https://doi.org/10.22364/iscflul.10.14

Spyridon Tsantinis, *Dr. iur., Professor*
Democritus University of Thrace, Greece

REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN GREEK LAW: TRANSPOSITION OF THE DIRECTIVE AND INITIAL EXPERIENCES

Key words: Directive (EU) 2020/1828, representative actions, Greek consumer law, collective redress, qualified entities, opt-in, cross-border actions, litigation funding, procedural safeguards, settlements, injunctions, civil penalties

Summary

Directive (EU) 2020/1828 restructures EU collective consumer protection by requiring Member States to provide a "representative action" mechanism capable of producing both injunctive measures and consumer redress, while preserving national procedural autonomy within a set of minimum safeguards. The Greek transposition, as reflected in Law 5019/2023 (amending Part Eight of Law 2251/1994: "Consumer Protection Act") combines continuity with earlier association-based enforcement with significant design choices on (i) standing; (ii) the organisation and monitoring of qualified entities; (iii) the consumer participation model for redress (opt-in, including a post-judgment option); (iv) the use of a civil-penalty logic as an ancillary deterrence mechanism; and (v) a strict stance on litigation finance.

Introduction

Research questions and relevance – research structure

Directive (EU) 2020/1828[1] requires Member States to ensure the availability of a representative action mechanism for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, explicitly addressing both injunctive relief and redress within a single framework. The Directive positions representative actions as part of the Union's

[1] Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC [2020] OJ L 409/1 ("Representative Actions Directive", hereafter RAD).

response to the risk that "the same unlawful practice" may harm large numbers of consumers, including in cross-border markets shaped by digitalisation.[2] While the Directive does not impose a uniform procedural model, it does specify minimum requirements concerning qualified entities, funding safeguards, information duties, and the interaction of representative actions with consumer rights derived from a broad range of EU instruments listed in Annex I.

Greece's transposition, as reflected in Law 5019/2023 is relevant for at least three reasons: First, the Greek legislator chose to locate the transposition within the existing architecture of the Consumer Protection Act (Law 2251/1994) by modernising Part Eight, rather than building a wholly separate, general collective redress code. Second, the Greek scheme emphasises a consumer-association-centred standing model, an opt-in approach for redress measures (including a "late" opt-in possibility), and a distinctive approach to deterrence (including a civil penalty mechanism).[3] Third, the Greek implementing choices adopt a notably strict position on third-party funding, which raises interpretive and policy questions when assessed against the Directive's more governance-oriented approach to funding risks.

Against that background, three tightly framed research questions are addressed:

Transposition and design choices: How do the Greek implementing provisions map onto the Directive's core concepts (qualified entities, injunctive/redress measures, safeguards, information duties, cross-border functionality)?

Continuity and change: How does the transposed regime relate – doctrinally and institutionally – to pre-existing Greek consumer enforcement and association-based collective action mechanisms?

Initial experiences: What can be said about the early implementation phase in Greece (designation practice, court readiness, emerging interpretive questions), and what cannot yet be concluded?

To ensure this presentation is coherent and self-contained, we start with a concise summary of the directive itself. This will be useful for readers and will also facilitate independent reading of this study.

Meaning of "representative actions" in the Directive and in Greek context

At EU level, RAD defines a "representative action" as an action "for the protection of the collective interests of consumers" that is brought by a qualified entity, seeking either injunctive measures, redress measures, or both.[4] The Directive thereby formalises a model in which the procedural protagonist is

---

[2] Directive (EU) 2020/1828, recitals 1–5.

[3] Dionysopoulos G. The new framework of Law No. 5019/2023 concerning representative actions. In: Monthly Bulletin of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises "Regulatory environment and Business", 2 March 2023.

[4] Directive (EU) 2020/1828, Art. 3.

not an individual consumer but a designated organisation (or public body) meeting specific independence and transparency conditions.[5]

In the Greek transposition, "representative actions" are embedded in the Consumer Protection Act's Part Eight through a new chapter that structures: (i) who may bring such actions (consumer associations meeting certain criteria); (ii) which measures may be sought (injunctive and redress); and (iii) procedural and institutional conditions, including registration and monitoring. The Greek regime can be characterized as both a continuation of association-based consumer litigation and a structural reorganisation aimed at aligning with RAD's bifurcated remedy model.[6]

Contribution and limits (especially regarding "initial experiences")

As (up to February 2026) there are no Greek judicial decisions applying the post-transposition regime, "initial experiences" are approached as early doctrinal and institutional observations grounded in statutory design and scholarly discussion rather than claims about settled practice.

