new Muslim intellectuals were in evidence. A new kind of
aliran became apparent in the university sector. In the 1970s, the so-called
dakwah (predication, mission) movement surfaced. It started in Bandung
around the campus-based Salman mosque and spread in the following
years to other universities. The educational and training methods for its
members, i.e. the formation of small cells (the *usrah* system), were modelled
after those of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood[17]. The related *tarbiyah*
(education) movement began in the early 1980s at different university
campuses.[18]

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[15] Ricklefs, M. C. *Islamisation and Its Opponents:* pp. 464–465.

[16] Ufen, Andreas. *From Aliran to Dealignment..* p. 36.

[17] Salman, Salman. The Tarbiyah movement: why people join this Indonesian
contemporary Islamic movement. *Studia Islamika*, 2006, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 190ff.

[18] The cells later became the backbone of the *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim
Indonesia* (KAMMI, Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), the powerful student
organization in the Reformasi era in 1998.

Whereas the *dakwah* movement had its stronghold in secular universities, *pembaruan* ('a renewal') movement was in particular based at the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (*Institut Agama Islam negeri,* IAIN) and the State Islamic Universities (*Universitas Islam Negeri*, UIN). The state established a number of influential, liberal Islamic universities with a contextual approach to Islamic knowledge, which today educate ever-growing numbers of scholars working in *pesantren* and *madrasah*, but also to encourage these schools to incorporate general and professional education into their curricula. The State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) and State Islamic Universities (UIN) to some extent began to bridge the divides between traditionalists and modernists.[19] The *pembaruan* movement ushered in a broad-based reformist 'civil Islam' whose activists later formed one of the pillars of the pro-democratic *Reformasi* movement.

Meanwhile the rural population which is around 40 per cent is modernizing its world view in lesser degree. According to anthropological research by Judith Schlehe the rural orientation focuses more "on Indonesia, local culture and increasingly on Islam".[20] The growing influence of Muslim teachings is ensured by television and religious gatherings.

To sum up, it would be misleading simply to transfer the Geertzian framework into contemporary situation and to ignore social and cultural change. The dividing line between traditionalist and modernist Islam has become blurred, and even the differentiation between *abangan* and *santri* is questionable because of the expansion of orthodox Islam all over the archipelago (a process referred to as *santrinisasi*). Whereas in the 1950s the proportion of *abangan* was supposedly around half or even two thirds of the total Muslim population, today the percentage has dropped significantly.[21]

Yon Machmudi dates the emergence of the new *santri* with the 1970s, when Suharto regime was in full blossom, and explains it as a growing gap between the younger generation of Indonesian Muslims and their elders.

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[19]   Ufen, Andreas. *From Aliran to Dealignment.*. p. 14.

[20]   Schlehe, Judith. Concepts of Asia, the West and the Self in contemporary Indonesia An anthropological account. *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, September, 2013, p. 511.

[21]   Ufen, Andreas. *From Aliran to Dealignment.*. p. 20.

The gap appeared as a result of Suharto's regime's repressions towards the political Islam which was compensated with extension of religious education. The prominence of Iran's religious revolution contributed greatly into the new consciousness of the young people.[22] The heavy-handed policies of the New Order towards political Islam led some Muslims to adopt a more pragmatic approach, avoiding formal political struggle and turning instead to cultural and social activities.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the global influences of Islam on Indonesian Muslims have become more apparent. The global phenomenon of Indonesian Islam is the result of an imitation of international orientations. Religious and political events in the Middle East, including scholarly disputes, have had a certain impact upon Indonesian Muslims. Movements similar to those in the Middle East have appeared in Indonesia, each developing its networks with Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, India and Pakistan. The emergence of movements such as the Muslim Brothers (Egypt), the *Salafi* groups (Saudi Arabia), *Hizbut Tahrir* (Jordan) and *Jemaah Tabligh* (Indo-Pakistan) are a significant evidence that trans-national movements have seeded their influences in Indonesia. Thus, one of the most salient characteristics of Indonesian Muslims since the 1980s has been their tendency to connect themselves with global issues and movements. This has undermined the authority of local scholars in dealing with religious issues.

The opposition to global Islam is local beliefs, called *kebatinan*, or *kejawen*; they are source of *abangan* syncretism. Because the real source of religious knowledge is *wahyu*, or religious inspiration of a guru, Javanese mysticism lacks a systematic theology, and the theories, practices, and methods of religious propaganda. Most guru stress the originality of their revelations while denying knowledge from books. Therefore, most *aliran kebatinan* do not survive the death of their originators.[23] Meanwhile, the

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[22] Machmudi,Yon. *Islamising Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party*. ANU Press, 2008, p. 23.