1. Directive (EU) 2020/1828: Architecture and core concepts

1.1. Objectives, regulatory technique, and the "two-track" remedy model

RAD's core regulatory move is to require a representative action mechanism that can (at minimum) support two types of measures: (i) injunctive measures designed to stop or prohibit infringements, and (ii) redress measures designed to obtain remedies for consumers affected by those infringements.[7] Recital 5 frames this as a deliberate shift beyond the older injunction-focused framework in Directive 2009/22/EC, which is repealed and replaced. The Directive thereby treats collective consumer enforcement as not merely prospective (stopping unlawful conduct) but also remedial, by requiring that representative actions can result in outcomes delivering compensation, repair, replacement, price reduction, contract termination, or reimbursement (depending on the relevant substantive instrument and national implementation).

This "two-track" model is both an expansion of collective consumer enforcement and a compromise: the Directive sets minimum procedural components but leaves core choices – such as opt-in vs opt-out and details of redress distribution – to Member States.[8] This combination reflects the Directive's explicit

---

[5] Directive (EU) 2020/1828, Arts. 4–6.

[6] Dionysopoulos G. 2023.

[7] Directive (EU) 2020/1828, Art. 8–9.

[8] Visscher L., Faure M. A Law and Economics Perspective on the EU Directive on Representative Actions for Consumers (Directive 2020/1828). Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2021, pp. 455–482.

balancing concern: improving access to justice while avoiding abusive litigation and "punitive damages". On a law-and-economics reading, the Directive's architecture may be understood as seeking to increase deterrence and consumer protection while controlling the risk of opportunistic litigation through governance of actors (qualified entities) and procedural safeguards.[9]

2. Scope and Annex I: Linking procedure to substantive EU consumer rights

2.1. Scope by reference to EU instruments

RAD applies to infringements of the Union law provisions listed in Annex I, encompassing a wide set of consumer-facing regimes (covering, for example, unfair terms, consumer rights, product safety, digital services, passenger rights, and GDPR insofar as it protects consumers' collective interests). Recital 15 emphasises that the Directive is "without prejudice" to these legal acts and does not replace their enforcement mechanisms; rather, it provides a procedural vehicle to protect the collective interests implicated by their infringement.

This "Annex technique" is central to understanding both EU-level design and national transposition: rather than creating a general class action for any harm, the Directive ties representative actions to a defined catalogue of EU consumer-protection norms. The Greek implementing law similarly uses annex-based references to specify the substantive perimeter of representative actions under Greek law.

2.2. "Collective interests" and the need for a representative actor

RAD's procedural logic assumes that the "collective interests of consumers" may be harmed even where individual consumer claims are low-value, dispersed, or informationally difficult to vindicate individually. The Directive therefore prioritises a representative actor model (qualified entities), rather than individual aggregation through ad hoc group formation. This is consistent with the Directive's insistence that representative actions be brought by entities meeting specified criteria of legitimacy, independence, and transparency.

[9] Visscher L., Faure M. Actions for Consumers (Directive 2020/1828). Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2021, pp. 455–482.

3. Qualified entities: Designation, independence, transparency, and monitoring

3.1. The qualified entity as the procedural "gatekeeper"

The Directive makes the qualified entity the principal gatekeeper of collective consumer litigation. Under Art. 4, Member States must ensure that qualified entities are designated for the purpose of bringing representative actions. While domestic designation may include both private organisations and public bodies, the Directive establishes a more structured regime for cross-border representative actions, in which a qualified entity designated in one Member State can bring actions in another (subject to conditions), and Member States must maintain and communicate lists of such entities.

The recitals underscore that this model is intended to enhance access to justice while controlling abuse by confining standing to entities meeting minimum governance standards. Thus, the "qualified entity" device is the Directive's primary instrument for balancing collective enforcement with restraint, effectively shifting emphasis from individual claimants to the regulation of representative organisations' legitimacy and incentives.[10]

3.2. Criteria and monitoring

Art. 4 and Art. 5 require Member States to establish criteria for designation and mechanisms for monitoring compliance, including the possibility to revoke designation where criteria are no longer met. The Directive's approach is thus not merely permissive (allowing certain entities to sue), but supervisory (requiring ongoing compliance and transparency).