[23] Mulder, Niels. *Mysticism in Java: Ideology in Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Kanizius, 2005, p. 54.

state-led Islamic education continued to be compulsory in urban and rural schools. A law of 2003 required schools to recruit teachers of religion and to provide places of worship. Additionally, the religious gatherings and a great growth in the number of mosques and prayer-halls had nearly eliminated more mystical forms of spirituality in the region.[24]

In Javanese-speaking areas promotion of Islamization is performed in the form of local ordinances aimed against different vices, which gain the support of many non-Muslims as well as Muslims. Practicing Christians, Buddhists and Hindus are just as likely as Muslims to support the suppression of drunkenness, gambling, prostitution, opium (or marijuana) smoking and the like. Thievery, womanizing and drinking alcohol were the entertainments regarded as characteristic of the abangan.

Abangan culture has been rich in superstitions, argues M. C. Ricklefs, and even these seem to have become more Islamised:

> *Many of the historically important art forms of Java that were thought to have spiritual powers are losing those spiritual meanings in the modern world and being degraded to mere entertainment, where they face tough competition from more modern diversions. So, it is possible that for many Javanese something of a spiritual or superstitious vacuum opens up in these circumstances, which Islam offers to fill. This is not a case of superstitions disappearing, but rather of them becoming more Islamised. This is particularly true of Muslims of Traditionalist background.*[25]

Conclusion

To sum up the problem of Islamization in Indonesia, it should be mentioned that the growing and diverse Islamic participation is in no way balanced with respective activity of the traditional, or *abangan* layer of religiosity. During the era of Sukarno, the nominal, or syncretic Muslims, called *abangan* via *aliran* were ideologically influenced by the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*). Beside *abangans* there were (and are) numerous animistic and mystical religious groups in Indonesia.

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[24] Ricklefs, M. C. *Islamisation and Its Opponents.*. p. 281.
[25] Ibid., p. 305.

In the early 1960s, Muslim conservatives persuaded the founding president Sukarno to counter mystical sects that they claimed 'tarnished' Islam. Followers of the nation's roughly 245 indigenous faiths gradually left them, leaving only about 200 000 followers of native faiths today in a country of 260 million people. The religious diversity was a powerful resource of pluralistic thought and political discussion. The religious quest in the great extent was replaced by socialist egalitarian arguments and slogans in 1950s. After the abortive coup d'état of 1965, the *abangans* were attacked by *santri* youth and mass killings[26] seriously undermined further growth and even tradition of the syncretic Islam. The modernizing economy and migration completed the process. The empty religious niche was occupied by dynamic and expanding international Islam. Political tenets of Islam tighten the political grasp of the religion and it can be a serious obstacle on Indonesia's way towards modernization and democratic development.

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[26] The Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66 occurred over several months, targeting Communist sympathizers, ethnic Chinese and alleged leftists *abangans*, often at the instigation of the armed forces and government. It began as an anti-communist purge following a controversial attempted coup d'état by the 30 September Movement in Indonesia. The most widely published estimates were that 500 000 to more than one million people were killed, with some more recent estimates going as high as two to three million. The purge was a pivotal event in the transition to the "New Order" and the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a political force. See: Cribb, Robert. The Indonesian Genocide of 1965–1966. In Samuel Totten (ed.). *Teaching about Genocide: Approaches, and Resources*, Information Age Publishing, 2004, ISBN 159311074X, pp. 133–143.

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Ingrida Kleinhofa

THE CHRONICLES OF DOUBLE UN-BELONGING: REPRESENTATIONS OF HYBRID IDENTITY IN MOHJA KAHF'S *THE GIRL IN THE TANGERINE SCARF*

Introduction

The writing of Mohja Kahf, an Arab-American novelist, poet, and scholar of postcolonial and comparative literature,[1] is much noted for shattering stereotypes about the "oppressed and silenced Muslim woman"[2] and speaking up for Arab American Muslim women with scathing "diasporic Arab feminist critique."[3] However, there is a less noticed aspect of her literary work: its being an authentic, detailed account of culture interaction processes in immigrant communities and, most notably, of culture interference and transfer in an immigrant's mind, which, according to Iyall Smith (2008), may lead to assimilation, rejection of the non-native

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[1]   Born in Syria, 1967, arrived with her family to the U.S.A. in 1971. Kahf's short biography: see Darraj, Susan Muaddi. Introduction to "Poetry Is My Home Address" by Mohja Kahf. In Darraj, Susan Muaddi (ed.). *Scheherazade's Legacy: Arab and Arab American Women on Writing.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004, p. 7.

[2]   Hammer, Juliane. *American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More Than a Prayer.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012, p. 148. See also pp. 147 and 164 on Mohja Kahf's work.

[3]   Naber, Nadine Christine. *Arab America: Gender, Cultural Politics, and Activism.* New York: New York University Press, 2012, p. 55.

culture, or, most often, to forming a hybrid identity.[4] Diaspora literature in general tends to focus on this complicated adaptation process in the new country as the uniting experience of immigrants,[5] and Arab American autobiographical novels are no exception, as writers partially identify with both conflicting cultures and thus are not able to take fully the side of any of them, struggling with contradictory feelings and double affiliations.[6] One of such works is Mohja Kahf's autobiographical novel, *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf* (2006),[7] which shows tensions resulting from the superposition of two cultures, Syrian [Damascene]-Arab-Sunni-Muslim and 'mainstream' [White Protestant] American with an accurate first-person descriptions of alternation between two worldviews with conflicting value-systems, resulting in identity crisis and gradual identity hybridization. Its protagonist, the young Khadra Shamy, must understand and resolve these contradictions in the process of growing up between extremes of both cultures: on one side, her ultraconservative Muslim community and parents; on the other, Christian fanatics and Indiana Klansmen. Caught in the middle of this 'clash of civilizations,' she faces the formidable task of shaping own personality and becoming a responsible adult with definite values, beliefs, and loyalties.

The task of creating of a hyphenated Arab-Muslim-American identity as such is rather complicated, as it involves bridging the enormous cultural gap, named and explained differently by different communities, but nevertheless being the basic demarcation line between hostile camps and maintained by aggressive discourse and its counter-discourse from *both*

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[4]   Iyall Smith, Keri E. Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations in Iyall Smith, Keri E. and Patricia Leavy (eds.). *Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations*. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 3–12.

[5]   Weiner, Melissa F., and Richards, Bedelia Nicola. Bridging the Theoretical Gap: The Diasporized Hybrid in Sociological Theory. In *Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations*, 2008, pp. 101–116.

[6]   See Hassan, Wail S. *Immigrant Narratives: Orientalism and Cultural Translation in Arab American and Arab British Literatures*. Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 80.

[7]   Kahf, Mohja. *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006.

sides. For Khadra's family, it is Muslims versus *kuffar*,[8] while for some of their Indiana neighbours it is White Christian Americans versus *ragheads*,[9] both communities dividing the world into the Self, having a culture and virtues, and the Other as the negative reflection of Self, with each virtue replaced with a corresponding vice, and therefore reduced to some cartoon-like, dehumanized image. This distinction roughly corresponds to the division into 'the West' and 'the Orient,' used by Edward Said, and to the one of "the fault lines between civilizations," constituting, potentially, "the battle lines of the future"[10] mentioned in "The Clash of Civilizations." According to Huntington (1993), Arabs (in particular, Muslims) belong to the Islamic civilization, while Americans (in particular, of European origin) are part of the North American variant of the Western civilization.[11] While the ideas of Huntington may be much discussed and criticized,[12] and terms such as 'the West,' the 'Orient,' or 'the East' may indeed be labeled 'hyperreal'[13] or belonging to the realm of 'imaginative geography,'[14] it should be pointed out that they are used as 'short-hand generalizations' characterizing different cultures and, therefore, helpful in differentiation and classification of cultural communities.[15] Thus, from the viewpoint of the semiotic analysis of culture, they are terms, or *cultural units*, related to culture-specific visualization and connotations,[16] the referent of which is not a real object but rather a socially conventionalized

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[8] See, for instance, *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, pp. 13–14.

[9] Ibid., pp. 5, 82, 97.

[10] Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer, 1993, p. 22.

[11] Ibid., p. 24.

[12] Some insights provided by: James F. Hoge and James Hoge Jr., F. (eds.). *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate*. New York: The Council of Foreign Affairs, 2010.

[13] Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History. In *Decolonization Reader*. Le Sueur, James D. (ed.). London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 428–448, 428.

[14] E.g., *Orientalism*, p. 49.

[15] Hall, Stuart. The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power. In Gupta, Tania Das et al. (eds.). *Race and Racialization, 2E: Essential Readings*, Toronto: Canadian Scholars, pp. 85–95.