A key interpretive point is that the Directive's design assumes that entity-level governance can substitute, at least partially, for US-style class certification procedures. In other words, rather than a court certifying a class through an elaborate test, the EU model often "pre-certifies" the representative through designation rules, while leaving national law to provide admissibility and procedural coordination tools.[11] Whether this approach successfully controls opportunism is a recurrent theme in the literature, especially in relation to funding and conflicts of interest.[12]

---

[10] Visscher L., Faure M. Actions for Consumers (Directive 2020/1828). Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2021, pp. 455–482.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Kramer X., Tillema I. The Funding of Collective Redress Actions in the EU: Transparency and Conflicts of Interest. Revista Italo-Española de Derecho Procesal, Vol. 2, 2020 [published 2021], pp. 165–181.

4. Injunctive vs. redress measures: Functional differences and procedural implications

4.1. Injunctive measures (Art. 8)

Art. 8 requires that representative actions may seek measures to stop or prohibit an infringement, including (depending on national law) interim measures. The structure reflects continuity with earlier EU injunctive mechanisms (Directive 2009/22/EC and its predecessors), but RAD reframes injunctions as part of a broader collective redress architecture.

CJEU case law predating RAD illuminates the procedural character of injunction actions brought by consumer organisations. In Henkel, the Court classified a preventive injunction action by a consumer protection organisation seeking to prevent the use of unfair terms as a matter relating to tort/delict (for jurisdiction purposes under the Brussels Convention), explicitly recognising that such actions can aim to prevent imminent harm rather than respond only after damage occurs.[13] While Henkel is not an interpretation of RAD, it is relevant doctrinally because RAD similarly treats injunction actions as a core component of collective consumer enforcement, and because cross-border representative actions inevitably raise questions of jurisdiction and applicable law.

4.2. Redress measures (Art. 9) and consumer participation models

Art 9 requires Member States to ensure that representative actions can seek redress measures (compensation, repair, replacement, etc), subject to national procedural arrangements. However, the Directive does not mandate a single participation model; instead it explicitly allows Member States to choose an opt-in, opt-out, or mixed system, including discretion regarding the stage at which consumers may opt in or out.[14]

Recital 43 is especially explicit on this point. It states that consumers should have "adequate opportunities" to express whether they wish to be represented and to benefit from outcomes, and it describes opt-in and opt-out mechanisms as alternative tools that Member States may select "to best respond to their legal traditions". This flexibility is central to transposition analysis because it marks a deliberate regulatory choice: the EU sets minimum availability of redress but allows Member States to calibrate participation and binding effect.

From an economic and procedural perspective, opt-in/opt-out design affects both participation rates and deterrence. Opt-out may yield higher participation and stronger deterrence but may raise legitimacy concerns, while opt-in may be

[13] Case No. C-167/00 Verein fuer Konsumenteninformation v. Henkel. Court of Justice, 1 October 2002, EU:C:2002:555, [46]–[50], classification and preventive scope; para. 50 on tort/delict characterisation for preventive action.

[14] Directive (EU) 2020/1828, recital 43.

more consistent with certain procedural traditions but risks under-participation and weaker corrective effects.[15] RAD leaves this trade-off largely to national law, within the bounds of consumer information and procedural fairness requirements.

5. Safeguards: Abusive litigation, conflicts of interest, and the funding question

5.1. The Directive's "balance" framing (Recital 10)

Recital 10 articulates RAD's guiding balancing concern: improved access to justice should be matched by safeguards to avoid abusive litigation and undue burdens on traders; punitive damages should be avoided; and procedural rules on designation and funding should prevent misuse. The Directive thus conceptualises safeguards as integral to the legitimacy of collective enforcement, not as optional add-ons.

5.2. Third-party funding (Art. 10): Transparency/conflict governance rather than prohibition

RAD addresses third-party funding through Art. 10, which requires Member States to ensure that representative actions for redress measures are not influenced by funders in a manner detrimental to the collective interests of consumers, and that conflicts of interest are prevented (including where the funder is a competitor of the defendant). The Directive's technique is governance-oriented: rather than endorsing or banning funding, it requires transparency and conflict controls.

Art. 10 is indeed one of the Directive's most practically sensitive provisions. Kramer and Tillema, in particular, analyse funding as a potential enabler of collective redress but also as a source of conflicts and accountability problems, emphasising transparency and governance mechanisms to mitigate those risks.[16] The ELI Principles likewise treat third-party funding as requiring structured governance (disclosure, conflict checks, fairness), rather than as inherently illegitimate.[17] These benchmarks are relevant for evaluating national transpositions that choose either to allow funding under governance constraints or to adopt stricter stances. The Greek choice is markedly stricter than the Directive's default governance approach, a point that will be analysed in detail in the transposition section (see below).