[16] *A Theory of Semiotics,* p. 67.

concept – a semiotic sign.[17] In other words, regardless of the discussion about their validity and definition, 'the West' and 'the East' (and, in some contexts, *kuffar* and *ragheads* as well) do exist in the subjective reality of representatives of different cultures – as semiotic signs which form the basic binary opposition for self-identification, embedded in cultural codes. It is enough to mention that the mentioned partition of the world into some generic 'West' versus some generic 'East' defined as 'NOT West' is used in a matter-of-fact manner in Western literature, in particular, by the whole range of colonial and post-colonial critics, while the distinction between 'Muslims' and 'NOT Muslims' is used in the same way in Islamic publications.

While Huntington defines civilizations as distinct "cultural entities," characterized "both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people,"[18] it must be noted that they are distinct only because of their differentiation from something else, which is done by the sharp demarcation of Self vs. Other, using this binary logics to construct own identity.[19] Edward Said rightly points out, however, mainly speaking about the Western master discourse, "Self-definition is one of activities practiced by all cultures: it has a rhetoric, a set of occasions, and authorities," adding that, in the globalized world, "the assertion of identity is by no means a mere ceremonial matter" because it can "mobilize passions atavistically."[20] This kind of passionate self-defining and identity-defending discourse, both Western and Arab-Islamic, is presented in Kahf's novel, also showing the reason for perpetuating it as fear of "being swallowed up by this land, reduced to nothing," in immigrants' case, as they force their children to maintain their original identity.[21] Yet, as soon as cultures come in con-

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[17] *A Theory of Semiotics,* p. 66.

[18] The clash of civilizations?, p. 24.

[19] *The Location of Culture*, p. 3. See also the views of Juri Lotman on the role of binary oppositions in the construction of culture/identity: *Лотман, Юрий Михайлович.* "О метаязыке типологических описаний."

[20] Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage Books, 1994, p. 42.

[21] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 405.

tact in some environment, the negotiation between such culture-defining narratives begins, as the representative speakers of each culture tend to 'rewrite' the reality from own position, proving its validity by the axioms of own culture.[22] If cultures that use each other as a foil for positive self-identification come in contact in some community, family, or mind, the process of identity negotiation might be qualified as self-perpetuating reciprocal epistemic violence[23] with attacks and retaliations, where both sides play simultaneously roles of the oppressors and the oppressed, each in their scope and sphere, to the maximal extent they may reach, curbed only by the resistance of the other side. Thus, the main problems in culture contact stem from their tendency to define Self against some Other, or non-Self, which, in this case, best would stay physically distant, speaking incomprehensible language, and acting in an inexplicable way, so that it might be comfortably used as the everlasting opponent.

In a literary work, the operation of two (or more) culture-defining narratives may be explored using the semiotic analysis proposed by Juri Lotman[24] and Umberto Eco.[25] Each text contains semiotic signs belonging to at least one cultural code, arranged into a set of binary oppositions which define the properties of 'Self' having CULTURE as contrasted to NONCULTURE of the 'Other;'[26] similarly, each text simultaneously plays the role of a constituent of some culture as a metatext[27] and represents the group of references to the general culture-context, which is formed by other

[22] Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 9–15.

[23] See Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Can the Subaltern Speak? In Ashkroft, Bill, Griiffiths, Gareth, and Tiffin, Helen (eds.). *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 24–28.

[24] As in Lotman, Juri M. *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*. London, I. B. Tauris, 2001.

[25] As analyzed by Umberto Eco in *A Theory of Semiotics* (1976) and *The Role of the Reader*: *Exploration in the Semiotics of Texts* (1979).

[26] Лотман, Юрий Михайлович. О метаязыке типологических описаний in *Статьи по семиотике культуры и искусства*. Available at https://culture.wikireading.ru/48671 (retrieved 28.10.2018).

[27] Лотман, Ю. М. Текст и функция in Лотман Ю. М. *Избранные статьи*. Т. 1. Таллинн, 1992, с. 133–141.

similar texts.[28] Obviously, the author's hybrid identity would reveal itself by the overlap of heterogeneous cultural codes and by references to more than one literary and cultural canon. This theoretical framework helps discover the many instances of overlapping cultural codes and culture-defining narratives in Kahf's novel, pinpointing the mode and manner of hybridization as well as drawing conclusions on the Arab-American identity shaping process in general. It must be noted that the competent reader[29] of *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf* should have some knowledge of Islam as well as of Arabic language and culture, as these not always are explained; in general, the addressee of the novel appears to be a person with an Arab-American-Muslim background, of 'hyphenated' identity, who is able to recognize signs of both cultural codes and the complex intertextuality. In fact, Kahf explicitly states in an interview that her target audience consists of American Muslims, "Arabic-speaking intellectuals and scholars," Arab Americans as well as to "Other Americans" whom she defines "in contrast" to her "first group, Muslim Americans,"[30] thus illustrating the binary division construction principle in identity building.