---

[15] Visscher L., Faure M. 2021, pp. 455–482.

[16] Kramer X., Tillema I. 2020 [published 2021], pp. 165–181.

[17] European Law Institute (ELI). Principles for Third Party Funding in Civil Litigation. 2024. Available: europeanlawinstitute.eu

6. Information duties and effects: Consumer awareness, deterrence, and collective impact

6.1. Informing consumers (Art. 13) and the deterrence dimension (Recital 60)

RAD includes specific requirements concerning information to consumers about representative actions, including information on final decisions and approved settlements. Recital 60 links information to both consumer empowerment and deterrence, noting reputational risks as relevant for discouraging infringements. The Directive thereby treats publicity and consumer information not merely as procedural fairness elements, but as part of the enforcement ecosystem.

6.2. Effects of decisions and the "collective interest" logic (Art. 15) – doctrinal anchors from case law

Although Art. 15 focuses on the evidentiary and legal effects of final decisions (including their potential relevance in subsequent actions), the broader collective impact logic is illuminated by CJEU case law on injunction actions in consumer law.

In Invitel, the Court held that EU law does not preclude a declaration of invalidity of an unfair term (in an injunction action brought in the public interest and on behalf of consumers by an authorised body) from producing effects with regard to all consumers who concluded contracts to which the same general business conditions apply, including consumers who were not party to the injunction proceedings, provided this is in accordance with national legislation.[18] This line of reasoning is doctrinally significant for representative actions because it supports the idea that collective consumer protection can legitimately generate effects beyond the parties formally present in proceedings – subject to national procedural design and safeguards. That logic will be relevant when analysing the Greek regime's approach to binding effect, consumer consent, and post-judgment participation.

[18] Case No. C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztovedelmi Hatosag v. Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt (Court of Justice, 26 April 2012) EU:C:2012:242, [40]–[41] (effects of declaration of invalidity in injunction action with regard to all consumers, including non-parties).

7. Cross-border dimension and the role of "qualified entities" in EU procedural coordination

RAD's cross-border architecture builds on the notion that qualified entities should be able to act beyond the state of designation, enabling a form of procedural mutual recognition for collective enforcement. The Directive also recognises that cross-border representative actions raise issues of jurisdiction and applicable law, and recital 34 specifically links the information provided by qualified entities to enabling courts to determine jurisdiction and applicable law, with explicit reference to tort-based connecting factors in cross-border contexts.

While RAD itself does not codify private international law rules, case law such as Henkel illustrates the procedural characterisation issues that cross-border injunction actions may trigger, especially where the action is preventive and aims to stop unfair terms or unlawful practices in consumer contracts. This is particularly relevant for Greece insofar as the Greek transposition includes a specific provision on cross-border representative actions and must operate within the broader EU private international law framework.

8. Greek transposition: Article-by-article and concept-by-concept analysis

8.1. Standing and the Greek model of qualified entities (Arts. 10γ–10στ; 10δ; 10ε)

Greek law operationalizes qualified-entity standing primarily through consumer associations constituted as associations under the Civil Code and established for the exclusive purpose of consumer protection. A twotier register is maintained by the General Secretariat of Commerce, including a specific subregister for entities entitled to bring representative actions. Designation as an entity entitled to bring domestic and/or cross-border representative actions is granted by the competent body of the Ministry upon application, subject to criteria including a requirement of twelve months' actual public activity and transparency through publication (notably via a website).

The statute embeds independence and transparency requirements at the level of consumer association registration (independence from suppliers; publicly available information on funding sources and governance). It also specifies permissible funding sources for associations (membership fees and contributions, grants, limited fees from represented consumers in specific actions, and certain other receipts), which is relevant when assessing the functional capacity of qualified entities in a system that relies on association-based enforcement.

8.2. Cross-border standing (Art. 10h)

Foreign qualified entities designated in other Member States may bring cross-border representative actions before Greek courts; conversely, Greek entities may litigate abroad where designated for that purpose. For proof of status, the Greek court may rely on registration in the national subregister or the Commission list referred to in the Directive, while retaining the ability to verify whether the statutory purpose justifies litigation in the particular case.

8.3. Measures: injunctive (Art. 10i) and redress (Art. 10ia)

Greek law reproduces the Directive's dual-remedy model. Injunctive measures may be temporary or definitive, may include a determination of infringement and publication/corrective statements, and do not require proof of individual consumer loss or supplier fault; nor do they require that individual consumers express willingness to be represented. In domestic representative actions, the entity may additionally request a civil penalty (as a sanction), with statutory criteria for calibration and a specific liability mechanism for manifestly unfounded sanction claims (including potential liability of the association and responsible board members).

For redress measures, Greek law enumerates remedies consistent with the Directive (compensation, repair, replacement, price reduction, contract termination, reimbursement) and permits group description without identifying each consumer at the pleading stage. Consumers may express an explicit wish to be represented, and the law also provides a structured mechanism by which consumers who did not opt in during litigation may nonetheless benefit after an irrevocable decision, through written notification to the supplier and an administrative followup channel involving the General Secretariat of Commerce. This is a distinctive operationalization of participation and enforcement, combining judicial determination with administrative facilitation of compliance.

8.4. Procedure, evidence/disclosure, interim effects, and limitation (Art. 10ib)

Jurisdiction is allocated to the multimember court of first instance at the supplier's domicile/seat, with a specific rule for broadcast advertising. The statute provides for limited evidentiary access: at the parties' request, the President may order document production pursuant to Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Art. 232, framing disclosure within existing procedural constraints rather than introducing expansive discovery.

The law also sets limitation-related effects: a representative action for cessation/prohibition must be brought within an exclusive oneyear period from the last occurrence of the unlawful conduct (subject to an "average consumer" knowledge condition), and the bringing of representative actions interrupts

limitation periods for consumers concerned. For injunctive actions, the procedure is characterised as voluntary jurisdiction with early hearing, potential provisional enforcement, and *erga omnes* effects. Final decisions from Greek courts – and, significantly, from courts or administrative authorities of other Member States – on the existence of an infringement may be used as evidence in other Greek actions for redress, under free assessment of evidence rules.[19]

8.5. Settlements/conciliation (Art. 10ic)

For redress actions, the authorised entity and supplier may jointly propose a settlement to the court. Court approval requires scrutiny (including compatibility with CPC settlement provisions and applicability of terms) and consideration of consumers' rights and interests. The settlement becomes binding on the entity, supplier, and the consumers concerned, while the statute contemplates a consumer ability to accept or refuse to be bound within parameters set by the approving decision. This reflects the Directive's insistence on court/authority control of collective settlements and consumer-protective safeguards.

8.6. Funding (Art. 10ιδ) and costs (Art. 10ie)

A salient Greek design choice appears in the enacted text: "The financing of representative actions by third parties shall be prohibited". This stands in contrast to the Directive's approach, which regulates third-party funding "where" it exists by imposing transparency and conflict control duties. Within the Greek statutory design, the financing capacity of qualified entities is therefore channelled through the association's internal funding sources (including limited fees and certain receipts) rather than external litigation finance.

On costs, the Greek statute adopts a consumerprotective rule: consumers subject to a representative action for redress/reparation do not pay legal costs, subject to an exceptional derogation where a consumer became a party and caused costs through intentional or negligent conduct. The information provisions further contemplate supplierborne costs for informing consumers, where ordered by the court and subject to proportionality limits.

8.7. Information duties and databases (Arts. 10ist; 10iz; 10z)

Qualified entities must provide website-based information about actions they decide to bring, their status, and results; they must also inform consumers

[19] Papachristou G. Directive 2020/1828/EU on representative actions. In: Studies in Honor of Professor Yianna Karympali-Tsiptsiou, Vol. 2, 2022, pp. 1323–1361. Alexandridou E. 'Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on Representative Actions: To What Extent Will EU Consumer Protection Be Improved through the New Rules of Procedural Law? 2020/1828/EU on representative actions – How is consumer protection in the EU going to ameliorate through the new procedural rules? In: Studies in Honor of Professor Yianna Karympali-Tsiptsiou, Vol. 1, 2022, pp. 1–36.

within a short period after filing so consumers may opt in to redress proceedings. Institutionally, the General Secretariat of Commerce must publish information about designated entities and general information about pending actions and decisions through a national electronic database, corresponding to the Directive's public information infrastructure. Monitoring is supported by a committee-based mechanism tasked with periodic assessment of whether designated entities continue to meet criteria.

8.8. Relationship with existing Greek legal mechanisms

The Greek transposition is not a "standalone" procedural invention; it restructures the existing collective consumer protection architecture in Law 2251/1994 and recentres collective litigation around designated consumer associations and representative actions as the primary vehicle for collective interests enforcement.[20] EU collective redress initiatives interact with national traditions of association standing and collective enforcement, and that the effectiveness of the model turns on institutional capacity and procedural feasibility rather than formal transposition alone.