The operation of this kind of culture-defining discourse is shown in *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf* as uncensored hate speech of both antagonistic groups, Indiana racists and ultraconservative Muslims, with the hatred emanating from Indiana racists and Muslim-haters is balanced by the hate speech of Khadra's own community, and the scene of mutual enmity is completely set. On one side, her family (and the whole Dawah community) spends much effort maintaining their separation from the *kuffar* society, mainly by *telling* each other, especially, their children, about the bad qualities of everyone who does not belong to their culture. From the earliest age, Khadra's upbringing involves warning against *kuffar*, their filthy food, and filthy habits. Her father works at the Dawah Center,

[28] Ю. М. Лотман. Семиотика культуры и понятие текста, с. 129–132.

[29] Eco, Umberto. *The Role of the Reader*: *Exploration in the Semiotics of Texts*, pp. 7, 16–26.

[30] Zine, Jasmin. Interview with Mohja Kahf. In: *Muslim Women, Transnational Feminism and the Ethics of Pedagogy: Contested Imaginaries in Post-9/11 Cultural Practice*, pp. 247–251.

helping Muslims "to find solutions to the ways in which living in a kuffar land made practicing Islam hard," which is considered "a noble jihad."[31] Her mother believes that "you can never be friends with unbelievers"[32] so "Muslims must become strong again, and get nuclear arms, and depend on themselves" to "save themselves from destruction."[33] For Khadra's family, "The Americans were the white people who surrounded them, a crashing sea of unbelief in which the Dawah centre bobbed, a brave boat;"[34]Americans could be "nice" as their good neighbours or "nasty" as the Lott family, but the "majority" was "ignorant," as those who "followed false prophets" and had wrong ideas about what was right.[35] The novel contains plenty of examples how the image of Americans is carefully built as the NONCULTURE using the negative counterparts of the main values possessed, by default, Shamys' CULTURE, and reinforcing the effect by using terms with negative, abhorrent, and physically revulsive connotations when referring to the Other.[36] On the other side, this separation is maintained and reinforced by the attacks of Indiana racists, who with their words and actions confirm the whole range of negative stereotypes maintained by Khadra's community. For the little Khadra, a representative of the hostile American/*kuffar* society is Brian Lott, "a boy with heavy pink flushed cheeks" who attacks, threatens, yells swearwords, and calls her *raghead*.[37] Similarly minded young men attack the building where several years later Khadra's friend's henna party is held, throwing at the hedge rotten eggs and tomatoes and writing over the windows abusive slogans signed "KKK, 100% USA."[38] The mentioned Khadra's friend, a Kenyan American Muslim girl Zuhura, is later found raped and murdered, most

[31] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 14.
[32] Ibid., p. 381.
[33] Ibid., p. 382.
[34] Ibid., p. 67.
[35] Ibid., p. 67.
[36] For instance, Ibid., pp. 29; 67–68.
[37] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf,* p. 5.
[38] Ibid., p. 82.

probably, by the Klansmen, and the police never finds the aggressors,[39] which strengthens Khadra's distrust of white non-Muslim men.[40] It is by Zuhura's grave that Khadra finally thinks, "*Maybe we* don't *belong here*" and muses that "maybe she belonged in a place where she would not get shoved and called 'raghead' every other day in the school hallway."[41] The novel does not say what is *told* to Brian Lott at home to trigger this behaviour, as the reader sees the events from the viewpoint from inside Indiana Muslim community; however, the hate speech meant for the *insiders* appears to be powerful enough to cause enmity to all outsiders, with a great surprise that a *kafir* or a *bad Muslim* may have decent human qualities, as it often happens.[42]

The overlap of viewpoints and value-systems within one consciousness and coping processes with ensued hybridization, as described by Mohja Kahf, corresponds also to the theoretical framework provided by such scholars as, for instance, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with her concept of 'Resident Alien'[43] and Homi Bhabha with the idea of culture dialogue in some virtual 'third space' (which sometimes turns to a battleground), where the negotiation takes place and different strategies of dealing with value conflicts are tried out.[44] In particular, Spivak points out that inhabitants of the postcolonial world, and in this case, it refers to environment in which carriers of antagonistic discourse live side by side, try to communicate, and may even form mixed families, necessarily form some indefinite, 'in-between' identity belonging to the culture-space between the two worlds rather than any of the two heritage ones. This kind of the new [meta-

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[39]   *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf,* p. 416.

[40]   Ibid., p. 416.

[41]   Ibid., p. 416.

[42]   See, for instance, Ibid., pp. 189.