8.9. Initial experiences in Greece

There is only one representative action filed after the transposition (and heard recently: January 2026).

Accordingly, early observations must remain institutionally grounded. The statute itself evidences that implementation depends on (i) active designation and monitoring of qualified entities by administrative bodies and a committee mechanism; (ii) information duties enabling consumer awareness and opt-in participation; and (iii) database publication infrastructure.

9. Comparative observations

The Directive permits Member State variation on several operational dimensions (notably consumer participation for domestic redress actions and details of procedural management), while requiring functional equivalence as to the availability of both injunctive and redress measures and cross-border access through qualified entities. Comparative academic analysis has highlighted that this design can generate uneven practical outcomes: formal availability of collective redress may coexist with limited uptake if standing is narrow, costs and funding are restrictive, or consumer participation is administratively burdensome.[21]

---

[20] Alexandridou E. 2022, pp. 1–36; Papachristou G. 2022, pp. 1323–1361.

[21] Hornkohl L. The New Representative Actions Directive: A Milestone for Consumer Protection? Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (EuCML), Vol. 10, Issue 5, 2021.

From a Greece-centered perspective, two limited comparative points can be made: (1) Greece's reliance on consumer associations as the exclusive procedural "gatekeepers" is consistent with the Directive's qualified-entity model but places weight on organisational capacity and resourcing; and (2) the Greek statutory rule on third-party funding adopts a more restrictive stance than the Directive's "regulated permissibility" template, which may affect the feasible scale of complex representative actions, depending on how association funding sources operate in practice.

Evaluation and conclusions

Greek law transposes the Directive's core architecture: a qualified entity model, a dual remedial structure (injunctive and redress measures), cross-border access, and an information/database infrastructure. The statute includes several consumer-protective calibrations (no need for individual loss proof for injunctive relief; *erga omnes* effects for cessation/prohibition decisions; cost protection for consumers in redress actions; structured information duties and a mechanism for late benefit from redress decisions).

At the same time, the Greek design places strong functional demands on consumer associations and administrative bodies tasked with designation, monitoring, and information management. The prohibition on third-party funding (as expressed in the enacted text) marks a particularly consequential choice when evaluated against peer-reviewed scholarship that links collective redress effectiveness to sustainable financing and case management capacity. Given the limited post-transposition litigation practice, any judgment about uptake and impact must remain cautious. The most defensible near-term research agenda is therefore institutional: monitoring the designation pipeline, the operation of information duties and databases, and the emergence (if any) of judicial practice applying Articles 10α–10ιη in concrete consumer disputes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Literature

1. Alexandridou E. Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on Representative Actions: To What Extent Will EU Consumer Protection Be Improved through the New Rules of Procedural Law? In: Studies in Honor of Professor Yianna Karympali-Tsiptsiou, Vol. 1, 2022, pp. 1–36.
2. Dionysopoulos G. The new framework of Law No. 5019/2023 concerning representative actions. In: Monthly Bulletin of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises "Regulatory environment and Business", 2 March 2023.
3. European Law Institute (ELI). Principles for Third Party Funding in Civil Litigation. 2024.

4. Hornkohl L. The New Representative Actions Directive: A Milestone for Consumer Protection? Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (EuCML), Vol. 10, Issue 5, 2021.
5. Kramer X., Tillema I. The Funding of Collective Redress Actions in the EU: Transparency and Conflicts of Interest. Revista Italo-Espanola de Derecho Procesal, Vol. 2, 2020 [published 2021], pp. 165–181.
6. Papachristou G. Directive 2020/1828/EU on representative actions. In: Studies in Honor of Professor Yianna Karympali-Tsiptsiou, Vol. 2, 2022, pp. 1323–1361.
7. Visscher L., Faure M. A Law and Economics Perspective on the EU Directive on Representative Actions for Consumers (Directive 2020/1828). Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2021, pp. 455–482.

Normative acts

8. Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC [2020] OJ L 409/1 ("Representative Actions Directive": RAD).

Court practice

9. Case No. C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztovedelmi Hatosag v. Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt (Court of Justice, 26 April 2012) EU:C:2012:242.
10. Case No. C-167/00 Verein fuer Konsumenteninformation v. Henkel (Court of Justice, 1 October 2002) EU:C:2002:555.