[43]   Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Resident Alien." In Goldberg, David Theo and Ato Quayson (eds.). *Relocating Postcolonialism: A Critical Reader.* Malden: Blackwell, 2002, pp. 47–65.

[44]   Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 36–38.

national?] identity is also aptly dubbed 'plural' or 'hyphenated identity'[45] which, regardless of the nature of its constituent cultures, share a common trait: they result from a conflict of contradictory culture-narratives and thus transcend them. The result is people who simultaneously belong and do not belong to their heritage societies, defamiliarizing both cultures and partly identifying with both. This new, 'in-between' identity is the real one of people raised in environment with cultures in contact, which, in Spivak's case, was her choice to "retain an Indian passport and remain no more than a permanent resident in the US," belonging to "a small group" of people "in both worlds, deeply, without being quite of them."[46] Spivak claims that such people have almost magic power to fight the evil and to change the world, being immune to manipulation because of having no loyalties based on hostile culture-defining discourse.[47] It must be noted also, as it will be obvious from the analysis of *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf* provided below, that such people have the ability to instantly locate the incongruences in definitions which lead to problems in intercultural communication, not in the least because these misunderstandings have been for years the source of their own inner conflicts.

From the first pages, the interlacing cultural codes manifest themselves with a plenty of signs and allusions; for instance, the scene of return of the protagonist, Syrian-American Khadra Shamy, to Indiana where she spent her childhood, presents the multicultural setting and announces the main conflicts of the novel. The quotation from Sue Monk Kidd's *The Dance of the Dissident Daughter*, "my creative life is my deepest prayer"[48] connects the anglophone reader to the supposedly familiar American/Christian tradition and hints at the deep religiosity of the author/protagonist who, as the reader already knows, is Muslim; in this way, the equivalence of both religions and both writers is suggested for an audience familiar with the past

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[45] For instance, see Caglar, Ayse S. Hyphenated Identities and the Limits of 'Culture'. In Modood, Tariq and Pnina Werbner (eds.). *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Culture*. London: Zed Books, 1997, pp. 169–185.

[46] Resident Alien, p. 48

[47] Ibid., pp. 49–53.

[48] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 1.

and current attitudes towards Christianity and Islam in American society. Khadra is described as "olive-skinned, dark-haired young woman" driving a hatchback on a highway over "the unbearable flatness of central Indiana" and having with her "a small zippered Quran and a camera,"[49] representing her difference from White non-Muslim Americans. At the same time, this depiction presents an image familiar to Muslims – the pious but progressive, up-to-date Muslim woman, the replica of Aisha or Fatimah as she would look in the 21st century: driving a car instead of riding a camel, and publishing articles instead of speaking to the congregation.[50] In addition, Khadra's name carry a symbolism in Arabic, not instantly obvious to the anglophone reader; the surname Shamy means 'Syrian,' while her name Khadra means 'the green one,' most probably, referring to the holy colour of Islam. As Gauding (2009) explains in "Islamic Color Symbolism", green is "a symbol of Islam" which "represents life, nature, and fertility" and is one of the colours of Paradise; besides, it might hint at being a warrior in the holy war, *jihad*: "Muhammad wore a green cloak and turban and Muslim warriors wore green in the Crusades."[51] Non-fiction written by Mohja Kahf contains clues to the mentioned overt/covert symbolism of Khadra's name, appearance, and mission; for instance, she states that speaking the truth about the falsehood and injustice of this world, even if it concerns "the dark side" of her own heritage community, "and asking the disturbing, subversive questions is a noble jihad."[52] This stance stems from her upbringing "in America on the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the narratives of his Companions" with "Aisha as a woman of eloquence and nerve"[53] as a role-model. Therefore, she will not let "hatemongers" of "either side" to

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[49] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 1.

[50] Cf. Hubbard, Ben. A Saudi Morals Enforcer Called for a More Liberal Islam. Then the Death Threats Began. *The New York Times*, July 10, 2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html (retrieved 02.02.2019).

[51] Gauding, Madonna. Islamic Color Symbolism. In *The Signs and Symbols Bible: The Definitive Guide to Mysterious Markings*. New York: Sterling Publishing, 2009, p. 107.

[52] *Poetry Is My Home Address*, p. 15.

[53] Ibid., p. 8.

silence her, in particular, as she is urged by her own "roots community" to "shut up about the sexism and the bullshit within that community, and be an ambassador of the pretty side of the heritage culture."[54]

From this thoroughly Islamic position, using Khadra as the Aisha-figure, Kahf scrupulously describes life between two warring cultures. Sometimes, the two worlds, the 'mainstream' American and the ultraconservative Sunni Muslim, peacefully coexist in parallel, as shown by the scene of little Khadra playing by the drying laundry.[55] Remarkably, the girl's thoughts refer largely to an American child's culture code: "Ruffled home-sewn nightgowns became Laura and Mary Ingalls racing Khadra along the banks of a prairie creek."[56] Most names of plants and insects in her child's world come from Indiana reality and English language, such as "fat jewel-box caterpillars with white, yellow, and black stripes" and "a potato-bug;"[57] moreover, "daddy longlegs" is connected to the English nursery-rhyme, *Old Father Long-Legs* who wouldn't say his prayers, which is compatible with the emphasis on prayers at her home. It must be noted that the little Khadra has no contradiction regarding plants and insects, so she may keep this part of her world; yet, were she to follow more into the anglophone American life and consider having a dog, that would strike a dissonance and meet a strong resistance. In the novel, this fully American, English culture-specific description of the child's world is contrasted with the description of her mother's opinion on washing according to Islamic ritual purity principles:

> Her mother always ran the laundry twice in the Fallen Timbers basement laundry room with the coin machines. Because what if the person who used the washer before had a dog? You never knew with Americans. Pee, poop, vomit, dog spit, and beer were impurities. Americans didn't care about impurities. They let their dogs rub their balls on the couches they sit on and drool on the beds they sleep in and lick the mouths of their

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[54] *Poetry Is My Home Address*, p. 14.

[55] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 3.

[56] Ibid., p. 3.

[57] Ibid., pp. 3–4.

children. How Americans tolerate living in such filth is beyond me, her mother said.[58]

In this manner, a demarcation line between *them* and *us* is set, defining with disgust as a non-culture the one where the Islamic ritual purity, *taharah*, is not observed, forming the first remarkable binary opposition which builds Khadra's world and is in contrast with her identification with the anglophone American culture though allusions to nursery rhymes and children's literature as well as the names of the plants and the animals related to the associations that are clearly anglophone American and certainly not Syrian. Ritual purity as a cultural marker is mentioned in Kahf's poem "My grandmother puts her feet in the sink of the bathroom at Sears" (in a preparation for Islamic prayer); the poem exposes the underlying antagonism of cultures through their different understanding of cleanliness, with mutual implications that the Other is filthy, and, therefore, leading to "a clash of civilizations brewing in the Sears bathroom."[59]

Descriptions of vision from both sides of the cultural gap demonstrate the subjectivity of perception, when the same range of images may signify the positive values of own community, and at the same time be triggers for hostility as hallmarks of the Other, in the eyes of those on the other side of the gap, though, possibly, not accurately so but rather as it is imagined to be. An instance of such shifting view is shown in the scene of her American friend Livvy visiting Khadra's home, as Khadra suddenly sees the 'normal' summer clothes, shorts and a halter-top, as if through the eyes of her parents, "Suddenly poor virginal Livvy [..] seemed very naked to Khadra. She was all thin bare legs and shivering goose-pimply arms. Like you wanted to wrap a warm blanket around her."[60] Another example is the overlapping and contrasting descriptions of Khadra's family. First, from her

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[58] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 4.

[59] Kahf, Mohja. My Grandmother Washes Her Feet in the Sink of the Bathroom at Sears. In *E-mails from Scheherazad*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003, pp. 26–28.

[60] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 87.

point of view: her father was "wiry and olive-complexioned, with glasses,"[61] while her mother was "green-eyed and ivory-skinned and lovely" wearing "a white wimple on her head, and a long blue robe. The colour of sky, it swept the earth."[62] Next, as probably seen by the neighbours: "a bunch of foreigners. Dark and wrong. Dressed funny" whose speech for them was "gross sounds, like someone throwing up."[63] While the described shifts of vision may be considered rather benign, the ones involving basic values may cause severe distress. Taking a course of Islam taught by a Western professor makes her realize that "the belief system of her parents and their entire circle" was "just one point on a whole spectrum of Islamic faith," "just one little corner of it."[64] She "heroically" resists the idea that all these "other paths" are Muslim as well[65] because in her community she is taught that "the only way to know God is to obey his Law" (in their edition only) and "Westerners like to focus on the heretics and deviants in Islam;"[66] yet, the religion that has been part of Khadra's life since childhood is defamiliarized and the two outlooks clash in her mind:

> *There were moments in Professor Eschenbach's class in which Khadra felt as if she were standing atop two earth plates grinding as they moved in different directions. The one under her was the view of Islam she'd grown up knowing. The other was what she was catching glimpses of. A rift occasionally opened beneath her feet, but she steadied herself against it. Otherwise, suddenly, what she'd always thought was right, appeared wrong, and what she'd always known was bad seemed, for an eye-blink moment, good. It was terrifying.*[67]

Another example of radical disagreement of the two cultures is the is the attitude to hijab in Khadra's family and community as contrasted to the reaction of non-Muslim neighbours and schoolmates. Authentically

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[61] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 5.
[62] Ibid., pp. 5–6.
[63] Ibid., p. 6.
[64] Ibid., pp. 232–233.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., p. 233.
[67] Ibid., p. 234.

and minutely, Kahf describes the feelings of little Khadra towards her hijab as stemming from the beliefs of her community: "the sensation of being hijabed was a thrill. Khadra had acquired vestments of a higher order. Hijab was a crown on her head. She went forth lightly and went forth heavily into the world, carrying with her the weight of a new grace."[68] Furthermore, "hijab soon grew to feel as natural to her as a second skin, without which if she ventured into the outside world she felt naked."[69] Khadra explains to her friend, "I'd no sooner take off my hijab than you'd take off your blouse in the middle of the street" and sincerely believes that enduring the heat while wearing the hijab will save her from hellfire.[70] These feelings are reinforced by love, care, and respect lavished on her by her parents and community because she came of age and fulfilled her religious obligations, thus confirming her loyalty to her religion. However, her family and community severely underestimate pressures on the young Khadra because of her wearing the hijab,[71] which was turning the girl into a human billboard and personification of a Muslim Other, a Muslim terrorist, especially, after Iranian hostage crisis and against the background of perpetual turmoil in the Middle East. Her schoolmates attack her yelling, "Take off your towel first, raghead,"[72] pull off her headscarf wondering if she has hair under it and mock her, while the teachers do not interfere. In her poems, Mohja Kahf focuses on these bitter experiences and stigma brought upon Muslim women because of head covering. For instance, she evokes the sense of total estrangement from non-Muslim Americans, being perceived by them as a hostile alien, as she exclaims, "I'm a Muslim Woman, Not a Klingon," saying, "I could've been antimatter," and referring to the "positronic field of hijab" which divides her from the rest of society.[73] In her poem, "My Body Is Not Your Battleground,"[74]

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[68] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, pp. 112–113.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., p. 113.
[71] Ibid., p. 125.
[72] Ibid., p. 124.
[73] Hijab Scene #3. In *E–Mails from Scheherazad*, p. 25
[74] My Body Is Not Your Battleground in *E–Mails from Scheherazad*, pp. 58–59.

Kahf exposes the objectification, dehumanization of her feminine body by both cultures: the Islamic, as *awrah* to be covered; and the Western, as evil Other, if covered, and for that reason, becoming the battleground for the 'clash of civilizations.'

Conclusion

As a result of these severe external and internal conflicts, Khadra reaches a crisis which, at last, makes her think about the nature and needs of own self, long neglected and, therefore, underdeveloped.[75] Only when she, trying to be a perfect daughter and "Dawah Center poster girl,"[76] goes too far against own wishes, does she realize that she has some individuality, who she "essentially deep-down" is and which she must finally recognize,[77] and that she needs to "find out for herself"[78] the truth about her religion.[79] Only contrasted to people from traditional Arab communities, such as her Kuwaiti husband Juma, Meccans, and relatives in Syria, does she recognize the Americanness of her personality; conversely, only after separation from her community does she realize her belonging to them and feel the pull back to be safeguarded by her family and Islamic traditions.[80] She admits, finally, that her most characteristic feature is her contradictions,[81] and that she is a 'freak' which belongs nowhere.[82] The only way to preserve her sanity and to build some coherent identity is to admit her multiple partial belonging to different communities, alienated from each by some characteristics, which places her in the 'third space' on the intersection of cultures, a Resident Alien everywhere. She keeps her hijab, just like Spivak

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[75] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 248.
[76] Ibid., p. 242.
[77] Ibid., p. 251.
[78] Ibid., p. 262.
[79] Ibid., p. 262.
[80] Ibid., p. 353.
[81] Ibid., p. 341.
[82] Ibid., p. 354.

keeping her Indian passport, as a mark of in-between position,[83] and feels at last part of a large part of American society – "people with parents who had accents."[84] Among them, "it almost feels as if she, Khadra Shamy, she and her kind, are just the latest in the series of Americans, instead of trespassers on the homestead of the real Americans."[85] Therefore, she is able to define herself at last: "Well, I *am* an Arab woman!" – "An Arab-*American* woman"[86].

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[83] *The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf*, p. 424.
[84] Ibid., p. 380.
[85] Ibid., p. 391.
[86] Ibid., p. 360.

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